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## BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE WORLD WAR


by

CHESTER E. SUPPLE, Ph.D.

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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY  
SINCE THE WORLD WAR

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## PREFACE

*The first decade following the World War has too recently passed to permit of final conclusions concerning the events of that period. There are no times, however, more replete with interest and no years more completely filled with matters of vital importance to our present social, economic and political life than the first ten years after the Peace of Versailles. It was the hope of the writer, therefore, that he might be able, not to present final and conclusive evidence concerning the meaning of the events of that period, but to discover, if possible, some of the forces, both new and old, which determined the course of one phase of the political life of that time. It was hoped, also, that some definite trends might be traced in the apparent confusion and conflict in the realm of foreign policies during those years. The struggle to return to "normalcy" after more than four years of destructive warfare, and the determined effort to avoid wars that were a natural outcome of the normal working of the dominant forces of the pre-war period, add to the importance of the problem of international relationships of post-war years. If the nature of this conflict is somewhat clarified, and if the manner in which the various forces have reacted upon the relations of one great nation with other parts of the world is suggested, the purpose of this thesis will have been accomplished.*

CHESTER E. SIPPLE

Iowa City, Iowa  
April 7, 1931

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## CHAPTER I

### THE NEW FORCES

It is inconceivable that a modern war which was of more than four years duration and which involved all the great nations and many of the lesser nations of the world should leave a possibility, in spite of the efforts of conservatives and reactionaries, of restoring just as it was the old order of society, economics and politics. Many forces that are too weak to demand consideration before a war are given by an upheaval such as the world experienced from 1914 to 1918, a power that can not be disregarded. Old social and political forces may be deflected from their former courses, or transformed, or even strengthened, by war. It is to be expected, therefore, that a post-war period should be marked by a conflict between the old, which was not entirely destroyed, and the new, which rises to proclaim the failure of the *ancien regime* and to challenge the supremacy of the old order. A study of the aims, the ideals and the methods which determined the conduct of the foreign policy of one of the world's Great Powers during the first decade following the World War serves to confirm this statement.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Great Britain was confronted by a new situation which caused the collapse of the policy of aloofness, of "splendid isolation," which had characterized her attitude since her definite break with the Quadruple Alliance near the close of the first quarter of the century. Preoccupation with domestic problems of social and economic welfare became impossible and Britain was again drawn into a prominent position in continental politics which drew her inexorably into the World War. But the change in policy was brought about only indirectly by European affairs. It was because of continental imperialism rather than because of continental domestic matters that isolation was found to be no longer possible. For half a century after the close of the Napoleonic Wars, the political energies of Europe were consumed by the struggle between the old order and the new forces of democracy and nationalism which had sprung to life in the French Revolution and which had been spread over Europe by the

Napoleonic conquests. Economic reconstruction, too, presented a tremendous problem, requiring the attention of statesmen and business men alike after the long period of devastating wars with which the century had begun.

Before the close of the century the countries of Europe were facing a new economic and political problem caused by the demands of developing industries for more extensive markets. Many industrialists, their European markets limited by tariff walls, turned for the solution of their problem to the development of markets in industrially backward regions. Such a solution was aided by improved means of transportation and by highly developed national pride, which brought to the economic venture a powerful support. But the national feeling also made impossible an "open door" commercial policy in the backward regions. Instead, spheres of influence were drawn and territories were annexed in order that national trade might be assured of a monopoly.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, certain French statesmen were urging their country to assume the burdens and responsibilities of economic and political expansion, and in spite of the apathy or actual opposition of the majority of the French nation to imperial expansion, the foundations for a great French Empire were laid in Africa and Asia.<sup>(1)</sup> Germany, too, her unification completed, began after 1870 an unparalleled economic development, and her government, succumbing to the demands of business and of national pride, sought to extend her influence into Africa and the Near East. Even Russia, in spite of despotism, corruption, and defeat, revived her struggle for new commercial outlets.

In this race for imperial possessions, the British were eager participants. Even before the beginning of the nineteenth century the British Empire had been extended to the Far East and to the regions of the South Seas, while in the British Isles the Industrial Revolution had already begun the transformation which was to make the lives of the inhabitants as well as the industries of the Island dependent upon the intercourse with the outside world. During the middle years of the nineteenth century, when British statesmen were discussing the possible dissolution of the Empire, Lord Palmerston was giving expression to the new aggressive national spirit which Disraeli was to utilize in transforming the sordid struggle for business advantage and private gain into a splendid

drama, the theme of which was the building of a mighty Empire. By 1882, the demands of the new imperialism had become so powerful that even Gladstone was forced to become "the tool of British aggression" in Egypt (2), and before the close of the century a large section of the Liberals had succumbed to the force of imperialism. The result of the renewed imperial interest was the addition of regions of vast extent to an already immense Empire (3), and an inevitable clash with other Europeans who were endeavoring to seize for their own countries some of the regions still capable of exploitation.

It was this struggle of the nations of Europe for imperial possessions which made the "splendid isolation" of Great Britain an empty phrase and which drew her again into the realm of continental politics. It was imperialism which drew Great Britain into the system of continental alliances which had been formed as the old Concert of Europe gave way before the force of nationalistic ambitions. In imperialism is found the basis of British foreign policy for three decades before the World War.

During these years, in the Congo, in Egypt, and in Siam the new French Imperialism prevented unlimited expansion of British imperial interests. Russia's perpetual desire for an outlet through the Straits continued to threaten Britain's commercial lines to India. The same danger arose from Russia's steady advance into Persia and Afghanistan, while her policy of expansion in the Far East placed British control of trade in jeopardy in that region. And in the first year of the new century, the German Government launched a naval building program which, designed to protect her own growing imperial interests, challenged the very foundation of British imperial power. Not only was isolation no longer "splendid," it was no longer possible. Even an attempt to maintain a position of neutrality among nations which had grouped themselves into alliances for mutual support had become dangerous. The continental alliances had become instruments of a new "Weltpolitik." To find friends among the continental powers from whom diplomatic support and military aid could be expected became, therefore, in the opinion of the British, essential to the security of the Empire.

To accomplish this aim, the British statesmen turned first to Germany, who had not yet introduced the new naval policy and who had already suggested a settlement of Anglo-German differences. (4) This suggestion came to nothing, however, as did the



British attempt of March, 1898, to arrange an Anglo-German Alliance.(5) Negotiations were renewed in 1899 and in November of that year Sir Joseph Chamberlain made public the Government's definite repudiation of the policy of isolation, and announced upon the same occasion, that he believed that an alliance with Germany was the natural one.(6) Viscount Grey later explained the reason that this alliance should have been considered "natural." "The greatest fleet in the world was the British, the greatest army was the German," he said. "The Fleet and the Army could not fight each other; let there be an alliance between them and they could maintain their own interests and keep Europe in order." (7)

However, this attempt, like others, failed and the Germans began in 1900 the naval building program which was designed to make sure Germany's prestige in the field of imperialism.(8) In spite of this move, which made impossible a final agreement between Germany and Great Britain, negotiations for an alliance were again opened in 1901 and again came to nothing. (9) To end the danger of British isolation by means of a German alliance had proved impossible, and Britain turned to other Powers.

An alliance with Japan in 1902 seemed to secure the commercial interests in the Far East against possible Russian aggression, and Great Britain turned to France for further support. French and British differences had been serious, but these were composed in the face of a growing danger which was common to both. The agreements regarding Morocco and Egypt were the first step toward securing safe passage through the Mediterranean, while the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 settled the question of Russian penetration of Persia and cleared the route to India. Security in the Mediterranean region was further assured by the secret naval and military "conversations" which were authorized by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs.(10) These conversations, begun in 1905, resulted in the withdrawal of the French fleet to the Mediterranean in order to further secure that region, and at the same time to allow the British fleet to concentrate for the protection of another vital spot in the Empire—the Channel and the Belgian coast. (11)

Great Britain therefore became a member of the system of continental alliances in her effort to maintain her imperial position; and as the growing German navy became more menacing, Britain became more closely bound to her allies even though no formal

treaties of alliance were signed, although British statesmen made much of the fact that the Government had made no definite agreements regarding the action to be taken in case of war, and although negotiations for a naval agreement with Germany continued.

All efforts to come to an agreement with Germany failed, however, for the price which Germany was asking for permitting the continuation of British naval supremacy, was British neutrality in case of continental wars in which Germany might become involved. (12) To this demand British statesmen could not accede. Viscount Grey said that the Government must be left free "and the country uncompromised as to its liberty of judgment, decision, and action." (13) Such an agreement would have bound Great Britain to stand idly by while Germany destroyed the power of Britain's chief ally, and would have opened the way for the appropriation of French imperial possessions and commercial advantages by Britain's greatest rival. The British hoped for proportional reduction of fleets or the maintenance of the status quo, with the privilege of retaining understandings with their allies; but the Germans, having failed to obtain Britain's pledge of neutrality, demanded equality with the British in naval power. (14) Consequently, there could be no settlement of the imperial problem by agreement, at least in so far as it centered about the question of naval strength; and Great Britain was drawn into the war by the belief in the necessity for saving her ally from defeat and her own imperial system from destruction.

Even in the years before the war certain forces which promised change were already at work. These forces, which were still too weak to demand consideration in the pre-war period, were tremendously strengthened by four years of international strife; and when the war closed, British statesmen found themselves confronted by a new situation which was not entirely adaptable to former principles and policies. The result was a decade of transition, of conflict between the old and the new, of effort to maintain old principles, and of struggle to fix governmental policies upon new foundations. Imperialism had not passed away with the close of the war which it had helped to create, but imperialism did not remain the sole factor in the determination of governmental policy in negotiations between nations. The weakening of imperialism supported by national alliances was indicated almost before the war had closed



by the establishment of a mandate system and a League of Nations. Internationalism was rising to challenge imperialism; and for the next decade and more, a battle royal was waged between these two opposing principles for domination of the policies of the British Government. The honors rested sometimes with one and sometimes with the other and neither could ever claim complete victory.

In this struggle between conflicting principles the economic situation with which Great Britain was faced at the close of the World War would seem to have favored the continuation, even the intensification, of a policy of imperialism. Never in her history, perhaps, had Great Britain needed so much the economic advantage that was to be gained from the exploitation of industrially backward regions. With great industries built to supply an immense European market as well as extensive markets in China, in India and in other distant portions of the world, and with a merchant marine designed to carry a large portion of the world's trade, Great Britain's prosperity was completely dependent upon the economic situation in the rest of the world. But the war had brought ruin to European markets. The war had reduced populations; it had swept away savings; it had brought instability of currency and loss of credit; and it had resulted in the erection of new tariff barriers. Added to these problems was that of readjustment of home industries, some of which had been expanded to meet war demands and some of which had been neglected because they were considered non-essential to war. Nor was that all. Countries cut off from the usual source of supply of goods had in many instances built up their own industries or had developed substitutes to provide for needs which formerly had been supplied by British factories.(15) Great Britain, therefore, was faced, at the close of the war, with an adverse balance of trade and with greatly impaired means of compensating for that situation. The British shipping trade from which a large amount of wealth had been realized before the war, suffered as did the British industries; and the income from over seas investments which might also have compensated for the unfavorable balance of trade, had been seriously reduced by war purchases. (16)

The attempt to solve the economic problem led to suggestions that the economic bonds of the Empire should be more closely drawn, but opposition to such a plan was met both in Great Britain and in the Dominions. To develop the economic unity of the Empire would have meant further barriers to foreign trade and

to the maintenance of Britain's valuable shipping trade; and both foreign trade and carrying trade were necessary to Britain's reconstruction. The need for the rebuilding of continental markets also gave rise to difficulty. The attempt to aid in the reconstruction of the economic structure of Germany and of Russia was opposed by the forces of conservatism and nationalism, which conflicted with the need for economic and political internationalism.

No matter how successful other means of solving the economic problem might be, Britain must still look beyond the continent of Europe and even beyond her own Empire, if economic reconstruction was to be complete. In an extended and intensified imperialism might have been expected the solution of the problem of economic prosperity. The opening of extensive markets, the exploitation of rich oil fields, the development of regions rich in mineral wealth, might have offered to Great Britain the opportunity she needed for restoring her prosperity, and the destruction to German power seemed to offer to Britain a large share of the wealth and opportunity formerly controlled by imperial Germany. Could such a program have been realized, the victory of Great Britain in the World War might have brought the material gains that might reasonably have been expected through the destruction of her greatest rival. But forces whose development was hastened and intensified by the war tended to destroy the possibility of the realization of Britain's hope, and made an extensive imperialistic program less and less possible of realization as the decade drew to a close. An imperialistic program depended for its success upon the ability of the imperialistic Power to dominate completely the country to be exploited; but the rise of nationalism in the East in the years following the war made such dominance increasingly difficult. Nationalism had been growing slowly for many years in the East under foreign tutelage; but never until after the World War did national feeling become strong enough to break down distinctions of class, race, and religion, and not until after 1919 were feelings sufficiently aroused to overcome the fear in which the great Occidental Powers were held by the peoples of the Orient. (17) The Russo-Japanese war had proved that European power was not invulnerable; but not until the struggle among the Western Powers a decade later had drawn the Orientals into the maelstrom of western warfare, did the Eastern people begin to realize the possibilities of independence and national greatness. It was during the



four years of the World War that European ideals of national independence reached a height never before attained, and the Wilsonian doctrine of self determination was not lost on the people of the East. This doctrine the British, too, had apparently accepted, for they had declared in 1918 that their policy in the East was to be the establishment of national governments under the management of the native populations. (18) The aid given to the British by the Indians and the Egyptians during the war certainly gave those peoples the right to expect concessions as a reward. At any rate, the British found in the force of aroused nationalism a power which affected vitally the policy of imperialism, and which necessitated a trend toward more liberal policies. Internationalism again offered itself as a substitute for imperialism.

However, added to the force of growing national consciousness was another factor which was much emphasized by the economic situation arising from the War and which tended to increase the hostility of a large class of the British against imperialism. This factor was a change in the nature of imperialism. Economic development began as a search for markets which make possible a continuous development of home industries; but more and more during the first part of the twentieth century it became a search for opportunities for profitable investments. (19) This change became especially noticeable when brought to light by the serious post-war economic situation, and tended to alienate from the support of imperialism a large group of British who would profit from the development of home industries but who had no money to invest abroad. Then, too, the economic situation which lowered the available supply of money for foreign investment no doubt destroyed much of the incentive for an imperialism of investments. (20)

The growing consciousness of nationalities in industrially backward regions and the changing nature of imperialism were not the only factors which Great Britain was called upon to consider in an attempt to maintain her pre-war policy. The rise of American sea power offered to Britain's naval supremacy a challenge such as even Germany had not been able to offer in the years before the War. Freedom of the seas again became America's slogan. The War brought sharply to the fore the fact that a European war meant interference with American trade and a consequent loss of prosperity, even if not final participation in the war itself. During the war, therefore, the United States embarked upon a naval build-

ing program which was quite frankly designed to enable her to maintain freedom of the seas in time of war as well as in time of peace. The interest of the United States through her entire history, with the exception of the brief period of the American Civil War, has been in her right to carry on commerce undisturbed. But the attempts to maintain her neutrality and continue her commerce in spite of British and German blockades had failed. To maintain this desired condition, the United States must have a navy that could enforce freedom and neutrality even in spite of the efforts of the great British fleet.

The new American naval policy was suggested by President Wilson on February 3, 1916, when he said that "a navy impregnable to the navies of the world is the first need of the country." (21) A building program was soon after begun which was designed to realize the President's desire for the world's most powerful navy. This demand for naval supremacy did not cease with the close of the war; and in 1920, the United States Secretary of the Navy was able to say that when the ships then under construction and those recommended should be completed, the navy of the United States would be the most powerful in the world. (22) That this seems to have been no idle claim "can be seen by comparing the British and American battle fleets in 1921. In that year the tonnage of American capital ships built and building was almost exactly fifty per cent greater than the corresponding British total." (23)

The new naval policy of the United States brought Great Britain face to face with the necessity of choosing between abandonment of her traditional supremacy of the seas and acceptance of the challenge to a race in naval armaments. To choose the first of these alternatives would have meant, apparently, that American naval power might be in a position to threaten the security of British possessions and of British trade. The choice of the second alternative would have meant the undertaking of a great naval building program. The attempt to maintain control of the seas would have implied the adoption of the policy used to meet German rivalry before the war, and the laying down of two vessels for every one laid down by the United States; but the situation in 1920 was in no way similar to the situation in 1912, and a program of building against the United States in the years following the war presented insuperable difficulties. Four years of warfare had left Britain

burdened with a tremendous debt. Her commerce and industry were disorganized. She was in no position financially to embark upon a great naval building program. But America had been made rich with the vast sums spent upon war supplies by the nations of Europe. She had been building industrially and financially, while Europe was being devastated and disorganized. The resources were limitless. There seemed to be no restriction to her ability to carry through her plans. To make the matter more serious for Great Britain, the war had shown that most of the old-type vessels were out-of-date and practically useless for modern warfare. Her great pre-war fleet therefore gave her no great advantage over the other Powers in the new naval building race. (24) Under these circumstances, to maintain the old Two-Power standard in the face of America's determination to assume a position of first rank was quite obviously out of the question.

How would British statesmen meet this new problem? Would they turn for assistance against the competition of the United States to military alliances and agreements, as they had done to meet the German rivalry before the war; or would the old course be abandoned and a new policy be evolved to meet the new situation? The conflicting points of view regarding the proper answer to these questions became evident in the attempts of the various British Governments to solve the problem.

At the same time when Nationalism in the East and naval aspirations in America were exerting a tremendous power against the old system of British imperialism, a situation within the Empire itself arose to menace the old order. An increased spirit of independence in the Dominions gave warning that a policy based only upon the economic and political needs of Britain would no longer receive the undivided support of the Empire. Although in the years before the war the chief responsibility for the management of imperial matters had fallen upon Great Britain, the Dominions had offered material aid in time of crisis. For many years before the war, the Dominions had been consulted regarding the policy to be employed in matters which concerned them directly, but no definite responsibility had been assumed by the Dominion Governments at the time of the outbreak of the war in 1914. (25)

The British Government could, therefore, enter the war with little thought for the attitude of the Dominions; and the latter, accepting the action of the Government at London, responded loyally and ef-



fectively, sacrificing men and money in a European war which they believed to be for the defense of the Empire.

Again, the situation was materially changed as a result of the war. A change in the attitude of the Dominion Governments toward foreign affairs, particularly in their relation to war and peace, was particularly noticeable. During the terrible struggle in which the lives as well as the material interests of the people of the Dominions became deeply involved, the Dominion ministers came to feel that they owed a direct responsibility to their people, and they soon demanded the right to participate in the direction of affairs of moment to the Dominions as well as to Great Britain herself. This attitude is well summarized in an article published in a British newspaper a few years after the close of the war: "In 1917 the Dominion Prime Ministers came to London, and with the four members of the British War Cabinet, sat as an Imperial War Cabinet to examine the war situation and agree upon what further common measures could be taken to assure victory. In 1918 they came again. Only this time there was a subtle change in their attitude. They came not for information alone, but as of right, to discharge their responsibility to their own peoples for seeing that the war was properly conducted. During 1918 the Imperial War Cabinet, instead of being an *ad hoc* body for the exchange of information and ideas, sat alternately with the British War Cabinet, and became, in fact, the plenary authority which dealt with the major problems of the war. It was the same at the Peace Conference.—Every major problem of the peace was brought before it.

"Before the war," the article continues, "most people in the Dominions were willing to leave foreign problems to be handled by Great Britain. Many of them are still willing that it should be so. But they are not now, as they were before, willing to be bound by the results. They will support the Empire's foreign policy only if they approve of it. They certainly will not approve of it merely because it is made in Downing-street. The Dominions have no special confidence in the omniscience of the Foreign Office. They recognize that it has great knowledge and traditions. But they also think that it is too insular in its outlook, too much preoccupied with Europe, and has but little understanding of the interests and point of view of the overseas world." (26)

The fact that the Dominions had no intention of surrendering the position taken, but rather that they were extending their power



of independent action and their influence in determining the foreign policy of the Empire, is indicated by a number of developments which are suggested in the *Times*' article. One of the most notable of these is the distinction between active and passive resistance in case the Empire should become involved in war. The distinction was brought out by the Chanaq incident of September, 1922. (27) The difficulty which arose at that time between Great Britain and the Turkish Nationalist Government was due to the resistance of the Turks, following the great nationalist revival under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, to the Allied attempt to divide the old Turkish Empire among themselves and to Britain's attempt to substitute a Power amenable to British influence for the ancient Ottoman Empire. The Greeks, who had been left by the Allies to struggle alone against the rejuvenated Turkish armies, were defeated and driven back to Europe; but the victorious Turks found their pursuit blocked by the British at Chanaq on the shores of the Straits. The Turks demanded the right to cross the Straits in order to complete their victory over the Greeks. The British refused. The hope of gaining large material benefits by taking over the former German imperialistic enterprises in the Near East and by arranging for the unhampered exploitation of that region had been much impaired by the rise of Turkish nationalism and would have been completely lost along with the hope of complete control of the Straits by surrender at Chanaq. The difficulty arose out of activities which were very frankly imperialistic and although the circumstances in September, 1922, were very different from those of August, 1914, a comparison of the attitude of the Dominion Governments upon these two occasions brings to light a significant change. In 1914 the Dominions accepted without question the decisions of the British Government in the matter of foreign affairs. The interests of Britain were the interests of the Dominions and the competence of the British statesmen to decide such matters was unquestioningly accepted.

On August 1, 1914, the Canadian Governor-General telegraphed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that "in view of the impending danger of war involving the Empire my Advisers are anxiously considering the most effective means of rendering every possible aid and they will welcome any suggestions and advice which the Imperial Naval and Military Authorities may deem it expedient to offer. They are confident that a considerable force

would be available for service abroad." (28) And on August 5, the Governor-General in Council declared: "Whereas a state of war now exists between this Country and Germany, steps to meet the situation must at once be undertaken." (29) Similar action was undertaken in the other Dominions. And again, in September, 1922, the safety of imperial communications was threatened and the British Government invited the Dominion Governments to send contingents to aid in the new war which seemed inevitable. But this time the response was very different. The Australian Prime Minister accepted the invitation but was forced by the criticism of his action in Parliament to explain that he believed that the invitation meant merely the maintenance of the military status quo until a conference could be held. (30) The attitude of the Canadian Government was even more significant. Instead of unquestioning acceptance of the decisions of the British statesmen, the Canadian Prime Minister asked permission to place the facts before Parliament, a request refused by the British Government. He then telegraphed for more information, considering the facts at hand to be insufficient to warrant a decision upon a matter so important. (31)

The Chanaq incident closed without war and therefore before the full significance of the Dominion attitude could be determined, but Prime Minister King later expressed very clearly his attitude regarding Canada's obligation in such a situation. He said in part, "It is for Parliament to decide whether or not we should participate in wars in different parts of the world, and it is neither right nor proper for an individual, nor for any group of individuals to take any step that might limit the rights of Parliament in a matter which is of such great concern to all the people of our country." (32)

As to whether in circumstances similar to those of 1914, there would result a refusal to offer active participation is, of course, a matter that cannot be definitely determined; but this much seems certain, that an attitude of unquestioning acquiescence on the part of the Dominions in case of a crisis which threatens war can no longer be depended upon. The Dominions must realize that their own interests are at stake and something more than vague references to the country's honor and treaty obligations will be required to bring the Dominions into active support of a European war.

The same significant distinction between passive and active obligations was insisted upon in regard to treaties, the Dominion Governments refusing to be bound by the proceedings of a conference



or by the provisions of a treaty without previous definite action on the part of the Dominion Parliaments. (33)

A third significant development in the relation of the Commonwealth to foreign affairs is the relation of the Commonwealth to the League of Nations, particularly Canada's efforts, first to eliminate, then to revise, the famous Article X. The Canadian representatives presented to the Third Assembly two amendments to this article. The first stated that "the Council should take into account the special circumstances and geographical position of each State member of the League when recommending application of military measures as a result of aggression or threat of aggression." (34) The second amendment provided that "it should be for the constitutional authorities of each State to decide in what degree the State concerned is bound to assure the execution of its obligations under Article X." (35)

The effect of these developments within the Empire can be as yet only a matter of surmise, but British statesmen were forced, soon after the close of the war, to the realization that the interests of the British Empire no longer centered in Europe and the island of Britain. What had been an Empire had become a Commonwealth of equal nations, "autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, although united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." (36) The question of war was no longer merely a matter of a decision of a cabinet in London, nor was it a matter of a vote of the British Parliament, nor even a question of satisfying the people of the island of Britain as to the justice and wisdom of military action. Governments in Ireland, Australia, America and Africa must also come to believe in the necessity for the support of the British Government, if the integrity of the Commonwealth itself was not to be endangered.

The problem of the support of an imperial system involves still another negative factor. The old imperialism was founded on force. Its maintenance demanded the power to wage effective warfare, if necessary, both for the control of the native peoples and for the elimination of the claims of other imperialistic countries. But in this matter, after the War, statesmen were called upon to consider an awakened public opinion. It is, of course, impossible to measure the extent of this development or to estimate its power and decisive-

ness of action in time of crisis, but evidence of the tremendous strength of such a force is not lacking. Statesmen recognized it by their efforts toward disarmament and by the negotiation of war prevention treaties. The large number of societies organized for the advancement of peace indicated a widespread interest in the question of war and peace. The Peace Yearbook for the National Council for the Prevention of War lists forty national and international peace societies in existence in England in 1927. The estimated membership of these organizations stood near seven million, and their publications had a wide circulation. (37) It seems significant also that J. Ramsay MacDonald, who had maintained throughout his public career a consistent opposition to war even when such opposition apparently meant political suicide and whose speeches and activities during the World War were considered little short of treasonable, should be called to take the highest political office in the country within five years after the war closed. (38) This action would seem to indicate that there had arisen since the war a widespread feeling that perhaps, after all, there was more truth in the statements which had been rejected as treasonable than in those which had been so unhesitatingly accepted as true.

It is inconceivable that a people could go through four years of modern warfare and be content to accept again unquestioned, the old methods which had brought on a war so devastating. They must "understand now, what they have failed to appreciate sufficiently before, namely, that a crisis in foreign affairs may lead to war, and that war immediately affects their work, their wages, their food, and their existence, as well as the industrial and economic life of the whole country." (39) The people who have experienced this war "will understand that mere readjustment of frontier lines and the casual regroupings of allied nations, however skilfully arranged, is not a result worth purchasing at such a price." (40)

This reaction against war as a means for realizing national imperialistic aims received material support from the ideals of socialism, particularly as expressed through the British Labour Party. War, no matter what its cause, is contrary to socialist tenets. The reason for this opposition was expressed by a resolution adopted at the International Congress which met at Stuttgart in 1907. This resolution declared that wars were the result of competition in the world markets and of the race for superiority in armaments, that wars were "part and parcel of the nature of capitalism," and that



"the working classes, who contribute most of the soldiers and make the greatest material sacrifices, are, therefore, the natural opponents of war." (41) In the opinion of many, such a resolution contains no force, because of the Socialist surrender to the militaristic and chauvinistic outburst at the outbreak of the war in 1914; but that the position and influence of socialism were materially changed by the war is proved by a glance at the position held by the various socialistic parties in Germany, Russia and Great Britain during the years since the war. A closer study of the attitude of the socialist parties at the time of the outbreak of the war also indicates that their support of the war meant, not so much a surrender of principle, as a temporary suppression. In every European country, bitter opposition to the war was maintained by the Socialists until war was actually declared or invasion had become a certainty. (42) It was only then that the Governments were given Socialist support, and the reasons for the granting of such support were everywhere the same. These are well expressed in the formal declaration of the German Social Democratic Party in explaining their action in voting for the war loan in the Reichstag on August 4, 1914. The war, the declaration states, was the result of an imperialistic policy. "The Social Democratic Party has always combated this policy to the utmost," the declaration continues, "and even to this hour we have agitated for the maintenance of peace by great demonstrations in all countries, and, above all, by our coöperation with our French brothers. Our exertions have been in vain. And now we are too surely confronted by the fact that war is upon us and that we are menaced by the terror of foreign invasion. The problem before us now is not the relative advisability of war or peace, but a consideration of just what steps must be taken for the protection of our country." (43)

Even though these forces were in 1914 insufficient to prevent the entrance of the various countries into the war, the fact that socialist opposition remained comparatively quiescent, but uncrushed, during the years of struggle, only to flame forth with renewed vigor as the old Governments failed, seems even more significant than the failure. The resolution proposed at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 by the Russian delegation, of which Lenin was a member, takes on a new and sinister importance in view of events of 1917 and 1918: "In case war should, nevertheless, break out, the Socialists shall take measures to bring about its early termination and strive with

all its power to use the economic and political crises created by the war to arouse the masses politically and hasten the overthrow of capitalist class rule." (44)

The extent of influence which Socialist groups would exercise in another crisis like that of 1914 is, of course, a matter of conjecture; but certain it is that Socialism, with its ideals of international unity and peace, and with its direct influence in Government, and its greatly increased capacity for the exertion of influence through other means, and with its feeling, intensified by the war, that the old policy had miserably and disastrously failed, became a power which conservative elements were not able to ignore in shaping their foreign policies in the first decade after the close of the war.

In Great Britain, this influence exerted itself chiefly through the Labour Party, which maintained as a part of its program the socialist opposition to war. Twice during the ten years immediately following the World War, the Labour Party was charged with forming a Government, and during the greater part of the remaining time in this period the Labour Party was the party of the opposition. The opportunities offered by these positions of influence were not neglected by the Party in its effort to create conditions which would make future wars impossible.

Thus, opposition to the use of force for the maintenance of imperialism was added to the other negative forces which made the continuation of the pre-war policy increasingly difficult. But a return to the isolation of the middle nineteenth century was obviously impossible. A new basis for foreign policy became essential, and this new foundation the opponents of the old policy found in internationalism, an ideal already formed and ready for further development and application. The ideal of internationalism had developed in Great Britain from two different sources, one of which is found in Socialism. The outlook of Socialism was world-wide. Its emphasis was upon men rather than upon nations, or upon property, or race; and although the ultimate goal of Socialism was from the first somewhat obscured by national sentiments this goal remained an all-inclusive internationalism of some type.

Even the English Socialists, who were looked upon as a group which had surrendered to nationalism and its attendant evils, held to the same final aim. The most extreme statement of internationalism as a party policy to be adopted by a British political party is contained in the reports adopted by the Labour Party Conference



of 1918. This declares that the party stands for "the immediate establishment actually as a part of the Treaty of Peace with which the present war will end, of a Universal League or Society of Nations, a Supernational Authority with an International High Court to try all justiciable issues between nations; an International Legislature to enact such laws as can be mutually agreed upon, and an International Council of Mediation to endeavor to settle without ultimate conflict even those disputes which are not justiciable." The Conference further declared that it was desirable to have all nations promise to make common cause against any nation which dared break away from this fundamental international agreement. (45)

The type of internationalism which calls for the practical obliteration of national authority and the substitution of a "Supernational Authority" is, however, not found again in the recommendations of the Labour Party. A much more moderate tone is adopted in later expressions. W. Arnold-Forster speaks of internationalism as the basis of Labour's Foreign Policy, which is, he says, "based on the idea that particular interests of each nation should be subordinated to the common interests of the race as a whole." (46) But the party aim seemed to be, not so much a subordination of national to international interests, as the recognition that the particular interests were a part of and dependent upon the interests of the entire world. British interests were not to be neglected, nor were international interests to be served at the expense of British interests. Rather was British welfare to be attained by furthering international interests. The Labour Party did not make the decided, though often indefinite, distinction made by the Conservative groups between matters purely domestic and affairs of international import. The Labour Party believed that artificial political boundary lines were insufficient to prevent the invasion of ills originating in another State, and that the welfare of one, therefore, could not be separated from that of another. (47)

Not only in socialism is internationalism found to be an ideal. In liberalism as well, internationalism is an inherent element, for liberalism is essentially individualistic. Liberalism has as its fundamental aim the freeing of the individual from oppressive forces and the creation of circumstances permitting the development of individual personality. The function of liberal parties "consists in removing all artificial and harmful impediments to the expansion of

individual energies, in refuting the sophisms of a degrading authoritarianism, and in leaving men so far as possible to act for themselves." (48) This individualism might develop into selfishness, into a mere desire to act in total disregard of the general social welfare, or into an attempt to dominate society in the interests of one individual or small group of individuals with common interests; but when such a change occurs, liberalism ceases to characterize the individualism, for liberalism demands the extension of individual liberties to all men and the right of all to develop by means of the society of which they are a part. This element of liberalism is not confined to the individual man, however, but is applied to the individual state as well. Liberalism and national feeling developed together, the demand for the right to develop an individual national personality being a part of the national feeling. And, as in the case of the individual man, so individual nations should be accorded the right to develop within a society of nations. (49)

In the relations of nations, as in the relations of men and in the ideals of parties, the application of the principle of individualism was challenged. With the growth of industry and the development of capitalism, liberalism became identified with a class, and the right of individual development came to be limited in its application to the individuals of a class. In the field of international relations, too, the right of the individual to complete development was challenged by the demands of an economic imperialism. Liberal nationalism gave way to chauvinism and oppression, while liberalism as an ideal gave place to the desire for exploitation, and liberal parties apparently surrendered to economic forces.

The attempt to apply the principles of liberalism in the face of rising imperialistic forces was exemplified in the policy of Gladstone who gave expression to the liberal international ideal and who attempted to maintain that ideal at a time when the maintenance of liberalism was becoming increasingly difficult. In 1872 Gladstone gave expression to this ideal when he said in the House of Commons that so far as it was possible to lay down an abstract and general rule with regard to annexation, he was prepared to say that Her Majesty's Government would not annex any territory, great or small, without the well understood and expressed wish of the people to be annexed, freely and generously expressed and authenticated by the best means the case would afford. (50) During the course of a debate in the same body ten years later, Gladstone spoke of ex-



pansion as an "irrepressible tendency" which was perhaps not wholly undesirable, for if properly regulated it might become an almost unmixed good. (51) To these statements might be added accounts of Gladstone's attempted policy in Ireland, his dealings with South Africa, and, in fact, an account of Gladstone's entire foreign policy. "Gladstone's was the judgment of abstract morality," Ramsay Muir states, "for which many hold that there is no place in international relations.—His principles were that the supreme national interest was not glory or prestige but peace; that for this end the best ultimate means must be the cordial coöperation of all the Powers of Europe;—that all nations should be regarded as having equal rights, none, not even Britain, being entitled to a pre-eminent right to be consulted; and that the policy of Britain should always be inspired by a love of freedom and sympathy with the oppressed." (52)

This was an international outlook which was never entirely lost by the British Liberal Party. Even as the power of imperialism grew stronger and when even the Liberal Party under the leadership of Lord Rosebery had apparently adopted imperialism as liberalism's own policy, a segment of the party maintained its opposition to such a surrender and the "lists were thus again set for a renewal of the conflict on foreign and imperial affairs which from the days of Palmerston and Bright had continued intermittently in the Liberal Party and was still smoldering up to the time of the Great War." (53)

It was in David Lloyd George that liberalism found its most determined champion through the period when imperialism seemed overwhelming. His greatest fight was waged against the Boer War, when he risked his life as well as his political future in his opposition to an imperialistic war. "Since John Bright's great fight against the Crimean War nothing of the kind had been seen in England," is the estimate of a biographer of the liberal statesman. (54) During the years just preceding the war other members of the Liberal Party, Campbell-Bannerman, Grey and Asquith, as they saw their country drifting toward war, joined in suggestions of a league of peace and the renewal of the Concert of Europe. (55)

Liberal internationalism continued as a prominent part of the Liberal Party ideal after the close of the World War. "The new world has a different faith and a different point of view," Lloyd George stated. "It believes in nationalism no less firmly than the

old, for nationalism is the individual force, the genius, the salt in every varied impulse which makes up Western Civilization as a whole. But it also believes with its whole heart that in the welter of passion, and in the economic chaos to which the world has been reduced by war, the welfare of every nation depends upon peace, coöperation, a helping hand from the strong to the weak, a regard for the welfare of all." (56)

The same ideal was expressed by Sir Herbert Samuel at the Liberal Summer School in 1928. "Let us conduct our affairs in relation to our Empire and to other countries," he said, "with a full recognition that 'the greatest nation is but a fragment'—not an ultimate unit, but one part among many of a greater whole, each with a duty toward the common membership; that the world is not merely a congeries of separate sovereign States, but a moral unity, divided for its own advantage into different nationalities and Governments." (57)

Thus the ideal of international coöperation stood ready to supplement with a positive element the forces which were working to break down the old policy of national imperialistic struggle. But old ideals and policies are not easily supplanted by the untried, and the decade which followed the World War was characterized by efforts to return to the normal condition of pre-war days and to maintain the old policy intact, and by an equally earnest endeavor to meet the new situation by means of principles and policies adapted to a new world.

## CHAPTER II

### POST-WAR IMPERIALISM

The struggle of the new forces for recognition in the decade following the World War may first be traced in the efforts of the British to maintain unbroken the economic and political policy adopted before the war in dealing with industrially backward regions. To Great Britain the imperialistic system had become vital. Imperialism had woven itself firmly into the fabric of the industrial system upon which the very lives of the British people depended. But this system, as has been noted, was seriously deranged by the war, and imperialism was threatened by forces that had been enhanced by years of international strife. To what extent was the problem solved by crushing the new forces, in order that former foundations of policy might remain intact; or in what way were pre-war policies modified to meet new world conditions? A partial answer may be found in a study of the fortunes of British imperialism itself during the first ten years after the war.

In making such a study, we turn first to the stated policy of the three great British political parties; for, although stated policy so often fails to agree with policy as carried out, such statements frequently indicate the tendency of the party and the direction in which their efforts will be directed.

In the first days after the war, the Coalition Government could be very frankly imperialistic and bend every effort toward the maintenance and extension of the position won by the Allied victory, but to the process of imperialistic expansion the Labour Party must necessarily be unalterably opposed, because of their opposition to war and their ideal of international coöperation. Even the Conservative Party did not long remain so frankly imperialistic. This is partly due, no doubt, to the fact that the various industrially backward regions of the world were quite completely appropriated by the various Powers. China might be suggested as a possible field for aggressive imperialism; but public opinion at home, combined with the rising power of nationalism in China itself, tended to cause a modification in this policy of openly aggressive imperialism. Such



a change was expressed by Phillip Kerr at the Liberal Summer School in 1928. He said that he was very frankly an imperialist—but because of the new meaning of the word “Empire,” which meant not dominance of a monarch over the people or of one race over another but rather the dominance of “reason and justice, mercy and freedom, as the cement of the unity and the principles of the government of a political organism which gives peace, individual liberty, and opportunity for self-government to a quarter of the population of the earth.” (1) Mr. Kerr, no doubt, forgot for the moment the many peoples to whom the Empire meant something very different from the ideal he expressed; but it should be noted that the speaker was not advocating aggressive imperialism, but rather a second phase of the problem, which deals primarily not with international rivalries but with the manner in which the control of the territories and peoples that have already been brought within the borders of the Empire shall be exercised.

And this phase, too, is of importance to the peace of the world, for disturbances in one region necessarily affect others, and problems of nationality, race, and religion are raised. From this phase of imperialism, the most serious threats to the peace and integrity of the British Empire arose after the close of the war. This situation has tended to draw England into closer coöperation with the Powers in imperialistic affairs; (2) and it has encouraged the growth of the “colony as a trust,” or the “white man’s burden” idea, which received expression in the mandate system outlined at the Peace Conference. In the manner in which British control has been exercised, we might expect a difference in the policy of the various governments; but all three parties have accepted in theory the policy of trusteeship as a part, and by far the most prominent part, of their programs.

The attitude of the Conservative Government in this regard was laid down in a State Paper regarding the policy to be followed in Kenya. This states: “Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty’s Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail.—But in the administration of Kenya, His Majesty’s Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, and they are unable to delegate or share this

trust, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races. It is not necessary to elaborate this position; the lines of development are as yet in certain directions undetermined, and many different problems arise which require time for their solution. But there can be no room for doubt that it is the mission of Great Britain to work continuously for the training and education of the Africans toward a higher intellectual, moral and economic level than that which they had reached when the Crown assumed the responsibility for the administration of this territory." (3)

The position of the Conservative Party might be considered as quite clearly indicated, therefore, by their lack of condemnation of an expanding imperialism and by their complete indorsement theoretically of the idea of the precedence of native interests in dealing with British controlled territories. The position of the Liberal Party apparently differs little from that of the Conservative. (4) But the stated policy of Labour, as is to be expected, is much more radical and also less consistent. The opposition of this third British party to aggressive imperialism is unqualified, and the reasons for this attitude have already been suggested. The relation of imperialism to international rivalries and war was made clear decades ago; and the Labour ideal of international coöperation had permitted no intense national feeling to overshadow the dangers of an imperialistic struggle and to encourage the Government to continue such a process in the name of national glory and honor. Then, too, economic expansion into backward regions was looked upon, not only as nationalistic, but as primarily and necessarily capitalistic. Imperialistic expansion was the work of capitalism, and, in the view of many Labourites, was carried on chiefly for the benefit of a select group of capitalists, while labor's chief part in it was to pay the bills and furnish the men for the wars that the system engendered. This feeling was increased by the growing tendency on the part of industrialists to invest their money in industries in industrially backward regions rather than to use these countries for the building of home industry. It is small wonder that the most definite condemnation of such a system is found in the Labour Party programs. (5) We find the Labour Party demanding withdrawal of troops from China and the restoration of complete sovereignty to that country. (6) We also find this party passing resolutions demanding the right of the Indians to full self-government and to free



and equal partnership in the commonwealth. (7) We find the party even demanding that Egypt be permitted to deal with issues regarding the Suez Canal on the ground that it would be better to deal with a friendly Egypt than with a hostile country, in case of difficulties in that region. (8) And then the party expresses the desire "that both the Jews and Arabs shall have full autonomy, democratically organized; . . ." (9) and, fortunately for the resolution, no one concerned himself about how the demand could be granted.

But the Labour Party, even in its statements of policy, did not hold so firmly to this attitude as one might, at first thought, believe. The reason for this lack of consistency was due partly to the fact that resolutions entail no responsibility and any attempt to frame a practical program made necessary the abandonment of some of the radical statements. But there was a deeper reason for a more conservative position. Many members of the Labour Party were coming to see that their own interests, no less than the interests of the capitalists, were bound up with the entire Empire. This more or less imperialistic position of the Labour Party was recognized even before the war. Walling wrote in 1914: "In proportion as a country has colonies, as the vote at the International Congress at Stuttgart shows, the aristocracy of labor in that country favors colonies—and their defence." (10) He then pointed out that Keir Hardie was advocating only moderate reforms in India, and the purpose of these reforms was to bind India more closely to the Empire. (11) As early as 1907, MacDonald said that the imperialism of the industrial classes was not of the bragging, aggressive type; but the system already established was accepted and could not well be interfered with. (12) Even the resolution quoted above concerning the withdrawal of troops from China closed with a provision for the protection of foreign property by the Chinese.

The imperialism of labor, however, differed quite materially, in theory at least, from the ruthless exploitation of capitalistic expansion. The problem of unemployment which became so acute after the World War was a result of the slowing down of industry. (13) As an aid to the stimulation of British industry, which would make possible the reabsorption of some of the unemployed, the reopening of former markets and the developing of new markets was necessary. The development of the home market by increasing the purchasing power of the laborers was a part of that program,

and the increase of markets in the Dominions and in foreign countries, through coöperation and advance of mutual interests, must be considered; but most important of all were the markets that might be developed in India, in the Crown Colonies and in the Mandates of the Empire, where there were great populations who might be taught to demand the manufactured goods of Britain and at the same time to develop the vast natural resources which would furnish much needed raw materials for the home factories. (14)

Within such a system, there lay a danger which the Labour Party clearly recognized. Should capital, instead of sending the raw materials to England to be manufactured, build factories in the colonies themselves, near the markets, labor at home must be cut off still further from its source of livelihood through the further injury to industry in Great Britain. The vast amount of labor available at wages so far below those of the British laborer offers a temptation to which capitalistic enterprise has succumbed in certain instances in China and in India. (15) And it is not to be supposed that the development of industries by the natives would meet with any great favor in the eyes of the Labourites of Great Britain. The imperialism of labor would be, if carried to its logical conclusion, the old system of mercantilism; for while capital may profit from its investments in factories run by cheap labor in India, British labor profits only through the development of her industries at home. But the party's modern mercantilism was strongly tintured by another element which may have been due partially to idealism growing out of a fellow-feeling with laborers of all lands, but probably was chiefly the result of the Labour Party's attempt to modify a situation which it could not destroy, a situation which it had already accepted as a system to be maintained in some form. The long hours, low wages, and child labor which are features of the factory system in so many of the countries where the industrial revolution is just beginning, offer serious competition to the British laborer, who, if he cannot destroy the overseas industries, must necessarily work to bring foreign labor up to his own standard. From this situation came the protests against the exploitation of labor in the backward regions. A typical protest came from the Labour Conference of 1922 when the President of the Conference in the course of his address put the following rhetorical question: "Is it nothing to the factory workers of Lancashire that in the textile mills of Bombay, women are working twelve hours a day for



a working month of thirty days for twenty-five shillings? Is it nothing to the jute-workers of Dundee that already ten million pounds are invested in Bengal jute factories where the wages range from fourteen up to thirty-eight shillings a month?" (16) And among many similar protests we find a Labourite complaining that capitalists were incurring expense to the country for their own benefit while working children of five and six years old from ten to thirteen hours a day, paying wages that were next to nothing, keeping no factory records or health statistics, and suppressing workers' combinations by means of police and soldiers. (17)

It is to be expected, therefore, that "Trusteeship" as a policy would receive even more emphasis than was given to the idea by the other parties. And such is the case, the party accepting "Trusteeship" not merely as a policy which is thrust upon it, but as a policy to be accepted in a very positive way. In 1918 when the Labour Party was making its most radical statements regarding a Supernational state, a party resolution was passed which declared: "If we repudiate, on the one hand, the Imperialism that seeks to dominate other races, or to impose our will on other parts of the British Empire, so we disclaim equally any conception of a selfish and insular 'non-interventionism,' unregarding of our special obligations to our fellow-citizens overseas; of the corporate duties of one nation to another; of the moral claims upon us of the nonadult races, and of our own indebtedness to the world of which we are a part." (18)

So much for the theories and declarations of party policies. Our next, and most important problem is the determination of the manner in which these policies were carried out in practice, first in regard to the expanding, aggressive imperialism, and second, in regard to the internal development of backward regions already under British control.

Since the World War was a result, in part, of imperialistic ambitions and conflicts, it was natural that one of the results of that war would be the seizure of colonial territories by the victorious allies. This process began during the war when various agreements were made by the Allied Powers among themselves for apportioning the Empires of Germany and Turkey among the victors, as rewards for victorious effort and as further assurances of the future safety and prosperity of their own Empires. Great Britain emerged from the struggle with large portions of the old Empire of Germany as well as rich sections of the former Turkish Empire. There was,



in theory, one important check to the imperialistic proclivities of the victorious Allied Powers. The Mandate system had been devised, and had been incorporated with its famous statement of "Trusteeship," into the Covenant of the League of Nations. Furthermore, very definite limitations and obligations were agreed to by each Power at the time of accepting the Mandate. These regulations dealt with such questions as the prohibition of the slave trade and forced labor, the control of the traffic in arms and of intoxicating liquors, and the assurance of freedom of conscience and the material and moral well-being of the natives. (19) An annual report was also to be made to the Mandates Commission and a questionnaire to be used in making these annual reports was sent to each Mandatory. (20) Such a report might act as a deterrent to the exercise of power for purposes of exploitation at the expense of the natives, for such reports were given full publicity and the Commission was not hesitant about asking for more information and making suggestions for the improvement of administration by the Mandatory Power. (21) Protests from the natives themselves have also been received by the League of Nations. (22) There was, however, one question of vital importance that had not been settled. That is the question of sovereignty in the Mandate. The question did not receive wide attention, although a dispute regarding the matter arose between the Commission and South Africa. (23) But the Mandatories would quite naturally expect a practically permanent exercise of predominant influence in a region which was being developed at considerable expense to the controlling Government and which had been received into the imperial system chiefly for the purpose of obtaining security or economic benefit for the Empire. The consideration of the inclusion of the mandated territory of Tanganyika in a federation of British East African territories might be interpreted as a recognition of residence of sovereignty in the Mandatory, even though provision for such action was made in the terms under which the Mandate was accepted. (24) At any rate, since the Mandatory was responsible for the administration of these territories and since it held them as a part of an imperialistic system, responsibility to the League apparently meant little except for the publicity the latter organization gave. A direct appeal to the League by the mandated territory for relief from administration by the Mandatory, should such an appeal ever be made, would be likely to have meagre results, if we may judge from the effect of

protests that have been sent and from the nature of the administration of mandated territories in certain instances. No further distinction, therefore, need be made between a mandate and a territory held without responsibility to the League of Nations.

The British policy of aggressive imperialism stands out most prominently, perhaps, in her seizure of the regions of Mesopotamia and Palestine during the war, and her struggle to maintain and extend her territory there during the years that followed. This struggle, in leading as it did, not only to trouble with the natives themselves, but to international complications with France, Italy, and Turkey, is typical of the pre-war struggle for new territories rich in natural resources and important to the communications of the European States and their Empires.

The Mesopotamian Valley and Palestine include one of the ancient trade routes to the East, a route which had been increasing in importance to Britain with the constantly increasing trade with India and China. The northern route to the Far East was held by Russia, and it was Russia's attempts to utilize this way to the East which had been one of the important factors in the enmity between Russia and Great Britain. The southern route Great Britain herself held, but the middle route through Mesopotamia had been in the control of Turkey for centuries. The weak Turkish Empire, however, offered no threat to the communications of the British Empire, and, in fact, the region as a highway to the east had not been of great importance until the work of Germany during the latter part of the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries had begun the development of this region into an Eastern route dominated, not by the inefficient Government at Constantinople, but the imperial power at Berlin. This meant, not only control by a great power of an important route to India, but it also meant the extension of the influence of Germany into regions from which even the Suez Canal could be threatened. The victory of the Allies in the World War offered Britain the opportunity to remove this danger to her Empire.

While the war was still in progress, France, Italy and Great Britain agreed upon the division of the Turkish Empire, awarding to Great Britain the Mesopotamian Valley. (25) According to the treaty of Versailles, the German concessions in that region were definitely annulled and all their economic rights and enterprises



were abrogated in order to prepare the way for the Allied Powers. (26)

This work was carried further by the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, and by the Secret Tripartite Agreement of the same date between France, Great Britain and Italy. (27) These confirmed Britain's oil and commercial concessions in the Old Turkish Empire, confirmed to her Mesopotamia and Palestine as Mandates, and turned the former German enterprises over to a Tripartite corporation. Apparently the Allied Powers had won their rewards and were to enjoy the fruits of their victory over Germany and Turkey, but almost at once the arrangements of Sèvres were overturned. The rise of the Nationalist movement among the Turks made impossible the carrying out of the terms of the Treaty. The Allies themselves, dissatisfied with the disposition of the spoils, began to quarrel among themselves. The ancient rivalry between France and Great Britain was revived, with all the old suspicion and acrimony, in their struggle for wealth and territory. French statesmen believed that Great Britain had taken more than her share of the spoils and that she was responsible for many of the French troubles in Syria and Cilicia, while Great Britain thought that France had no right to abrogate the Treaty of Sèvres and surrender territory to the Turks without agreement of all the Powers. (28) And Italy, hoping to regain a share of the spoils of which she had been very largely deprived, joined France in the abrogation of the Treaty of Sèvres.

But Great Britain's difficulties were not confined to France and Italy. The struggle with the Nationalist Turks dragged on through the two Lausanne Conferences. In September, 1922, war with Turkey appeared inevitable. The strong nationalistic aspirations of the young Turks were running counter to Great Britain's desire for the destruction of the Turkish Empire and the transfer of former Ottoman territory to her own or to international control. Another serious point of disagreement was the boundary of Iraq, which Great Britain insisted be placed far enough north to include the Mosul region. In one matter, however Great Britain was in a more favorable position in her relation to Turkey than was France. Most of the concessions which Britain held were in the region already recognized as under British control, while France was desirous of important concessions in Anatolia, the center of the Turkish Nationalist State. This fact tended to draw Britain and the

new Turkish Government into closer relations and it was agreed in 1924 that the boundary dispute would be referred to the League of Nations if a friendly settlement between the two countries proved impossible. (29) This course was taken, and a special commission appointed by the League Council (30) decided that although the chief legal right to the territory belonged to Turkey, the Mosul region should be awarded to Great Britain because of the economic unity with the rest of the Mesopotamian Valley; and Great Britain was urged to extend her mandatory powers to a period of twenty-five years in order that she might properly begin the development of the territory. (31)

Still another difficulty that Great Britain was forced to meet, particularly in Palestine, was the dissatisfaction of the peoples under her control. The conflicts of the Jews and Arabians made difficult the carrying out of Britain's Zionist program. (32) The failure of Britain to carry out the policy outlined in the declaration of November 17, 1918, (33) which stated that the purpose of Great Britain was the "complete and final enfranchisement" of native peoples and the establishment of national governments and administrations "drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations," caused much dissatisfaction. Instead of the immediate establishment of native self-government, the High Commissioner was given almost absolute authority through his power to appoint all public officers, to control all lands, mines and minerals, to reserve ordinances for the home government, and through the requirement that all ordinances must receive his consent. (34) Such a government seemed necessary because of the internal conflict among the natives, but it quite naturally did not satisfy natives who desired control of the government for themselves.

The government granted to Iraq was apparently more liberal. The people elected their own king, although it is impossible to know to what extent the election was under British influence. At least, it appears that the British gave considerable aid in getting rid of rival candidates. (35) Then too, the king, according to the treaty of 1922, agreed to be guided by the advice of Britain; and, by the same treaty, British commercial and industrial interests were assured of ample protection. (36) This arrangement was not entirely satisfactory to Iraq, however, and the demand for a still greater degree of independence continued. In 1923, a protocol was added to



the Treaty of the previous year which agreed that the Treaty itself should be automatically abrogated with the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations. (37) Four years later a new treaty was negotiated by the terms of which Iraq was recognized as independent on condition that the rights of foreigners be guaranteed and that the British Government be consulted regarding foreign affairs which would affect both Governments. A British High Commissioner was to remain in Iraq and was to be kept informed of events there. Great Britain, in return, was to support the candidature of Iraq for membership in the League of Nations in 1932. (38) Financial and military agreements were left for later decision and in the attempt to define the relations between the two countries in these matters, negotiations broke down and the Treaty was never signed. (39) Endeavors to settle the difficulty were dropped, therefore, until the Labour Party took charge of the British Government in 1929. In September of that year, the announcement was made that Great Britain had decided to recommend the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations in 1932 without conditions. A treaty which would regulate the future relations of the two nations was drawn up, however, and it was stated that this treaty was to be similar to that already offered to Egypt and would, therefore, provide for the continued maintenance of British troops in Mesopotamia. (40) Great Britain was not yet ready to surrender control of Iraq, whose independence was quite evidently to be largely nominal. Although her membership in the League of Nations would give Iraq a place in the discussions and in the decisions regarding world affairs, it would seem safe to assume that such membership would make little difference in her relations to Great Britain whose interests would be guaranteed by a treaty duly ratified by Iraq and registered with the League.

In Palestine, there was no granting even of nominal independence. The strife between Arab and Jew made necessary a vigorous administration by the British, with no concessions in the direction of self government if the terms of the mandate regarding the Jewish National Home were to be carried out. This problem was brought to the attention of the Labour Government by conflicts between the two nationalities in Palestine, but instead of concessions to either group, the Prime Minister issued a statement which made clear the intention of the Government to continue to administer the territory in strict conformity with the terms of the mandate. (41) But the

British were faced with a difficult situation in an attempt to carry out such an intention, and in October, 1930, the Government announced the recognition of the necessity for a modification of policy. It had been the policy in the past, the announcement stated, to leave "the economic and social forces to operate with the minimum of interference or control"; but such a course could no longer be followed. (42) There were three practical problems to be faced in Palestine. The first was the question of security, the second was the problem of constitutional development, and the third was the problem of the social and economic development in the region assigned to Great Britain. The first of these would be solved by the retention of troops in Palestine; and the second, by the formation of a Legislative Council which would serve as a beginning of self-government. In the attempt to solve the third of the problems, the Government declared that the interests of both races must receive equal protection and that the land and labor situation demanded that restrictions be placed upon Jewish immigration. It was this last statement which drew severe criticism from the friends of the Zionist program; but the Labour Government held that the British were under obligations to protect Arab interests as well as Jewish, and declared that the coöperation of the two races was necessary for the full development of Palestine.

This very brief sketch of British activities in the region of the old Turkish Empire in the period just following the war indicates that during the first years of the decade a policy of the most aggressive imperialism, which brought with it threats of war and situations characteristic of pre-war days, was followed. And certainly Mesopotamia and Palestine offered a most tempting field for British imperialism. The importance of the former as a route to the East, an importance revived by the introduction of steam transportation, was further enhanced by the use of the airplane, for it is across this region that new air routes between Europe and the Far East should pass. (43) This portion of the old Turkish Empire was of vital importance to the British Empire also, because of its proximity to the Suez Canal, for it might well serve as a base of operations against the latter point if allowed to fall into the hands of another Power. Strategically, therefore, this region was one of the most important in the world, (44) and especially was this true for the Empire of Britain.

In addition to its strategic importance, Mesopotamia offered fur-



ther inducement for exploitation. This territory was also one of the most important undeveloped regions of the world, economically. (45) It was hoped that by the development of irrigation and by the introduction of modern methods, the great Mesopotamian Valley would become a source of vast amounts of raw materials, particularly cotton for the mills of Lancashire, and wheat to feed England's great industrial population. This would be another step in making the British Empire self-sufficing and in maintaining her prosperity and power.

But there was still another resource that Iraq could provide which was perhaps even more important to Britain than her own wheat and cotton fields. That is, oil, a product that had become essential to the existence of the Empire; for transportation had come to depend on oil rather than on coal, as was the case before the war, and British naval supremacy, dependent, before the War, no less upon her well distributed coaling stations than upon the size of her fleet, was threatened because of her lack of fuel for her vessels. (46)

Not only does England herself produce no oil, but neither do other portions of the Empire as it existed before the war, with the exception of small amounts in India and Egypt. (47) It is, therefore, no wonder that Britain insisted upon having the Mosul district of the Mesopotamian Valley, nor is it any wonder that she was willing to face not only the ill-will of the Turks, but the antagonism of the French, to gain a district believed to be so rich in a product of which she stood in such dire need. The demand of the French for a share in this rich region became so insistent that a compromise, the San Remo Oil Agreement (48) was drawn up, an agreement which gave to France the share that she had demanded, but which proved to be another source of ill feeling between the two Powers, when France decided that she had, after all, received the worst end of the bargain.

The availability of the product of the rich oil fields of Persia also depends upon the control of the Persian Gulf, the commercial outlet for the oil fields of that region. And although the Anglo-Persian Treaty which would have given Great Britain complete control of Persian resources failed of ratification because of a Persian nationalistic revival after the war, and although Russia withdrew from Persia and renounced all of her imperialistic schemes and surrendered her concessions only on condition that no other country would receive them, (49) Britain, in control of the Persian Gulf,

would have a decided advantage in a struggle for the supply of Persian oil.

Palestine, too, held certain probable values for Great Britain besides the possible natural resources which might be developed there, and in addition to the fact that this region was a part of the commercial route to the East. (50) These are summarized by Loder in the following statement: "Zionism, however, provided an opportunity for an even more advantageous arrangement than the internationalization of Palestine, which had first been suggested. Apart from the question of abstract justice and its bearing on a solution of the Jewish problem as a whole—Zionism offered certain advantages to Great Britain. There was the chance of an alliance with the international force of Jewry which the circumstances of the war made specially attractive and which might survive as of permanent value, and there was the chance of introducing a Jewish element into Palestine, bound by ties of gratitude to Great Britain, which would turn Palestine into an advanced bastion for the defense of the Suez Canal." (51)

Certainly, in her acquisition of Iraq and Palestine, Great Britain acquired regions of immense value to the Empire, and the method by which this was accomplished was an example of the old-time aggressive imperialism, dictated by the needs of the Empire, and unmodified by the desire of peace.

The same statement can be made regarding Egypt, whose value to the Empire is very similar to that of Mesopotamia and Palestine. The British position in regard to this territory in northern Africa at the time of the close of the war is clearly and definitely stated in a declaration made in the House of Commons by A. J. Balfour, a member of the Coalition Cabinet, on November 17, 1919: "Let me, therefore, say very shortly that in our view the question of Egypt, the question of the Sudan, and the question of the Canal form an organic and indissoluble whole, and that neither in Egypt nor in the Sudan, nor in connection with Egypt, is England going to give up any of her responsibilities. British supremacy exists, British supremacy is going to be maintained, and let nobody either in Egypt or out of Egypt make any mistake on that cardinal principle of His Majesty's Government." (52) Mr. Balfour added that the British desired to associate the Egyptians with the government of the country, but the first part of this statement makes clear that any arrangement made regarding self-government would not be per-



mitted to interfere with the certainty of the safety of British interests there. This was the course that the British Government continued to follow for a decade. The safety of the Empire demanded that the British retain control of Egypt, but a sincere effort was made to conciliate the Egyptians and to grant all the freedom that the Government of Britain felt to be compatible with the security of the Empire. The policy of coöperation was not very successful, however, largely because of the attitude taken by the Egyptians themselves. The war had given in Egypt, as in many other parts of the world, a mighty impetus to nationalism. "In the March days of 1919 the Egyptian people had attained unity for the first time. The intelligentsia of the towns were united with the fellaheen in a common enterprise.—So great was the enthusiasm at this time that even the aristocracy joined the movement in considerable numbers, or did not dare to oppose it.—The most remarkable occurrence in 1919 was the fraternization of Mohammedans and Copts, united by the common weal of the newly awakening nation.—For the first time Copt priests preached in El Azhar and other large mosques, and Mohammedans called upon men in the churches to take part in the national struggle. Christian priests went through the city streets hand in hand with mullahs, preaching love of the common fatherland.—In those days, too, Egyptian women were roused to political activity for the first time. They came out of the harems and demonstrated in the streets. They marched to meetings and spoke in popular gatherings." (53)

Quite naturally, the Protectorate, with its arbitrary rule, and martial law, would be totally unsatisfactory to a nation so thoroughly aroused and completely united. Open insurrection settled into passive resistance, with a boycott and non-coöperation with the British authorities. The Milner Commission, composed entirely of British members, was sent to Egypt to investigate and make recommendations; but the Egyptians refused to coöperate with it, for they were demanding complete independence, removal of British troops, and a share in the administration of the Sudan. (54) The Commission recommended as a means of settling the difficulty that a bilateral treaty be drawn up, a treaty which would permit that troops be maintained in Egypt, that foreign interests be protected by the British, and that Great Britain should legislate on all matters pertaining to foreign affairs. The Sudan, the Commission thought, deserved the right of independent development. (55) In

accordance with the report of the Commission a treaty was offered to the Egyptians; but this the latter refused, because of its provision for the maintenance of the British troops in Egypt and continued control of the Sudan. In 1922, Great Britain granted nominal independence to Egypt in an effort to conciliate the people there, but reserved absolutely for her own management the safety of imperial communication, the defense of Egypt against foreign attacks, the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the control of the Sudan. (56)

In spite of the hopes and expectation of the Egyptians, no change in policy was made with the advent of a Labour Government in England. In fact, MacDonald's declaration of policy in 1924 was quoted by the Conservative Government in outlining their policy as frequently as was the statement of the Coalition Government in 1922. This declaration of policy MacDonald made in a letter to Lord Allenby, Britain's High Commissioner in Egypt. It stated that "No Government in the light of that experience [the World War] can divest itself wholly, even in favour of an ally, of its interest in guarding such a vital link in British communications [as is the Suez Canal]. Such a security must be a feature of any agreement come to between our two Governments, and I see no reason why accommodation is impossible, given good-will.

"The effective coöperation of Great Britain and Egypt in protecting those communications might in my view have been insured by the conclusion of a treaty of close alliance. The presence of a British force in Egypt provided for by such a treaty freely entered into by both parties on an equal footing would in no way be incompatible with Egyptian independence, while it would be an indication of the specially close and intimate relations between the two countries and their determination to coöperate in a matter of vital concern to both." (57) But the good-will was not given and the Labour Government accomplished no more than its predecessors. The next year, settlement of the difficulty seemed still further delayed by the murder of a high British official, Sir Lee Stack, and by the quick and severe action taken by the British Government.

In 1927, another effort was made to come to an agreement with Egypt and a treaty, still based on the essential points of policy as outlined in 1922 and 1924, but making some additional concessions over the former treaty, was offered by the Conservative Government. Egypt was to be permitted to control her own foreign af-



fairs so long as no action inimical to British interests was taken. Great Britain also agreed to use her influence to obtain revision of capitulations "in accordance with the spirit of the times," to gain the admission of Egypt to the League of Nations, and to refer all disagreements to the League. British judicial and financial advisers were to be kept in Egypt. (58) Although this treaty offered to Egypt a position very closely approximating Dominion status, she refused ratification; for it was still absolute independence, not Dominion status, that she wanted.

With the accession to office for a second time, the Labour Government prepared to make renewed efforts toward the final settlement of the Egyptian problem. The first step in this direction was the acceptance of the resignation of Lord Lloyd, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. In explaining the action of the Labour Government in asking the Commissioner's resignation, Mr. Henderson, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, pointed out that Lord Lloyd's attitude had been more harsh and more uncompromising than Chamberlain himself had desired. The foreign Secretary declared that his predecessor's policy had been a minimum of interference in the internal affairs of Egypt and a liberal interpretation of the declaration of 1922, but that Lord Lloyd was very clearly not in sympathy with either of those objects. Henderson then cited instances to prove that the High Commissioner's policy was absolute rule rather than coöperation. (59) The importance of the High Commissioner in the execution of a policy, and an intimation of Lord Lloyd's method, are suggested by a writer who is very favorably disposed toward the former High Commissioner, (60) when he says that "Lord Lloyd believes in standing his ground every time and on every point, and in trying to carry out the Declaration of 1922 as well as so vague and elastic an instrument can be successfully carried out. As most of the questions arising out of the Declaration and the 'four reserved points' call for settlement on their own merits, the personal judgment of the High Commissioner has to play an important part in the conduct of affairs, and on many occasions Lord Lloyd has to exercise his own personal influence to overcome opposition." This tendency toward rule by force the Labour Party wished to minimize as far as possible, substituting a spirit of coöperation whenever it could be attained.

As a second step in the attempt to solve this problem, the Labour Government reopened negotiations with Egypt for a new treaty.

The conference which was called for this purpose met on March 31, 1930, and again on May 5. The offers made by the British Government at that time contained important concessions to the Egyptians, who, however, made still further demands which the British refused to grant. According to the terms agreed upon by the two Governments, British troops were to be stationed only in the vicinity of the Suez Canal, and Egypt was to be admitted to the League of Nations. Capitulations were to be abolished. In foreign affairs the two Governments were to coöperate, and mutual aid was to be given in case of war. (61) But no agreement could be reached in regard to Egypt's position in the Sudan. Egypt demanded complete parity with England in the civil and military administration of the Sudan, and this the British refused to grant. (62) The efforts of the Labour Government, therefore, again came to naught and Egypt's status in the Empire remained as it had been since 1922.

The British policy in Egypt throughout the decade, although marked by a determination to protect the Empire communications and foreign interest in Egypt and to control the Sudan, was characterized by sincere efforts to coöperate with the Egyptians and to remove all cause for accusations of British oppression. The failure to accomplish this policy to a greater degree was not due to lack of earnest effort on the part of the British Government, but rather to the demands of a powerful nationalism, which, while it was perhaps able to force the British to make such an effort, nevertheless, by its radicalism, prevented the realization of its own aims. It is true that martial law was maintained, in spite of nominal independence, until 1923, and that its abolition even then was more or less in theory rather than in practice. It is also true that the rule of the British was often arbitrary and contrary to the constitution, (63) but there seemed no solution for the problem, in spite of the fear that another Ireland would be created by the use of force, (64) unless Britain was willing to accede to the demand of the Egyptians and to withdraw completely. But such action was given serious consideration by no one in Britain. Great Britain also refused to refer the difficulty to the League of Nations for settlement. Lloyd George, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, said in 1922 that the question of Egypt was a matter of concern only to Britain. The rights and interests of the British Empire were vitally concerned, he said, and Britain could not permit any interference of any kind



from any other Power. (65) Five years later, membership in the League was offered to Egypt by Britain, but on condition that arrangements, satisfactory to the latter country, regarding the future relations of the two countries, could be made.

The imperial problem in Egypt is, of course, primarily a problem of the defense of the Empire, but economic interest is not lacking. Egypt is of great importance in Britain's cotton industry, sending, as she does, a large amount of a high grade of raw cotton to England's mills and buying large amounts of cotton cloth in return, (66) and there are extensive British interests to safeguard there; but it is the maintenance of troops and the control of foreign policy to insure the safety of the Canal region with which the British were most concerned. Good-will would be as important in maintaining the desired economic status as would military force. In the control of oil this would not necessarily be true, but Egypt does not produce oil in great quantities. (67) The Sudan also offers a field for exploitation, and plans for the development of the cotton raising industry have received considerable attention. (68) In 1920, the British Government announced an irrigation scheme for the Sudan, a plan which, when carried to completion, would mean the raising of cotton that would compete with that raised in Egypt. But of greater importance to the Egyptians was the fear that their water supply would be cut off for use in the development of the territory to the South. (69) The bitter opposition to the development of the Sudan indicates an important reason for the British determination to separate that region from Egypt. Lloyd George stated definitely that Britain could not agree "to any change in the status of the Sudan which would in the slightest degree diminish the security for the many millions of British capital which are already invested in its development—to the great advantage of the Sudan." (70)

In other parts of the world, too, British interests have been primarily economic rather than strategic. The control of Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia have been considered essential to the maintenance of open communications with India, but there are regions in the Far East where Great Britain attempted to maintain a control of territory which can hold no such position in the British Imperial System as does the Middle and Near East. In China, famous as a region of imperialistic rivalries, ruthless economic exploitation and territorial division before the World War,



the interests of Great Britain have remained unchanged, but new forces have entered into the situation which are gradually reshaping British policy there.

Great Britain, as a result of pre-war activities, held under her control Hong Kong, and the territory of Kowloon on the mainland across from the Island, and Wei Hai Wei. The valley of the Yangtse was an important sphere of influence. Besides these, she held trading concessions in a number of Chinese cities. Then too, the nationals of the foreign Powers, including those of Great Britain, enjoyed extra-territorial privileges, and the Powers themselves controlled the custom duties. Britain's interest in China was due to the opportunity which that densely populated country offered for the development of markets for British manufactured goods and for the investment of British capital. As a market for British cotton goods, China was outranked only by India and Egypt in 1923 (71) while British investments in China far exceeded those of any other power, amounting, it is estimated, to twice those of Japan, her nearest rival. (72) In such circumstances it is to be expected that Great Britain would carry out a vigorous imperialistic policy in the Far East, meeting Chinese dissatisfaction and international rivalries alike with firmness and decision. There was, since the war, an added reason for such a policy. A weak withdrawal of British forces because of hostile demonstrations or outside pressure would be a serious blow to her prestige, a blow which would be dangerous because of the unrest in other parts of the British world. The aspirations of the people of India and Egypt were too similar to those of the Chinese to permit a surrender in one place without endangering British control in all. Her need of markets, too, was even greater than in the pre-war period, because of the depression in industry since the war. On the other hand, the rise of the spirit of nationalism, with its powerful anti-foreign feeling, made international rivalry in Chinese affairs a dangerous luxury and display of force in dealing with the Chinese did not prove profitable to trade nor advantageous to investments. This difficult situation was complicated by the activities of the Russian Bolsheviks, who, even though failing to obtain a favorable response from the Chinese coolie to their call to join forces with Bolshevism, did succeed in exciting still further the anti-foreign sentiment.

But the first intimation of a tendency toward a more conciliatory policy is seen in the Washington Conference of 1921. This Con-

ference was called in the interest of naval disarmament, but the Chinese situation and the larger question of the Pacific were closely bound up with naval limitation. The elimination of causes for conflict must go hand in hand with reduction of armament, and China, offering by its weakness and disorganization a tempting field for rivalries and conflicts, was immediately recognized as a major problem for the Conference. (73) This problem, as viewed at the Washington Conference, was not a matter of conciliating China, but of reducing international rivalry and providing for the protection of interests in the Far East by re-defining the mutual positions after the disruption caused by the World War. In this conference, Great Britain found that her interests coincided more closely with those of the United States than with the policy of Japan, the only other Power whose extensive interests in China survived the war. Japan, determined to obtain for herself a liberal portion of the disorganized and helpless Republic, was in a position because of her geographical location and her unscrupulous aggressiveness to obtain what she wanted. This policy, was, however, vigorously opposed by the United States, who had no spheres of influence in China. The policy of the United States offered to Great Britain an opportunity to continue the development of her investments and her markets unhampered; but not so the Japanese policy, which would have meant the re-establishment of spheres of influence and a struggle for concessions and cessions of territory. And in this game Japan held an advantageous position, a fact that could not be overlooked by Britain nor by the Dominions.

The Nine-Power Treaty was the result of the discussions of the committee on Pacific and Far Eastern questions at the Conference. (74) And in this Treaty, following the policy outlined by the United States, the Powers agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of China, and declared that they would refrain from taking advantage of unsettled conditions to seek special rights and privileges. Equal opportunity for commerce and industry was to be established and maintained; the seeking of monopolies that would interfere with legitimate undertakings of the nationals of other Powers should receive no support; there should be no unfair discrimination in the matter of railroads; and China's rights as a neutral in time of war should be respected. (75) A Resolution was then passed calling for the establishment of a Board of Reference to discuss problems connected with the "open



door" policy. (76) This Board would act as an executive body for the enforcement of the policy. Tariff revision also came under the consideration of the Conference. China was given an actual five per cent, the amount which she had been getting theoretically but not actually. The Treaty on Tariffs also called for revision every seven years and for the meeting of a commission to put the terms of the treaty into force. (77) This commission finally met in 1925, at which time China's demand for tariff autonomy was granted, to take effect by January 1, 1929, on condition that the *likin* system first be abolished. (78) The other subject of such great importance to the Chinese, extraterritoriality, was also taken up by the Washington Conference. A resolution was passed declaring that the Powers were desirous of relinquishing extraterritorial rights whenever the administration of Chinese laws would permit; and the establishment of a Commission, which should investigate and make recommendations to the Powers, was suggested. (79) This commission made its report in November, 1926. The report declared that because of the interference with justice by military authorities and because of the unsatisfactory conditions in the Magistrates' Courts before which such a large number of cases appeared, extraterritoriality could not yet be abolished. (80)

The Washington Conference, therefore, although called for the purpose of making satisfactory arrangements among the Powers themselves, actually resulted in a number of important concessions to China, even though the Powers were not willing to make the very definite guarantees which the Chinese delegates asked. (81) Advance in this direction, however, was prevented to a large degree, not by the Powers, but by the unsettled conditions in China. But the Republic lost nothing through the conference of the Powers, largely because England did not find it to her interest to revert to the pre-war situation. This, at least, indicated a definite step toward reduction of imperialism in China. But British interests were well protected, and it could hardly be said that Great Britain had sacrificed any of her imperialistic interests in favor of the Chinese. Balfour was careful to make sure that the suggestions made by the United States delegation were to be construed as in no way detrimental to existing interests in China. (82) Against the Chinese request for upward revision of the tariff schedules were ranged both labor and capital in England, because of the serious industrial situation there. And, in fact, the five per cent schedule agreed upon



was not high enough to be in any way protective. It would not, therefore, encourage the building of rival factories in China. Then, too, Britain still held Hong Kong, Kowloon, and Wei Hai Wei, and although the British were later driven from some of their concessions, troops were kept in China for the protection of British property. (83) The surrender of Hong Kong was never considered, and Kowloon, the British said, was necessary to the protection of Hong Kong. (84) Wei Hai Wei was to be returned as soon as the other leased territories were given up. This port, although Chinese sovereignty was to be restored, was to remain open to British ships without harbor dues and the British were to be permitted to store naval supplies there. (85) Since this port had been obtained in order to balance the leases of other Powers in north China, Britain had no further use for it, except as provided in the Treaty of Retrocession, if Japan would return her leased territories. This Treaty of Retrocession was finally put into effect in April, 1930, and the British forces were withdrawn from Wei Hai Wei, leaving Hong Kong and Kowloon as the only portions of China under direct British control. (86)

The relation of investments in China to the home governments has been regulated by a new China Consortium, formed in 1918. The United States had already withdrawn from the old Consortium because it was opposed to the "open door" policy. The withdrawal of Russia and Germany as a result of the war completed the dissolution. Consequently, Great Britain welcomed a suggestion from the United States for the formation of a new agreement. The new Consortium, extended to include Japan and France, provided for a closer relation of the governments and the companies by agreeing to give diplomatic support to the national group, which all firms of good standing interested in Chinese investments could be required to join. Independent firms would receive no diplomatic recognition. (87) The Powers were preparing at the close of the war to continue the old policy of exploitation.

By the middle of the decade, however, nationalism was reaching a most virulent stage and the uprisings of 1925 seriously threatened British interests, both through the boycott and the driving of the British from their concessions. To put down the movement by force of arms would have involved military operations of major importance which would necessarily have extended to all China and would doubtless have required the division of Chinese territory among the

Powers for military conquest and occupation. The possibility of the coöperation of the United States in such an enterprise was not to be considered, while Japan and Great Britain were competitors in the struggle for Chinese markets. Such a military undertaking might offer too much opportunity for increase of Japanese prestige and power to be looked upon with equanimity by the British. There could well have been doubt, too, about the attitude of English public opinion toward such a move. Moreover, the attitude that would have been taken by Russia and toward Russia in the event of military occupation of China was doubtless no small factor in the decision regarding the policy to be taken in the Far East. The only alternative to a policy of force was a policy of coöperation and conciliation, and perhaps withdrawal.

The Chinese nationalists were not without their sympathizers and supporters even in the British Parliament. This was, perhaps, due partly to a feeling of sympathy for a race oppressed by foreign domination, but it was due chiefly to the competition which cheap Chinese labor was offering to the British workman. Not only were native industries springing up in China, but British capitalists were also taking advantage of the cheap labor available, and numbers of British owned industries had been established. The result of these to the British laborer was clearly pointed out during the course of a debate in the British House of Commons in 1925. (88) The true interest of Great Britain does not lie in the exploitation of cheap Chinese labor, one member of the House pointed out in a severe indictment of the British policy there. That was to the interest of only a few shareholders, who were getting larger dividends than they would from home investments. "But there is a British interest in the Lancashire cotton mills," he continued, "and outside those Lancashire cotton mills adult workers are unemployed in Great Britain because small children drop asleep in Shanghai and elsewhere in China because of long hours of labor in the factories." (89) When this same process goes farther, another member pointed out, and the products of this cheap labor go into India and cut off the Indian market from the Lancashire mills, the situation at home will be worse than ever. "Then when the process goes one step farther the Government comes to this House and asks the Lancashire factory worker and the workers of this country to pay their share in taxation to finance a British navy to go away to the Far East to protect



the exploiters in their exploitation and further to degrade the Lancashire factory workers." (90)

The course being taken by imperialism in China was quite evidently not proving profitable to British labor, and the Government policy which made such a system possible was most severely criticised. It was claimed that armament-factory owners in England had floated Chinese loans in England. The warring factions were evidently getting from England the arms with which to carry on their struggle among themselves. The prevention of settlement among the factions in China was claimed to be a British policy, for through division there Britain might maintain her power. (91) But for the last accusation there seems to be no foundation, especially in view of the fact that at the Washington Conference the British delegation had sponsored a resolution calling for the exclusion of arms from China until conditions had become settled and the Government had been united under one head. The measure was lost only through lack of Italian coöperation. (92) The Government in the course of the same debate was also accused of sanctioning the political oppression of Chinese in many Chinese cities where the governments were in the absolute control of foreigners, but it was pointed out that the Chinese had moved into the foreign-controlled areas because of the peace and security they enjoyed there and that they were granted no more political privileges in territory under native control than in the foreign sections.

The conditions among the laborers there were also painted in darkest colors and the blame for these conditions was placed upon England by the opponents of the Government policy. The interest aroused in Parliament by the criticism directed against the Government because of this situation became so intense that as early as 1924, arrangements were made for an investigation of labor conditions there. The investigation and reports were made by the British Consuls in the various Chinese cities and their report was, on the whole, favorable to the British. (93) It was acknowledged that child labor, long hours, poor pay, and unsanitary conditions were the rule in the factories, but all seemed agreed that conditions were better in the foreign-owned factories than in the Chinese. The Consul of Foochow, who sent in the most extensive report, stated that long hours were not generally felt to be a grievance and that the women were used to heavy work, so did not mind it; that the Chinese owners would make no move toward reform, and, without



them, attempts of foreign owners would be useless. Moreover, the Foochow Consul suggested that the Chinese laborer, no matter what wages he received, had no assurance that he could keep the money that he had earned, for he might at any time be dragged off by robbers or by a military press gang. "A man exposed to dangers of this sort would count himself happy if he could be in a country where the rule of law is sufficiently firmly established to give people leisure to complain of long hours of work." (94) All this seems to suggest that there was a feeling among the foreign population of China that any amount of concession was justified if only peace and safety could be established.

Regardless, however, of any justification for unrestricted imperialism, the pressure arising from circumstances in China led to a very definite statement of policy, which took the form of a Memorandum to the Powers, issued by the British Government in December, 1926. This Memorandum marked a very decided change in the tendency of the British policy in the Far East. It began with an expression of anxiety regarding the recent course of events in China, and stated that, in the opinion of the British Government, the situation had changed materially since the agreements of 1921 and 1922 had been made. The Memorandum continued by asking the Powers to declare their readiness to consider revision of these treaties as soon as China should have a government with which they could negotiate. A failure of the Powers to meet sympathetically the powerful nationalist movement would not correspond to the real intentions of the Powers, according to the British view. "The idea should be abandoned that the economic and political development of China can only be secured under foreign tutelage. The Powers should announce their readiness to recognize the right of China to tariff autonomy as soon as she herself has settled and promulgated a new national tariff. They should modify their traditional attitude of rigid insistence on the strict letter of treaty rights and admit the essential justice of the Chinese claim for treaty revision. It would be wise to abandon the policy of ineffective protest over minor matters, reserving protest—which should then be made effective by united action—for cases where vital interests were at stake." (95)

The Memorandum is an acknowledgment of the failure of the policy of unrestricted force and of the necessity for finding a new solution to the imperial problem in China. Even Chamberlain in

1925 had declared that although lives and property must be protected and the Chinese must be held absolutely responsible for wanton injury, that did not solve the problem. (96) At the same time, Lloyd George had pointed out that peace in China was impossible because of the lack of unity there and that the British were responsible to a large degree for that situation because of their policy since the time of the Opium War. MacDonald had suggested that the whole trouble was due to the fact that China was in the throes of an industrial revolution and he had expressed hope for a policy which would show to China in a most emphatic way Britain's desire to aid her and to coöperate with her. And MacDonald's hope seemed, at the close of the last decade, in a fair way to be realized, for in spite of the unfavorable reception given the Memorandum by the other Great Powers, the British Government, on January 28, 1927, presented to the authorities at Hankow and at Peking very definite suggestions for treaty revision. The British declared themselves ready to recognize the modern Chinese Law Courts, to accept the Chinese Commercial and Civil Code, to consider a new penal code, to require British subjects to pay the legal Chinese taxes, and to discuss modifications of municipal administration in British Concessions. (97)

Some one has very aptly said that Great Britain, in her dealings with China, has carried an olive branch in one hand and a sword in the other, but of the two, the sword has played the more important role. That this relative importance will be maintained is by no means certain. The reasons for the change have already been noted and that these same conditions will force Great Britain into further concessions is highly probable. The Chinese certainly were not placated by a mere statement of liberal policy, as was proved by the uprisings and the capture of British concession areas in 1926 and 1927. The sword still had its place in British policy, however, for although British interests might be advanced to a greater degree by a more liberal policy and by a sincere endeavor to regain the goodwill of the Chinese than by the old policy of military force, the British still had immense interests that could not be tamely surrendered, even in an effort to obtain that good-will, without material injury to a very influential class in England. Then, too, it was necessary that the British retreat from their former position in China should appear voluntary and that it should be covered by a



show of legal negotiations, because of the necessity for the maintenance of British prestige in portions of the Empire itself.

That this was a serious problem in Egypt and in the Near East has already been indicated, but in still another portion of the Empire the problem was even more difficult. In India Britain's position was seriously threatened by a rising nationalism, but fortunately for the integrity of the Empire, this movement had not attained the degree of unity realized in Egypt. This nationalist movement had been developing in India steadily for many years; but there, too, the spirit of nationalism received remarkable stimulation from the World War, and Great Britain was forced to recognize a change in the nature of the imperial problem there. "The work of the Government in India," wrote MacDonald in 1920, "is no longer that of a government of civil servants, but of statesmen; its problems are no longer office and administrative problems, but political and legislative ones; it can no longer be a committee of Civil Service heads of departments, it must be a Cabinet. And the change has come from without owing to the growth in Indian merit, and self confidence, due to the strengthening of Indian opinion. Whilst we sat in our chairs of office, the halls and court yards became full of people animated by a new will. The relation of our imperialist power to their obedience had been revolutionized. Our power now knows its weakness, their will is strength, and we need no writing on the wall to tell us that such things belong to the nature of freedom, and their fulfilment should be the pride of the nation that has done its work so well. They close ancient chapters, but they do not end histories; they change relationships, but not allegiance." (98)

The necessity for the abolition of the old régime of economic exploitation supported by military force was recognized during the war. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 and the resulting Government of India Act indicate the direction of British policy. The first aim of this union, the Report states, cannot be based upon race, religion, past history, or common civilization, but upon "a common realization of the ends for which the Empire exists, the maintenance of freedom and the development of the culture of each national unity of which the Empire is composed." (99)

"The policy of His Majesty's Government," said Montagu in the House of Commons, "is that of increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of

"Trusteeship" and they conclude that the British are trustees not only for the development and advancement of the civilization of the native Africans, but that they are also "trustees for the world of very rich territories." This means that the British "have a duty to humanity to develop the vast economic resources of a great continent." It would seem that this duty is one which the British investors and settlers in East Africa were very willing to assume. But responsibility to the natives and the desirability of economic development should not conflict, according to the Commission. The Government has provided for the good of the native inter-tribal peace, security of life and property, provision for Western standards of justice and criminal jurisdiction, medical service, schools, means of communication, and social and political organization. That something has been done along these lines is acknowledged, but that there has often been a lack of interest in providing these advantages and that the native had paid well and was still paying for the "progress" which the Europeans brought, is only too evident. There seemed ample justification for the statement that it "is still true that 'colonizing in Africa is making the negro work.' " (106)

The scarcity of labor in the Colony "is necessitating the use of communal or compulsory labor for the construction of much needed new roads and it is not inconceivable that similar forms of compulsion will be required for public services," the Commission reported, but declared that it was the duty of the British Government to prevent the chiefs from using compulsory labor for their own profit and also to define clearly its use under other circumstances. Taxes were levied upon the native for two purposes, apparently. One was to make him work, for he could not pay taxes unless he worked to earn the money with which to pay. But this, from the white man's view-point, was good for him, and, besides, helped to develop the region. The other purpose seemed to be to raise money to improve the settled areas without putting too great a burden upon the white settlers. The minority report of the Commission states that in one district over two hundred thousand pounds in direct taxes had been collected in ten years, but that the same district still remained a wilderness, and, if the British were to leave at that time, the only evidence of British occupation would be the buildings which had been erected for the tax-collecting staff. Ross claims that the natives, in the twenty-five years from 1900 to 1925, paid in direct



taxes nearly six million pounds while the white settlers in the same period paid slightly over three hundred thousand pounds, and yet this money was used almost exclusively for the benefit of the white settlers and investors. (107) Besides this, the white settlers have appropriated the best of the lands for themselves. "In 1921 it was estimated that 10,000 square miles of the choicest land was the private property of 10,000 Europeans whereas 2,000,000 natives were placed on reservations which totaled, it is true, 33,000 square miles, but of this only 5,000 square miles was classified as good." (108) In this matter of lands, the Commission reported that neither the individual native nor the tribe as a whole had any right to lands which were recognized in the courts, and although the Kenya Government could not alienate land from the native reserves legally without the sanction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the boundaries of the reserves were not definitely fixed, and in some instances the Governor failed to report the cases or reported them too late for a reversal of his decision because of the development of the land by the individual to whom it had been granted.

The British in East Africa were quite evidently more concerned in the development of cotton plantations and in the building of roads than in seeing to it that all the benefits which are supposed to accrue from the imperialistic regime were realized by the natives. The obligation to the world was perhaps more in line with their interests than the obligation to the natives. At any rate, the Commission found examples of the inadequacy of the existing educational facilities and they found that attention to sanitation and medical care left much to be desired. The Report leads to the belief that at least in Nyasaland and Uganda, this work was left entirely to the missionaries, the Government having taken no interest whatever in such matters.

The Minority Report of the Commission noted that desertion by a laborer from employment was still a criminal offence, and recommended a change in regard to this law. Courts were, in 1929, still very partial to the white man and even the death of a native at the hands of a white settler carried at most a very light sentence. (109) Hall cites instances of the fatal flogging and shooting of natives by the whites for minor offences, in which cases no action was taken against the whites. Such incidents can leave little doubt as to the

native opinion regarding the worth of "Western standards of justice and criminal jurisdiction" with which he was favored.

Apparently, however, the British Government made no effort to remedy the condition described by the Commission. There was no vigorous nationalism among the natives to keep the matter before the minds of the public as was the case in Egypt, India and China. The Government did, however, refuse to grant self-government to the region, and that refusal in the case of East Africa was not the result of mere conservatism. Self-government would have meant government by the Colonists, an arrangement which would not have worked to the advantage of the natives. The Governors in the Colonies themselves recognized the problem, however, and in a Conference of the Governors of the British East African Dependencies in 1926, the problem of the native in his relation to the development of the Colonies was considered, as was the question of federation and the association of white immigrants and natives in the government. (110) But as for the Government at London, there seemed to be no positive, active policy in regard to the East African possessions. These regions were developing satisfactorily, there was no great internal disturbance that demanded attention, and no great international rivalry was threatening the security of the territories. There seemed, to Britain, therefore, no need for active interference. (111)

This is more or less characteristic of Britain's entire imperialistic program during the latter half of the decade, as is indicated by examples cited in this chapter. Events in the British Empire indicate that the old-time aggressive militaristic imperialism, such as was carried through in Mesopotamia even after the war, is now playing a less prominent role in British policy. This may be due to the satisfaction of imperialistic demands by the acquisitions made during and just after the World War. So far as this satisfaction accounts for the abandonment of spreading acquisitive imperialism, the change will be temporary. As the new regions are more fully developed, British capital and British enterprise must reach further, perhaps for areas that less enterprising nationals have failed to develop as completely as the British have developed theirs. But in so far as public opinion has become aroused to the dangers inherent to an arrogant, grasping imperialism, and is ready to join with the more liberal parties in condemning such a policy, to that extent an important cause of war will be lessened. How far this



latter force is exerting an influence, one decade is much too brief a period to determine. In the regions under British control, recent years have seen the British policy becoming more liberal, less definite and aggressive, more opportunistic. The most powerful force in breaking the old policy of unlimited British dominance is the rising nationalism of the East, but it is doubtful if opinion in England, in the Dominions, and in other parts of the world would sanction another Opium War or a partition of China carried out by force of arms. The sword and the olive branch both have their place, but confidence in the efficiency of the sword in dealing with native peoples seems to have suffered a considerable diminution during the past few years.

This, it would seem, accounts for the similarity in policy among the three political parties of England. The policy is continued without a noticeable break, regardless of change of Governments, not so much because the Labour Party has abandoned its ideals—for security and integrity of the Empire are a fundamental part of the Labour creed, even if grasping imperialism is rejected—but rather because the Conservative Party finds it inadvisable or impossible to carry through a forceful policy. The strength of these new movements opposing the old policy is as yet untried, and consequently the method for handling the new situation must be developed slowly and with the greatest care.

## CHAPTER III

### THE NAVAL CHALLENGE

Closely allied to this problem of imperialism which presented itself to the British in new form in the decade following the War, was the question of control of the seas and the maintenance of the relative power of the British fleet. Great Britain had been drawn into the World War through her effort to maintain her supremacy of the seas and to find security for her great Imperial System and she had succeeded well in destroying the German Empire, with its claims to equality with the British. But the war, even as it failed to solve the problem of Imperialism, failed to establish the supremacy of British naval power. When the war was over, Great Britain found that in destroying one menace she had hastened the rise of another even more formidable. This new rival for supremacy of the seas, as has already been indicated, was found in America.

The British Government did not, however, immediately upon the close of the War, take up the challenge thrown out by America in 1916. Problems of peace and reconstruction absorbed the attention of her statesmen and for a time there seemed to be no general recognition of the change in American policy. The unprecedented activity during the War had given to Britain a fleet which seemed, after the destruction of Germany, far greater than the needs of the Empire demanded, and economy and retrenchment dictated Government policy. (1) But by the beginning of 1921, the new problem which Great Britain must face was clearly recognized, (2) and a number of possible solutions were put forward at various times in the effort to meet the new situation. Formal alliance with the United States, assistance from the Dominions, the building of a great air force, open competition in naval armaments, agreements regarding naval armaments and alliances against the United States, were all suggested and some of these plans were tried. The first of these, an alliance with the United States was suggested in the House of Commons but was given no consideration. (3) The plan of calling upon the overseas Empire for assistance in building up a great navy was also dismissed without extended discussion. The First



Lord of the Admiralty suggested that the Dominions had already accepted heavy burdens during the war and that it probably would not be wise to ask them to assume still heavier obligations at once. (4) That this method of meeting American competition has never been used is indicated by the almost total lack of Dominion and Indian fleets, later in the decade. In 1928, Australia, which maintained the largest of the Dominion navies, owned only two submarines, four small cruisers built during the war and two large cruisers still in process of building; Canada maintained four destroyers and four mine-sweeping trawlers; New Zealand counted two small cruisers as her naval force; the Union of South Africa owned one surveying vessel and three mine-sweeping trawlers; the Royal Indian Navy consisted of three sloops, one depot ship built in 1886 and four patrol boats; the Irish Free State listed no vessels of any kind. (5) Great Britain has very evidently not been depending on supplementary Dominion fleets with which to meet American competition.

Neither, apparently, has an air force been counted upon as a substitute for a great fleet. This question was discussed in the House of Commons in 1920 and again in 1921 when the navy estimates were under consideration, and it was then maintained that the war had proved that the air force was not yet effective against capital ships. The inability of the air forces to operate at long distances from their bases also made it impossible to substitute air force for capital ships and cruisers. (6) For these reasons the question of growing air forces has never figured in the competition between Britain and America. That has remained for Great Britain very largely a European problem. (7)

Open competition was adopted, however, as a means of meeting the American challenge. Sir James Craig, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty, announced to the House of Commons in March, 1921, that four new Capital ships provided with all improvements and constructed according to the lessons learned in the war were laid down that same year. (8) It was pointed out during the course of the debate which followed this announcement that the experience of the war had made all capital ships obsolete but that the building program undertaken by the United States after 1916 would give her eighteen post-Jutland ships by 1924. Great Britain would have at that time at most only five. (9) To maintain the old Two-Power standard of pre-war days, in view of this situation, was quite

obviously out of the question, but the Admiralty announced, at the same time that the new naval program was outlined, that a One-Power standard had been definitely accepted, (10) and that large increases were necessary to maintain even the new standard.

At the Washington Conference which met near the close of that same year, the British representative apparently gave assurance of the acceptance of the demands of the United States for parity. But the acceptance of agreements which provided for parity between the two navies was more apparent than real, as was amply proved by the failure of the Geneva Conference of 1927. Then, too, as has frequently been pointed out, the meaning of parity has never been made clear. Does it mean equality in the number of naval units; does it mean equality in total tonnage, or in the tonnage of separate categories; or does it mean equality in so far as national needs may dictate? The Naval Conference of 1921 did not go far toward settling the different points of view held by the two countries regarding the interpretation to be placed upon a principle which had been accepted at least nominally. But even though an agreement was reached only in regard to capital ships and airplane carriers, the Conference marked, because of the spirit which made even this agreement possible, a very definite step in advance of the attitude which had been maintained toward German competition before the war. It also marked the beginning of endeavors to solve the new naval problem which had arisen between Great Britain and the United States by a new method, that of agreement as opposed to unlimited competition.

The first step taken toward agreements concerning limitation of naval armament, however, was to provide for security in regions where the situation made the maintenance of great armaments necessary. This the Powers attempted to do at the Washington Conference by drawing up the Four-Power Treaty which was designed to guarantee the status quo in the Pacific by means of mutual guarantees of the insular possessions of the signatory Powers. (11) But this Treaty may be looked upon as something quite different from a mere foundation for naval disarmament. It may also be considered as an attempt to meet the naval problem by means of a military alliance rather than through mutual understanding. This contention is based partially upon Article II of the Four-Power Treaty which states that "If the said rights in relation to the insular possessions and Dominions of the Powers in the region of the



Pacific Ocean are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation."

In the opinion of some persons, this article forms a definite alliance with military sanctions; in the opinion of others it entails no definite military obligation, (12) depending for its execution upon the good faith of each signatory and perhaps upon diplomatic pressure. At the same time when the Treaty was drawn up, the Government representatives spoke of the obligation of each of the signatories to aid in the maintenance of the rights of the others as "only moral." (13) But that moral obligations can become as binding as a formal treaty was amply proved by the British relations to France in 1914. The Treaty, however, indicates a different spirit and a different aim than were found in the pre-war treaties of alliance. The latter were military alliances directed against the aspirations of an outside group and were intended to aid in the maintenance of the allied interests at the expense of the furtherance of the enemy interests. The Four-Power Treaty, on the other hand, while not overlooking the possibility of outside aggression, emphasizes the relations among the signatories themselves. Article I provides for a joint conference to be held to settle any difficulties arising among the ratifying nations. That this Treaty was aimed primarily to provide for the peaceable settlement of disputes among the signatories rather than to form a military alliance is further indicated by the agreements regarding fortifications. According to this agreement, the status quo was to be maintained within a specified region, (14) each country thereby abandoning the possibility of carrying out plans for extensive additions to fortifications in that region.

If, however, the Four-Power Treaty did make possible a military alliance directed against any one Power, that Power, from the British point of view, could scarcely have been the United States. It must, in that case, be looked upon as an attempt to solve the problem of Imperial security through an alliance with, rather than against, America. In the first place, the new Treaty abrogated the old formal Anglo-Japanese Alliance, (15) substituting for it a broader agreement including the United States and France. It has, in fact, been claimed that the Four-Power Treaty was merely a dé-

vice for destroying the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and that it was supplemented by a definite understanding between the British and American delegates providing for the coöperation of the two fleets in the Pacific, thus making possible the domination of the Far East without the expense of maintaining two immense fleets in that region. That such an understanding had ever been reached was of course emphatically denied by representatives of both Governments. (16) But a formal agreement would not be necessary to insure coöperation between the two countries. A similarity of interest would have the same effect. Buell claims (17) that "while the Four-Power Treaty eliminates the menace of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the United States, it does not destroy entirely the moral encouragement which that Alliance gave to Japanese imperialism. Great Britain no longer guarantees Japan's special interests in the Far East. Nevertheless her diplomatic freedom is restricted by the Four-Power Treaty and by her interests in the Orient which Japan may imperil." The developments of the last few years showed, however, that British interests in the Orient were much more similar to those of the United States than to those of Japan. (18) The aggressive imperialism of the latter was rather an added reason for close coöperation between Great Britain and America. And there is no provision in the Treaty itself which would place England under obligation to support Japanese imperialistic interests, as did the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The obligation for granting support, either military or "moral," to Japan would, it seems, depend upon the interpretation as to what constituted the "rights" of the signatory as mentioned in Article II of the Treaty. There seems no justification for assuming that Japanese imperialistic designs should constitute "rights" that Great Britain would be bound to defend or would have any desire to support.

Because of this growing similarity of interest between the United States and Great Britain in the Far East, their fleets could hardly be considered rivals in that region and since the Treaty, no matter whether it formed the foundation for a military alliance or not, offered guarantees which proved satisfactory to Japan and France, as well as to the great English Powers, it made possible definite agreements concerning the relative size to be attained by the various navies. The first attempt to come to a satisfactory agreement regarding this matter was made at Washington immediately after the signing of the Four-Power Treaty, and resulted in agree-



ments regarding certain classes of vessels and the acceptance, to a certain extent, of the principles of parity. The Conference closed, however, with the application of this principle only to the capital ships and aircraft carriers. The attempt to limit auxiliary vessels, that is cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, failed. Great Britain was especially anxious to limit, or, better still, to abolish the submarine, for her experiences during the war had proved that these instruments of warfare, while offering little aid in the defense of England, had been destructive to commerce and had threatened the very existence of the Empire. The British delegation therefore, brought forward, at the Washington Conference, a proposal for abolition of the submarine by mutual agreement. (19) This position had to be abandoned, however, in the face of the combined opposition of France, Japan, Italy, and the United States. (20) These countries had disagreed with Britain's contention that the submarine was practically valueless as a means of defense and no agreement even for limitation could be reached. The failure to limit submarine building made impossible any limitation on destroyers, and even cruisers had been limited to a maximum size which exceeded the displacement of any cruisers then being built. (21)

The efforts to limit or abolish the use of submarines did not cease with the closing of the Washington Conference, as will be noted in connection with the Anglo-French Accord of 1928. The problem was taken up by the Preparatory Commission in the League, and efforts to come to an agreement with the French, who became the chief opponents of the British submarine policy, continued. The question of cruiser building also remained a live issue. Great Britain's need was for many small cruisers rather than for a few large ones as was the case in the United States, for she had an immense region to defend, but her naval bases were numerous and well distributed. But the small cruiser would be no match for the great 10,000 ton vessel the United States was building. Great Britain, therefore, felt the necessity for the building of great cruisers which she did not want, unless some definite agreement with America could be reached.

It was to remedy this failure of 1921 and to satisfy these demands for further agreement regarding naval competition that the invitation to a new Naval Conference at Geneva was accepted in 1927. In this Conference the difficulties which had been somewhat overshadowed by the successes of the Washington Conference came to

light. That national interests had been paramount in the considerations of all of the countries at the Conference of 1921 had been proved by the heated dispute over submarines, but at the Three-Power Conference at Geneva this attitude was over-emphasized to such a degree that failure was inevitable. This over-emphasis upon national interests and the refusal of all groups to compromise sufficiently to reach an agreement was due to a number of factors. In the first place, the divergence between the interests of the Powers had grown no smaller since 1921, but had perhaps been clarified and emphasized. The representatives of the United States went to the Conference in 1927 with a plan which would have applied the principle of parity to auxiliary vessels and would have extended the ratio adopted for capital ships at the Washington Conference to all auxiliary vessels. (22) This proposal the British refused to accept, chiefly because such an arrangement limited the total tonnage rather than the number of vessels of each size. The plan proposed by the United States would have permitted the building of the great cruisers up to the limit of the total tonnage granted and Great Britain would have been forced in order to maintain the One-Power standard to follow suit. Great Britain, therefore, proposed to limit naval armament by limiting the size of vessels and by extending the life of those in use. (23) In addition to these differences, the total tonnage suggested by the British was twice the amount which the United States delegation considered should satisfy all defensive needs. (24)

Difference in national need, however, was not the only factor which entered into the failure of the Conference. In 1927, Great Britain was not faced with a competitive building program such as the United States had launched in 1916. America's demand for the greatest navy in the world had materially lessened, for the discomfiture caused by her inability to enforce freedom of the seas during the war had been forgotten to some extent, and popular demand had been satisfied by the accomplishment of equality with Great Britain in the matter of capital ships, little distinction being made in the popular mind between capital ships and auxiliary vessels. There was, therefore, no pressing need for an agreement with the United States. Great Britain in 1927 held a substantial lead in the matter of cruisers, a lead that was not likely to be seriously threatened by any other power. (25) Then, too, France and Italy had declined to take any active part in the Conference and the at-



titude of these countries could not be overlooked by Great Britain. For, in spite of the protested friendship between France and Great Britain, the Entente had at times been subjected to severe strain, and one occasion of this kind had arisen over the matter of submarines at the Conference of 1921. Italy also had declared in favor of a policy of aggressive imperialism. Great Britain's position in the Mediterranean was, therefore, threatened by both France and Italy, and in the maintenance of her position the submarine was a most important factor.

More important than any of these factors in the failure of the Conference was the attitude taken by the Governments, and the spirit with which the Powers entered the Conference. And in this most important cause of failure the Conservative Government of Great Britain must assume a considerable share of responsibility. Since it is the purpose to determine here the attitude of Great Britain toward foreign policy and problems of peace, and not to attempt to determine the relative degree of responsibility of the various Powers, the attitude of the Governments of the United States and Japan must be largely disregarded; but the viewpoint of the British Government, at least, was undoubtedly primarily military. That the Conservative Government had refused to accept equality with the United States in number and size of all classes of vessels was evident even before the convening of the Conference. Mr. Bridgeman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, made this clear when he declared a year before the Conference opened that there was always a little danger in talking about a One-Power standard. That only existed, he said, in regard to battleships and ships of large size. It would be a very dangerous thing for Great Britain to allow it to be thought that she could be satisfied with a One-Power standard in cruisers. In cruisers they wanted to feel that they were, at any rate, superior to other countries, and were able to protect their trade. (26) Even if the pre-war Two-Power Standard could not be maintained in its entirety, the Conservatives were evidently unwilling to consider equality as a new standard. Mr. Bridgeman's statement indicated that national need was the only standard that the Government was willing to consider in the building or the limiting of the navy. If such a criterion were adopted for the size of naval programs, there could scarcely be a limit to naval building, for the military experts are never at a loss to find weaknesses that must be strengthened. In the second place, Bridgeman's declara-

tion implied that any country was a potential enemy which might at any time threaten England's trade. Against this enemy or enemies, Great Britain must maintain an indefinite naval strength which no one nation must be allowed to proximate. *The Times* of a later date (27) comes out in an even more definite expression of this point of view: "The difference," according to the *Times*, "between the 'parity' that means an effective equality in British and American naval strength and the 'mathematical parity' that would put an American Navy in a position to threaten the internal communications of the British Empire has yet to be fully explained both to the British and American peoples." The intimation here is that "effective equality" means a British navy with sufficient strength to protect the Empire against an American navy. *The Times* concludes in the same editorial that there is only one solution for the problem, and that is for each country to go its own way and for each to determine its own needs for national defense. Such a solution could mean nothing but unlimited competition.

The Conference itself carried through from first to last a military atmosphere very different from the spirit of the Conference of 1921. The note of acceptance of the invitation to the Three-Power Conference sent to the American Government by the British called attention to the special geographical position of the British Empire and the necessity for the protection of the food supply. This, the note stated, must be taken into consideration along with the special conditions and requirements of the other countries, when the question of limitation of naval armaments was to be considered. (28) The basis of discussion was evidently to be military needs instead of the requirements of peace and disarmament. National interests rather than disarmament was to be the keynote. Such a procedure was in striking contrast to the Washington Conference at which questions of mutual security, understanding, and good-will were made the foundations for disarmament agreement. But even with this foundation, agreement upon the question of auxiliary craft had failed. It is small wonder that agreement could not be reached when only national needs, considered apart from all else, should form the basis of discussion.

The next indication of the attitude of the Conservative Government was in the personnel of the delegation sent to the Conference. The First Lord of the Admiralty headed the delegation which was overwhelmingly military. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood was the only



political representative of prominence (29) and he felt that all his efforts in behalf of disarmament had been so hampered during the Conference and that he was, therefore, so completely out of harmony with his party that he resigned his position in the Government at the close of the Conference. He placed the blame for the failure to come to any agreement at the Conference directly upon the Cabinet, who, he said, had refused three different compromises suggested by the delegation, although these compromises had a very good chance of acceptance, and although the Cabinet had been warned that refusal would mean the breakdown of the Conference. (30) Lord Cecil further declared that the representatives of the Admiralty scarcely concealed their hostility to the entire proceedings of the Conference, and that he considered the instructions from the Council of Imperial Defense an unsatisfactory compromise between the fighting services and disarmament as an essential to security. (31)

Although Viscount Cecil intimated that the Cabinet was even more determined than was the British delegation to refuse to agree to any limitation or compromise in regard to naval force, statements of the head of the delegation indicate a most decidedly uncompromising point of view. Mr. Bridgeman declared definitely that the Japanese and the United States proposals were far below anything that could be considered as a figure of security for the British and that care must be taken not to make promises that would prevent the British from being able to build what they wanted. Even necessity for defense is not held up as the criterion of limitation, but the desire of the Admiralty. Security was the first consideration, he said, and that depended largely on numbers. (32) The First Lord of the Admiralty was declaring, not for the principle of parity as adopted in 1921, but in favor of the British policy as outlined by Sir Austen Chamberlain when he said that it was the understood policy of the Government to try to limit the size and armament while leaving the numbers as fixed at Washington unaltered. (33) But since the number of auxiliary craft was not fixed at Washington, this could mean nothing but maintenance so far as possible of the existing ratio, which, as has already been indicated, left Britain far in advance of the United States in the matter of naval strength.

The importance of the attitude of the Government in the failure of the 1927 Conference is indicated by the success of 1930. The London Conference was apparently faced with all of the difficulties

that had caused the failure of the Geneva Conference. There had apparently been no change in the national needs of Great Britain and the United States, and although France and Italy consented to send delegates to participate in the discussions of the Conference of 1930, their attitude regarding naval affairs had undergone no change. The attitude of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain was very different, however, from that which had been exhibited in 1927. During the latter part of 1929, both Governments were emphasizing the need for coöperation rather than the military needs of national defense. (34) This change in attitude is indicated by the nature of the delegations sent to London. Instead of being predominantly military, as had been the case at the earlier Conference, the British delegation was headed by the Prime Minister and the American delegation was led by the Secretary of State, both being assisted by leading statesmen from each country. (35) Such a choice indicated the determination of the Governments to relegate military considerations to a minor position, while attempting to meet the problem with the wider view of the statesman. These changes resulted in the overcoming of the difficulties which had wrecked the earlier Conference and in a further application of the principle of understanding and coöperation which had been accepted by the Labour Party as the means of solving the naval problem.

All efforts to reach an agreement with France and Italy failed, however, as completely as in 1927, but such a failure was not allowed to bar the way to an understanding between Great Britain and the United States. Any danger that might arise because of the refusal of the Powers of Southern Europe to participate was eliminated by the "safe-guarding clause" included in the final treaty, which provided that should national security demand an increase in naval armaments, any Power might make the needed additions to its naval force after notifying the other signatory Powers, who would then be permitted to make the same increases. (36) The European situation, MacDonald said, had proved difficult to solve and had therefore been put aside for later settlement; but in the meantime, the safe-guarding clause had made possible an agreement between the other interested Powers. (37)

The question of cruisers, which was a problem the Geneva Conference had been unable to solve, was also settled to the satisfaction of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, in spite



of the fact that agreement had appeared impossible three years earlier. It was provided that the total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines should be limited by 1936 to 541,700 tons for each country. (38) The tonnage for cruisers alone was to be practically equal within five years, but the demands of each country were cared for by allowing the United States a greater tonnage than Great Britain in cruisers carrying guns of more than 6.1 inches, while conceding to Great Britain the advantage in cruisers carrying smaller guns. (39) The size of the destroyers and submarines was limited to prevent a continuous increase in size such as would have been inevitable under a system of open competition. The good-will between the two great powers was further manifested by the fact that the agreement made at Washington in 1921 was carried further by the provision that there should be no replacement of capital ships until after 1936. (40) It was estimated by the British delegates that the arrangement made at London meant a saving of about sixty-seven million pounds in five years as compared to the amount that would have been spent under the plan proposed by the British at Geneva. Of this amount, fifty million pounds represented money that could have been spent on battleships according to the Treaty of 1921. (41) The London agreement put a limit on British cruisers, submarines and destroyers of nearly fifty thousand tons less than the lowest demands of 1927, while Great Britain agreed to reduce the number of her cruisers by twenty, in order that the United States might easily attain an equality of tonnage. (42) The agreement brought naval armaments to the lowest level of limitation ever seriously discussed, according to Secretary Stimson of the United States. (43)

Before the Labour Government had succeeded in coming to an agreement with the United States regarding naval competition, however, England's Conservative Government had made another effort to solve the problem of naval power. The failure of the Three-Power Conference of 1927 made such efforts even more essential, for the Conference had made clear the vital differences in the naval needs of each country as each saw these needs, and it had also indicated an unyielding attitude in these matters on the American side as well as on the British. Again, the danger of American competition emerged, and the English again faced the necessity of finding a means of meeting this competition which the failure to come to an understanding was threatening to arouse. The method adopt-

ed was quite typical of the Conservative Party, whose effort, which began in the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations in 1926, culminated in the Anglo-French Accord of 1928. There is much concerning the aims and purposes back of the agreement which had been reached between the Governments of France and England, and much concerning the real meaning of the Compromise, as it was called by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that has never been made clear. Consequently, there is decided disagreement as to its full meaning; but, in spite of a lack of clarity regarding aims and purposes, the opposition aroused by it revealed important new trends. Its consideration is, therefore, well worth while.

Disarmament had been recognized by the League of Nations as one of the great problems with which that organization must deal. The solution of this problem had, in fact, been set forth in the Covenant itself as one of the important aims of the League (43) and this body had devoted itself earnestly since the time of the meeting of the First Assembly to the attempt to find a solution. The Geneva Protocol of 1924 had carried a provision for the calling of a general disarmament conference, and although the Protocol failed of ratification by the Powers, the League Council, unwilling to allow the attempt to solve the disarmament problem to drop entirely, appointed a committee to make arrangements for a general conference. (45) This committee, which began its work in 1925, attempted to draw up some program upon which a conference could proceed. It was in this Preparatory Committee that the differences between the plans of Great Britain and France came to light, and it was the cause for the failure to call the disarmament conference. The inability of these two Powers to agree caused a practical deadlock in the Commission at its session in March, 1928. But the British Foreign Minister and the French Prime Minister had already begun negotiations between themselves in an effort to settle the vital differences between the two countries. This action was announced to the Preparatory Commission in March, 1928, and apparently received the Commission's approval. (46) These negotiations had proceeded without receiving attention from the people of either Parliament in either country until the final agreement was reached in July, 1928. There would seem to be, according to the history of the negotiations up to this point, nothing to arouse the storm which the Compromise was met, but there were a number of other



elements which throw an entirely different light upon the matter. The first of these was the air of secrecy which had surrounded the negotiations after they had been taken up by the two Governments. The first intimation that the British Parliament had of what had been going on came on July 30, when Sir Austen Chamberlain suggested that an agreement had been reached. The statement was made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in answer to a question as to what progress was being made by the Preparatory Commission.

"At the moment the Preparatory Commission on disarmament is not in session," he said, "and no definite date has been fixed for its session, but, as has been publicly announced, conversations have been proceeding between ourselves and the French with the hope of reducing the difference between us, indeed in the hope of finding some compromise upon which we could both agree and which we might then submit to other Powers and perhaps by our proposals, facilitate progress in the Committee. These conversations have been successful between the French and ourselves and I am about to communicate to the other principal naval Powers the compromise at which we have arrived, with the hope that it may be acceptable to them also—" (47)

The statement of the Foreign Secretary, who refused to make any further explanation at that time, is important not only because of its vagueness but because it outlines what he and his party consistently maintained was the true purpose of the Agreement. The motive, according to the Conservative Party, was to facilitate the work of disarmament by settling differences which could be settled only through compromise, and to make possible a continuation of the work of the Preparatory Committee, if the other Powers could be persuaded to accept that arrangement as a basis of further negotiations. There is no doubt that one reason for the failure of the Geneva Conference was Great Britain's unwillingness to agree to reductions without some arrangement with France, and the Anglo-French Accord of 1928, according to the Conservative claim, was an honest attempt to remove this difficulty and to bring France into a disarmament agreement.

Those, however, who believed that this was not the prime motive for the action of the Government had considerable foundation for their contention. The secrecy maintained by the Governments of Great Britain and France quite naturally gave rise to the suspicion that there were secret agreements which would bind England to an

alliance with France, or, at least, place her under obligations to the French as had the military conversations before the World War. The Government's refusal to publish an official account of proceedings until nearly three months later (48) added to that suspicion, which was further intensified by the comments upon the Compromise by various French papers which immediately interpreted the agreement as a definite alliance, a view adopted by many of the English as well as by many Americans, since there was no information with which to prove the arrangement anything else. After Chamberlain's vague statement in the House of Commons on July 30, there were no further explanations forthcoming from the British Government until October 22, except reiteration of the purpose as first stated and categorical denials of the formal alliance. There was need for such denials, for there was abundant information and extensive speculation coming from the press. The French papers, in spite of the statements of the Governments that the terms of the agreement must not be made known until the other Powers had had an opportunity to form an unprejudiced opinion in regard to the matter, had somehow obtained information as to the compromise. The Governments still refused to publish authoritative information; but nearly two months later, the *New York American* published a letter which the French Government had sent to the French Ambassadors in the United States, Great Britain, and Italy, which contained the technical naval agreement which had been reached by the British and the French. (49) About the same time, the *Echo de Paris* published a summary of the correspondence which had been carried on in making the arrangements between the two countries. (50) There was evidently a leak in the French Foreign Office and the opponents of the British Conservative Government suggested that such slips were not unintentional on the part of the French. (51) The suggested purpose was to make definite, by means of publicity, the obligation of the British Government to the French. Even though the Powers refused to accept the technical arrangements regarding the fleet, Great Britain might be considered as publicly bound to stand by her ally. There was, of course, disagreement as to the possible future obligation of Great Britain because of the public announcement. Chamberlain himself had first mentioned the agreement in the House of Commons and he had already agreed to the sending of the plans to the other Powers, al-



though in the White Paper it appears that this suggestion came first from France. (52)

The terms of the Accord as they finally became known also gave considerable strength to the belief that the British Government had something very different from disarmament in mind. According to the agreement, four classes of ships were to be subject to limitation. Capital ships and airplane carriers had already been limited at Washington. This limitation was to be extended to the lesser Powers. In regard to cruisers, only those which carried guns of six to eight inches were to be subject to limitation, while only submarines of over six hundred tons were to be limited. (53) This would leave the way clear for building an unlimited number of small submarines and cruisers, a plan in direct opposition to the position taken by the United States. It is difficult to believe that the British Government had any real hope that the United States would accede to a plan which would permit Great Britain to build all of the small cruisers she wanted, and France to build an unlimited supply of small submarines, while limiting herself in the number of large vessels which she felt she needed. It would seem that the experience at the Geneva Conference would have proved that such hope was vain. It looked very much more like a scheme to build, in England and in France, all of the naval equipment desired under a camouflage of disarmament. In addition to this plan, and as a further inducement to France to accept the Compromise, the British agreed to withdraw opposition to the French demand that military reserves should be excluded in computing land forces in any scheme which might come before a disarmament conference. (54) Britain would thus have abandoned all hope of limiting land forces, a move which certainly shows no particular enthusiasm for general disarmament. But the British had gone one step further in winning French coöperation. France was to be granted equality with Great Britain and the United States in the matter of cruisers and small submarines. (55) These were the terms of the plan which Chamberlain said he hoped would form the basis of an agreement which it had been found impossible to reach at Geneva. It is small wonder that considerable scepticism existed as to the sincerity of Conservative aims.

The most common accusation brought against the Government was that it had made a definite secret alliance with France. The willingness of the British to have the French build an army which

would be limited only by the number of able-bodied men of France suggested the plan of the British Government already referred to, (56) of allying the world's greatest fleet with the world's most powerful army. The French newspapers were apparently very frank in adopting just this interpretation of the Accord. (57) The *Liberal Manchester Guardian Weekly* gives a number of quotations to support this view. For example, the *Liberte* remarked that it could not "be a mere matter of settling purely and simply armies and fleets. In the long account this agreement resembles rather a convention between the General Staffs. Fundamentally we are interested in the naval strength of the English, fundamentally the English have an interest in the solidity of our army. Often enough have the Germans said that we are England's troops. Similarly in a way the English have become our sailors." (58) The *Echo de Paris* regretted that the affair had been announced. Politicians, this publication thought, should keep as discreetly quiet as do the military officials. (59) The *Temps*, in "an obviously inspired article," while claiming that there was no alliance, spoke of "the confident Anglo-French collaboration in view of the safe-guarding of the general peace, a coöperation which is in practice at the base of any policy of security for Europe." (60)

The French note of July 20, 1927, caused much criticism to be directed against the British Government because of their failure to answer in any way the suggestion made by the French. The note, as it appears in English translation in the White Paper, says that the French Government is "convinced that the concerted action of France and of Britain will enable the two Governments to obtain the approval of the naval Powers concerned. Whatever the result, and even should this hope prove illusory, the two Governments would none the less be under the urgent obligation to concert, either to ensure success by other means or to adopt a common policy so as to deal with the difficulties which would inevitably arise from a check to the Preparatory Commission." (61) The French note, however, does not mention the Preparatory Commission specifically, and it might, therefore, be interpreted to imply a much wider field of coöperation. (62) The French were very clearly suggesting the closest coöperation in case the other Powers refused to agree to the plan drawn up by Great Britain and France for carrying out their own schemes regarding military and naval armaments. This suggestion was never answered by the British Government, whose op-



ponents claimed that such failure was an implicit agreement to the suggestion. Lord Cushendun offered an explanation of this failure somewhat later. "It is a very disagreeable thing among friends," he said in reply to the charges of the opposition, "—to be obliged to repel an advance, and what we felt was that that particular paragraph, which—is vaguely expressed, does not make any specific proposal, but it did appear to us that it might bear the suggestion of something in the nature of a closer, formal political alliance, rather than the mere friendliness, which I call the Entente, which exists between the two countries. We do not like to repel an advance, and we thought that our silence would be perfectly understood, and I have not the least doubt that it has been." (63) Perhaps it was, but one is still left somewhat in doubt as to what the French Government understood. Lord Cushendun had said a few days before that the old Entente with France had never been dissolved. (64) It might be supposed that the new Accord marked the beginning of the renewal of the old obligations which had helped to drag England into the war.

It may be superfluous even to mention the attitude of the other parties toward the attempted compromise with France. The Government was subjected to the severest criticism during the entire next session of Parliament, which opened on November 6. Even Viscount Cecil, while maintaining that the aim of the Conservative Government was no different from the purpose of the other parties, condemned the method by which the problem had been attacked, and he entered a plea that the Government should treat the problem of disarmament as a matter not merely for technical consideration but that it should be treated with a broader outlook and as a matter of important national policy. (65) David Lloyd George, in speeches delivered at various times during the autumn of 1928, brought the most severe indictment against the British Government. He stated that France and her allies could put eight million trained men in the field in a few days, a force which would be overwhelming in view of the tiny armies of England and Germany. It was folly, he thought, to give way to France in the matter of reserves, and so approve an unlimited French army, and at the same time to estrange England from the United States, Italy, Germany and Russia. This would leave only France, who, he said, had proved an unsatisfactory friend at Angora and Chanaq. (66)

Members of both of the opposition parties seemed to disapprove

of the Conservative policy more because of the attitude adopted toward the United States in both the Geneva Conference and in the Anglo-French Accord than for any other reason. Both parties seem to have given up very definitely any idea of competition with the United States, whether through building programs or by agreements with other Powers. Supremacy of the seas was not entirely abandoned by either party, apparently, but the old idea was materially modified. Their hope lay in supremacy through coöperation with the American power, not through an alliance, nor through Conversations, or any other agreement which would place one country under obligations of any kind to the other, or which would exclude or estrange any other country; but through coöperation and open friendship which would consider the United States as a member of the Great British Commonwealth of Nations. Even naval agreements between the two Powers should be unnecessary, since discussion concerning parity and national needs implies a lack of complete understanding and the existence of a fear of future war. (67) Not only should war between the two countries be unthinkable, as the Conservatives also hold, but the fact that war is unthinkable should make possible, at the least, the greatest ease in agreeing with one another. American building should not even be considered as a factor in developing the British program, according to the liberal position, for competition between the two countries should be both a disaster and a disgrace. "The revolution in sea power, of which the sanction is the American Navy," declared Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy, "is really far more of a menace to the existing order in our points of view and policies than is the revolution in social policy. But it is even less a menace to our peace and prosperity and even more a means to recover our position and progress, provided we realize how to accommodate our old ideals to it and how to adapt it to our real interests. Yet we can do nothing until we recognize the new factors it has introduced into our old problems and the new forms in which it has recast them." (68)

The two liberal parties were, therefore, apparently prepared to face the problem of American naval power squarely and to solve it by means of the building of friendly coöperation and good-will. It is true that the Washington Conference, in which the Liberals along with the Conservatives participated, did not solve the problem which wrecked the Geneva Conference; but from the former the Powers emerged with a spirit of good-will which was a tribute to the method



of handling the situation, and which was in marked contrast to the spirit which pervaded the Conference of 1927, while the agreement reached at London three years later apparently marked the end of naval competition between the two greatest naval Powers. There is much evidence to show that the Conservative Governments, on the other hand, have been clinging tenaciously to the old idea of British supremacy, either through direct competition or through the formation of more or less definite and formal understandings with other Powers. Just how far a Conservative Government would carry this method or solution of the problem, if left to carry out its own policy unopposed, can not be definitely determined. But the fact that the belief that the Government was reverting to the old policy, no matter what the actual intention of the Government itself may have been aroused such a mighty storm of protest in England is extremely significant. The new forces are proved to be actively and powerfully at work. They have proved that there is a powerful determination that the old must be discarded and the new methods of the maintenance of peace and Empire must be given fair trial. To the opponents of the Conservatives, the Anglo-French "Compromise" meant that America had been accepted as Britain's next enemy whose power would have to be destroyed as Germany's had been; it meant to them a return to the old system of alliances which had played such an important role in bringing about the World War; it meant the revival of intensified national feeling with its fears and suspicions and its arrogance and false conception of honor; and it meant the return to the military predominance in Europe of a single Power. It was against the placing of the stamp of English approval upon the entire pre-war system that the opponents of conservatism fought, and their success, no matter what the real aims of the Government may have been, is significant of change.

## CHAPTER IV

### GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

With the World War there came to many, practical statesmen as well as idealists, the realization of the need of some new and earnest effort in international coöperation. The old Concert of Europe had broken down, overwhelmed by conflicting national desires for power, territory, wealth and prestige; the Hague Tribunals had proved ineffective in the face of national fears and jealousies; and the great system of alliances had, instead of preserving peace, merely served to help drag the whole world to war. But the War, instead of forcing the world to accept the inevitability of such catastrophies, gave added intensity to the determination to overcome somehow the evils of an overdeveloped nationalism. It was of this determination that the League was born, but it came into a world dominated by the fears and hatreds engendered by the war, and strongly influenced by the belief that only a relentless military control of the enemies of the victorious Powers could assure the future peace and safety of the world. One section of the people saw in the new organization something far in advance of the old Concert of Powers or an association of victorious nations. It was to be an organization within which should reside a tremendous coöperative influence more potent than the causes of international strife. The conservative and the cynical, on the other hand, saw in the League only something to satisfy a too powerful idealist who might accept the League in exchange for more materialistic considerations, or perhaps an agency through which nationalistic ambitions might be realized. There were those who hoped that the League might become a super-state, there were others who hoped that it might become at most an agency through which diplomatic bargaining might be conducted. (1) A study of the principles that the framers had in mind, or a study of the provisions of the Covenant itself, tells little of what the League was or what it might become; for, like all constitutions, the Covenant was subject to various interpretations, and much depended upon the trend of its development. And because of the confusion



of aims and purposes regarding the League at the time of its beginning, the course that the great experiment was to take could be determined only during the years which followed.

While the attitude of the States members determines the course of development in the League, it is obvious that conversely, the attitude taken toward a great international body will influence vitally the course of foreign affairs in each country. But in England, as well as in other parts of the world, there have been vital differences of opinion as to the part the League should assume in the conduct of foreign affairs. Its place in the determination of English foreign relations, therefore, as well as the position assumed by the League in world affairs, has been influenced to an important degree by the party in control of the Government at London and by the interpretation placed by each Government upon the League and the attitude of each Government toward the role that the League should play. All parties declare themselves favorable to the League and express the hope that it will prove an effective agent for the maintenance of peaceful relations. But there is much to indicate that the Conservative group has more faith in the old system of ententes and military agreements in the accomplishments of this aim than in the new and untried League. The Conservatives, according to one who has become impatient with the attitude of this great party, "do not regard the League so much as a real guarantee of peace, but rather as an established reality which must be kept from getting so important as to disturb the traditional ways of the British Empire." (2) Another liberal complains that the Council has tended to become, under conservative influence, more a machine to register decisions already reached through private diplomatic bargaining than for the open discussion of matters which should be subject to the force of public criticism. (3)

The best expositions we have of the League from the conservative point of view have been given by Sir Austen Chamberlain who states what the League is and what it should be. The purpose expressed in the preamble is, "To promote international co-operation, and to achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to go to war,

by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments,

and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another." (4)

"It follows," Chamberlain says, "that the League must work in the main not by force, but by persuasion—. It must seek its main support in the willing coöperation of its members, in public opinion, and in the moral force which it derives from its representative character.—If persuasion fails and its decisions or recommendations are refused acceptance, the refusal involves no penalties." (5) The last statement is especially significant because of the stand taken by the liberal parties. The conservative leader advises caution in using the League to settle international difficulties, and he expresses the fear that a too enthusiastic faith in the League will cause meddling with matters that lie wholly within the authority of national governments. It is his hope that the League may gradually, through custom and a slow increase in good will, become a body capable of demanding the confidence of the entire world. (6)

If we turn from the cautious, slow-moving policy of the Conservative Party to the attempts of the Labour Party to make the League a determining force for peace, we find a contrast most marked, a contrast of material importance to the League and to international affairs of Europe and the world. The first idea of the Labour Party as to what the League might become is suggested in their declaration of 1918, already noted, (7) regarding a super-national state. The declaration was an extreme statement of a type of political internationalism and was soon dropped by the Labour Party, their efforts being later directed toward a more gradual strengthening of the League Covenant, in which lay their hope of the realization of internationalism and the attainment of world peace. This effort took the form of the Geneva Protocol, which was drawn up by the famous Fifth Assembly of the League. The initiative for a definite attempt to devise means of strengthening the League Covenant in the interests of peace came from Prime Minister MacDonald, ably seconded by the liberal Prime Minister of France, both of whom were present at the opening of the Assembly in September, 1924. In his opening speech MacDonald urged expansion of the Covenant and the application of arbitration as a test of aggression. (8)



The Protocol was a concrete attempt to provide for the application of the principles outlined in the Covenant. These principles are clearly stated and sanctions are provided for their application, but the provision for more than voluntary enforcement was left incomplete. Article VIII of the Covenant recognizes that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments, that national safety must be provided for, and that international obligations are to be enforced by common action. Article X makes more definite provision for these principles by providing for mutual guarantee of political and territorial status quo, while Article XII states that the members agree to arbitration, judicial settlement, or enquiry by the Council. The signatory States also agree never to resort to war until three months after a decision has been rendered. But Article XIII provides merely that the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken in case of refusal to arbitrate, and Article XV states that if the Council fails to reach a unanimous decision, the parties to the dispute not considered, the members may take such action as they see fit. Then, too, there is no provision for enforcement of the Council's decision even if one is reached. The refusal to accept decisions, evidently, as Chamberlain said, involves no penalties, and the final decision in the matter of the waging of wars rests with the national government.

The Geneva Protocol was designed to deprive the individual governments of such discretionary powers. Arbitration was made compulsory under the Protocol, and the nation refusing to arbitrate became automatically, by the accepted definition of the term, the aggressor against whom sanctions were to be applied by all other signatories. The Permanent Court of International Justice was given final authority to determine what disputes were subject to arbitration and the Council of the League was given authority to call for the application of sanctions. Of these sanctions, the economic rather than the military were emphasized in the Protocol, all signatories agreeing "to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, opening of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and sea of the attacked or threatened States." (9) In addition to the military force implied in the last phrase, each signatory nation was invited to give to the Council definite information as to

the military and naval forces which would be available in case of aggression on the part of a member State. At the same time, all signatory states agreed to make no increase in armaments during the time required for the investigation of a dispute. These provisions provided for the enforcement of the principle, stated in the Covenant, of national safety secured through the mutual enforcement of international obligations. Disarmament was also recognized in the Covenant as an essential step toward permanent peace, but no definite provision had been made for actual realization of a disarmament program. Consequently the Protocol provided for the participation of the signatory states in a conference for the reduction of armaments which was to meet in 1925.

That the British Government, even under the leadership of the Labour Party, would have ratified an agreement with such extensive obligations, is extremely doubtful. It is true that even under the Protocol the State was to be permitted to determine for itself what measures it would take in the application of sanctions to an aggressor State, but the obligation itself was to be automatic with the refusal of any state to arbitrate. The principles contained in the Protocol, however, disarmament and obligatory arbitration, enforced by the pooling of economic and financial resources, combined with such military equipment as remained for police purposes, provided the method by which the Labour Party hoped to realize a general national security that would make war impossible and armaments a superfluity. The Protocol, MacDonald thought, would do much toward the molding of public opinion in favor of peaceful means of settling disputes. He recognized clearly that public opinion must, after all, be the determining factor, and that something must be done to educate the people to depend upon something other than armaments for their security. In the meantime, peace must if necessary, be enforced. (10) "Give us ten years of the working of the Protocol," said MacDonald, at a later time, "and we will have Europe with a new habit of mind." (11)

With the signing of the Paris Peace Pact in 1928, however, a new line of action was opened. The Geneva Protocol was dead, declared MacDonald to the League Assembly on September 3, 1929. (12) "Since 1924," he added, "we have started upon another road; The Pact of Peace has been signed in Paris, and that pact is now the starting-point of our further work." Further developments proved that although the Pact furnished a new start-



ing point, the aim and method of the Labour Party remained the same, and its principles practically unchanged.

The Paris Pact bound its signatories to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, and to "the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be," by pacific means only. (13) This provision, even with the reservations of the British Government, placed more stringent restrictions upon signatories than the Covenant had required of the League members. (14) The Labour Party, therefore, again took steps to strengthen the Covenant by bringing it into accord with the Pact. In January, 1930, at the opening of a meeting of the League Council in Geneva, Mr. Henderson, the British representative, succeeded in obtaining the appointment of a Committee to frame the amendments necessary for the accomplishment of this aim. (15) The recommendations of this committee were made public a few months later (16) and were taken under consideration by the Eleventh Assembly of the League which met in September of the same year. Should the proposed amendments be made a part of the Covenant, the League members will pledge themselves never to resort to war for the solution of a dispute. They will, on the other hand, bind themselves to submit their differences to arbitration, judicial settlement, or inquiry by the Council, to abide by the decision reached and to take no measures against any state which complies with such decision. The right to go to war three months after a decision as originally provided, would be surrendered. In case a dispute should be referred to the Council and that body should fail to reach a unanimous decision, the parties to the dispute not considered, the League members, according to the original provisions of the Covenant, would be free to take such action as each desired; but should the amendments be adopted, the Council, in case of a failure to reach a unanimous decision, would make recommendations as to the best procedure to be followed, although the members would not be bound to follow the recommendations made under such circumstances. The proposed amendments, while lacking, perhaps, something of the force of the Geneva Protocol, in that the aggressor is not definitely defined and there is no provision for disarmament, place the League members under obligation to arbitrate and provide for common action in case of the failure of a state to comply with the decisions of an international body. There would seem,

after all, to be little difference between amendment of the League Covenant by the Geneva Protocol and amendment by the Peace Pact.

These efforts of the Labour Party to strengthen the League are indicative, not only of Labour's desire to provide adequate machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes, but also of the central position in foreign affairs assigned to the League by the Labour Governments. The importance of the position that the League may be made to assume in international affairs is still further indicated by the reasons given by MacDonald for his refusal to consider Briand's plan for a "United States of Europe." In such a plan the Labour Government might be expected, in view of their international outlook, to coöperate wholeheartedly; but through such an arrangement, the British Government stated in reply to the French suggestions, nothing could be accomplished that was not already possible through the League of Nations. (17) An additional international body would merely create danger of confusion and might also tend to emphasize or create inter-continental rivalries and hostilities. (18) This last possibility all British Governments would attempt to avoid, for British interests are world-wide rather than European.

The assignment of the League to a similar position in the conduct of foreign affairs has not met with the approval of the Conservative Party, however, as was indicated above. This party, which took over the control of the Government in the autumn of 1924, made short work of the consideration of the Protocol. Sir Austen Chamberlain, who was again the spokesman of the Party, multiplied the arguments against the Protocol. From these arguments it became very clear that his Party was definitely opposed to any suggestion for strengthening the Covenant. "The futility of this plan [strengthening the sanctions of the League] is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, abundantly proved by the Protocol," Chamberlain thought. "For whatever else its proposals give us, they do not give us security. They multiply offences, but do nothing to strengthen remedies. They increase responsibilities undertaken by individual members of the League, but do nothing to adjust their burden." (19) In rejecting the Protocol, Sir Austen was chiefly occupied with possible difficulties that might arise to destroy the Protocol itself. The Conservative Party was unable to adopt principles with such far-reaching pos-



sibilities, and only in very limited form and with definitely restricted obligations did they reappear in part in the Locarno Treaties of 1925. "The founders of the League, deliberately, and not by oversight,—left gaps in the structure of the Covenant and thus made possible an elasticity in its application and development that is the first condition of life and growth," according to the spokesman of the Conservative Party. (20)

Refusal to strengthen the obligation for international coöperation extended to the World Court, which was provided for in Article XIV of the Covenant, and was established by the First Assembly. (21) The statute of establishment gave the Court jurisdiction only over all cases referred to it and in all matters especially provided for in Treaties and Conventions in force; (22) but the second paragraph of the same Article provided that any nation might, by designating its desire to do so, "recognize as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement" the jurisdiction of the Court in matters pertaining to international law and interpretation of treaties. It was this last "Optional Clause" that provided the real test of the State's willingness to accept a policy of complete international coöperation, and it was this clause that the Conservative British Government refused to sign. The Labour Government of 1924 declared itself favorable to the Optional Clause, (23) but was replaced by a Conservative Government before the ratification had been accomplished. It was not, therefore, until 1929, when the MacDonald Government was returned to power, that the principle of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court was accepted and the Optional Clause was signed. (24)

That the League has not assumed a larger part in the conduct of foreign affairs is not due entirely, however, to the attitude taken by the British Conservative Party. Observers may wonder rather that the new international organization succeeded in attaining a position such as it did in world affairs, for various circumstances, especially acute in the first years after the war, materially hampered its development. It has been pointed out that the League of Nations is in reality three Leagues in one; it was charged with the responsibility of the execution of portions of the peace treaty; it was planned as a means for the abolition of war; and it was designed to promote international coöperation in such matters of international concern as the opium traffic. (25) In the exercise of the first of these functions there at once appeared the danger that

the League would become merely an agent of the victorious powers instead of the impartial body it was designed to be; for the great European Powers which were members of the League, Great Britain, France and Italy, were still dominated by hatred and fear for Germany and by the feeling that compensations were due the victors in the recent war. The administration of the Saar Basin furnishes the best example of this attitude and the possible effect upon the League. The Treaty of Versailles had arranged for the administration of the region by a commission consisting of a Frenchman, a native inhabitant of the Saar not a French citizen, and three members from three countries other than France and Germany, (26) the Commission to be under the direction of the League of Nations. But this Commission as appointed by the Council in 1920 proved to be overwhelmingly pro-French. The Belgian representative was sympathetic with France, and the Danish member had lived in Paris for twenty years and so had become French in his general outlook. (27) The French representative was made chairman because of the position that had been accorded the French in the Saar Valley. (28) The type of administration given by this Commission is made clear by the numerous protests which finally found expression in the Council through the representative of the British Empire, Lord Robert Cecil, who presented a Memorandum from the British Government asking that an inquiry be made as to whether the administration of the Saar was being carried out in accordance with the "spirit and terms of the Treaty of Versailles." (29) Lord Cecil set forth very plainly in his presentation of the Memorandum the reasons for the request for inquiry: the Advisory Council elected by the Saar inhabitants had not been consulted, the work having been carried on without regard to the wishes of the inhabitants; some members of the Commission apparently did not realize that they were responsible to the League and not to one particular government; it was alleged that the Chairman had been acting without consultation with the rest of the Commission. The compulsory adoption of the franc, the maintenance of French troops in the district, and restrictive measures in matters of speech and press, added to the grievances. The French Government had been accused of instigating these repressive measures, a charge which Lord Cecil declared he did not accept. The inquiry, Lord Cecil said, should be a serious one, made in the interest of no one but the League of Nations. (30) With this with-



drawal of Great Britain's support of a policy carried out in the exclusive interest of one victorious Power, the way was paved for the development of the League into a truly impartial international body, a development which was carried a step further by the admission of Germany to membership and to a permanent seat in the Council.

The part played by the British Government in this latter matter is not so clear, however. Lloyd George and other Liberals accused Chamberlain of supporting the French Government in its effort to obtain for Poland a permanent seat, in order to strengthen the position of the former Allies against German influence in the Council. (31) There seems to be no proof, however, of any bargain between Chamberlain and Briand, the former apparently refusing to commit himself before the meeting of the Assembly. He seems to have followed the Government's instructions to do nothing to prevent or delay Germany's entrance, but he apparently took little positive action to obtain a settlement of the question. (32) There is an indication in Chamberlain's negative attitude that he, at least, would not have been averse to maintaining a preponderance of power in the hands of the former Allies in the League. Germany's application for a permanent seat in the Council as a condition of her entrance into the League (33) was followed immediately by other applicants for similar position. Of these, France insisted upon the election of two, Poland and Spain, the British representative also giving his support to the latter. (34) It was Sweden, not Great Britain, which prevented these additions to permanent membership in the Council. "One Power interposed her veto," said Chamberlain later, "one Power who holds her seat by election from the Assembly, and I cannot think that she served either her own interest or the claim which she wished to put forth, when she thus set herself counter to the wishes and hopes of every other member of the Council and every member of the Assembly." (35)

But Sweden, by her action, prevented a situation within the League which Chamberlain evidently would have permitted and which might well have prevented the development of the League into an impartial international body. Some of the comments regarding this matter made by the *London Times*, a publication which ordinarily is a staunch supporter of the Conservative Governments, are worth noting. The offer made by Sweden to withdraw in favor

of Poland in order to solve the difficulty would have left the Council overwhelmingly pro-French, according to the *Times*, (36) since it was customary for distant states to send their Ambassadors at Paris to represent them on the Council. There were good reasons, the *Times* sarcastically added, why other members such as Belgium and Czechoslovakia should not retire. "The main crux of the difficulty is, and has been all through the present negotiations," the same publication remarked, "that the League machinery is not suited to the compacts and bargains of traditional diplomacy." (37)

Other matters entrusted by the Peace Conference to the League do not bear so clearly the imprint of the attempt of a few great Powers to dominate. The League was responsible neither for the assignment of mandates nor the distribution of minorities and the policy followed in both matters has been one of influence through investigation, publicity and recommendation rather than of direct interference. Even Lord Cecil objected to the assumption by the League of obligations for the enforcement of definite rules for the treatment of minorities. (38) The administration of Danzig has also apparently been much more satisfactory than that of the Saar. To a High Commissioner appointed by the League was entrusted the task of assisting representatives of the City in drawing up their own constitution and dealing with differences which should arise between Poland and Danzig. (39) The first High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Tower, was an Englishman with wide diplomatic experience, (40) and he and his successors, the League records show, have settled, apparently to the satisfaction of all concerned, a large number of problems that have arisen in the relations between Poland and native German inhabitants of Danzig.

In the accomplishment of the second and primary aim of the League, the abolition of war, Great Britain has also played an important rôle. Her aim has been "Peace First," (41) though the methods of accomplishing that aim, according to critics, have often stopped short of possible accomplishment and have as often been negative. In the crises which have arisen to threaten the peace of Europe, however, the representatives of the British Government have thrown the full weight of their country's influence into efforts for satisfactory peaceful settlement. The dispute between Finland and Sweden over the possession of the Åland Islands was brought to the attention of the Council by the British representative. (42) Sir Austen Chamberlain took a prominent



part in the settlement of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute which threatened a new Balkan war four years later, (43) while the part played by the British Government in the difficulty which arose between Albania and Yugoslavia was expressed by the Prime Minister of the latter country when he said, "The British Government—has summoned the Royal Government before the Council of the League of Nations, and threatens it with the application of extreme measures such as those provided in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By this action a threatening situation has been created resembling that arising out of an ultimatum. Placed in this position the Royal Government states with the greatest regret, and under protest, that it bows to the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, in order to avoid the dangerous consequences of non-acceptance." (44)

In the settlement of the Corfu Affair, the accusation has frequently been fairly made that the decision was determined by the fact that one of the interested parties was a Great Power. The decision was the work of the Conference of Ambassadors, however, and not of the League of Nations and it appears that had the latter organization been left free to make the settlement, the decision would not have been colored by the political and military influence of the Italian Government. Lord Robert Cecil criticized severely the action of the Italians in the occupation of Corfu; he not only denied but disregarded the claim of the Italian representative regarding the competence of the League Council to deal with the situation; and regarding the relative influence of Greece and Italy, he said, "I think it essential to say that I cannot recognize, before the Council of the League, any distinction between great Powers and small Powers. They are all equally amenable to the obligations they have entered into by signing the Covenant," he continued. "There is no difference in the sanctity of a contractual obligation because it has been entered into by a powerful individual or a less powerful individual." (45) How much influence Lord Cecil's attitude and the position taken by the Council had upon the peaceful settlement of the question is a matter of controversy. The British representative felt certain that the pressure in favor of peace expressed through the League was one of the chief factors in the maintenance of peace. (46) There is doubt, however, that Lord Cecil had the support even of his own government (47) and the doubt grows stronger in the light of the decision reached by

the Conference of Ambassadors and in view of the later resignation of Lord Cecil. (48)

In the management of the affairs of the British Empire itself, the League has not played a prominent part, for the British Government has drawn the line closely about affairs concerning the safety of the Empire. Lloyd George, then Prime Minister, declared most emphatically in 1922 that the trouble with Egypt was purely a domestic matter and that any effort to bring the question before the League of Nations would be considered an unfriendly act to be repelled with all the means at the command of the Empire. (49) Yet Article XV of the Covenant gives to the Council the power to decide whether or not a dispute is, according to international law, solely within the jurisdiction of any nation, and less than two years before Lloyd George's declaration concerning Egypt, Finland had been forced to accede to this provision in her dispute concerning the Aaland Islands. (50) Again, in September, 1922, when war with Turkey appeared inevitable, there was no appeal to the League. Great Britain instead appealed to the Dominions for military aid. (51) In the matter of the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Iraq, however, the matter was referred to the League for settlement, after diplomacy had failed. (52) Egypt, too, has been offered League membership by Great Britain, but only after very definite conditions have been met. (53)

Direct appeal to the League or the interference of the Council in disputes that have already arisen between nations is not the only method provided by the Covenant for the abolition of war, however. Other means provided may very conceivably prove in the end to be more effective than direct threat of application of sanctions. Rappard points out five methods provided by the Covenant for the destruction of war: (54) international publicity, revision of treaties, arbitration, collective sanctions, and disarmament. To these should be added another, not specifically mentioned in the Covenant but made possible by the existence of the League: the abolition of war through the promotion of international understanding, coöperation, and good-will; by means of discussion, friendly debate, personal contacts, and perhaps by international diplomatic pressure. Of these methods provided by the Covenant, the first two have played a minor rôle in the disputes which have arisen concerning methods of abolishing war, the question of in-



ternational publicity having apparently been quite generally accepted so far as international treaties and agreements are concerned, and the interference of the League in the matter of revision of treaties having apparently been quite generally rejected. Around the questions of compulsory or voluntary arbitration, the application of sanctions, and the importance of disarmament in its relation to the destruction of war, however, has arisen a storm of differing opinion in the direction of which the Governments of Great Britain have taken a leading part. These problems of arbitration, sanctions and disarmament became inextricably bound up with one another during the attempts made to solve the problem of peace and war by means of disarmament.

Progress in the matter of disarmament has been slow. And for this slowness of progress, the British Conservative Party must bear a considerable share of the responsibility. The failure of the Government to reach an agreement with the United States in the matter of naval competition has been noted in a previous chapter, and the initiative which could have been exercised in dealing with this problem of armaments, and which has been exercised at times during the last decade through the influence of the more liberal groups of various countries has been noticeably lacking from the British Government when it has been in control of the Conservative Party. *The Manchester Guardian* voices the criticism arising from this sacrifice of leadership when it says that the "French conception of armed peace (sometimes called security) has been accepted by the British Government," (55) a criticism for which there seems to be considerable justification in view of the policy adopted by the Party during the past ten years.

The disarmament policy of the League is based upon Article VIII of the Covenant, which states that the "members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." This article presents three principles to which the League has been endeavoring to conform since the meeting of the First Assembly. It recognizes that disarmament is essential to peace. With this the Conservative Party has not agreed. It is their view that wars are the result of conflicting interests, not of armaments (56) and therefore disarmament is not an essential, but rather an incidental, part of their peace program.

Article VIII also declares for enforcement of obligations by common action, a principle which involves the question of compulsory arbitration and application of sanctions provided for in the Geneva Protocol and the Optional Clause of the Statute for the establishment of the World Court, both of which were definitely rejected by the Conservative Government. The Third principle of security as a pre-requisite to disarmament is the only one that was given whole-hearted support by the Conservative Party.

When the First Assembly met in 1920, immediate steps were taken to put into force the provision of Article VIII. A permanent Advisory Commission was formed by the Council of the League. (57) This Commission consisted of military, naval and air experts, but at the suggestion of the British delegation a Temporary Mixed Commission less military in its composition, and therefore more likely to be favorably disposed toward disarmament, was appointed. This Commission met in March, 1921, and attempted to draw up a plan of disarmament, but serious difficulties at once presented themselves. Demands for national security forced the Commission to shift its approach to the problem to the attempt to provide security by common action, and so make possible an advance in the matter of disarmament. The result was the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was, however, definitely rejected. (58) The Geneva Protocol, which has already been considered, was an attempt to avoid the objections made to the earlier treaty. This, too, failed of ratification, but the League Council, unwilling to allow the problem of disarmament to remain unsolved through a failure of the Protocol, appointed a Committee to begin arrangements for a conference similar to that provided by the Protocol. The committee, appointed in 1925, was instructed to "make the necessary studies for determining the questions which should be submitted for a preparatory examination with a view to a possible conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments and to draft definite proposals to the Council on this subject." (59) The Committee recommended the appointment of a Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference, which would study the nature of armaments and the possible means of reduction. This last Commission was appointed and began its sessions in 1926. (60) The work of the League since that time, so far as disarmament is concerned, has been limited largely to the labors of the Commission, which attempted to define terms, to de-



termine the needs of various states, and to build some scheme by which disarmament could proceed. Toward the close of 1928, the Commission presented to the Assembly certain model treaties which, if ratified, it was believed would aid in the cause of peace and disarmament. The Assembly referred the treaties to the various states with the hope that they would be accepted. (61) Aside from these treaties, the only result of the work of the Commission which became apparent was the Anglo-French Accord which grew out of the attempt of the British and French representatives on this Commission to compose their differences. (62)

By far the most radical suggestion to come before the Commission was the work of the Russian delegates who proposed total abolition of all land, marine and air forces. (63) But the plan was not favorably received by the British. (64) That the British Government should refuse even to discuss a radical proposal from Bolshevik delegates is not surprising, but there apparently has been little enthusiasm for the entire project of disarmament on the part of the British Conservative Government. A suggestion as to what the British policy would be is found in the answer made by G. T. Locker-Lampson, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to his opponents in the House of Commons, when asked as to what the Government's policy would be at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission. "We are ready to assist whole-heartedly in any international steps leading to a general measure of disarmament, and Lord Cecil will go to Geneva prepared to urge some definite scheme of disarmament. But," he added, "we must do nothing to endanger the power of the navy." (65) There seems to be no record of the definite scheme mentioned, however, and Lord Cecil's resignation (66) is an eloquent commentary upon the actual attitude taken by the Government. This negative attitude is further indicated by the discussion of the work of the Preparatory Commission in the League Assembly in June, 1927. (67) The delegates were much discouraged because of the slowness with which matters were proceeding, but an air of determination was also present. Dr. Stresemann, the German representative, stated that although the solution of the problem had not been advanced much, the members of the League were under obligations to reduce armaments. The question was urgent. The Belgian representative also spoke forcefully upon the question. It was his belief that if the work were to succeed, the Governments must show the will to make it

succeed. The tone of Chamberlain's speech, which closed the discussion, was in notable contrast to those which had preceded it. He emphasized the difficulties of the problem, pointing out that there was one element necessary to success—namely, time. He did not believe that even the Disarmament Conference would bring the final solution. Only by slow and gradual steps would it be possible to arrive at a measure of peace and confidence in one another by which could be realized the expectations to which the Covenant gave rise. Lord Cushendun, the British representative on the Preparatory Commission, later emphasized the need for care in distinction between limitation and reduction of armaments. If reduction were adopted, he thought, there was danger of going beyond Article VIII of the League Covenant. (68)

The failure of the British Government to assume the initiative in the attempt to solve the problem of disarmament stands out clearly in another phase of the problem, the importance of which in this question is perhaps not given sufficient recognition. This is the matter of manufacture and sale of arms and ammunition by private companies. Just what influence the demand for continued and perhaps for swollen profits from this source has had upon the whole problem of war and disarmament is, of course, impossible to determine; but certainly little headway has been made toward regulation of the means of warfare, although the League Covenant recognizes the danger which lies in the traffic and provides that the "Council shall advise how the evil effect attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety." (69) There seems, however, to have been no driving force back of the movement. The most influential states were, like Great Britain, probably too much interested in the economic side of the question to urge it as a move toward peace. That the interest in the arms traffic goes beyond its relation to national defense is indicated by the failure of the various national governments to place the manufacture entirely under national control and by the fact that warring factions are sold arms which certainly contribute nothing to national stability. Herbert Williams, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, stated quite frankly that the British Government was unwilling to prevent the export of munitions, because of their value to British trade. (70)



The sacrifice of peace to the interest of the manufacturers of munitions was suggested by Mr. Barnes, the representative of Great Britain in the League Assembly, when he stated that so long as countries continued to supply southeastern Europe with arms, there would always be danger of war. (71) A suggestion of the relation of this traffic to the disturbances in China was also made in the House of Commons at a later date. (72)

It was not, however, until the Fifth Assembly met that action was taken. This Assembly requested the Council to submit to the Governments a draft convention to be drawn up by the Temporary Mixed Commission. The Council was also requested to ask the Powers concerning their willingness to meet in conference to discuss the ratification of such a convention. (73) This conference met in 1925 but there appears to have been very little enthusiasm among any of the Powers for the work to be accomplished. The British Government had again become Conservative and the delegation, like the representatives at the Naval Conference of 1927, was composed chiefly of military, naval and air experts. (74) The draft convention itself was an extremely moderate document (75), but even that was amended, the British delegates asking for reservations for their own colonies, and that no publicity be required for munitions sent to their own armed forces. (76)

The purpose of the convention as finally adopted by the Conference is stated in the preamble which says that "international trade in arms and ammunition and in implements of war should be subjected to a general and effective system of supervision and publicity." (77) There was no attempt to abolish or even to limit the traffic except in accordance with international law already in force. Nor did the convention attempt to control the manufacture of war materials. It provided merely for the observance of international law and for a system of license and publicity. But the British Government refused to give to the cause the strong support that the ratification by the Government of one of the leading Powers would have given, and the special commission which had been appointed to consider the problem finally gave up its independent endeavors and merged its work with that of the Preparatory Commission, declaring that the question was too closely bound up with the problem of disarmament to permit accomplishment through independent effort. (78) The matter was never entirely dropped, however, and three years later Chamberlain was

again called upon to state the Government's position regarding the matter. In answer, he said, "As regards the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, His Majesty's Government is prepared to ratify at any moment when it can secure simultaneous ratifications by the principal arms producing powers." (79) But there is no record that the Government had made any effort to secure the needed ratifications.

The Labour Party might have done something to further the work of limitation of the arms traffic, but the Labour Party, during the brief time that it held the chief positions in the Government, found itself in a dilemma in regard to disarmament as well as in other matters. The Labour Party, because its ideals demanded so much more than the practical necessity permitted, exposed itself more than any other party to the charge of perfidy in the use of ideals for mere political advantage. It was obvious that the immediate realization of the Labour ideal regarding disarmament was not then possible, but such an ideal should, if it meant anything at all, bring to every movement for disarmament the highest possible degree of coöperation and of active leadership. The active interest in this question manifested itself by the work of the Fifth Assembly in drawing up a definite plan to enforce peace. The Geneva Protocol, with its recognition of the relation of armaments to permanent peace, stands in marked contrast to the five years of inactivity which followed. "We have to abandon every vestige of trust in military equipment," is the comment of MacDonald in regard to the attitude of the Labour Party, "and with that end in view we have to devise ways by which we can go through the transition time, when we may have to maintain a pure defense force relatively adequate, whilst we work sleeplessly to place national security on a totally different foundation." (80) But neither of the more liberal parties was given ample opportunity during the first decade of the League's history to demonstrate the extent to which, working through the influence of the British Government, the League might be made to function in its effort to obtain peace, security and disarmament. But neither were any of the parties faced with a great crisis which would have determined the extent to which national prerogative would have been surrendered, either temporarily or permanently, in the interest of world peace.

The third aspect of the League mentioned by Rappard, the



League for International Coöperation in matters of international import, does not require detailed consideration. Article XXIII of the Covenant entrusts to the League the execution and supervision of agreements concerning certain matters of international concern. But in the attempt to obtain the ratification of such agreements which would give to the League the definite power needed, a marked neglect on the part of the Governments of the States Members may be noted. Draft conventions were drawn up and in the formation of these, the Governments often gave coöperation, but the undertaking of new obligations was quite a different matter, and there was developed no great force of public opinion which was necessary to force these questions into a position of first consideration. But the coöperation of the Governments in providing the information necessary for the draft conventions was not without importance in laying the foundation for future action. (81) In only two questions among those listed in Article XXIII for international coöperation, viz., conditions of labor, treatment of natives of backward regions, the traffic in women and children, the opium traffic, the traffic in arms, freedom of communications and transit and the control of disease, did the British Government refuse to coöperate to any great extent. One of these, the trade in arms, has already been mentioned. The other was the traffic in opium. An Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium was established by the League in 1920, (82) but the Committee could accomplish little. The initiative for the Conferences which met in 1924 and 1925 came from a resolution passed by the United States Congress suggesting that the opium traffic could be controlled effectively only by control of production. The Advisory Committee, following this suggestion, sent out a call for two international conferences. (83) But no agreement regarding the limitation of production could be reached. Lord Cecil, the British representative, declared that there might be a difference of opinion as to the harmfulness of the use of the drug, but that there could be no difference of opinion as to the fact that the production of opium was purely a domestic question and not a matter for an international conference. (84) The British Government would go no farther than to agree to abolish opium smoking in the British Far Eastern territories within fifteen years, on condition that effective measures had been taken in the meantime by China to suppress the growth of the poppy and so remove the danger

of smuggling. (85) Great Britain did, however, join with the United States in a scheme by which manufacturing countries would limit the output according to the estimated legitimate scientific and medicinal needs of the world, a scheme refused by France and Holland. (86) The British Government had also made definite preparation for the conferences by appointing local committees in Hong Kong, Malaya and North Borneo, to report upon the situation there. (87) These reports furnished definite data for the Conferences and presented a view of the actual situation in the traffic in opium that might serve as a basis for further developments toward prohibition of the traffic.

Viewed as a whole, therefore, the development of the power and influence of the League in these matters requiring international coöperation and in the matter of the abolition of war was, during the first decade of its history, somewhat discouraging to the internationalist. There appears to the friend of the League the danger, not yet entirely eliminated, of a body dominated by a small part of the nations of Europe, or by the great Powers to the exclusion of the small. The League was hampered by failure of great Powers to join, by the jealous guarding of nationalistic rights, by indifference and by lack of faith in the competence of an international body. But in providing means for publicity, in offering the opportunity for effective direct interference to settle disputes between nations less inclined toward peace, in the development of a public opinion that may show its power at a later time, the League did a work, the effectiveness of which is not subject to measure. And in the accomplishment of these things the British Government gave its assistance in varying ways and with differing degrees of enthusiasm but always with the security of the Empire and the peace of Europe as the fundamental aim. "Proceeding tentatively, applying to each difficulty, as it arises, the best solution that seems available, not seeking to overstrain its authority at any one moment or to impose in advance decisions which to be effective must be the outcome of free coöperation, the League may gradually build out of case law an international jurisprudence which will command the assent and receive the allegiance of all." (88) This is a description of the policy followed in large part by the British Government in molding its foreign policy in its relation to the League. But if the Conservative Party outlined the method, the Labour Party furnished the ideal toward which the League may strive.



The idea of a superstate was abandoned years ago, but a finer ideal was substituted. The League "shall be based on something more than an agreement between Governments: it must be the first step in creating a real League of Peoples" is the statement of one of Labour's leaders. (89) The result would be, not a superstate but a federal state to which would be delegated by the nations the power to handle certain affairs of international import. A League that would speak for the public opinion of the world, (90) a League which would be a new "corporate entity" (91) with a definite sphere of action of its own, is Labour's idea of what the League must become, not, as contended by Chamberlain, an organization controlled by the States. The Labour Party was looking toward the extension of such a system, already begun with the giving to the League of the control of Danzig and the Saar, for example, and in the suggestion that the Suez Canal be placed under League control. (92) The Liberal Party has also suggested that the League should, after the danger of war has been eliminated, assume a collective responsibility for essential international waterways and the territory controlling them, Gibraltar, Suez and Malta, for example. (93) The League must become, according to this ideal, not a new concert of Europe nor a mere medium for the negotiations of diplomatists, but an organization created by the states of the world, completely democratized, to make possible the realization of a new world federalization.

## CHAPTER V

### CONTINENTAL RELATIONS

The conflict which characterized Great Britain's attempt to solve her imperial problem and which marked her relations to the League of Nations is to be found in the policy adopted in dealing with the great continental Powers and with the problem of the Near East. The developing consciousness of a changing outlook and a need fundamentally different from the needs of pre-war years, as it rose to challenge the old economic and political system, resulted in a policy lacking in the conciseness and the straight forwardness which should characterize a strong, clear-cut foreign policy directed toward the accomplishment of certain definite aims and purposes. In her dealings with France this characteristic was especially noticeable. Not until just at the close of the decade did the British Government take a definite stand for her own interests in direct opposition to the French. Charges of subserviency to the French were frequently placed against the British Government. Yet, at the same time, the quarrel between the two countries went on almost uninterrupted. The result was described by the British Foreign Minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, when he said, "Our Policy, not wholly through our own fault, has been wavering and inconsistent. Our influence—has lost something by our hesitation and our inconsistency—." (1)

The conflict between the antagonistic forces arising from the pre-war system and the post-war needs first arose with the diverging economic demands of the two former allies, France and Great Britain. The necessity for the rebuilding of British industries after the war has already been discussed. (2) The part to be played by Russia and Germany in this reconstruction may be indicated by a comparison of the trade carried on between these countries and Great Britain before the war and during the years immediately following. The value of exports to Russia of goods produced and manufactured in the United Kingdom in 1913, for example, was over eighteen million pounds sterling. By 1920, the value of this same group of exports had shrunk to less than twelve million, and by 1924, to less than four million. By 1928, the value



of British goods exported to Russia had decreased to 2,715,990 pounds. (3) Although the imports from Russia do not show, on the whole, the same percentage of decrease, the value was only approximately half in 1928 of the value in 1913, and it might be noted that in 1921, when imports had reached their lowest mark, this value had dropped to about one fifteenth of the 1913 value. (4) Figures for Germany, while not indicating a condition so serious, still show the need for economic reconstruction. (5)

However, immediate values of commodities exported and imported were not the only considerations that had to be taken into account in dealing with Russia and Germany. The fear of the spread of Bolshevism to the West from the Soviet Republics probably exerted considerable influence in strengthening the desire of British statesmen to bring about an early economic rehabilitation of Germany, for Sovietism in Central Europe would have meant destruction of trade from that region as completely as had already been the case in Russia, and would have materially delayed, if not destroyed, any hope of restoring normal conditions. The British Ambassador to Berlin wrote on July 30, 1920, (6) that if the Bolshevik armies succeeded in capturing Warsaw, there would be such an outbreak of Communism throughout Germany that there would be no possibility of financial settlement for months or years afterward. This danger, he thought, the British statesmen at London underrated, but it was not overlooked, as is indicated by a portion of a Memorandum sent by Lloyd George to Clemenceau as early as March, 1919. In this Memorandum, Lloyd George protested against the use of harsh measures in Germany. In his explanation of the reasons for such a protest, he said:

"The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics, whose dream it is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms.

"Once that happens all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and within a year we may witness the spectacle of nearly three hundred million people organized into a vast Red army under German instructors and German generals, equipped with German cannon and German machine guns and prepared for a renewal of the attack on Western Europe." (7)

The danger of Bolshevism meant more, therefore, to the British

than a threat to economic prosperity. It was a threat of war, a threat to the entire existing social, economic and political order in Western Europe. In neither France nor Britain was the danger due to the growth of Bolshevism within, but the danger of the spread from Eastern Europe constituted a real menace to both countries alike. But the two Governments were far apart in their recommendations as to the best method of handling the situation. Great Britain's need of trade, when added to the fact that Germany was no longer a rival in commerce, in colonial Empire or in naval affairs, inclined the British toward a lenient policy in spite of the fact that the hatreds and suspicions engendered by the war and pre-war rivalries were not so soon forgotten. Economic prosperity would destroy the force of Bolshevik arguments in Germany and help Great Britain to regain normalcy. But the interests and outlook of the French were very different from those of the English. France wanted, not trade with which to rebuild shattered industry, but money to rebuild devastated areas. And more than all she wanted security from attacks from her ancient enemy. And this she believed could be attained only through military force. Political, military and economic weakness in Germany was much more to be desired by France than rapid recovery of strength. To France, political considerations stood first; to Great Britain, the economic became, as the hatreds of war died down, much the more important. Nor did the threat of Bolshevism incline the French toward lenient treatment of either Russia or Germany. The British Ambassador to Germany complained that France did not seem to realize that the military danger from Germany was past and that the real danger lay in the communist disorder. (8) The problem with which British statesmen were faced, therefore, was the difficulty of carrying through a policy which would serve the needs of the Empire and at the same time maintain a position of loyalty to their ally, France.

Not only over German policy did the two Governments seriously disagree, but the problems of the Near East threatened to disrupt the old Alliance, and Poland proved to be a cause of contention. Yet through all these quarrels the British Government was making serious efforts to meet the demands of the French. "It has been the weakness of every recent English Government that it dared not rely upon moral forces," was the accusation of one critic. "Each Government in turn, knowing that physical force was out of the



question, has tried to make use of economic pressure.—When that has failed we have belatedly and half-heartedly, talked about legality.—Never yet have we said in plain English that France's policy to Germany was morally indefensible and that we would do our utmost to thwart it. We could have thwarted it, and may, perhaps, yet do so. But only on the condition that for once we make our position plain before the world, that we nail our colors to the mast and appeal to every country that will join us in salvaging the wreck of Germany." (9)

The dilemma in which the British Government found itself might, under certain circumstances, have been solved by the aid of the League of Nations, but the price that France was asking for co-operation in British plans was sufficient guarantee of security, and this the League could not furnish. The machinery of the new international organization was not yet in running order and confidence in the ability of the League to protect its members was extremely small. Even when Germany applied for admission, thereby offering to assume all the obligations of membership, on condition that she be given a permanent seat on the Council, France attempted to gain a like position for Poland in order to counteract German influence. (10)

This French attempt to assure her own safety by strengthening other countries which were not favorable to the recovery by Germany of her position as a first rate Power, had never received the whole-hearted support of Great Britain. Lloyd George had no sympathy with Poland's aspirations to become a great Power through the additions of territory at Russia's expense and he apparently felt no regret when the Poles suffered defeat in their invasion of Russian territory in 1920, although Poland, he thought, served a useful purpose as a buffer between Russia and Germany. Poland might act as a barrier to the westward spread of Bolshevism, but she should not be permitted to grow at the expense of Russia or Germany. (11)

An even more serious cause of disagreement between France and Great Britain arose the next year over the disposition of Upper Silesia. Here, again, the British point of view was favorable to Germany, while France was interested in strengthening her eastern ally, Poland. It was due entirely to the English that the entire territory was not surrendered to Poland at the Peace Conference, Lloyd George later said, for President Wilson had joined in the

demands of France for separation of the entire region from Germany. (12) When the plebiscite which was to have settled the dispute had not proved entirely satisfactory, the matter came before the Supreme Council, which in turn, referred the problem to the League of Nations, where a solution quite favorable on the whole to the British point of view was finally reached. But in the meantime relations between France and Great Britain had become somewhat strained. Lloyd George declared in a speech in the House of Commons that Upper Silesia was a nerve center of German industry and that the territory should not go to Poland in order to aid French security. (13) A Memorandum from the British Foreign Office stated that the industrial area was the heart of the problem and that the region was indivisible, "owing to the close inter-dependence of mines and factories, water supply, electric power supply and communications." (14) The British Prime Minister had already warned France at the Paris meeting of the Supreme Council, according to the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, (15) that "the nations of the British Empire would not be dragged into war which resulted from an oppressive use of superior force by any ally in the hour of triumph," a statement which suggested Lloyd George's opinions of French policy and indicated the extent of the lack of sympathy existing between the statesmen of the two countries.

Even the Separatist movement in the Rhineland in 1923 and 1924 widened the breach between England and France. (16) By the vote of the French and Belgian members of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, this Commission had decided to register decrees of the Separatist Government, which had been established within a portion of the Rhineland. This action was protested by the British Government, which a few days later ordered the British Consul General at Munich to investigate the movement. This decision met with determined opposition from the French, and when the British continued with their plans for investigation in spite of the protest, the French High Commissioner suggested sending a French agent to accompany the British Consul General. This offer was declined by the British, but the French agent was sent regardless of this refusal, very evidently to keep watch over the British representative. The incident is indicative of the suspicion engendered by the difference of policies in the Rhineland.



The most serious differences arising out of the economic point of view of Great Britain as opposed to the political view of France grew out of the problem of reparations. The problem had proved to be too great for the Peace Conference to settle at once and the question had been passed on to a Reparations Commission which was to decide upon the amount to be paid by Germany and to oversee the collection. (17) The withdrawal of the United States, however, left only four votes, since a Japanese delegate seldom participated, and also left the chairmanship and the dominating influence to France. (18) But the Commission was unable to maintain its independence of political pressure and its work was frequently taken over by the various Allied Governments in an endeavor to settle the question through diplomatic action. These attempts failed and the problem had finally to be considered a question for economic and financial experts before it could be settled; but these attempts made the problem of reparations one of the principal political problems before the Governments of Europe for half a decade, and seriously threatened the amicable relations between France and Great Britain. The history of this problem becomes, therefore, not merely the history of the endeavors of the Commission, but includes a long series of attempts of the Supreme Council, of International Conferences, and of Prime Ministers and special agents of separate Governments to solve the problem. Neither these nor the proposals and counter proposals need to be noted here, however, except in their relation to the policy adopted by the British Government toward her former Allies and toward Germany.

The breach between France and Great Britain was opened even before the Peace Treaty was signed. In March, 1919, Lloyd George sent to Clemenceau a Memorandum outlining the policy which he believed should be adopted in dealing with Germany. This should take into account, he thought, Germany's responsibility for the War and her manner of waging the War, but it should be a settlement which a responsible German Government could sign with the expectation of fulfilling the obligations assumed. It should be a settlement which would contain no provocation for future wars, a settlement that would appear to Germany to be fair. (19) To this Memorandum Clemenceau sent a clever and caustic reply, in which he called the attention of Lloyd George to the fact that Germany would probably not be satisfied with European con-

cessions, for she had been proud of her World Empire and her great battle fleet and her commercial advantages. He thought, in view of the German mentality, that the German conception of justice would differ from that held by the Allies. Lloyd George's reply to this communication was even more sarcastic. He reminded Clemenceau that France as well as Britain was holding parts of the former German World Empire, and he concluded with the accusation: "What France really cares for is that the Danzig Germans should be handed over to the Poles." (20)

During these first years, however, the divergence in the interests of France and Great Britain did not become serious. The latter, as well as the former, was demanding that Germany pay exorbitant amounts and was giving no thought to the question of ability to pay or to possible economic results. The nature of the problem was not yet realized by the majority of the people. Even at the first London Conference of March, 1921, Lloyd George delivered a severe arraignment of Germany; but a German delegate to that conference states that in private conference Lloyd George showed himself very favorably disposed toward Germany, but that he was unable to offer concessions because of the French attitude and because of the condition of public opinion in England. (21) That the English Prime Minister realized the nature of the problem is indicated by his comment to Viscount D'Abernon, who quotes Lloyd George as saying that "the French can never make up their mind whether they want payment or whether they want the enjoyment of trampling on Germany, occupying the Ruhr, or taking some other military action. It is quite clear they cannot have both, and they have to make up their minds which they desire." (22) From other sources, too, were beginning to be heard expressions of the realization of the possible consequences of the policy that was being followed by the Governments of the Allied Powers. In July, 1920, an article by Philip Snowden ascribed the high prices prevailing in England to the foreign policy. In this article, the Government was criticized because it had taken no steps for the reconstruction of Germany and Russia, the sources of food stuffs and building materials. (23) The slump in the coal industry of England the next year turned the attention particularly toward the way in which coal was being used for the payment of reparations. The first efforts of the Reparations Commission had, in fact, been directed chiefly toward payment in kind rather than in gold,



and of these deliveries coal played the most important rôle, though timber and other materials needed for reconstruction purposes, and other commodities were included. The deliveries of coal began as early as September, 1919, even before the Treaty of Peace had gone into effect, and the amounts demanded were increased continually through 1920. (24) This policy of requiring deliveries in kind and its effect upon English industry were discussed by the Labour Party at their Annual Conference in 1921. German home industries, according to this discussion, were crippled by the fuel shortage. Low wages and reduced buying power were the results. The Labour Party declared this was particularly true in regard to coal exports, of which the amount sent to Germany had been reduced from approximately eight million tons in 1913 to near six hundred fifty thousand in 1921. Not only was the export to Germany reduced, but forced deliveries to France and Italy were cutting off the British exports to these countries. (25)

The breach between the two Allies appeared at the London Conferences of 1921 and continued to grow as the discussions proceeded, although there apparently was no change in policy for some time. At the first London Conference in March, 1921, Lloyd George had not only criticised the Germans severely but had threatened to occupy more German territory with Allied troops if the Allied demands were not met. (26) At the Second London Conference, which met the same year, a further advance into German territory was threatened, with Lloyd George's approval. (27) At the same time, however, the British and French Representatives were disagreeing seriously over the question of an ultimatum to Germany and over the occupation of the Ruhr, (28) and Lloyd George was meeting in private conferences every possible chance for agreement with the Germans. (29) The attempt to reach such an agreement did not mean, however, that the collection of reparations had been abandoned, nor that such a step was considered by the British, but that economic reconstruction, not military occupation of German industrial regions, was the aim of the English. The real danger to British industry, the British Ambassador pointed out, lay in the cheaper production of goods in Germany. The Germans, he said, instead of taxing industries to pay reparations, were "subventioning" them. This fact, combined with low wages and improved methods devised during the war, made it possible for Germany to produce goods at a much lower figure than could

Great Britain. This meant that foreign markets would be captured by the Germans and that even England might be invaded by German goods. (30) Abandonment of the collection of reparations would have made the situation even worse. It was, therefore, Britain's problem not only to prevent German industry from being destroyed by the enforcement of the radical demands of the French, but to see that German industry was again put in a healthy condition and at the same time to put upon Germany obligations of sufficient weight to raise the cost of production somewhere near the English level.

The problem of revival of English industry had, in the meantime, become to Lloyd George more than a mere question of German reparations. At the third London Conference, therefore, the British Prime Minister insisted that the meeting of the Supreme Council at Cannes should take up schemes for dealing with the larger question of a general European Economic Conference. (31)

The Cannes Conference was itself adjourned by the fall of the Briand Government in France, and the question of reparations was turned back to the Reparations Commission which granted to Germany a brief moratorium. A general economic conference was called, however, at Genoa and although the question of reparations was barred at the request of the French, the matter was privately discussed, but hope of arriving at any helpful understandings was shattered by the signature of the Treaty of Rapallo. (32) British efforts to reach a settlement continued, however, through the remainder of 1922, but all failed in the face of Poincaré's unyielding opposition.

The climax of the difficulty was reached in 1923. At the Paris Conference in January the British presented a plan for settling the reparations problem, a plan which marked a wide divergence from the policies previously carried out. A moratorium of four years was to be granted to Germany, payments in kind were to be reduced and the minimum liability was fixed.

The payment of reparations was also bound up with the question of inter-Allied debts. Great Britain agreed to cancel her claims against the Allies, but demanded from the latter certain concessions such as the forfeiting of gold deposited in England by them during the War. (33) The plan brought sharply to the fore the differences between the British and the French. Poincaré attempted to prove that the scheme was contrary to the provisions of the



Treaty of Versailles; he stated that the sum fixed by the British was much lower than the French could consider reasonable; and he held that, contrary to the British view of Germany as the victim of circumstances, Germany had deliberately put herself in a position from which she was deriving arguments for refusing to execute the terms of the Treaty. Poincaré also declared that there would be absolutely no moratorium without securities, to which Bonar Law replied that he objected only to those securities which would prevent the restoration of Germany, but that Great Britain would not take part in nor assume responsibility for such action as the French contemplated. (34) The debate was acrimonious throughout and the conference ended in a complete break in the policies to be adopted by the two countries. At the close of the conference, Poincaré is reported to have stated that France had regained her freedom from restraint upon the policy she wished to follow and was free to execute the Treaty of Versailles. (35) The occupation of the Ruhr by French troops followed. Opposition in England to this action on the part of the French Government appeared united and powerful, but not sufficiently powerful to call forth any attempt to frustrate the French plans. Lichtenberger claims that "in England an important fraction of opinion, particularly among the Conservatives, remained favorable to us [The French], because of war comradeship, instinctive fidelity to allies and fear of German competition; although the city and business men considered that British commercial interests required the economic restoration of Germany and therefore criticised the methods of constraint applied by us in the Ruhr, general opinion on the contrary was very far from demanding that the Entente should be ruptured in order to aid Germany." (36) At any rate, the British Government took no action. Asquith urged that action should be taken by calling on the League, (37) and Lord Curzon expressed the belief that only international action would finally settle the matter, (38) but doubtless it was recognized that to have referred the matter to the League when the Great Powers were hopelessly divided and the prestige of the League was not yet established would have merely put upon the International Organization an impossible task, unless Great Britain were willing to apply the force in the name of the League that she was unwilling to apply in her own name. But the policy of the Government as outlined in the King's Speech was to be non-interference. Nothing was to

be done which would add to the difficulties of the Allies, although the British Government felt unable to participate in the action taken by France. (39)

So the matter drifted, until Stanley Baldwin became Prime Minister of Great Britain. The task of settlement was then again taken up and on June 7, 1923, a German note, composed under British influence and offering very definite guarantees, was sent to the Allies; but France refused to consider the offers until passive resistance should cease. (40)

The British, however, continued to attempt to bring about settlement, offering to reduce their claims against the Allies, and finally on August 11 intimated that separate action on the part of Great Britain might be necessary in order to hasten a settlement which could not be much longer delayed without the gravest economic and political consequences. (41) The British could avail nothing, however, and even after passive resistance broke down in October the French did not withdraw their troops from the Ruhr.

Demands made for a general conference to settle the reparations problem came to nothing because of the French refusal to cooperate, but suggestions for impartial committees of inquiry finally won, and two committees of experts were appointed by the Reparations Commission. (42) The Dawes plan was the result of the work of these committees. With the adoption of the Dawes Plan in 1924 and the Young Plan in 1927, reparations became, for a time at least, an economic rather than a political question, and the cause for the strained relations which had existed between Great Britain and France because of this question was removed. There was some difficulty between the two Governments at the London Conference of 1924, which met to consider the adoption of the Dawes Plan, over the possibility of wilful default on the part of Germany; but the Poincaré Government was much more favorably disposed to accept a more lenient policy toward Germany than former French Governments had been, and the question was settled without serious difficulty. (43)

The conflict over reparations therefore closed, temporarily at least, without a definite break between England and France, in spite of the vital difference in interests, purposes and outlook, and in spite of the fact that there were times when a break would appear to have been almost inevitable. But there was another side to the Anglo-French relations. The pro-French feeling that re-



mained in England as a result of the war and the old Entente has already been noted, but there was another reason for the constant endeavor to maintain cordial relations with France. The *Manchester Guardian Weekly* gives expression to this reason in an editorial of January 20, 1920, which says:

"Our relations with France can for us never be other than a matter of deep importance. She is our nearest neighbor. We have a strong and permanent interest in her security. We could never afford to see her territory overrun or any other Power placed in control of her Channel ports. That is elementary—Her interests are in a very real sense our interests, and were her safety seriously menaced it would be strange indeed if she did not look to us for help. That constitutes a sort of natural alliance."

There were, therefore, accompanying the almost constant conflicts of this decade, almost continuous efforts to reconcile the interests of the two nations. The question of French security became the center of these endeavors and negotiations. It was recognized from the first that France was held in the grip of fear of Germany, and throughout her negotiations with England, France maintained that the guarantee of her security was a necessary condition to the consideration of a more lenient treatment of Germany. In the Memorandum of the French Government dated January 10, 1919, (44) it was stated that Germany was held in check in 1914 until aid from England and the United States arrived, only because of the alliance with Russia. But Russia could no longer be relied upon and it was therefore necessary that the western barrier against German invasion should be made stronger. A natural frontier, the Rhine, was a prime necessity, according to the French Memorandum. This last request was not conceded by the Allies, but in March, Lloyd George and Wilson offered to France a military guarantee against future German aggression. (45) This guarantee was never realized because of the refusal of the United States to participate, but the subject was brought up again by the French in December, 1921. In a private conference with Lord Curzon, the French Ambassador to England outlined a new French proposal. (46) The first offer, he said, would not have been satisfactory, for it was unilateral and therefore humiliating to France, and, besides, the guarantees all turned upon the definition of "unprovoked aggression." What the French Ambassador had in mind, Lord Curzon said, "was something much more definite

and precise, nothing less than a defensive alliance concluded in precise and categorical terms—in which the two parties should bind themselves mutually to march each to the defense of the other in the event of attack, and to treat, in fact, any aggression upon one or the other as a hostile act in itself.” Such an alliance was to include even an attack upon Poland, as almost equivalent to a direct attack upon France. France would offer as an inducement the reduction of her land armaments and the immediate admission of Germany into the League. (47) France would also join in the attempt to reconstruct Russia. This proposal was not accepted but neither was it definitely declined, and on October 21, Briand suggested an alliance in which the two Powers would guarantee the interests of each in all parts of the world. But Lloyd George replied to this that Great Britain was not prepared for the undertaking of such extensive obligations. (48)

At the Cannes Conference, negotiations were continued, Lloyd George offering to France the guarantee of British forces for use on French soil against Germany in case of unprovoked attack, on condition that France would allow her full satisfaction in regard to reparations to wait on the economic restoration of Europe. Other conditions laid down by Lloyd George were that France should enter wholeheartedly into the economic conference to be held at Genoa, that she should refrain from hampering British policy in the Near East, that she should conform her naval policy to that of Great Britain and renounce her submarine program, and that she should inaugurate a truly international program for Tangier. (49) Apparently, there was a chance that the negotiations might be brought to a successful conclusion, but the Briand Ministry fell and Poincaré returned to the demands for a still more extensive treaty which should include a guarantee of the eastern front. (50) The French also later declined to discuss the problem of security in connection with the Ruhr, claiming that that was a purely economic question. (51)

The Labour Government inherited an extremely difficult situation in 1924. The reparations problem had reached a point where the British Government was threatening separate action, the committees of experts had scarcely begun their work, and the French and the British were at loggerheads over the Separatist movement in the Rhineland. MacDonald immediately set about the attempt to bring about a better feeling between the two coun-



tries. That there was no change in attitude as far as reparations were concerned, was indicated by a note to Poincaré in which MacDonald stated that the people of Great Britain regarded "with anxiety what appears to them to be the determination of France to ruin Germany and to dominate the Continent without consideration for our reasonable interests and future consequences to European settlement—" (52) But the problem of French security took on a broader aspect with the attempts of the Labour Prime Minister to find a solution. This wider view of the problem MacDonald explained to Poincaré in a communication in which he declared that while France conceived of security as security against Germany alone, the British desired security against war. "To my mind," he said, "the problem of security is not merely a French problem; it is a European problem, and one which interests alike England and Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Jugoslavia, Russia and Rumania, Italy and Greece." (53)

MacDonald's idea worked itself out through the League of Nations and the Geneva Protocol, rather than through an agreement limited to Great Britain and France, although he was not averse to special arrangements between the two countries, as is indicated in the Franco-British Memorandum on the application of the Dawes Plan. (54) This stated that the two countries had agreed to continue to coöperate in devising, through the League of Nations, or otherwise, means of obtaining security until the problem of general security could finally be solved.

With the return of the Conservative Party to power, the ratification of the Protocol was refused, but while explaining this action on the part of the Government to the House of Commons on March 24, 1925, Chamberlain announced a new policy in regard to French security. (55) Former efforts had been directed toward the formation of some plan by which France could be guaranteed against Germany in order that Great Britain should no longer be hampered in her policy of economic reconstruction; but in his announcement to the House of Commons, Chamberlain declared that a one-sided pact could no longer be considered. He attached great importance, he said, to proposals the German Government had recently made concerning this question. Germany would be interested, according to these suggestions, in considering a peaceful understanding with France, a comprehensive arbitration treaty with all the Powers interested in the Rhine, abandonment of recourse to war, and ac-

ceptance of the status quo in the West. Chamberlain added that to such an agreement it was essential that Germany be admitted to the League and that the Cologne area should be evacuated.

The result of the negotiations begun in pursuance of the policy announced by Chamberlain in March was the series of treaties signed at Locarno on October 16, 1925.(56) To only the first of these was Great Britain a party. This treaty was signed also by Germany, France, Belgium and Italy, the last joining with Great Britain in guaranteeing the obligations undertaken by Germany on the one hand and France and Belgium on the other, all of whom undertook to refrain in all cases from attack, invasion or resort to war except in cases of legitimate defense or upon the order of the League of Nations, and to settle all difficulties by peaceful means. All Parties, including Great Britain and Italy, collectively and severally guaranteed the maintenance of the territorial status quo in the boundaries of Germany and Belgium and of Germany and France. By means of this treaty, Great Britain apparently succeeded in guaranteeing the security of France without assuming the wider obligations connected with former French demands for guarantee of the eastern frontier, but agreement upon that point is not complete. MacDonald declared that there was no distinction between the guarantee of one border and the guarantee of both boundaries. (57) MacDonald's contention is supported by a study of the treaties signed at Locarno. For example, Germany signed with Poland and Czechoslovakia treaties by which all signatories agreed that disputes would be settled by the World Court or by a Permanent Conciliation Commission. The duties of the latter, however, were made advisory and, according to Article Eighteen of these treaties, if the two parties should fail to reach an agreement within a month after the termination of the work of the Commission, the dispute might be brought before the Council of the League of Nations which should deal with the matter according to Article Fifteen of the Covenant. But France also signed treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, the first Article of which provided that in case the signatories should be suffering from a failure to observe the obligations assumed at Locarno, these countries would give each other immediate aid in applying the sanctions provided by Article Sixteen of the Covenant for enforcing a decision of the Council. In other words, if the Council decision should be directed against Germany, France would assist her east-



ern Allies in enforcing the decision. But Article Fifteen of the Covenant provides that if the Council fails to reach a unanimous decision, the members to the dispute not considered, the League members should take such action as each should deem necessary. The Locarno Treaties between France and the central European countries provided, however, that in such an instance, if the dispute led to attack, mutual aid should be given. These provisions make possible a situation similar to that which arose in 1914, for should a dispute arise between Poland and Germany and should the difficulty be referred to the Council for settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty between these two countries, France could prevent a unanimous decision and so be free to take any action she considered necessary in support of her Ally. Such a circumstance would bring Germany and France into conflict and the status quo of the Rhineland would be threatened. And this region Great Britain guaranteed by the first Locarno Treaty. Consequently, the Locarno Treaties marked, not only a departure from the British policy of guaranteeing France alone, but also to some extent, at least, a departure from the former refusal to extend her obligations to Germany's eastern border.

It has been suggested that the British Government was more eager to isolate Russia than it was to avoid additional obligations to France and that the Locarno Treaties were primarily directed against Russia. (58) It might also be conceived that the Treaties, in the minds of Conservative leaders, provided a means of actual alliance with France, but there seems to be no reason for thinking that the purpose of the British Government was any other than the effort to alleviate the fear of conflicts in the Rhine region. This she hoped to realize, not so much by means of the actual Treaties, but rather by the feeling of good-will and security which was engendered by the Treaties. "Locarno as a spirit and gesture is admirable," said MacDonald. (59) "I described it once," he continued, "as one of the best examples of coueism that has been practiced in Europe in this generation." "It is the spirit of Locarno which the world needs, and which the world must cherish," was the declaration of Sir Austen Chamberlain. (60) But it was the fear of Chamberlain's opponents that unless this spirit were backed by actual disarmament, it might not prove permanent, for the peace of Europe could not be settled on the Rhine, and Locarno left so much of the world untouched. (61) The criticism seemed

justified by the difficulty which arose soon afterward over the admission of Germany to the League.

The Locarno Treaties did not provide the final solution for the problem of French security. The question arose again in 1930, in connection with the efforts to reach an agreement regarding naval armaments; and again the French demand for security, this time in the Mediterranean, as a condition of agreement was presented and was again rejected, the British Government refusing to assume more extensive obligations than those already undertaken in the League Covenant and the Locarno Treaties. (62)

In the meantime, however, relations between France and Great Britain had improved materially, largely because of the attitude assumed by the Conservative Government of Britain. Even in the efforts of the French Government to keep the balance on the League Council turned against Germany, the British representative apparently assumed a passive attitude toward the policy of the French. (63) A few months after the signature of the Locarno Treaties, Chamberlain declared that in the fifteen months he had been in office, he had "restored the old confidence and intimacy between the French and British Governments." (64) The next step in this rapprochement was the Anglo-French Accord of 1928. (65) The Conservative Government was accused at that time of planning a formal alliance with France, but if such was the plan, it was prevented by the storm of disapproval which arose in England and in the United States.

With the accession of the Labour Party to power for the second time, all cause for accusation of subserviency to French policy was temporarily abolished, and French hopes of renewal of the old Entente were shattered. "It is not a question of ententes or alliances," declared the Labour Prime Minister. "All that is a state of mind quite out of date. We wish to inaugurate an entirely new era of European coöperation. No more rivalries, no more agreements for or against this or that Power, no more secret diplomacy." (66) The occasion for the assertion of an independent British policy came with the presentation of the Young plan to the Powers for approval. Philip Snowden, the British representative, declared at the opening meeting of the Conference which had been called to approve the plan, that Great Britain could not accept a scheme which reduced the amount she would receive by 2,400,000 pounds per year as compared to the amount granted at



the Spa Conference, while France, Belgium and Italy all received larger sums than those previously granted. This position was maintained, at the risk of disrupting the Conference, until most of the British demands were granted. (67) This was a definite departure from the policy that the Government had previously been following. Snowden could be accused neither of subserviency to the French nor of the attempt to buy an agreement by financial concessions from Britain.

In these negotiations between Great Britain, France and Germany, Russia, in spite of her isolation, exercised an important influence. The effect upon the German policy of the fear of the spread of Bolshevism has already been noted, and the need for the economic reconstruction of Russia, as well as of Germany, and the British failure to effect a general European economic settlement which would include Russia, have already been suggested. During the first years after the Revolutions of 1917, the efforts of Great Britain and her Allies had been directed toward the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime by military force; but on February 10, 1920, Lloyd George admitted the failure of intervention and urged the desirability of the resumption of trade. (68) On July 14 of the same year, Bonar Law stated to the House of Commons that proposals had been made to the Soviet Government for an agreement in conformity with Lloyd George's suggestion. (69) These included the withdrawal of Polish troops from Russian territory and the withdrawal of General Wrangel and his troops to the Crimea, besides other provisions included in the trade agreement of the next year. This agreement, signed on March 16, 1921, provided for the protection of the facilities of trade in each country and for the exchange of commercial commissioners. Each agreed that no obstacles should be placed in the way of trade with the other, and each agreed to refrain from hostile action toward the other and from the conducting of official propaganda. (70) This agreement remained in force for the next six years; but an agreement which made no provision for official recognition of the Soviet Government, offered no settlement in regard to property nationalized or to debts cancelled, and gave no assistance in economic reconstruction could not be a satisfactory basis for relations between the two countries. Russia and Great Britain were, therefore, engaged for the next ten years in efforts to extend the agreements between the two Governments, as well as in conflicts over the ques-

tions which arose regarding the provision concerning propaganda.

The first of these attempts to extend the understanding between the two countries was made the next year, 1922, at the general conference held at Genoa. The purpose of this conference, as outlined by Lloyd George at the meeting of the Supreme Council of Cannes, was to lay the foundation for the restoration of European trade, one of the most important problems in the realization of such a scheme necessarily being the opening of Russian markets to the world. (71) At the Conference, the Russians declared that foreign loans were necessary to the economic reconstruction of their country. They were met by the Allied demands that financial obligations of the Czarist regime, which were held principally by the French, be recognized; that the war debts, which were due in large part to Great Britain, be assumed by the Bolshevik Government; and that individual property lost through nationalization be restored or compensation offered. The Russian delegates argued that, since Russia had given valuable assistance during the war but had gained nothing by the peace, the war debts should be cancelled. They also declared that the absolute restoration of private property as demanded by the French was contrary to Russian Revolutionary principles; but compensations and long leases were offered by the Russians instead. (72) The negotiations were extended, but, in spite of Lloyd George's strenuous efforts to obtain agreements, the Conference closed without definite arrangements for the restoration of trade. The reasons for the failure of the conference apparently were several. The disagreement between France and Great Britain stands out as one of the principal obstacles in the way of success. French hostility to the Conference was apparent throughout. The French Prime Minister failed to attend, but sent a delegate who was permitted to take no action without first consulting the Government at Paris. Consequently, French adherence to proposals made to the Russians was merely provisional. The French also maintained a much less liberal attitude toward the Russians throughout the entire conference than did the British. (73) The signature of the Treaty of Rapallo during the Conference also lessened the chance for success. According to the German observer of the situation, all hope of real success in either economic or political questions vanished with the signature of the treaty between Russia and Germany. The sincerity of both of the signatories was called into question and the threat



of isolation of France was destroyed by the apparent vindication of her position. (74) Another explanation offered by a French writer concerning the failure of the Conference is at least interesting. The French newspapers, he said, published a secret agreement by which a monopoly on the export of Russian oil was to be granted to an English company in case satisfactory arrangements were concluded between Russia and Great Britain. (75) It is impossible to determine how much truth there was in the report of such an agreement or how much influence it may have had in the breakdown of negotiations. It would seem, however, that the influence was not great, for the hostility of the French to the proceedings of the conference was evident from the time of its opening. But, regardless of the causes of the failure of the Conference, the fact remains that the breakdown of negotiations at Genoa left the Russian situation just where it had been at the opening of the Conference.

The policy followed by the Labour Government was much more liberal than that of the Coalition and Conservative Governments. The first step, according to Labour's plan, was unconditional official recognition of the Soviet Government, and the invitation to the Soviets to send delegates to London to assist in drawing up a treaty which would define the future relations between the two countries. (76)

The economic reconstruction of Russia was to be dependent upon the attitude of other Governments no longer, nor was recognition of the Government to be made only on condition that all points of difference be settled first. This action aroused a storm of protest, for it seemed to many Conservatives that the English Government had placed the stamp of approval upon the Soviet system and that the new British Prime Minister himself must be in accord with Bolshevism. MacDonald, however, took special pains to make it clear that these accusations were in no way true. Diplomatic relations are in no sense a partnership, he said, but were merely a channel for official communication. (77) No Government accepted responsibility for the actions of another by extending official recognition. (78) That the Russian Government had used diplomatic channels to carry on conspiracy and propaganda, he admitted, but it was his opinion that "starvation, industrial paralysis and bankruptcy do not nourish constitutionalism and law and order." (79) It was time to see what sympathetic assistance could do where force

had failed. MacDonald was confident that if aid could be given to Russia, and if the Eastern Power could be brought into closer contact with western Europe, the danger from that source would be eliminated. (80)

If, however, the Soviet delegates went to London expecting the British Labour Government to sacrifice English interests in order to obtain an understanding with Russia, they were disappointed. In this opening speech, MacDonald made clear that before English capital in any form could become available for Russia, it would be necessary to make sure that all contracts and agreements would be honored to the last letter. (81)

The questions that arose were the same as those faced in dealing with Russia at Genoa, and disagreements at times threatened to disrupt the conference, but by the first of August two treaties had been agreed upon. The first of these, as explained by Arthur Ponsonby in the House of Commons, (82) was a commercial treaty which followed the usual lines of commercial treaties and granted to each country most favored nation treatment in dealings with the other. The second treaty dealt with financial claims, government debts and propaganda. In the settlement of the question of claims, the Soviet delegates admitted the liability of the Russian Government to English bond holders and gave assurance of later negotiations for the final settlement of this question. Property and other claims were also to be passed upon by committees of British and Russians at a later date. The war debts owed to the British were balanced against Russia's interventionist claims, and both were to be settled later. The third portion of the treaty contained a propaganda agreement very similar to that included in the Trade Agreement of 1921. Finally, according to Article Twelve of this second treaty, when negotiations concerning claims which were left for later settlement were complete, the British Government agreed to place before Parliament the proposal for a loan to the Soviet Government.

Again, however, the attempt to come to satisfactory agreement with Russia failed, even after the treaties had been signed. The failure this time was due to the overthrow of the Labour Government. The proposed agreement with Russia had aroused such intense opposition that it was made an issue in a general election. In the midst of the campaign the famous Zinoviev Letter, which purported to have been sent to the Central Committee of the Ex-



ecutive Committee of the Third International, was published in England. This letter declared that a settlement between Russia and Great Britain would aid materially in the endeavors being made to revolutionize the British proletariat. (83) Whether or not this letter was forged for campaign purposes has never been determined, but, at any rate, it played its part in the defeat of the Labour Government; for the letter merely seemed to confirm the claims of both Conservative and Liberal leaders, made during the campaign, that the treaties offered encouragement to a regime which was fundamentally inimical to the entire British order. (84)

The treaty negotiations were broken off with the accession of the Conservative Party to power, but the diplomatic recognition accorded by the Labour Government was allowed to continue until 1927, in spite of almost constant difficulty over dissemination of Bolshevik propaganda. The feeling against Russia was intensified in 1926 because of assistance given by Russians to British strikers; but the British Government refused to heed the demands for breaking off diplomatic relations, because of the difficulty of fixing responsibility upon the Russian Government and because of the threat that such action would offer to peace between the two. Chamberlain declared that he favored neither the Trade Agreement nor diplomatic recognition but nothing could be gained then by breaking off relations. Such a break, he said, would give "no weapon for fighting disorder or disloyalty or revolution within our own borders, would create division where we seek union, and would in its echoes abroad increase the uncertainty, increase the fears, increase the instability of European conditions, which it is and ought to be our chief object to remove." (85) Opposition to a continuation of recognition had become intense, (86) however, and opposition to the Government policy continued to increase, until early in 1927 another note of protest was sent to the Bolshevik Government. Chamberlain declared that before proceeding to extreme measures he wished to call the attention of the world to the situation and give the Bolsheviks one more chance. (87) There followed in May the raid of the "Soviet House," the breaking of diplomatic relations, and the abrogation of the Trade Agreement. Prime Minister Baldwin stated as an explanation of this action that secret agents had been obtaining important information regarding British armed forces and that these agents had been traced to the Soviet House, which was occupied by the Trade delegation

and the Arcos Company. The raid furnished proof, Baldwin said, that both "military espionage and subversive activities throughout the British Empire and North and South America were directed and carried out from the Soviet House." There was no effective distinction between the duties of the members of the Trade delegation and employees of the Arcos Company. All were engaged in espionage and dissemination of propaganda. (88)

Just what purpose was behind the action of the Government is not entirely clear. Chamberlain had already declared that nothing could be gained by breaking off relations, and in his explanation to Parliament he failed to indicate any advantage which would be gained by the action, as his opponents soon made clear. (89) The opponents also pointed out that England, as well as Russia and other European countries, regularly made use of espionage for obtaining military information from other countries. It has been suggested that the break in diplomatic relations may be explained by the rivalry which existed between British and Russian oil interests, (90) but for this explanation there is no proof. But, whatever might have been the real cause for the action of the Government in 1927, the break with Russia remained complete until the return of the Labour Party to office in 1929. Discussions were begun with a view toward renewal of diplomatic and trade relations almost immediately upon the establishment of the new Labour Government, but negotiations were broken off because of renewed difficulty over propaganda and were not resumed until September. (91) These discussions resulted in an exchange of Ambassadors in November, 1929, the questions relating to former treaties and other problems being left for later settlements, as was the arrangement in 1924. (92) The first step toward final settlement was accomplished on April 16, 1930, with the signature of a new trade agreement. This was similar to the agreement of 1922 except that there was no clause regarding propaganda, and it was to determine the relations between the two countries until a complete treaty covering the causes of differences could be arranged. (93)

The difficulty between Great Britain and Russia over propaganda, to which reference has already been made, centered largely in Asia rather than in England itself, although the furor caused by the Zinoviev Letter indicated that the public could be easily led into the belief that there was Bolshevik danger at home. But in Asia, where religious enthusiasm and awakening nationalism were al-



ready threatening the position of British imperial interests, the missionary zeal of the Bolshevik in his attempt to realize his vision of a world in which capitalism had been overthrown by a revolting proletariat and in which all men were Bolsheviks, aroused the antagonism, the fear and the opposition of almost every Britisher. Apparently, Russia's relations with the East had, as Kohn states in his *History of Nationalism*, entered a new phase: "Now Russia, like England in the past, had a message for the peoples of the East. Though Russian policy in Asia after 1917 was often determined by national egotism and conducted from the point of view of Russia's well-being and expansion, yet this was done in the name of an international ideal which augmented its force and at the same time gave it a sanction comparable only with England's middle-class European ideal of gradual training in the blessings of freedom and self-government." (94)

But the ideal was not Bolshevism. For that the East was not ready. The uprising there had a broader foundation than class struggle. It was based upon a nationalism that cut across class, race and religious barriers, demanding freedom, not from capitalism, but from foreign domination. Nevertheless, Bolshevism allied itself with nationalism and encouraged the revolt against Europe, in the hope of winning the people to the new doctrines of class struggle; and the people of the East, especially of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, gladly availed themselves of the proffered assistance. The treaties drawn up between Russia and some of the States of the Middle East indicate the threat that the new Soviet Government was offering to the British Empire. (95) The second clause of the treaty with Persia states in part that the "Government of the R. S. F. S. R. unconditionally rejects that criminal policy [of the old Czarist regime] as not only violating the sovereignty of the states of Asia but also leading to organized brutal violence of European robbers on the living body of the peoples of the East." The fifth clause of the same treaty declares that both of the High Contracting Parties bind themselves by "all the means at their disposal to prohibit the existence on their territory of the troops or armed forces of any third State whatsoever, the presence of which would constitute a threat to the frontiers, interests, or security of the other High Contracting Party"; while the next clause provides that if the Persian Government should be too weak to

enforce the provisions of the fifth clause, Russia should have the right to send troops into Persia to enforce them. The treaty with Afghanistan declared that both countries agreed upon "the freedom of Eastern nations on the principle of independence and in accordance with the general wish of each nation." Russia also agreed "to give to Afghanistan financial and other help," and both countries bound themselves "not to enter with any third State into military or political agreement which would damage one of the Contracting parties."

It was, therefore, not Sovietism that the British had to fear in the East. In fact, the idea of the rule of the proletariat was not likely to be well received by the small ruling cliques in countries like Persia and Afghanistan. But the strongly nationalistic, anti-imperialistic policy of the Soviet Government offered to the Eastern people inspiration that the British found difficult to combat. Great Britain's protests that the provision of the trade agreement regarding propaganda was not being observed began almost with the signing of the agreement itself, and as protests multiplied, so also did the denials of the Soviet Government that there had been any action contrary to the agreement signed. A protest sent to the Russian Government regarding action in Persia is typical of many others: "The Russian Minister at Tehran has been the most tireless, though not always the most successful, operator in this field. He has housed Indian seditionists within his hospitable walls, and has sped them on their mission to India. His Majesty's Government know the exact sums which have been sent him from time to time by the Russian Government largely for the purpose of anti-British intrigue; and they have seen instructions that have passed between him and his superiors—with a view to stirring up anti-British movements and rebellion in that part of the world." (96)

Afghanistan was another field of action even more favorable, and in India trained agitators were arrested as early as November, 1922, according to the same protest. In reply, the Russians claimed that the British Government had been misinformed, insisted that the maintenance of a policy of the development of friendly connections in the East was in no way contrary to the agreement with Britain, and reiterated their intention to refrain from all hostile action against England. (97) And so the controversy raged until the Arcos Raid and the break in diplomatic and trade relations. (98) But the propaganda most dangerous to British im-



perial interests was, probably, not the work of agitators but the Bolshevik policy itself—that policy described as the maintenance of friendly connections in the East, and typified by such treaties as those already mentioned. Against such a policy Great Britain was helpless, although she found her already overwhelming imperial problem in the Far East and in the Middle East accentuated by Russian influence.

Not only in the Far and Middle East were these influences felt. In another region just as vital to imperial safety and in connection with other complicating factors, the results of Russian policy were felt. This was the region of the Near East. The British interest there centered, as it had before the War, in the maintenance of the safety of the Empire communications, and although Germany's expanding power had been eliminated by the War, neither the War nor the Revolutions of 1917 had destroyed Russia's interest in the Straits. It seemed, however, at the close of the War, that with Turkey defeated and Russia unsettled by revolution, the three Allies might at least solve the problem of the Near East to their own satisfaction. But such was not to be the case. In the struggle which ensued, Russia and Turkey were drawn together by the Allied occupation of Constantinople, the seizure of Turkish territory and the support given to the enemies of the Bolshevik regime by the Allies. But in spite of these factors, the Russian influence was not as strong as it might have been had the Turks been in more complete sympathy with Bolshevik aims. The Nationalists, however, had no more desire to remain under the influence of Moscow than of London or Paris, and the Nationalist movement in Turkey looked to Western Europe rather than to Russia for guidance. (99) Great Britain's difficulties in the Near East were due, therefore, not primarily to Russian influence, but to a revitalized Turkey and dissensions among the Allies.

When the War closed, Turkey seemed utterly prostrate. The victorious Allies saw in the old Turkish Empire a region that might be carved to suit their own interests, and there seemed no force which would prevent such action; but they were occupied with the more pressing questions of western and central Europe, so that it was not until August, 1920, that the treaty with Turkey was ready for signature. According to the Treaty of Sèvres, (100) the Straits were to be entirely open and under the control of an International Commission. Smyrna and surrounding territory, Eastern

Thrace, and certain islands of the Aegean, were awarded to Greece. Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine had already been marked out as Mandates at the Peace Conference of Versailles. To Turkey was left only Asia Minor and the territory extending to the east. But even this region was carved into spheres of influence by the Tripartite Agreement which was also signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920. (101) The Nationalist uprising in Turkey and the increasing strife among the Allies themselves, however, prevented either of these agreements from remaining in force, and it became necessary to call new conferences for the settlement of the question. These met at Lausanne. The Powers agreed to evacuate all Turkish territory. Eastern Thrace, Smyrna and Constantinople were restored to Turkey, but the provision requiring entire freedom of the Straits was retained, and a demilitarized zone was established around the Straits and in Eastern Thrace. (102)

In the provisions of these treaties and in the events and negotiations leading up to the signature of these agreements, a number of the features of the British policy become clear. One of these is the new policy adopted in regard to the Straits and the Black Sea. At Lausanne, Russia demanded that the Straits be left open to commerce but closed to vessels of war, except for those belonging to Turkey; but Great Britain demanded the inclusion within the Treaty of the same provision as that included in the Treaty of Sèvres; that is, the maintenance of entire freedom for passage of war vessels as well as for merchant ships. (103) "In fact," declared Lord Curzon, "the more closely we examine the Russian programme, the more clearly does it emerge that it has only one object in view, viz., to convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake with Turkey as the faithful guardian at the gates." (104) The words might have been those of Lord Beaconsfield, who declared to the House of Lords in 1878 that the effect of the Treaty of San Stefano would be "to make the Black Sea as much a Russian Lake as the Caspian." (105) But in 1878, the British were trying to prevent a great Russian fleet from passing through the Straits to destroy the communications to the East, and Turkey was the sentinel guarding the gate to the Mediterranean. By 1923, however, the situation had changed. Russia no longer had a great fleet and the Straits must be kept open in order that the British could see that no fleet was built and no forts established. This she obtained, but Constantinople was returned to the Turks, and Great Britain



thus lost an advantage that she might have gained had the city remained in control of a commission of British, French and Italians. It could in that case have served as a base for control of the Black Sea, the Danubian countries and the oil fields of the Caucasus. Then, with Mesopotamia, Palestine and Egypt also under British control, and with Syria and Anatolia under the influence of Allies, the security of the routes of imperial communication for which England had been struggling ever since the acquisition of India would apparently have been obtained.

In this new attempt to solve the problem of imperial security in the Near East, Turkey no longer played a part in the British schemes. "The great powers had kept him together—because they were afraid of what might happen if he disappeared. There was no one there to take his place.—They feared that the country might fall into the hands of a great military empire which would use it to the detriment of the interests of their rivals or that it might fall into anarchy and confusion.—The late war has completely put an end to that state of things. Turkey is broken beyond repair, and from our point of view we have no reason to regret it.—Turkey is no more. Nothing will put Turkey together again as an empire.—We have to find a substitute for the authority with which we have been accustomed to deal for generations." Such was the emphatic statement of Lloyd George concerning the Near Eastern situation in 1920. (106) This new authority was to be found in Greece. Bulgaria might have assumed this position, according to Lloyd George, had it not been for the part she had played in the war. "The Greeks, on the other hand, have shown strength, capacity, restraint, and statesmanship throughout this war," the Prime Minister declared. He might have added that such capacity and restraint would be likely to continue so long as the British need of Greece continued, and the British navy remained in the Mediterranean. Because of Bulgaria's geographical position, she was much less likely to show the kind of restraint and statesmanship British statesmen could approve. There may have been another reason, too, for the selection of Greece to replace Turkey in the Near East. Kohn states that for a hundred and fifty years great Greek merchant dynasties had dominated trade in grain westward bound from Odessa and in cotton goods sold from Manchester to the East. They also owned much of the oil and mineral wealth of the Caucasus and they held shares in one of the great British munitions plants,

a branch of which was established in Greece after the close of the war. (107)

By the Treaty of Sèvres, Greece was given liberal portions of the old Turkish Empire, but she quite evidently was expected to hold these regions without assistance from the Allies. And in 1920 this did not appear to be a difficult task. Greek forces had driven back the Turks in Asia Minor even before the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres. (108) But this scheme of substituting a new Power for the obsolete Turkish Empire collapsed before the two forces which were doing most to frustrate the British Near Eastern policy: the rise of the Nationalist Turks and the disaffection of Britain's Allies. The Nationalist uprising placed Great Britain in an extremely difficult position. The use of force was out of the question, for the movement soon had back of it the great power of popular approval, and it was soon firmly intrenched in the mountainous regions of Anatolia. Then, too, it was a liberal movement, and for Great Britain to have gone to the support of the old Turkish Empire with its record of centuries of oppression would have required an occasion of direct necessity, if British opinion had given its support. There was nothing to do, the Prime Minister said, except to let the Greeks and Turks fight it out. (109) Apparently, Great Britain had again backed the wrong horse, and her policy collapsed. Had she allied herself with the forces of democracy and nationalism instead of with force, reaction and imperialism, suggested a liberal writer in looking back over this period, England might well have developed a powerful influence in rejuvenated Turkey and have realized her aims in the Near East. (110) But in 1920, such an awakening of national spirit could not be foreseen.

In an effort to settle the difficulties which had arisen, a conference was called at London in February, 1921, to which Turkish representatives from both Constantinople and Angora were invited, but no settlement proved possible. The Allies offered a modification of the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, but their offers were refused by the Angora representatives, while the Turkish suggestion of the internationalization of Smyrna was refused by the British. (111) The result was failure of the conference and the Allied proclamation of neutrality, which left Greece to fight it out alone, as Lloyd George had said. The complete defeat of



the Greeks made necessary the calling of the Conference at Lausanne, to which reference has already been made.

In the meantime the situation had been complicated by divisions and dissensions among the Allies. The French began negotiations with the Nationalist Turks early in 1921, and in October of the same year, agreed to peace and to the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia and other territory assigned to her by the Tripartite Agreement, territory which Great Britain claimed was of strategic importance to Mesopotamia. (112) The plans of the British Government for general Allied intervention in support of Greek policy in Turkey had to be abandoned, therefore, for Italy, too, had withdrawn from Anatolia, and Great Britain was left to carry on the struggle alone. (113) The climax came in September, 1922, when Turkish Nationalistic forces gathered at Chanaq, demanding entrance to Constantinople and the right to march through the City in pursuit of the retreating Greeks in Thrace. For a time war appeared inevitable, but warfare was avoided and an armistice was signed in October. By the terms of the armistice, the Turks were again given possession of Eastern Thrace and Smyrna. (114) The final settlement was made at the second Conference at Lausanne. The armistice of 1922 marked the end of the British attempt to destroy Turkey and substitute Greece as the nominal power in the region of the Straits. Her policy in regard to Turkey was governed after 1923 by the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. Her policy in the Near East had collapsed, partly because imperialism supported by an Empire already weary of war and uncertain of advantages to be gained by war in the East had been pitted against a rejuvenated, enthusiastic, nationalistic Turkey, and partly because of the disaffection of her Allies. The Straits were left open, but without the supervision of a Power friendly to Great Britain or under British control. The attempt of the British Government to make secure the imperial communications to the Far East had been successful only in part.

Closely connected with the problem of security of Empire communications in the Near East was the problem of the Mediterranean. In that region, too, Great Britain was called upon to consider the security of the road to the East. Before the war, this problem had been solved by the arrangement with France, by which the protection of the Channel and the North Sea had been left to the British fleet, and the Mediterranean had been assigned to the

French. But with the destruction of the German fleet the Northern region was no longer in danger, and British interest was again centered in the Mediterranean. So long as the Entente remained effective, Britain's interests were not endangered there; but as has already been indicated, French and British policies were in conflict in the Near East as early as the first part of 1921. The British, therefore, while maintaining two fleets, an Atlantic and a Mediterranean, recognized that their positions were such that the two could be quickly and easily united in the Mediterranean should the need arise. (115)

In the question of control of the Mediterranean, the policy of Italy, as well as France, required the attention of the British statesmen. For the first year after the close of the war, Italy had still looked to her Allies for support, and Russia and Greece had been looked upon as her chief enemies, but Italian policy had soon taken an anti-Anglo-Saxon turn. This change Schneider ascribes to the demand for payment of Italian debts in England and the United States, the new United States immigration law, and the depreciation of Italian currency in England. (116) To these must be added the failure of Italy to receive the desired share of the spoils of war particularly in the Near East, and the new intensely nationalistic attitude which came to dominate the Italian State. Italy had received no Mandates from which she might have obtained the oil, the coal and the raw materials of which she stood in need. Italy must, therefore, build her own Empire. The Mediterranean should become an Italian Lake. But the new Italian imperialism had found Great Britain in the way of the realization of the greatness of which Italian imperialists dreamed. (117)

Had it not been for the clash of imperial policies in the old Turkish Empire, a satisfactory Anglo-Italian agreement might have been arranged. In 1922, at the Genoa Conference, Lloyd George and Signor Schanzer, the Italian Foreign Minister, made an effort to come to some agreement, but in these negotiations the question of the old Turkish Empire was not considered. Their mutual needs in the matter of trade tended to draw the two countries together and Signor Schanzer reported upon his return to Rome, according to the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, that Lloyd George had agreed to a modification of the San Remo Oil Agreement (118) in such a way as to admit Italy to a share with England and France in all oil obtained. Arrangements had also been made, Signor



Schanzer said, for the sale of British coal in Italy and for facilities for storing Anglo-Italian goods at Italian ports. Trieste was to be made a port for Anglo-Italian traffic to and from the East, Great Britain furnishing the necessary funds and receiving in return extra favorable treatment. (119) But this did not settle the Eastern question, and in September of the same year the Italians, along with the French, withdrew from the Straits, leaving the British to face the Turks alone at Chanaq.

Great Britain's relations with Italy became more cordial, however, in 1923. In the Balkans, Great Britain seems not to have opposed Italian schemes. The Corfu affair of 1923 was settled in Italy's favor and although Lord Cecil, the British representative on the League Council, opposed the settlement made, it is by no means certain that his attitude was indicative of his Government's policy. (120) Italian support was needed at that time in the settlement of the reparations problem, while Italy was finding the French a more serious obstacle in the realizations of her ambitions in the Balkans than were the British in other parts of the Mediterranean area. This French-Italian opposition of interests gave Great Britain an opportunity to improve her friendship for Italy. The British policy in this struggle was apparently favorable to Italy, at least until the attempted Anglo-French Accord of 1928. After a meeting between Chamberlain and Mussolini on December 31, 1925, the former expressed his entire satisfaction with Italian policy, (121) and at a later meeting on October 6, 1926, Chamberlain, it is claimed, assured Mussolini of a free hand in Albania. (122) This was denied in London, (123) but there is no reason to suppose that Great Britain should have approved of any action, either by the Allies of France or by Italy, which would disturb the status quo and so threaten the maintenance of peace in the Balkans.

In the meantime, differences regarding outlying territories, particularly the Dodecanese Islands and Jubaland, had been settled. The settlement of the boundary between Somaliland and Kenya had been connected with demands for the surrender of Rhodes to Greece, but in 1924 MacDonald had separated these questions, allowed the Italians to remain in Rhodes, and finally succeeded in settling the dispute over territory in Jubaland to the satisfaction of Italy. (124)

In spite of the treaties which had been negotiated and the arrangements which had been made, however, Great Britain was still

faced at the close of the decade, in her relations to the Powers of Europe, by the two great problems which she had been attempting to solve throughout the period; namely, the economic reconstruction of Europe and the security of the Empire so far as this latter problem centered in her relation to the continental Powers. Two widely separated courses had been followed during the decade in the attempt to solve these problems. One course was determined by the old French Alliance and the opinions resulting from the war and from pre-war influences. This course, based upon force and narrow nationalism, had led to failure in the Near East, and it had failed to bring success in Germany and in Russia. The second course was dictated by England's needs and was based upon a spirit of international coöperation and mutual understanding. Between these courses British policy had wavered, but as the decade closed there were indications that the second course was coming into greater favor and might in the next decade be more constantly and consistently followed.

The political policies of the first decade after the World War were often conflicting, confused and vacillating. Militarism, ruthless imperialism, intense nationalism, were in conflict with new economic needs and new demands arising from broadened view points. The result was confusion which apparently was worse than before the war. But such a situation is characteristic of every transition period. A closer study of the chaotic post-war period makes apparent certain very definite tendencies toward a new order. It is true that for nearly half a decade the "war mind" dominated Great Britain as well as the rest of Europe. Imperialism and military Ententes determined the policies of European Governments. The fear of Germany and of Russia and the demand for compensation for the sacrifice of the preceding years, at the expense of those deemed guilty of precipitating the conflict, were the determining factors in policy during the first years after the war. But by 1923 the tide was turning in favor of new methods of dealing with international problems. New economic forces were making themselves felt. The rift in the old Entente became too apparent to be ignored as the fear of Germany and Russia subsided. An international ideal was beginning to assert itself against extreme nationalism. Faith in militarism and alliances was on the wane as the demand for peace founded on something broader and more firm became stronger. That the liberal parties with their



traditional internationalism, should take the lead in such a movement was natural. It was their task to translate idealism into realism. The attempts made by the Labour Party in 1924, and again in 1929, to base British policy on new principles, and the failure of the Conservative Party to entirely restore the old order during the five years they ruled, are both indicative of change. (The principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1924 have never been entirely abandoned, and the protocol itself marked an attempt to bring peace by a means entirely new and by a method unthought of before the war.) The recognition of Russia in 1924 marked a departure from the old policy of nationalistic isolation. The dispatching of a Commission of investigation to China in 1924, and the sending of another to Kenya in the same year, indicated a desire for a clearer understanding of the imperial problem. Although reactionary attempts characterized the next five years of Conservative rule, such attempts often failed because of economic needs, the growth of nationalism in the East and the development of a broader outlook in England itself. The negative attitude taken toward the League, the encouragement given to competition in armaments, and the apparent attempt to renew the old Anglo-French Entente are all indications of belief in the old diplomacy rather than in new and untried methods. But even during these years, the Locarno Treaties, the announcement of a new policy in China, and the ratification of the Paris Peace Pact, are indicative of a movement away from pre-war policies, even on the part of the Conservative Party.

The second decade after the close of the war opened with the Labour Party again in control of the British Government and with the renewal of attempts to inaugurate a policy founded on the broad principles of internationalism. The diplomatic isolation of Russia was again ended, concessions were offered in the endeavor to settle the conflict between Eastern nationalism and European imperialism, and an agreement regarding naval armaments was reached. Militarism still flourished in certain parts of Europe, but in Britain competition was abandoned in favor of limitation and agreement.

In many parts of the world, imperialism in its old form was showing unmistakable signs of dying. It was apparently declining as rapidly as it had risen. Expense, reaction against the use of force, a realization of the evils attendant upon imperialistic ex-

pansion, and a growing sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations of other peoples were destroying much of the old time aggressive imperialism. Concessions were offered to Iraq and to Egypt in 1929 and 1930 that would have been unthinkable in 1922, while China, if she had been able to establish a reasonably stable government, could have had the freedom from foreign intervention her Nationalists so much desired. Even the fact that the Powers did not take advantage of China's disorder to divide her territory among themselves was indicative of the passing of the old imperialism.

The old Entente, too, was gone, and in its place, so far as Great Britain was concerned, was an international coöperation based on mutual friendship with Russia, France, Germany, Italy and the Lesser Powers of Europe, working through the League of Nations in the effort to eliminate the causes of war.

Signs were not lacking that the new forces, stimulated and strengthened by the war, were gaining in their struggle against the old policies which culminated in the World War, and were introducing a new order based upon an international ideal and designed to assure the peace and security that the old had failed to bring.



## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER I

1. See S. H. Roberts, *History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925*, London, 1929.
2. P. T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, New York, 1927, p. 21.
3. "Accepting Sir Robert Giffen's estimate (made in 1898) of the size of the Empire (including Egypt and Soudan) at about 13,000,000 square miles, with a population of some 400 to 420 millions,—we find that one third of this Empire, containing quite one fourth of the total population of the Empire, has been acquired within the last generation." (J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism, a Study*, London, 1902, pp. 18-19).
4. In May, 1897. (M. B. Giffen, *Fashoda, the Incident and Diplomatic Setting*, Chicago, 1930, pp. 128-29).
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-38.
6. Grey of Fallodon in *Twenty-five Years*, New York, 1925, I:41.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
8. G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919*, New York, 1922, pp. 316-17.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 326-30; *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, II:80-88.
10. Grey, *op. cit.* I:72 ff.
11. Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, New York, 1923, I:114; H. H. Asquith, *The Genesis of the War*, New York, 1923, pp. 132-33.
12. Bethmann-Hollweg, *Reflections on the World War*, Translated by George Young, London, 1920, pp. 50 ff.; Viscount Haldane, *Before the War*, London, 1920, p. 79.
13. Grey, *op. cit.* I:244.
14. See Grey, *op. cit.*; Haldane, *op. cit.*; Bethmann-Hollweg, *op. cit.*; *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, VI:289, No. 195.
15. See for example, James W. Angell, *The Recovery of Germany*, New Haven, 1929.
16. Discussions of post-war situation: *Britain's Industrial Future*, (Report of Liberal Industrial Inquiry), London, 1928; Henry Clay, *Unemployment*, London, 1929. Norman Angell, *If Britain is to Live*, London, 1923; Figures given in *Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom for each of Fifteen Years, 1913 and 1915 to 1928*, Seventy-third Number.
17. See Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East*, New York, 1929.
18. J. de V. Loder, *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria*, London, 1923, p. 32.
19. Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
20. See *Britain's Industrial Future*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
21. President Wilson's speech in Kansas City as reported in the *New York Times*, Feb. 3, 1916.
22. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, Dec. 1, 1920, p. 1.
23. H. C. Bywater, *Navies and Nations*, London, 1927, p. 105.
24. *Infra*, p. 63.
25. See H. Duncan Hall, *British Commonwealth of Nations*, London, 1920,

- and Arthur B. Keith, *War Government of the British Dominions*, Oxford, 1921, *passim*.
26. *The Times* (London), Feb. 3, 1925.
  27. A summary of the constitutional developments in the British Commonwealth since the War is given by Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations Since the Peace Settlement*, London, 1928. Discussion of the Chanaq Incident, pp. 46-52; A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood, *Turkey*, London, 1926, pp. 92 ff.
  28. *Canadian Parliamentary Sessional Papers*, No. 40a, Vol. XLIX., No. I, 1914.
  29. *Ibid.* No. 40.
  30. Toynbee, *Empire Foreign Relations*, p. 49.
  31. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
  32. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
  33. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
  34. *Monthly Summary of League of Nations*, 3:198, Sept. 1923.
  35. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
  36. Report of the Interimperial Committee at the Imperial Conference of 1926, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XI., 1926, Cmd. 2768 (1926).
  37. *Peace Yearbook*, 1927, London, 1927.
  38. See H. H. Tiltman, J. Ramsay MacDonald, *Labour's Man of Destiny*, New York, 1929.
  39. Arthur Ponsonby, *Democracy and Diplomacy*, London, 1915, pp. 8-9.
  40. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
  41. W. E. Walling, *The Socialists and the War*, New York, 1915, p. 38.
  42. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
  43. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
  44. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
  45. *Labour and the New Social Order* (Report of Labour Conference), London, 1918, p. 23.
  46. W. Arnold-Forster, "Policy of the Labour Party," *Foreign Affairs* (British), XI:127-30, May, 1929. See also J. Ramsay MacDonald, *Socialism and Government*, London, 1909, II:133; W. E. Walling, *Progressivism—and After*, New York, 1914, p. 272.
  47. *Report of the Twenty-third Annual Conference of the Labour Party*, London, pp. 76-77.
  48. Guido de Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism*, Translated by R. G. Collingwood, London, 1927, p. 259.
  49. *Ibid.*, p. 411.
  50. Hansard, *Debates of House of Commons*, 212:217, June 25, 1872.
  51. *Idem.*, 267:1188-96, March 17, 1882.
  52. Ramsay Muir, *History of the British Empire*, London, 1920, II:598.
  53. J. A. Spender, *The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, G.C.B.*, London, 1923, I:209-10.
  54. Harold Spender, *The Prime Minister*, New York, 1920, p. 117.
  55. C. Howard-Ellis, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, London, 1928, pp. 69-75.
  56. H. L. Nathan and H. H. Williams (Editors), *Liberalism and Some Problems of Today*, London, 1929, pp. 99-100.
  57. *Ibid.*, p. 99.



## CHAPTER II

1. Nathan and Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
2. This necessity was expressed by Chamberlain in the House of Commons on December 19, 1924. (Hansard, 179:147-52).
3. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 18 (1925), Cmd. 1922, p. 10. While this particular case probably referred primarily to the presence of Indians in Kenya the principle clearly would apply against whites as well.
4. Statements by Liberal leaders, Nathan and Williams, *op. cit.*, *passim*.
5. This attitude is well summarized by J. Ramsay MacDonald in *Socialism: Critical and Constructive*, Indianapolis, 1924, pp. 326-27.
6. *Report of Annual Conference of Labour Party*, London, 1925, p. 261.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
10. Walling, *Progressivism*, p. 275.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 283.
12. J. Ramsay MacDonald, "Labour and the Empire," quoted in Tiltman, *op. cit.*, p. 313.
13. *Supra*, pp. 12-13.
14. J. Ramsay MacDonald, "Unemployment and Increase in Trade," Pre-election address, May 28, 1929. Quoted in Tiltman, *op. cit.*, Appendix K.
15. According to the statement of J. Coatman, Director of Public Information of the Government of India, (*India in 1927-28*, Calcutta, 1928, pp. 132-41) there were in 1921 nearly sixteen million people engaged in industry in British India. According to the same authority, India was, in 1928, leading the world in the jute industry and had reached fifth place in the cotton industry. Important iron and steel works had also been established. In 1926, there were employed in industry over sixty thousand children, and of the wages of the adult, Coatman states that "there is no doubt that all but the most highly skilled worker in India receive wages which are barely sufficient to feed or clothe them or to enable them to live with more than the minimum of comfort or even decency." Figures showing the growth of industry in China are not available, but the *China Yearbook* for 1928, pp. 943, ff. suggests a rapid growth of an industrial population and the increasing importance of the cotton industry there.
16. *Report of Annual Conference*, 1922, "President's Address," p. 170.
17. *Idem.*, 1925, Ben Tillett in a speech moving a resolution for recognition of Chinese sovereignty, p. 261.
18. *Idem.*, 1918, p. 22.
19. *League of Nations Official Journal*, Jan. and Feb. 1921, pp. 84-91, and August, 1922, pp. 865-68.
20. *Idem.*, Dec. 1921, pp. 1126 ff.
21. For example, see *Official Journal*, 8:1258 ff., Oct. 1927.
22. For example, the protest from the Third Palestinian Arab Congress (*Official Journal*, June, 1921, pp. 331-40) against military occupation, lack of self-government, division of Arab territory, etc.
23. See John H. Harris, "Mandates and Sovereignty," *Foreign Affairs* (British), 9:109-10, Oct. 1927.
24. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XVIII., 1927, Cmd. 2904 (1927).
25. Text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in Loder, *op. cit.*, Appendix I, pp. 161-64.
26. The diplomatic history of this region during the War and years just

following is given by Loder, *op. cit.* and by E. M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway*, New York, 1923.

27. Text of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite Agreements, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 51 (1920), Cmd. 963 and Cmd. 964.
  28. Earle, *op. cit.*, Chapter 12. British correspondence dealing with relations between France and Great Britain in the Near East, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIII., 1922, Cmd. 1570 (1922).
  29. Article 3 of Treaty of Lausanne, *League of Nations Official Journal*, 6:1434, Oct. 1925.
  30. *Idem.*, Oct. 1924, p. 1360.
  31. *Idem.*, Special Supplement No. 44, pp. 168-77.
  32. The protests against British policy by the Arabians outlined in *Official Journal*, 2:331-40, June, 1921, and 8:1262 ff, Oct. 1927.
  33. Text, Loder, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
  34. *Ibid.*, Appendix IV.
  35. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
  36. *Official Journal*, 3:1505-09, Dec. 1922.
  37. A. H. Lybyer, "British Plan for the Independence of Iraq," *Current History*, XXXI:404-05, Nov. 1929.
  38. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1927, Cmd. 2998 (1927).
  39. Lybyer, *loc. cit.*
  40. *The Times* (London), Sept. 20, 1929.
  41. *Current History*, XXXII:395-99, May, 1930; *The Times* (London), May 28, 1930.
  42. Extended summary of the statement of Government policy in *The Times* (London), Oct. 21, 1930.
  43. Loder, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
  44. Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 5; G. L. Beer, *African Questions at the Peace Conference*, New York, 1923, p. 413.
  45. Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
  46. Francis Delaisi, *Oil, Its Influence on Politics*, Translated by C. Leonard Leese, London, 1922, p. 20.
  47. According to the *League of Nations Armaments Yearbook*, 1928-1929, p. 895, British India, the only portion of the Empire which produced enough oil to warrant mention, produced in 1927 only 6% of the world's supply of oil. *The Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (Vol. VIII., 1927, p. 445), also published by the League of Nations, gives the following figures for oil in the United States and in the regions in which the British are interested:
- |               | 1918        | 1921        | 1926              |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|
| United States | 248,400,000 | 472,200,000 | 770,900,000 bbls. |
| India         | 7,900,000   | 8,700,000   | 8,300,000         |
| Persia        | 1,900,000   | 16,700,000  | 35,800,000        |
| Canada        | 200,000     | 200,000     | 400,000           |
| Egypt         | 100,000     | 1,200,000   | 1,200,000         |
48. Text, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. LI., 1920, Cmd. 675 (1920).
  49. Hans Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-38.
  50. The report of the British officials in Palestine in 1921 indicated the importance of the region commercially and the possibilities regarding economic development. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XV., 1921, Cmd. 1499 (1921).
  51. Loder, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-50.
  52. Hansard, 121:771, Nov. 17, 1919.



53. Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
54. E. W. P. Newman, *Great Britain in Egypt*, London, 1928, pp. 221-248.
55. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XLII., 1921, Cmd. 1131 (1921).
56. *Idem.*, Vol. XXIII., 1922, Cmd. 1592 (1922).
57. *Idem.*, Vol. XXVI., 1928, Cmd. 2050 (1928).
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-40.
59. Hansard, *Debates of House of Commons*, 320:1640-46, July 26, 1929.
60. Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
61. *The Times* (London), May 23, 1930.
62. *Ibid.*
63. Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-21.
64. Wedgewood in House of Commons, Hansard, 121:772, Nov. 17, 1919.
65. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 151:273, Feb. 28, 1922.
66. Egypt sent to England 304,216,600 pounds of cotton in 1928 as compared with the 896,934,900 sent from the United States and the 100,489,700 sent from India. (*Statistical Abstract*, Table No. 223, pp. 350-51) Exports of goods produced in the United Kingdom sent to Egypt in 1928 were valued at 11,185,147 pounds sterling.
67. *Supra.*, footnote 47.
68. The trade with Egyptian Sudan is still not large, but there has been a steady increase throughout the decade. *Statistical Abstract*, Tables 214 and 215, pp. 306, 310-13.
69. Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-10.
70. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 151:271-75, Feb. 28, 1922.
71. Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
72. H. K. Norton, *China and the Powers*, New York, 1927, p. 67.
73. H. M. Vinacke, *A History of the Far East in Modern Times*, New York, 1928, p. 420.
74. Minutes of Plenary Sessions and texts of Resolutions and Treaties, *Conference on the Limitation of Armament*, Washington, 1922. Text of Treaty also found in *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXX., 1924-25, Cmd. 2517 (1925).
75. *Conference on Limitation*, pp. 893-901.
76. *Ibid.*, Resolution No. 3, p. 903.
77. *Ibid.*, 897-901. Also *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXX., 1924-25, Cmd. 2518 (1925).
78. Vinacke, *op. cit.*, p. 437.
79. *Conference on Limitation*, pp. 903-04; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIII., 1922, Cmd. 1627 (1922); *China Yearbook*, 1928, pp. 439-458.
80. *China Yearbook*, 1928, pp. 445-46.
81. The Chinese demands were presented at the first meeting of the Far East Committee, but at the third meeting the American delegation offered as a substitute guarantees expressed in very general terms. *Conference on Limitation*, pp. 444 and 454.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 459.
83. At the Washington Conference, the Powers expressed their desire to withdraw troops, which have often been kept in China without treaty sanction, as soon as China was able to protect lives and property of foreigners. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIII., 1922, Cmd. 1627 (1922).
84. *Conference on Limitation*, pp. 542-43.
85. *Parl. Papers*, Vol. 23, 1922 Cmd. 1627 (1922). Formal agreement was

- not reached until 1923 and then was not ratified because of a change of government in China. *China Yearbook*, 1924, pp. 831-36.
86. *The Times* (London), April 19, 1930.
  87. *China Yearbook*, 1921-22, Text of agreement, pp. 357-60.
  88. Hansard, 185:906-47, June 18, 1925.
  89. Trevelyan in House of Commons, *Ibid.*, col. 913.
  90. Johnston in House of Commons, *Ibid.*, col. 944.
  91. *Ibid.*, col. 945.
  92. *Conference on Limitation*, 25th Meeting, Jan. 24, 1922, p. 708.
  93. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXX., 1924-25, Cmd. 2442 (1925).
  94. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
  95. *The Times* (London), Dec. 28, 1926. Text of Memorandum, A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, Oxford, 1926, Appendix V; *China Yearbook*, 1928, pp. 756-61.
  96. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 185:906-45, June 18, 1925.
  97. Text of measures, Toynbee, *Survey*, Appendix V., pp. 494-95.
  98. J. Ramsay MacDonald, *The Government of India*, New York, 1920, pp. 19-20.
  99. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. VIII., 1918, Cmd. 9109 (1918).
  100. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 98:1695, Aug. 20, 1917.
  101. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. I., 1919, pp. 696-758.
  102. MacDonald, *Government of India*, pp. 128-34.
  103. Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
  104. For abstract of Vol. I of the Simon Report see *The Times* (London), June 10, 1930; Vol. II., *Idem.*, June 24, 1930. See also "The Simon Commission's Plan for India," *Current History*, XXXII:871-86, Aug. 1930.
  105. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. IX., 1924-25, Cmd. 2387 (1925).
  106. W. McGregor Ross, "Kenya—Our Most Restless Dependency," *Foreign Affairs*, (British), 9:110-11, Oct. 1927.
  107. *Ibid.*
  108. Walter P. Hall, *Empire to Commonwealth*, New York, 1928, p. 444.
  109. Ross, *loc. cit.*
  110. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XVIII., 1927, Cmd. 2904 (1927).
  111. There seems, however, to be a growing restlessness among the younger members of certain tribes which is causing some uneasiness to the local government and is attracting attention even in England. The Governor of Kenya in Oct., 1929 warned the natives that disturbances would not be tolerated under any circumstances, but the suggestion of the use of force was not well received in England. *The Times* (London), Feb. 27, 1930.

### CHAPTER III

1. Debate on Naval Estimates in House of Commons, March 17, 1920, Hansard, 126:2296 ff.
2. *Idem.*, 139:1763-1879, March 17, 1921.
3. *Idem.*, 126:2335, March 17, 1920.
4. *Ibid.*, cols. 2313-14.
5. *League of Nations Armaments Yearbook*, 1928-29, Geneva, 1929, pp. 188-274.
6. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 126:2303-04; 139:1763-1879.



7. The problem of air defense was recognized as a serious one in 1923 when the Prime Minister declared that Great Britain must have an air force which would be capable of guarding against the strongest force within striking distance. (Hansard, *House of Commons*, 165:2142, June 26, 1923) In 1924 Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for Air in the former Conservative Government, pointed out that Great Britain had a total of only about one hundred planes as compared to France's one thousand. (*Idem.*, 169:1663, Feb. 19, 1924) On the same date, the Under-Secretary for Air, announced that the Labour Government planned to continue the policy of increasing the air forces as outlined by the former Government. (*Ibid.*) In 1927 Sir Samuel Hoare, who was again Secretary of State for Air, announced further increases in amounts to be spent for air defense, and declared that a move had been made toward an Imperial Air Policy. (*Idem.*, 203:1395 ff., March 10, 1927) It was pointed out, however, that of the total amount spent on defense, the amount spent on the air forces was still very small. (*Ibid.*, col. 1425)
8. *Idem.*, 139:1774-76, March 17, 1921.
9. *Ibid.*, cols. 1778-1833.
10. *Ibid.*, col. 1778.
11. Text of Four-Power Treaty in *Conference on Limitation*, p. 890.
12. Yamato Ichihashi, *The Washington Conference and After*, Stanford, 1928, p. 123.
13. *Conference on Limitation*, pp. 103-14.
14. Article XIX of Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, *Conference on Limitation*, p. 875.
15. *Ibid.*, Article IV.
16. See discussion of claim made by P. D. Craven at dinner of Council on Foreign Relations of statements made by British and American delegates in R. L. Buell, *Washington Conference*, New York, 1922, pp. 183-86.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 195-96.
18. *Supra.*, p. 48.
19. *Conference on Limitation*, p. 302.
20. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
21. Cruisers were limited at the Washington Conference to 10,000 tons. Great Britain had built forty-one cruisers during the ten years preceding this Conference and all were of smaller size than the maximum allowed at Washington. The largest possessed by the United States at that time was of 7500 tons. All of those laid down by either country since 1921 have been of maximum size. (*League of Nations Armaments Yearbook*, 1928-29, pp. 126-28, 870-71)
22. *Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament*, Washington, 1928, pp. 26-27.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-32.
24. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
25. The United States had 18 cruisers with a total displacement of 155,000 tons; Japan, 25 cruisers with a displacement of 156,205 tons; Great Britain, 54 cruisers, displacement, 332,000 tons. J. T. Gerould, "Disarmament at the Conference on Naval Disarmament," *Current History*, XXVI:792-96, Aug. 1927.
26. *The Times* (London), March 19, 1926.
27. *Idem.*, Jan. 30, 1928, Editorial.
28. *Records of the Conference*, Feb. 28, 1927, p. 12.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

30. Lord Cecil's letter to *The Times* (London), March 19, 1928.
31. *Foreign Affairs* (British), 9:188, Dec. 1927.
32. *Reports of Conference*, pp. 94-95.
33. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 209:1247, July 27, 1927.
34. See *The Times* (London), and *The Manchester Guardian Weekly* for Oct., Nov. and Dec. 1929.
35. The Washington correspondent for the *London Times* (Dec. 13, 1929) stated that "the composition of the delegation [American] is itself significant. It will have a weight and authority in the political field comparable with that of the delegation which conducted the negotiations for the United States at Washington in 1921-22—."
36. *The Round Table*, No. 79, pp. 456-60, June, 1930, contains a brief discussion of the terms of the Treaty.
37. *The Times* (London), April 23, 1930.
38. *Idem.*, April 17, 1930.
39. *The Round Table*, No. 79.
40. *The Times* (London), April 17, 1930.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Address of Secretary of State Stimson as reported in *The Times* (London), April 14, 1930.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Article VIII. Text of Covenant, *Official Journal*, I:3-12, Feb. 1920.
45. *Idem.*, 6:1529-30, Oct. 1925.
46. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIII., 1928-29, Cmd. 3211 (1928), pp. 20, 33, 45.
47. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 220:1827-28, July 30, 1928.
48. The White Paper was published on Oct. 22. The reason given for the delay was that the opinion of the other Powers must first be received. Italy did not send her reply until Oct. 6. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 23. 1928-9. Cmd. 3211, pp. 39 ff.
49. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 12, 1928; *The Times* (London), Oct. 6, 1928; *The New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1928.
50. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 12, 1928.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 23, 1928-1929. Cmd. 3211, pp. 25-27.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 17, 24, 31.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
56. *Supra.*, p. 10.
57. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 23, 1928-1929, Cmd. 3211, p. 29.
58. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Aug. 3, 1928.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Idem.*, Aug 24, 1928.
61. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 23, 1928-1929, Cmd. 3211, pp. 25-26.
62. The French note says, ". . . d'adopter une politique commune qui leur permettrait de faire face aux difficultés qu'un échec de ces travaux ne man-  
querait pas de susciter". Cmd. 3211, p. 24.
63. Hansard, *House of Lords*, 72:75, Nov. 7, 1928.
64. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Nov. 2, 1928.
65. Hansard, *House of Lords*, 72:90, Nov. 7, 1928.



66. Summary of Lloyd George's speeches in *Foreign Affairs* (British), Nov. 1928.
67. See for example expressions of Liberals and Labourites in Nathan and Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 301, 290 ff. and 352; *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 22, 1927, August 12, 1927, Jan. 27, 1928, June 22, 1928 and Dec. 7, 1928; Hansard, *House of Commons*, March 15, 1928, March 22, 1928, Nov. 6, 1928 and following days; J. Ramsay MacDonald, *The Foreign Policy of the Labour Party*, London, 1923, pp. 4, 7 ff. and 11; J. M. Kenworthy and G. Young, *Freedom of the Seas*, London, 1928, p. 5.
68. Kenworthy and Young, *op. cit.*, "Preface," p. 5.

## CHAPTER IV

1. Expressions of varying attitudes toward the League may be found in E. J. Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference*, New York, 1920, Chapter V.; H. A. L. Fisher, *An International Experiment*, Oxford, 1921; Arthur Henderson, *The League of Nations and Labour*, Oxford, 1918; Sir George Parish, et al., *The Nations and the League*, Philadelphia, 1920; Roth Williams, *The League of Nations Today*, London, 1923, Chapter III.
2. Roth Williams, *The League, the Protocol, and the Empire*, London, 1925, p. 148.
3. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Editorial, Dec. 10, 1926.
4. Text of Covenant, *Official Journal*, 1:3-12, Feb. 1920.
5. Sir Austen Chamberlain, *The League of Nations*, Glasgow 1926, pp. 20-21.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
7. *Supra.*, p. 24.
8. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXXI., 1924-25, Cmd. 2289 (1924).
9. Text of Protocol, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement, 23-29, Annex 30a, pp. 498-502.
10. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 167:85 ff., July 23, 1923.
11. *Idem.*, 182:341-42, March 24, 1925.
12. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Sept. 6, 1929.
13. Text of Pact, *The Times* (London), Aug. 25, 1928; J. T. Gerould (Editor), *The Pact of Paris*, New York, 1929, pp. 17-19.
14. The reservations, which took the form of an explanatory note from Chamberlain to the United States Government rather than a formal reservation, declared that each state alone was competent to decide when circumstances should necessitate recourse to war for self-defence. The note also called attention to the fact that there were certain regions which were of vital importance to Great Britain's security and in these she would suffer no interference and submit to no restrictions. Text of note, *The Times* (London), July 20, 1928; Gerould, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-85.
15. *The Times* (London), Jan. 13, 1930.
16. Text of proposed amendments in *Current History*, 32:362-63, May, 1930.
17. Reply of the British Government, *The Times* (London), July 19, 1930.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Speech delivered at Council of League of Nations, March 12, 1925, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXXI., 1924-25, Cmd. 2368, (1925). Reprinted in Sir Austen Chamberlain, *Peace in Our Time*, London, 1928.
20. Speech at University of Glasgow, Nov. 2, 1926, Chamberlain, *Peace in Our Time*, p. 169.
21. *Official Journal*, 2:14-16, Jan.-Feb., 1921.
22. Article 36, Text, *Ibid.*

23. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXXI., 1924-25, Cmd. 2289, (1924).
24. *The Times* (London), Sept. 20, 1929.
25. William E. Rappard, *International Relations as Viewed from Geneva*, London, 1925, p. 9.
26. Treaty of Peace, Part III., Annex, Chapter II., Article 17.
27. F. Lee Bennis, *Europe Since 1914*, New York, 1930, pp. 243-44.
28. *Official Journal*, 1:45-50, March, 1920.
29. *Idem.*, 4:939, Aug. 1923; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIV., 1923, Cmd. 1921, (1923).
30. *Ibid.*
31. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 196:1057 ff., March 23, 1926; *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 19, 1926.
32. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 196:1057 ff., March 23, 1926.
33. *Official Journal*, 6:323-26, March, 1925.
34. The Government's instructions to Chamberlain, Hansard, *House of Commons*, 196:1057 ff., March 23, 1926.
35. *Ibid.*, cols. 1084-85.
36. March 16, 1926.
37. *The Times* (London), March 13, 1926.
38. *Official Journal*, 7:288, Feb., 1926; 9:942, July, 1928.
39. Treaty of Peace, Part III., Article 103.
40. *Official Journal*, 1:17, 54, March, 1920.
41. Rappard, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-64.
42. *Official Journal*, 1:17, 54, March, 1920.
43. *Idem.*, 6:1696 ff., Oct. 1925; 172 ff., Feb., 1926; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXXI., 1924-25, Cmd. 2543, (1925).
44. Bennis, *op. cit.*, p. 227.
45. *Official Journal*, 4:1277 ff., Nov., 1923.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 1306.
47. Rappard, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
48. *Supra.*, p. 71.
49. *Supra.*, p. 45.
50. *Official Journal.*, 1:248, July-Aug. 1920.
51. *Supra.*, p. 19.
52. *Supra.*, p. 37.
53. *Supra.*, p. 44.
54. *International Relations*, pp. 105 ff.
55. Editorial, Nov. 23, 1928.
56. A. Wyatt Tilby, "Policy of Conservative Party," *Foreign Affairs* (British), XI:121, May, 1929.
57. Sketch of work leading to Geneva Protocol, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXXI., 1924-25, Cmd. 2289, (1924).
58. *Idem.*, Vol. XXVII., 1924, Cmd. 2200 (1924).
59. *Official Journal*, 6:1529-30, Oct., 1925.
60. *Idem.*, 7:218-19, Feb., 1926.
61. *Idem.*, 9:1146 ff., Aug., 1928.
62. *Supra.*, pp. 73 ff.
63. *Monthly Summary of the League*, 7:354-56, July, 1927.
64. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 215:354-55, March 21, 1928.



65. *Idem.*, 193:2412, April 1, 1926.
66. *Supra.*, p. 71.
67. *Monthly Summary of League*, 7:185-86, July, 1927; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1927, Cmd. 2925 (1927).
68. *The Times* (London), April 30, 1929.
69. Article VIII of Covenant.
70. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 215:1142-43, March 28, 1928.
71. *The Times* (London), Dec. 15, 1920.
72. *Supra.*, p. 52.
73. *Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War*, Geneva, 1925, p. 7.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-26.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 732.
77. Text of Convention, *Official Journal*, 6: 1117-86; *Proceedings of Conference*, pp. 93-116.
78. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1927, Cmd. 2925 (1927).
79. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 215:1141-43, March 28, 1928.
80. J. Ramsay MacDonald, *Foreign Policy of the Labour Party*, p. 20.
81. See for example the reply of the British Government regarding the situation within the Empire concerning the White Slave Traffic, *Official Journal*, 2:538-42, July-Aug., 1921, or the report of the Temporary Slavery Commission to the Council, *Idem.*, 6:1411-25, Sept., 1925.
82. *Records of the Second Opium Conference*, Geneva, 1925, p. 147.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
86. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXXI., 1924-25, Cmd. 2461 (1925).
87. *Ibid.*
88. Chamberlain, *The League of Nations*, p. 29.
89. Arthur Henderson, *The League of Nations and Labour*, Oxford, 1918.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Sir J. F. Williams, *Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations*, New York, 1929, p. 481.
92. *Supra.*, p. 31.
93. H. Wilson Harris at Liberal Summer School, 1928. Speech published in Nathan and Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

## CHAPTER V

1. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 182:322, March 24, 1925.
2. *Supra.*, pp. 12 ff.
3. *Statistical Abstract*, Table 215, p. 310.
4. *Ibid.*, Table 213, p. 302.
5. *Ibid.*, Table 215, p. 310; Table 213, p. 302.
6. Viscount E. V. D'Abernon, *Versailles to Rappallo*, Garden City, N. Y., 1929, pp. 79-80.
7. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1924, Cmd. 2169 (1924), Memo dated March 26, 1919.
8. D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

9. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 26, 1923, Editorial
10. *Supra*, pp. 91 ff.
11. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 132:482, July 21, 1920.
12. D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
13. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 146:1225-33, Aug. 16, 1921.
14. Louis Aubert, *The Reconstruction of Europe*, New Haven, 1925, p. 29.
15. Aug. 12, 1921.
16. Account of incident, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 18, 1924; George Glasgow, *MacDonald as Diplomatist*, London, 1924, p. 26.
17. Text of Treaty, Part VIII.
18. Carl Bergmann, *The History of Reparations*, London, 1927, pp. 22-23.
19. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1924, Cmd. 2169 (1924), Memo dated March 26, 1919.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Bergmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-67.
22. D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
23. Philip Snowden, "Foreign Policy and High Prices," *Foreign Affairs* (British), 2:1-2, July, 1920.
24. Bergmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 ff.
25. *Reports of Annual Conference of Labour Party*, 1921, p. 234.
26. *The Times* (London), March 2, 1921 and March 4, 1921.
27. *Idem.*, May 5, 1921.
28. *Idem.*, May 3, 1921.
29. Bergmann, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
30. D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
31. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Dec. 23, 1921.
32. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIII., 1922, Cmd. 1621 (1922); Bergmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 114 ff.
33. *Idem.*, Vol. XXIV., 1923, Cmd. 1812, Annex IV., pp. 112-19.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 194-212.
35. Bergmann, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
36. Henri Lichtenberger, *The Ruhr Conflict*, Washington, 1923, p. 8.
37. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 160:35, Feb. 13, 1923.
38. Hansard, *House of Lords*, 53:43-47, Feb. 13, 1923.
39. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 160:5-6, Feb. 13, 1923.
40. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXV., 1923, Cmd. 1943 (1923).
41. *Ibid.*; *The Times* (London), Aug. 13, 1923.
42. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 26, Nov. 23 and Dec. 7, 1923.
43. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVII, 1924, Cmd. 2270 (1924); Bergmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-63; D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-2.
44. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1924, Cmd. 2169 (1924).
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. This step had been suggested by Lloyd George to Clemenceau in March, 1919, the only prerequisite being that Germany should meet the reasonable requirements that Lloyd George seems to have had in mind at that time. *Ibid.*, Cmd. 2169 (1924).
48. *Ibid.*
49. D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, p. 258. Text of Lloyd George's speech quoted in *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 13, 1922.



50. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 20, 1922.
51. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1924, Cmd. 2169 (1924).
52. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 7, 1924; Tiltman, *op. cit.* pp. 217-18.
53. Quoted by Glasgow, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
54. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXXI., 1924-25, Cmd. 2289 (1924).
55. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 182:317-22, March 24, 1925.
56. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXXI., 1924-25, Cmd. 2525 (1925); *League of Nations Treaty Series*, LIV., 1926-27.
57. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 185:1573-75, June 25, 1925.
58. *Reports of Annual Conferences of Labour Party*, 1925, p. 253; Hansard, *House of Commons*, 188:419-24, Nov. 18, 1925.
59. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 193:1094, March 23, 1926.
60. Chamberlain, *Peace in Our Time*, p. 83.
61. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 188:419-24, 468, Nov. 18, 1925; *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Nov. 11, 1927; *Reports of Annual Conferences of Labour Party*, 1926, p. 254.
62. See *The Times* (London), April 1-11, 1930. Upon the refusal of the British to assume new obligations in the form of new treaties, the question of security centered around the extent to which Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations could be applied to obtain the desired degree of security, but the British were unwilling to go beyond the interpretation of that Article as stated during the Locarno negotiations. According to that interpretation "... the obligations resulting from the said article on the members of the League must be understood to mean that each State member of the League is bound to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with its situation and take its geographical position into account." *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXXI., 1924-25, Cmd. 2525 (1925).
63. *Supra.*, pp. 91 ff.
64. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 193:1085, March 23, 1926.
65. *Supra.*, pp. 73 ff.
66. *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, June 7, 1929.
67. *Idem.*, Aug. 9-30, 1929.
68. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 125:40-45, Feb. 10, 1920.
69. *Idem.*, 131:2369-75, July 14, 1920.
70. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XLIII., 1921, Cmd. 1207 (1921).
71. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 13, 1922; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIII., 1922, Cmd. 1621 (1922).
72. J. Saxon Mills, *The Genoa Conference*, London, 1923, pp. 180-207; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIII., 1922, Cmd. 1667 (1922).
73. Mills, *op. cit.*, *passim*.
74. Bergmann, *op. cit.*, p. 129; Text of Treaty and correspondence between Germany and the Allied Powers in *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIII., 1922, Cmd. 1667 (1922).
75. Francis Delaisi, "Oil and the Arcos Raid," *Foreign Affairs* (British), 9:106-08, Oct. 1927.
76. *The Times* (London).
77. MacDonald, *The Foreign Policy of the Labour Party*, p. 47.
78. From speech made by MacDonald at Albert Hall, London, reported in *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 11, 1924.
79. MacDonald, *Foreign Policy*, p. 49.
80. See Tiltman, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
81. Text of speech, *The Times* (London), April 15, 1924.

82. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 176:3012 ff., Aug. 6, 1924; Text of Commercial Treaty, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., Cmd. 2261 (1924); general treaty, *Ibid.*, Cmd. 2260 (1924).
83. The letter as published in *The Times* (London), Oct. 25, 1924, follows: "A settlement of the relations between the two countries will assist in the revolutionizing of the international and British proletariat not less than a successful rising in any of the working districts of England, as the establishment of close contact between the British and Russian Proletariat, the exchange of workers, etc., will make it possible for us to develop and extend the propaganda of ideas of Leninism in England and the Colonies. Armed warfare must be preceded by a struggle against the inclinations to compromise which are embedded among the majority of the British workmen, against the ideas of evolution and peaceful extermination of capitalism."
84. See for example, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 10, 1924.
85. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 197:777, June 25, 1926.
86. *Ibid.*, cols. 699-778.
87. *Idem.*, 203:634, March 3, 1927.
88. *Idem.*, 206:1845, May 24, 1927. Documents found in Arcos Raid published in *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1927, Cmd. 2874 (1927).
89. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 206:2204-2310, May 26, 1927.
90. Delaisi, *loc. cit.*
91. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 4, 1929.
92. *Idem.*, Oct. 11 and Nov. 22, 1929.
93. *The Times* (London), April 17, 1930.
94. Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-31.
95. Texts given in *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 1, 1921.
96. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXV., 1923, Cmd. 1869 (1923).
97. *Ibid.*, Cmd. 1874 (1923) and Cmd. 1890 (1923).
98. Selections from the correspondence between the two countries from 1921 to 1927 regarding the question of propaganda are found in *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1927, Cmd. 2874 (1927) and Cmd. 2895 (1927).
99. Toynbee and Kirkwood, *op. cit.*, p. 288; Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-39.
100. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. LI., 1920, Cmd. 964 (1920).
101. *Ibid.*, Cmd. 963 (1920).
102. *Idem.*, Vol. XXV., 1923, Cmd. 1929 (1923); *League of Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 28, 1924.
103. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXVI., 1923, Cmd. 1824 (1923).
104. *Ibid.*
105. Quoted by J. A. R. Marriot, *The Eastern Question*, Oxford, 1924, p. 339.
106. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 132:479, July 21, 1920.
107. Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-48.
108. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 132:480, July 21, 1920.
109. *Idem.*, 146:1234, Aug. 16, 1921.
110. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 26, 1929, Editorial.
111. Toynbee and Kirkwood, *op. cit.*, p. 97; Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 253.
112. *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XXIII., 1922, Cmd. 1570 (1922).
113. *Ibid.*
114. Toynbee and Kirkwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-09.
115. Hansard, *House of Commons*, 126:2302, March 17, 1920.
116. H. W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*, New York, 1928, p. 31.
117. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
118. *Supra.*, p. 40.
119. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, June 16, 1922.
120. *Supra.*, p. 93.
121. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 1, 1926.
122. *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 4, 1928.
123. *Foreign Policy Association, Information Service*, Vol. III., No. 1, March 16, 1927.
124. Glasgow, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-105; Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 32.



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
## ABSTRACTS IN HISTORY

From Dissertations for the Degree of Doctor  
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## FOREWORD

A rule of this University requires that all theses accepted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy must be published within three years after the degree is granted. This requirement is not easily absolved. Publishing houses usually do not issue books of no commercial value and University presses are not sufficiently endowed to support all scholarly studies worthy of publication. The high cost of printing creates a burden frequently too heavy for the purse of the author. For those not fortunate in finding a channel of publication there is the alternative of publishing fairly full abstracts of their dissertations. Granting that these studies add to the sum of historical knowledge it is worth while to make the general results available at once to scholars in history. Otherwise new knowledge would remain hidden until the uncertain day when the dissertation would appear in full.

The twelve *Abstracts* here presented are based upon selected and unabridged doctoral dissertations in history filed in the Library of the State University of Iowa. A scholar interested in one of these dissertations is free to borrow a typewritten copy from the Library. The publication of these *Abstracts* will not preclude the publication of any dissertation in full later. The writer of each *Abstract* is responsible for the facts and interpretations that appear.

The Department of History acknowledges its debt to Professor Louis Pelzer for the patient labor and fine editorial skill he gave to the preparation of this volume for the press.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY,  
STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

May, 1932  
Iowa City, Iowa





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LIS GEORGE SWARTZ, Southern Illinois State Normal Uni-  
versity, Carbondale 1**



# ROBERT HUNTER, ROYAL GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK: A STUDY IN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION\*

By RICHARD LAWRENCE BEYER

Current popular notions of a vigorous democracy and an all-prevailing equalitarian spirit in the British colonies in North America are not substantiated by an investigation of the provincial history of New York. From the days of Dutch occupancy through the War for Independence, New York was controlled by a narrow aristocracy, and an analysis of any given period only emphasizes the generally restricted management of the colony. This study reveals the history of New York during one of the more celebrated administrations of the eighteenth century—that of Robert Hunter, Governor from 1710 to 1719. In it are found the several phases of New York's institutional life, closely, even jealously, managed by an exclusive aristocracy that never for an instant relinquished its control. It dominated politics, controlled the trade of the province, monopolized its land, fought its wars, negotiated with its Indians, and even directed its spiritual life. This survey summarizes this complete domination of the elect over the province and attempts to portray Governor Hunter's relationship to it.

In appointing Robert Hunter governor of New York and New Jersey, the Crown hoped to settle for a time, at least, an aggravated situation in this part of the colonial empire. The three preceding governors had been either impecunious or corrupt noblemen and had achieved little success in America. Realizing now that noble blood did not necessarily make a successful executive, the Privy Council, through the Board of Trade, named a member of the middle class, Brigadier General Hunter, as governor. The appointment of this Scotch Hunter came in 1709, just two years following the Act of Union between England and Scotland. The Scotch were not reluctant to seize the

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Winfred T. Root.

opportunity to participate in the British Colonial System, and Hunter was only one of several natives of that country to receive appointments in the early eighteenth century. The new governor was a popular Whig, an intimate of Joseph Addison and Jonathan Swift, an officer in the War of the Spanish Succession, a second rate poet, essayist, and linguist, and a man who might have had a career in Virginia had he not been captured by the French when en route to America some years earlier.

Arriving in New York in June, 1710, the new Governor found a colony with a population of probably twenty-five thousand, no minor percentage thereof being black slaves. The major settled area was that around the mouth of the Hudson River, although there were some establishments on Long Island and a few villages on the banks of the Hudson above New York City. Farther up the river was the village of Albany, largely Dutch, and second only to New York City in size and importance. It was the fur trading capital of British America.

The Governor soon learned that New York's destiny was in the hands of a narrow aristocracy, a cohesive clique that certainly did not number more than sixty families. Of the sixty only one-half were of major importance, the others being families whose fortunes were either declining or on the ascendancy, or else families without the resources or inclination to play the greater rôles. Among the leading families were the Livingston, Schuyler, DeLancey, DePeyster, Van Rensselaer, Van Cortlandt, Jay, Heathcote, Morris, Smith, Mompesson, and Van Dam families. No one nationality had a monopoly on the control; there were Dutch, English, Scotch, and French Huguenot leaders in this aristocracy.

Property qualifications, a small electorate, non-secret voting, irregular elections, indifference on the part of the masses, and intimate manorial life kept the political control in the possession of a dominating group. Once this was gained the elect did not relinquish it. Economic and religious bonds further solidified the group. Likewise, the complex inter-relationship among the leading families, made possible by inter-marrying, created a strong bond to unite them. Moreover, this assured the unit of perpetuity. It would be impossible to trace these unions in detail but some of the important ones were the Livingston-Schuyler, Ver Planck-Van Cortlandt, Schuyler-Van Rensselaer, Jay-Bayard, Provoost-DePeyster, Van Cortlandt-DePeyster, DeLancey-Van Cortlandt, and Heathcote-Smith marriage pacts.



There was no political party strife in old New York, but even aristocratic solidarity could not prevent factionalism. At times there was ill feeling between Metropolis and Frontier, between Englishman and Hollander, between Anglican and Reformed Dutch communicant, and between Assembly and Council. The latter was the major type of political dispute that the colony experienced. The Assembly was a popularly chosen body, and in 1710 it numbered twenty-two representatives, elected by the freemen and the freehold electors. It clashed with the prerogative body, the Council, consisting of ten men appointed by the Crown, primarily on the matter of raising a revenue, which it deemed its own peculiar business. In the past the Assembly and the governors had lived on poor terms because of the desire of the former to dominate the executive by threatening to embarrass him financially unless legislation desired by the assemblymen received his approval.

Undaunted by past Governor-Assembly feuds, Hunter appealed for the raising of an adequate revenue, the payment of the colony's debts (restoring "the public credit," he called it), and provisions for frontier defense. In spite of his importuning, this program was not realized early in the administration and Hunter found himself in the same awkward situation which had plagued his predecessors. Money bills were introduced in the Assembly; the Council attempted to amend them when it received them; the Assembly refused to accept the alterations. According to the Council, the popular house had no right to demand exclusive control over the purse. It argued that both houses were constituted by the self-same power—the grace of the Crown. As Councillor Robert Walters once explained, the Council knew of no power the Crown had given the Assembly to remove the upper chamber's authority, and the Council determined to maintain its theoretical place. The burden of the Assembly's retort was that it, the only popularly elected body in the province, alone had the authority to divest the people of their property in the form of taxes. Strengthening the Assembly in its determination was the misapplying of funds in the past by former governors and, of course, it saw the advantage of its management of finances. Hunter usually favored the Council, and in general he believed that the Assembly had no inherent power or any authority superior to that of the Council.

The failure to break the deadlock meant that the colony's finances were in a garbled state, and, despite the pleas of Hunter, the feud continued. The Governor even went so far as to seek a remedy at home and suggested the creation of a revenue by authority of England. He proposed an increase in quit-rents or a parliamentary impost to defray American expenses. However, only indifferent consideration was accorded the plan in England, and no direct results came from Hunter's proposal.

Some support was given the governor in 1711, when an expedition was attempted against the French in Canada, but after that abortive venture the Assembly relapsed into its old adamant attitude. Even Governor Hunter perceived the true nature of the situation when he expressed his desire that the strife be ended, "the more because the contending Parties seem agreed, as to the Necessity of settling such a Revenue, and . . . differ only about the Measures and Means." But all pleas for support were ignored, and the best that the Assembly did for some years was to pass some short time revenue bills.

The inter-house breach was not to be permanent, for in 1714 an effort to pay the back debts of the colony was made. Since a large number of the political leaders were creditors of the government, this gesture was not surprising. Hope for concessions from the Governor was also an important factor, but the decisive one was the decision of the Assembly not to consider the debtor statute as a money bill. The act provided for the raising of £27,680, that the debtors be paid in bills of credit to "continue current" for twenty-one years, and that they be redeemed by the revenue derived from a liquor excise. This bill was the last major one passed during the reign of Queen Anne, and before examining the political history of the province during the Georgian period of the Hunter administration, certain of the other phases of the life of New York may be examined.

One of the absorbing aspects of New York's history is the chronicle of its frontier, especially the vicinity of the Mohawk Valley. This was a region of controversy with the French, the area of the Castles of the Iroquois, and a great North American fur producing center. The gateway to the frontier was Albany, the English peltry capital and the rival of the French fur trading city of Montreal. Defense of the Mohawk Valley was imperative, for its occupation by the French



would mean economic and territorial loss, while Canadian domination of the Iroquois invited military disaster.

When Hunter came to America, England and France were in the concluding stages of the War of the Spanish Succession, but despite the wartime, New York had made surprisingly scant provision for defense. The forts at Albany and Schenectady were in disrepair, the affection of the Indians for the English was wavering, and French scouts and missionaries were actually in the Iroquois country. The Governor made repeated pleas for funds for defense but the Assembly's contributions were meager. In part this was due to the mentioned Council-Assembly strife, which prevented much necessary legislation. Possibly the indifference of the assemblymen living on the lower Hudson, in New York City, and on Long Island, places relatively safe from attack, further explains the legislature's inactivity.

In any event, attention was deflected from purely defensive to offensive measures when it was announced from England that an expedition was to be undertaken against the French. All of the English colonies on the mainland were to contribute to the project, the northern provinces providing manpower and supplies, the southern furnishing money and supplies. Hunter, one of the major characters in rallying the colonies, was assisted by certain of New York's leaders including Van Rensselaer, Livingston, Schuyler, DePeyster, and DeLancey. The Governor was soon to learn a typical American lesson, that inter-colonial jealousy was so intense that any genuine coöperation was practically impossible. Even in a great common cause there were bickerings, dissent, and finally actual defection on the part of some provinces. Self-interest and even speculation and profiteering, to say nothing of flagrant mismanagement, prevailed even among Hunter's own New York aides. It is a wonder that any soldiers could be raised and any supplies collected. A scarcity of grain complicated matters. But Governor Hunter's diligence was in some measure rewarded and on August 29, 1711, a party of 2,260 persons, including 800 Indians, left Albany under the command of Francis Nicholson. It was commonly believed that the French were no match for English valor and that the Bourbon province would be readily overpowered.

The campaign itself was a fiasco. The British vessels carrying the troops from Boston in what was to be a concerted movement against Quebec were wrecked in the Bay of the St. Lawrence. With nine

vessels and about one thousand lives lost, the British commanders abandoned the expedition and returned home. New York, especially its persevering Governor, was stunned. The colonial levies were recalled, and a general neurosis seemed to affect the province. It was in this period following the summer of 1711 that the friction between Assembly and Council, as well as between Assembly and Governor, attained its height. Even though frontier dangers were enhanced because of possible counter-attack by the French, little was done for defense, and the Governor was compelled to refuse overtures from New England concerning measures for the common protection. Only Indian massacres finally spurred the New York legislature into making some plans for provincial security. All in all it was salutary for New York that the Treaty of Utrecht was finally signed in 1713, to end for a while the formal warfare in America.

Peacetime saw a flourishing trade in furs carried on in the Mohawk Valley—a traffic which had its origins in the era of Dutch control. Dominating this trade were a few frontier families, the aristocrats of the North, headed by the Schuylers and the Livingstons. Their dealings with the Iroquois were profitable but not always pleasant since there is overwhelming testimony to indicate that the Albany traders were a corrupt group. Their treatment of the Iroquois was shameful, and it had much to do with the frequent wavering in their friendship for the English. The Iroquois were the middlemen in the peltry traffic since they procured the furs usually from western tribes and then sold them at Albany. Defrauding the Indians, intoxicating them with rum, and paying them poorly for furs, were Albany practices which tended to drive the natives into the arms of the more considerate but poorly stocked and inconveniently located Frenchmen in Montreal.

Governor Hunter knew that if the Albany traders were permitted to carry on without regulation and restriction, the actual hostility of the Indians would be incurred. Consequently he went to extremes to treat them as liberally as he could and labored to remove the reasons for the Iroquois complaints. Lack of funds and certainly a lack of coöperation from many of the fur traders hindered the effectiveness of his campaign to bring the Iroquois more firmly into an alliance with the English. But even under the existing conditions the trade was valuable and in the fiscal year 1717-1718 peltry to the value of £10,704 was exported from New York to England.



These figures have no reference to the worth of the furs used in America—certainly a great amount. The Albany merchants profited in another way—the selling of goods imported from England to the Montreal traders. This was advancing the fortunes of the national enemy and lessening New York's prestige as a fur trading colony. Cadwallader Colden saw Montreal outdistancing Albany and predicted dire consequences. But the Albany merchants were unabashed, and it was computed that commercial relations involving as much as £12,000 a year developed.

While frontier aristocrats grew rich in the beaver traffic, other prominent families prospered from their participation in the oversea trade. New York's commercial relations may be placed in three major areas: (1) inter-colonial; (2) English and European; (3) West Indian. Not all of the trade was direct; much of it was triangular, usually the sugar islands of the West Indies being one of the corners of the triangle. Since it duplicated the rural economic life of the Mother Country, New York sent little except peltry directly to England. Indeed, the province was not considered especially valuable at home, and statistics in the records of the Board of Trade indicate that in a given year (1700) the Barbados were thirteen times and Jamaica nine times more valuable to England than New York. Mercantile England was fully appreciative of this, as the statement of an observer of the volume of trade from different parts of the Empire indicates: ". . . it appears that our Sugar and Tobacco Collonys are of greatest advantage and deserve most regard."

While England did not need New York's grain, vegetables, timber, and cattle, the West Indies did, and mainland merchants exchanged these items for sugar, molasses, and "a liquor called Rumme." Some of the tropical produce would be brought to the American continent, but frequently vessels would clear for England after taking on a cargo at a Caribbean port. The West Indian trade eventually eclipsed all others. Of ten vessels leaving New York harbor within a given period in 1713, one was bound for Old England, one for Rhode Island, and eight for the West Indies. F. W. Pitman discloses the fact that in the period 1705-1716, 921 of 1,821 ships cleared for the West Indies from New York.

The New York merchants were unable to dispose of all of their produce in the English sugar islands and eventually turned to Guadeloupe and Martinique and to a lesser extent to Dutch and Spanish

possessions. This was not in line with the best principles of the British Colonial System, and the Mother Country tried to halt this traffic. Governor Hunter was instructed to check the illegal trade, but was unable to destroy it completely even in wartime. New York vessels frequently made foreign West Indian ports under the guise of going there to exchange prisoners and by the misuse of flags of truce. The Governor publicly denounced the trade with the French islands, but it is possible that he winked at some violations or was deceived by the merchants themselves.

Not much success attended Governor Hunter in his efforts to limit the traffic with the French West Indies, but he experienced even less in shaping the slave trade as England desired. Royal orders favored the Royal African Company, created in the Restoration Era. These were ignored by the New York traders, and, while 1391 blacks were imported into the province during this administration, the Company handled none of this business. Equally unsuccessful was the Governor in suppressing piracy which became quite distressing during his final years in America. Suspicion always existed that some of the merchants were in league with the corsairs, but this was difficult to prove. It is probable that one of the minor aristocrats, Colonel Robert Lutting, was involved in underhand dealings in the vicinity of Spanish Florida and the West Indies, but naturally he denied this charge and the inquiry conducted by Governor Hunter and the Council was dropped.

Land speculation was another economic interest of the influential colonists and one not without consequences for New York. Earlier governors were prodigal, made liberal grants to petitioners, and hence a scarcity of available domain resulted. "Grants have been made of all the lands that could be discovered, some of them in very large tracts . . .," wrote Chief Justice Roger Mompesson, who probably had in mind the extravagant patents issued by Governors Benjamin Fletcher and Lord Cornbury. These made liberal grants to win the support of powerful men in the province. Land speculation was not a difficult game to play. The English land policy worked hardships on few, for even the annual land tax, a quit-rent of two shillings, six pence, per one hundred acres, was moderate.

There were definite reasons why such New Yorkers as Livingston, Schuyler, Van Rensselaer, Hardenbergh, and Heathcote, to mention only a few, were so grasping. First, in a colony where specie was



rare, land was a preferred form of wealth, especially since it was procured on lenient terms. There was also profit to the holder if he could secure tenants, and this was the objective of a number of patentees who would lease but not sell their holdings. Finally, prestige and political position came to those men who created manors or semi-feudal estates on their land. The Van Rensselaers and Livingstons possessed the most important of the manors, both of which sent a representative, usually a member of one of the respective families, to the provincial Assembly. Important manors each had a number of local officers—collectors and constables “for keeping the peace and other necessary services.”

The Hunter administration witnessed a number of further developments in New York's land history. There was the matter of settling the three thousand palatines whom the Governor brought with him from England for the manufacture of naval stores. These Rhinelanders eventually left their allotted location on the Hudson and moved into the Mohawk Valley. The result was to fling a bit to the westward the frontier of New York. Another concern of Governor Hunter was the collection of the arrears in quit-rents. A stride was made by the creation of a Court of Chancery and by the naming of energetic officials to handle the task, but signal success was not attained until 1722 when Archibald Kennedy became receiver-general under Governor William Burnet. In the concluding years of Governor Hunter's career a new group of land speculators appeared, in which Kennedy and Cadwallader Colden, a versatile newcomer, were prominent. They secured sizeable grants and laid the basis of fortunes which waxed as these men became leaders in colonial life and politics slightly later in the century.

The final years of the administration were relatively pleasant, as much of the earlier factionalism was quiescent. In 1714 the Assembly had passed a measure for paying the public debts and Governor Hunter, a major creditor, vigorously persuaded the Crown to accord it the royal approval. This assent was delayed partly because in England the Earl of Clarendon (the erstwhile Governor Cornbury) objected to it to the Board of Trade. Clarendon's action may be explained by his being excluded from the list of official creditors and by the fact that Lewis Morris, a sworn enemy of the Earl, had been largely instrumental in rallying the Assembly to pass the bill. This same Morris of Westchester was becoming one of Governor

Hunter's major aides, and the appreciative Governor rewarded him in 1715 with the office of Chief Justice.

All of Governor Hunter's efforts were now directed toward the securing of a long time revenue grant, to assure the colony of support and its officials of their salaries. In the past, the Assembly, fearing its control over the Governor would end if such a statute were passed, had limited its revenue settlements to one year. Procrastinating at first, the Assembly quickly changed its attitude, and in the early summer of 1715 a bill to provide a revenue for five years was enacted. Several reasons explain this remarkable happening—the collusion between Governor Hunter and the Assembly to resist the charges brought by Clarendon in England, the expelling of the intransigent Samuel Mulford of Suffolk County from the Assembly, and most important, the striking of a bargain between the Governor and the legislators whereby he gave his approval to a much desired Naturalization Act in exchange for a revenue settlement. Further, certain features of the revenue bill were concessions allowed by Governor Hunter to the Assembly—notably concerning the pay of its members and the position of the colonial Treasurer. The Treasurer was an officer responsible to the popular house, and this bill augmented his authority. This act of 1715 was a compromise, a bargain between prerogative and popular forces, but it did more than anything else to restore good feeling. It was no longer necessary for the Governor to dissolve assemblies. He had found a body with which he could work, and the house elected in 1716 continued for the remainder of the administration, indeed until 1726, which was well into the term of Governor Burnet.

The reëlection of Mulford to the Assembly which had ousted him in 1715 was embarrassing to Governor Hunter and his friends, especially as the critic from Suffolk County continued his wild attacks on the administration. In part, Mulford was agitated by the Governor's assessments on the Long Island whaling industry in which he was involved. The entire dispute was aggravated when Mulford went to England and distributed "A memorial of several aggrevances and oppressions of His Majestys Subjects in the Colony of New York." The original complaints were amplified while others pertaining to Indian affairs and quit-rents were added. On the latter topic Mulford could doubtless write feelingly while his payments were in arrears. Finally the memorialist argued that Long Island was under-



represented in the Assembly, a charge not entirely without basis. That Governor Hunter had the support of the province on his side is borne out by the speedy preparation of an address of vindication by the Assembly which branded Mulford's memorial as "a most false, malicious, and scandalous Paper." It was unusual in American provincial history to have a prerogative officer defended as was Governor Hunter by the New York Assembly.

For the most part the closing years were harmonious, in spite of some objections to the debt bill and to certain aspects of the raising of revenue. Ill health and private business at home were responsible for his departure. On leaving New York he was tendered a magnificent tribute by the two houses of the legislature. He had come to be loved and admired in the province and there was genuine sorrow when he quitted it on July 31, 1719 to return to England.

Epitomizing the period 1710-1719, it may be suggested that it was one in which a faction-ridden province, harboring an intra-legislature rift and an opposition toward prerogative interests was transformed into a colony in which concord and harmony prevailed and the influence of the Crown was strengthened. New York was still under the domination of its aristocracy, many members of which found it to their advantage to ally with an amiable, conciliatory, and upright Governor. The era witnessed a surprisingly small amount of sectional feeling, a condition which was to plague most of the American colonies in the eighteenth century. However, New York, not unlike its neighbors with an ambitious Assembly, increased its authority at the expense of the Governor and Council. The striking aspect of the growth of the Assembly's power was in the increased control of the purse. Continued commercial expansion and the renewal of land speculation and fur trading, especially after peace was signed, were the major economic features of the decade. Intellectual progress was slight and the religious phase of life was marred by some inter-faith dispute. But even with all of its shortcomings, the career of Governor Robert Hunter was one of the most distinguished in the history of colonial America.

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Fire destroyed or partly ruined a portion of the valuable archival material in possession of the State of New York at Albany. However, much was spared, and it is possible that the major conclusions would be unchanged even if all of the documents were available to-day.

Of the unpublished evidence the *New York Colonial Manuscripts*, New York State Library, Albany, volumes LIV to LXI, inclusive, were most valuable. They include much unpublished, intimate information and fill the gaps in the common knowledge concerning the colony. The *Council Minutes* (Executive) explain the activities of this body in working with the Governor as a prerogative group. The economic history would be incomplete without an investigation of the *Indorsed Land Papers, 1643-1803*. Family papers were serviceable in providing minutiae concerning the achievements of the aristocrats. Among them are the DeLancey, Livingston, and DePeyster collections in the New York Historical Society. For trade relations between the province and England, the transcripts of the Board of Trade *Journals* and *Papers* in Philadelphia were essential.

The published source that eclipses all others in value is the *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, edited by E. B. O'Callaghan. Volume V was important in the preparation of this work. Herein is the correspondence between Governor Hunter and various provincials on the one side and the Board of Trade and the Privy Council on the other. Poorly arranged but informative is the *Documentary History of the State of New York*, four volumes, edited also by O'Callaghan. The legislation for the period is embraced in the *Journals of the Assembly, of the Council*, and in the *Colonial Laws*. *The British Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, is partly a repetition of information found elsewhere. The best accounts of Indian affairs are those of Cadwallader Colden and Peter Wraxall.



# MARYLAND IN THE TIME OF GOVERNOR HORATIO SHARPE 1753 to 1769\*

By PAUL HENRY GIDDENS

In the summer of 1753, Horatio Sharpe crossed the Atlantic to become Governor of Maryland under the sixth and last Lord Baltimore. He served the colony ably for almost sixteen years, the longest period, save one, that any person ever acted as chief executive under the Proprietor. It is, therefore, the purpose of this dissertation, to describe the various phases of colonial life which felt the impress of Sharpe's fine personality, tolerant spirit, good judgment, and practical mind. The study serves to illuminate an important and picturesque period in the development of pre-Revolutionary society. Government and politics, religion and education, trade and commerce, land and its management, the last intercolonial war and the concurrent struggle to eliminate proprietary rule, and the revolutionary movement started by the Stamp Act and Townshend Acts, form the main subjects for treatment. Special attention has been given to the tidewater aristocracy which dominated the political, social, and economic life of the colony. It was the heyday of the ruling aristocracy and as fine a gentleman class as the colonies produced.

Little is known about the early life of Sharpe. Born in Yorkshire near Hull, he was thirty-five years old and unmarried at the time of his appointment as Governor of Maryland. Previously he had held a captain's commission in Brigadier General Harry Powlett's regiment of marines and had seen military service in the West Indies. His brothers were not without distinction in the religious, literary, and political circles of England. The eldest brother, Doctor Gregory Sharpe, was a classical scholar, a prebendary in Salisbury Cathedral, Chaplain to Frederick, Prince of Wales, and to George III, and Master

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Winfred T. Root

of the Temple. William served as clerk to His Majesty-in-Council. Both Joshua and John acted as Treasury Solicitors and colonial agents, John being at one time agent for Jamaica, Barbados, and Nevis. Furthermore, John was a member of Parliament for Collington, and upon the death of the fifth Lord Baltimore, became one of the guardians for his son—Frederick. In all probability Horatio Sharpe received his appointment as Governor of Maryland through the efforts of his brother—John. On more than one occasion the political influence of the Sharpe brothers proved to be of inestimable value to the newly-appointed Governor. It enabled him to secure important military commissions, to thwart various designs of Lord Baltimore and Secretary Calvert, to convince them of the practicability or impracticability of certain policies, to secure or prevent the appointment of certain Marylanders to public office, and to maintain his standing with the King and Proprietor. Aside from these meager facts, no more can be written about the man who guided Maryland through troublesome years from 1753 to 1769.

When Governor Sharpe assumed control of the government in Maryland, approximately 154,000 people lived in the colony. Their settlements clung to the shores of Chesapeake Bay, the large navigable rivers, and innumerable creeks that intersected Maryland. Population became thinner and plantations more widely separated farther inland. Racially, a majority of the Marylanders were of English stock; nearly one-third of the people were negroes. The number of Germans, Scotch-Irish, Irish, French, Spaniards, Italians, Bohemians, and Scandinavians within the province is unknown. About one-twelfth of the people professed the Roman Catholic faith and held over one-twelfth of the land. They were not entitled, however, to vote or hold office; they sometimes suffered from a double land tax; and they had to help support the Established Church. A third or more of the people were dissenters; the members of the Presbyterian faith probably exceeded in numbers those of all other denominations. Two-thirds of the people belonged to the Established Church, but it had fallen into disrepute on account of its close connection with the proprietary government and the lack of any supervisory agency over the clergy. Some of the ministers had become careless in their duties and had acquired bad reputations, reflecting discredit upon the Church. Before the end of his administration, however, Governor Sharpe inau-



gured certain reforms which greatly improved the character of the spiritual leaders.

Although held somewhat in contempt, the clergy conducted nearly all of the best schools in the colony. The Jesuits maintained a fine grammar school at Bohemia. The free public schools in every county were not a success. They suffered from a want of public interest, and from poorly paid, dissolute and incompetent teachers. Governor Sharpe more than once bemoaned the fact that the public schools were in such a deplorable condition. Parish and country schools, and many private schools were maintained where a girl or boy might learn geometry, trigonometry, reading, writing, "polite literature," needle work, French, Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. Ordinarily a wealthy planter hired a private tutor to teach his children. Since no colleges or institutions of higher learning existed in the colony, sons of gentlemen were sent abroad for a university education.

Maryland society was divided into three separate classes: the slaves and the servants, the middle class, and the aristocracy. At the very bottom of the social structure stood the great Negro population, treated as chattels, without rights and privileges, and subject to drastic penalties for violations of the peace. Negro slaves in the colony increased from 36,000 in 1747 to 49,675 in 1761. A brisk and profitable trade with the various African ports supplied the demand of the tobacco planters for Negro laborers.

White servants had about the same status as the Negroes, except that they could eventually become freemen. The number of voluntary servants imported annually is difficult to estimate. Through the port of Annapolis, however, there came approximately 10,000 between 1745 and 1775. At the expiration of his term an indented servant was not sent away empty-handed; fifty acres of land, a year's provisions, clothing, and tools were given him by his master. Some were thrifty enough to become prosperous after a few years' work. Daniel Dulany, the elder, and Henry Callister, rose to wealth and prominence, but they were exceptions. Most of them became indigent freemen and a heavy burden upon the public. Besides voluntary servants, Maryland had in 1755 about 2,000 convict servants. It was the only colony into which they were freely imported. J. T. Scharf claims that at least 20,000 convict servants reached Maryland before the American Revolution while Basil Sollers' estimate is 10,640. Upon the expiration of their term, they either returned to Europe

or moved to the back parts of the colony where some tried to become useful members of society.

The common freemen formed the great middle class. Most of them were small planters engaged in farming, either as renters or small landowners with or without a few slaves to cultivate the soil. The average leaseholder held from 100 to 150 acres of land while the average landowner had from 100 to 250 acres. Associated with the small farmer, but fewer in numbers, were the shopkeepers, merchants, and traders of the towns, who lived in small and inconspicuous houses suited to the modest ambitions of a commercial class.

Distinct and important, the powerful colonial aristocracy was composed of a comparatively few distinguished families like the Dulany, Tasker, Bordley, Lloyd, Tilghman, Goldsborough, Hammond, Calvert, Key, Plater, Carroll, Hollyday, Brice, Ross, and others. One reason for the strength and power of this gentleman class was its wealth, principally in the form of land and slaves. The elder Daniel Dulany, with the profits derived from his law practice and public offices, early began to speculate in western lands. The richness of the soil, a moderate climate, the increasing scarcity of land, and the coming of the Germans, made the venture extremely profitable. When Dulany died in 1753, he owned more than 47,000 acres of land, of which 40,000 lay in Frederick County. He was the largest landowner and, perhaps, the richest man in Maryland. The real and personal property of his son, the younger Daniel Dulany, was confiscated and sold in 1781 for £84,602. Colonel Edward Lloyd, the outstanding representative of his family during Governor Sharpe's time, possessed in 1783: 261 slaves, 700 sheep, 147 horses, 571 cattle, 215,000 pounds of tobacco, 500 ounces of plate, and 11,884½ acres of land. Charles Carroll of Annapolis, father of one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, had an estate which was valued at £88,380.9.7, and included among other items, 40,000 acres of land, a fifth share in an iron works valued at £10,000, 250 slaves, and silver plate worth £600. The accumulated resources of fathers passed to their children, who continued to acquire more wealth. Families grew stronger and became more firmly entrenched than ever before in the economic life of the colony.

Besides wealth, matrimonial alliances helped to bind the aristocrats more closely together. For example, several children fell heir to the amassed fortune, fame, and prestige of the elder Daniel Dulany.



Rebecca married James Paul Heath, who owned about 12,000 acres of land. Rachel married the Reverend Henry Addison, a wealthy parson and a descendant of a prominent family. The third sister, Margaret, married Doctor Alexander Hamilton of Annapolis, a physician and a member of the Assembly. Her second husband, William Murdock, a distinguished Assemblyman, owned about 5,000 acres of land. Lloyd married a daughter of John Brice, Chief Justice of the Provincial Court, and thereby became the brother-in-law of Philip Hammond, Speaker of the Assembly. Most significant of all, was the marriage of the younger Daniel Dulany to Rebecca Tasker, daughter of Benjamin Tasker, President of the Council. This marriage gave Dulany inestimable strength and support and made the Tasker-Dulany group the most powerful family combination in the colony. Next to the Tasker-Dulany group, the Lloyd-Tilghman alliance was perhaps the most important family combination. In passing, it should not be overlooked that through marriage one might secure entrance into the aristocratic ranks, as did John Ridout, Governor Sharpe's private secretary, who married, in 1765, Mary Ogle, the grand-daughter of President Tasker. By that stroke he assured himself of a fortune and union with the courtly circle.

Superior educational advantages also gave the members of the aristocracy an influence in society all out of proportion to their number. Maryland had an unusually large number of well-educated and university-trained men, mostly lawyers. The elder Daniel Dulany studied at Trinity College, Dublin, and Gray's Inn, London. Jeremiah Nichols and John Ridout were Oxford men. Henry Hollyday graduated from Princeton. Charles Carroll of Carrollton attended various French Catholic colleges and later Middle Temple. In fact, there was a surprising number of Marylanders who received their training at Middle Temple. Upon their return to the colony, university men became planters, practicing lawyers, or entered politics. There were no other channels through which the talent of the aristocracy could be directed.

Tied together by the bonds of marriage, buttressed by wealth, landholding, and education, this comparatively small group of families was able to dominate the political life of the colony. For example, the Taskers and Dulanys controlled the government of Anne Arundel County and the city of Annapolis for years; the Mackalls and Gantts held sway in Calvert County; the Keys and Platers ruled St. Marys;

while across the Bay in Queen Anne and Talbot Counties the Lloyds, Tilghmans, and Goldsboroughs reigned supreme. From these families were drawn the county justices, clerks, sheriffs, deputy surveyors, and deputy commissaries. And it was not unusual for kinsmen to act together upon public business for the entire colony. President Tasker, his son, and son-in-law, Daniel Dulany, sat together upon the Council for a long period. While Daniel Dulany served as Councillor, his brother, Walter, acted in the same capacity, and, in addition, three brothers-in-law sat in the Assembly. Associated with Colonel Edward Lloyd on the Council was a cousin; a brother served on the Provincial Court bench, and a half-brother, a nephew, and two cousins were Assemblymen.

A glance at the Assembly reveals how well the aristocracy monopolized the legislative positions. Walter Dulany represented the city of Annapolis for eleven years, and Mathew Tilghman served Talbot County for almost fourteen. Despite frequent elections, little change in personnel occurred in the Assembly. Out of the fifty-eight members elected in 1754, forty-two had served in the preceding session. In the election of 1761, forty-three had previously sat in the Assembly while in that of 1764, forty-six old members were returned. The committee personnel remained practically the same year after year. And the same is true in regard to the election of Speaker. Philip Hammond was elected to that office eleven different times while Colonel Henry Hooper was chosen on seventeen separate occasions.

Another striking feature in politics was the fact that many of the courtly circle held simultaneously more than one lucrative public office. Colonel Edward Lloyd acted as Agent and Receiver-General, Treasurer of the Eastern Shore, Keeper of the Rent Roll for the Western Shore, and as Councillor. His case illustrates a point which a dozen or more other examples would substantiate.

Annapolis, the center of this ruling aristocracy, was one of the most brilliant social capitals in America. Colonial travelers declared that there was more wealth and luxury in this little metropolis than in any other American city. Here lived many of the most opulent families: the Carrolls, Dulanys, Taskers, Bordleys, and others. Those living on isolated estates often came to the seat of government on business while the wealthier made it a practice to bring their families and live in the capital during the inclement winter season.



Great wealth enabled these noble plutocrats to erect beautiful colonial mansions in those prosperous days when land was cheap and favors came from the Proprietor. It was an era in which many of the finest Maryland homes were built. Simplicity, dignity, mass, and proportion characterized these magnificent dwellings, which are rich in carving, plaster work, and wrought brass. Masters of these pleasant villas, eminent for their generous hospitality, lived in a handsome and extravagant style. Life was comfortable and easy.

Gambling, gossiping, flirting, drinking, feasting, dancing, horse racing, card playing, fox hunting, visitors from neighboring provinces, the arrival of the latest vessel from England, and the quarrels between the Proprietor and the Assembly furnished excitement and amusement. The birthdays of Lord Baltimore, the King, Queen, and Prince of Wales were special days for elaborate celebrations. On these occasions Governor Sharpe always provided a sumptuous dinner for a large number of guests and an elegant ball in the evening. Exclusive clubs were not lacking. Particularly famous was the Tuesday Club, an Annapolis organization of wits who met to have a rollicking good time. There was also the Maryland Jockey Club, composed of the principal men of Annapolis and adjacent country, which encouraged horse racing and the breeding of fine animals. From 1747 to the American Revolution, horse racing was the king of sports for the aristocrats as well as the common people.

Land was the chief form of wealth; planting the main occupation. Land policies and land administration, therefore, were matters of prime importance to the Maryland people. Large quantities of vacant, uncultivated land could be found in all parts of the colony, but it was in such small and irregular sizes as to be of little value. What vacant, uncultivated land there was, sold for around £5 sterling per 100 acres. After 1751 the Proprietor made a determined effort to raise the price but Governor Sharpe persuaded him it was most unwise. On all grants of land the Proprietor retained a quit-rent of 4 sh. per 100 acres. This he tried to raise but the Governor successfully resisted the attempt. Avoidance of exorbitant and confusing rates, an excellent system of collection, and a disposition to be moderate in the method of enforcement, explain why quit-rents were paid in Maryland with less opposition than in any other colony.

Maryland was not a colony composed chiefly of large and princely estates. The average plantation of a middle class landowner ranged

from 100 to 250 acres. The nearer to Annapolis, the center of politics and of the aristocratic class, the larger the holding. The vast estates of the landed aristocracy consisted for the most part of many scattered tracts rather than single large plantations. Large tracts were held either for speculative purposes or for a desire to provide for one's children or for tobacco cultivation.

Leasing was a popular means of developing large estates. Rents on leased land varied from 10 sh. to £10 sterling per 100 acres, depending upon location, quality of soil, improvements, and bargaining power. The average leaseholds contained from 100 to 150 acres. Numerous estates were worked under the direction of an overseer, a system which was more profitable and prevented the waste of timber as well as the exhaustion of the soil.

Proprietary manors were divided into small holdings and leased like the lands of private citizens. Although rents were somewhat lower than on private lands, the manors were never completely occupied. Questions relating to terms of leases, sales, and laying out of new manors were handled by the Governor and Agent while the routine work of finding tenants, leasing the lands, and collecting the rents was done by stewards. Despite the fact that the manors brought in as much as £1,000 revenue per year, the Proprietor decided in 1765 to sell all cultivated as well as uncultivated reserved lands and manors amounting to 114,633 acres. They were divided into tracts and auctioned off to the highest bidder, but the demand was poor. By 1768, only 17,015 acres had been sold.

From both the Proprietor's and people's point of view, Governor Sharpe's record as a land administrator is one of great achievement. His wise and successful opposition to raising the price of land and the quit-rent rate favored the planters. On the other hand, his working out of a more effective method of collecting the quit-rents and perfecting the rent rolls favored his employer. The strenuous effort to discover surplus land was not only beneficial to the Proprietor but also to the planters who wanted to remove all grounds for boundary disputes. Where possible, rents on proprietary domains were increased and responsible management provided for those immense holdings. Delinquent and inefficient land officials were dismissed. A Board of Revenue was created and given unlimited power over all proprietary finances. Finally, a building was constructed where all books and papers relating to the Proprietor's land and revenue might



be deposited. As a result of Governor Sharpe's work, many causes of complaint against the Land Office and Proprietor were removed.

This study shows that the trade of the colony was closely bound to the Mother Country. The bulk of the trade was in the hands of a few great English merchants, like the Cunliffes, Hunts, Hydes, Gildarts, Hanburys, and some of lesser importance. Into Chesapeake Bay and the rivers sailed their ships in May or June laden with cargoes of goods previously ordered by the large planters. As these ships moved leisurely from wharf to wharf discharging their cargoes, the captains contracted for tobacco for a return load. Towns, as shipping and distributing centers, were not needed. Significant, however, was the phenomenal rise of Baltimore as a great emporium of trade. Although it scarcely rivalled Annapolis in buildings or in population in 1753, its strategic location offered exceptional advantages for extensive trade with the interior farming districts of Pennsylvania and Maryland. With wagon roads west and northwest tapping the diversified farming regions, Baltimore by 1771 had become one of the most important produce markets in America.

Tobacco was king in Maryland—the chief staple of production, the chief commodity for export. On an average, the colony exported annually 30,000 hogshead worth about £280,000. But the cost of the long haul across the Atlantic and of handling the crop was enormous. It was estimated that £140,000 were spent annually for freightage, wharfage, and storage charges. On account of these heavy impositions, uncertain crops, a flooded market, and constantly falling prices, planters turned to grain growing and diversified farming, which was more profitable.

While tobacco was the chief item of export, Maryland sent out yearly great quantities of wheat, corn, bread, flour, lumber, pork, fish, and iron. In fact, Maryland surpassed all other colonies during this period in the production and exportation of iron. Exclusive of tobacco, Maryland's exports amounted to about £80,000 annually. English exports into the colony averaged about £160,000 annually. Outside of England, Maryland had little commercial intercourse with Europe. What might have been a lucrative trade with the West Indies was practically destroyed by the French and Indian War.

There were no manufactures in Maryland worthy of the name. Several attempts were made to open copper mines, but the cost of production was an obstacle to success. Four rope walks employing

eight or ten hands operated in different parts of the colony with varying degrees of success. The manufacture of linen was encouraged by legislative acts but without great stimulating effect, except among the Germans. A surprising amount of shipbuilding was carried on in the colony; most of the vessels were schooners and sloops varying from twelve to forty tons capacity. However, those who had sufficient capital to establish industries and manufactures chose rather to invest their funds in lands and slaves or engage in trade.

The expanding economic life of the colony was seriously hampered by the lack of a satisfactory currency. What metal currency there was, consisted mainly of foreign coins, many of which were so clipped and cut that they were valued mostly by weight. The scarcity of coin was so great that all sorts of substitutes were used: wheat, rye, oats, corn, flax, barley, flour, and a dozen other articles. Because of their large number, bills of exchange assumed an important place in colonial currency; they were always in greatest demand. Like other colonies, Maryland resorted to the printing of paper money, but without the usual results of depreciation. On account of the exceptional strength of the fund against which all of the paper money was issued, its value fluctuated very little. Maryland probably had the most successful paper money issued by any of the American colonies.

Governor Sharpe's tenure of office coincided with the opening and progress of the French and Indian War. But Maryland contributed little towards winning the conflict, and not more than five hundred men were supported in the field. Governor Sharpe estimated, however, that over 2,000 Marylanders enlisted in His Majesty's land forces. Financially, the colony contributed a miserly amount. Apart from £6,000 granted for Braddock's expedition and a grant of £40,000 in 1756, no other appropriations were made. Maryland's obstinate attitude and failure to coöperate in prosecuting the war may be ascribed to a variety of causes. Sending English regulars to America inclined the colony at first to shirk its responsibility. Furthermore, Maryland's frontier was short and fairly well protected by the position of Virginia and Pennsylvania so that there was little pressure upon the Assembly to vote men and supplies. Then, too, unlike Virginia, there was no prospect for Maryland to acquire western land. Otherwise, the colony might have coöperated more heartily. Another important reason for Maryland's indifference was



the refractory example set by Pennsylvania. On more than one occasion the Maryland Assembly waited to see what action the neighbor to the north would take and then deliberately framed similar supply bills. The taxation of the proprietary estate, quit-rents, lucrative offices, and the issue of paper money were all schemes imported into Maryland from the Quaker colony. Last, but perhaps more important than any other reason, was the fact that the Assembly was more interested in eliminating proprietary rule than in voting men and supplies. Indian raids and the sufferings of the frontiersmen were insignificant contrasted to the struggle for home rule.

Although opposed and hindered at every turn by a stubborn legislature, Governor Sharpe faithfully endeavored to comply with all commands from His Majesty's civil and military authorities. Brad-dock, Forbes, Amherst, and other British officers highly commended him for his loyalty, enthusiasm, vigor, and efforts to promote His Majesty's service. Whenever an emergency arose, the Governor willingly advanced money on his own personal account to purchase supplies or to enlist men and depended upon the Assembly to reimburse him later. His own personal expense account for making journeys and sending messengers amounted to over £1,000. Both the colony and the British authorities permitted that account to go unpaid. In addition to his time and money, he gave freely of his military knowledge. Though honored on two different occasions with high commissions, the failure of the colonies to cooperate prevented him from displaying his talents. However, his methods and acts in perfecting frontier defenses inclines one to believe that he had a military knowledge of superior order. Rebuilding the stockade at Fort Cumberland, the reorganization of the commissary department, and the construction of Fort Frederick in 1756, indicate that he thoroughly appreciated the value of order, system, and military strategy. Garrisoning Fort Frederick during the summer of 1756 with militiamen, despite the opposition of the Assembly, attests his fortitude. Though often dejected and weary from laboring with a recalcitrant legislature, he was always alert and ready to take the field. No other Governor could have shown more zeal for His Majesty's service.

Peace was declared in 1763, but Governor Sharpe's troubles did not cease. Parliament's passage of the Stamp Act started a movement which could not be controlled. In protest against the act, Zachariah Hood, stamp distributor for Maryland, was burned in effigy in more

than a dozen places, his store in Annapolis was literally pulled down, he was chased out of the colony, and forced to resign. The mob would not even allow the stamps to be landed. Although the public offices, custom-houses, and nearly all the courts closed on November 1, 1765, they were open and transacting business in violation of the law by April 1, 1766, thanks to the efforts of the Sons of Liberty. Shortly, news of the repeal of the Stamp Act reached the colony. It was a joyous occasion and elaborate celebrations were held in every town. The Assembly, animated by a spirit of gratitude, voted to purchase an elegant marble statue of Pitt to be set up in Annapolis and to have a picture of Lord Camden painted and hung in the Provincial Court room. While the repeal of the Stamp Act seemed to restore harmonious relations between Great Britain and her American colonies, it did not settle the issue of taxation without representation. The passage of the Townshend Acts soon revived the whole controversy. But the story of Maryland's reaction to this and subsequent British acts belongs more properly to the next administration.

Early in October 1768, Governor Sharpe received word that he had been superseded as Governor of Maryland by Sir Robert Eden. As the report spread from county to county, justices of the courts, members of the bar, grand juries, the city officials of Annapolis, clergymen, and others, formulated and presented messages of sincere regret. The Governor could truly write to his brother: "I now quit the Station I have filled here with as much applause as I could ever have expected to do." On Monday, June 1, 1769, the vessel carrying Governor Robert Eden and his family anchored near Annapolis, and on the next morning Eden was formally inducted into office. Thus ended the administration of Governor Horatio Sharpe.

Sharpe did not leave the colony immediately; he took up his residence at Whitehall, a fine country home on Chesapeake Bay eight miles from Annapolis. Here he spent the next few years in managing his estate and in generous hospitality with friends. That free and easy life did not last long, however, for in 1773 Sharpe returned to England to remain until his death in 1790.

Though restless and dissatisfied with his position as Governor of Maryland, Sharpe nevertheless rendered valiant service. His attempts to improve the character of the clergy, his efforts to promote public education, his improvements in the administration of the Land



Office, his dismissal of inefficient and dishonest officials, his military service in the French and Indian War, his impartiality in administering justice, his recommendations for poor relief, and his liberal attitude towards Roman Catholic subjects, indicate the character and public services of the man who presided over Maryland for sixteen years.

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In the preparation of this dissertation, the writer has utilized unpublished manuscript materials in the possession of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the Maryland Historical Society, the Maryland Diocesan Library, the Library of Congress, and the Commissioner of the Land Office at Annapolis. Especially valuable for trade and commerce are the following unpublished collections: *Alexander Hamilton Papers*; *Board of Trade Papers, Proprieties, 1697-1776*; *Board of Trade Papers, Plantations General, 1689-1790*; *Clement Brooke and Carter Letters*; *Henry Callister Papers*; *Hill Papers*; *Port of Entry Books, Annapolis*; and *The Papers of Samuel and John Galloway*. *The Calvert Papers* is one of the most valuable unpublished collections for the investigator who delves into Maryland history at any point and on any phase. Another collection of miscellaneous papers, letters, petitions, and other proprietary papers is found in the *Port-folio Papers* of the Maryland Historical Society. *The Black Books* of the Maryland Historical Society contain letters, court records, petitions, depositions, and other documents dating from 1689 to the American Revolution. In *The Debt Books* are the names of the landowners, the number of acres held, and the amount of quit-rents due. Excellent material on the distribution of land may be found in these volumes.

Among the more important published sources are the *Acts of the Province of Maryland*, the *Proceedings of the Council of Maryland*, the *Votes and Proceedings of the Lower House*, and the *Minutes of the Board of Revenue*. The *Correspondence of Governor Horatio Sharpe* is perhaps the most valuable single source for excellent material on all phases of colonial life. *Letters to Governor Sharpe, 1754-1765* is a part of the same series. The old *Maryland Gazette* is a mine of information on all subjects. The *Letters of General John Forbes relating to the Expedition Against Fort Duquesne*; the *Correspondence of William Pitt, when Secretary of State with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners*; and the *Official*

*Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758*, are particularly helpful upon the French and Indian War. The *Unpublished Letters of Charles Carroll of Carrollton and of His Father Charles Carroll of Doughoregan; The Calvert Papers* (Fund Publication No. 34); Eddis', *Letters from American, Historical and Descriptive: Comprising Occurrences from 1769 to 1777 inclusive*; and "Extracts from the Carroll Papers" in the *Maryland Historical Magazine*, are excellent sources for the political, social, and economic conditions in colonial Maryland.



# FRANCIS NICHOLSON, A ROYAL GOVERNOR IN THE CHESAPEAKE COLONIES 1690-1705\*

By CHELLIS N. EVANSON

This study deals with the career of Francis Nicholson as a royal governor in the Chesapeake colonies. He was a staunch and loyal supporter of education and of the Anglican Church in both Virginia and Maryland. His appreciation of the British plan for the defense of the New York frontier and the protection of the carrying trade exceeded a mere attempt to carry out his instructions. He saw the wisdom of the former project, not only as an immediate need for the border colony, but also, in a broader sense, as a means of uniting all the colonies in an undertaking for the good of all. In the latter he was concerned for the benefit of the tobacco colonies as well as for the Mother Country. In general, he was not only loyal to his obligation to serve the British government, but also deeply interested in the welfare of the colonies. Better means of communication, and certainly the inauguration of a postal system, as well as his material assistance to the people of Maryland during an epidemic, reflect a local rather than royal interest. In administration he showed an unusual breadth of vision when he initiated a conference of governors at New York. In a quarrel with a powerful group in the Virginia Council, it is significant that he enjoyed the support of some of the members of the Council and especially of the Burgesses, the clergy and the trustees of the College of William and Mary. His recall indicates the untenable position of royal officials who took royal instructions seriously. His many appointments in the colonial service express the confidence of the British government in his merits. His American career began in 1686 in the Dominion of New England and included the Lieutenant-Governorship of New York, 1688 to 1689;

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Winfred T. Root

he was Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, 1690 to 1692, and Governor 1698 to 1705, and Governor of Maryland, 1694 to 1698; he commanded the land forces in the expeditions of 1709 and 1711 against Canada; and he held the Governorship of Nova Scotia, 1712 to 1717, and that of South Carolina, 1719 to 1725.

Nicholson came to America in 1686 as Captain in charge of two companies of British regulars to serve in the Dominion of New England under Sir Edmund Andros. His experience in the British army coupled with his service in the Dominion of New England later preserved his interest in the military features of colonial administration in the Chesapeake colonies. He was careful to conduct regular inspections of the militia, to see that these forces were provided with arms and ammunition, and to attend to the patrol of the frontiers by specially organized troops called rangers. Although England was engaged in war during most of the period under consideration, the Chesapeake forces took no part in the American side of the conflict. However, the fact that a state of war existed served as an incentive to Governor Nicholson to keep the militia organized and the rangers active. While the Chesapeake militia escaped service in the colonial wars, both Virginia and Maryland were called upon to furnish money in lieu of men for the defense of the New York frontier. Governor Nicholson's zeal and understanding were responsible for whatever assistance the Chesapeake colonies gave to the defense of New York. His brief but active military service in New England and his short executive career in New York gave him an insight into the wisdom of the British plan of defense not shared by the plantation owners. And yet, both Virginia and Maryland furnished money for the plan. But throughout his administrations his appreciation of the British plan continually surpassed that of the legislatures. Each request for aid found the Governor increasingly zealous while the colonials repeatedly urged the necessity of local defense and emphasized their great distance from an undertaking which, they stated, was strictly a problem for New York to settle. In fact, so enthusiastic was the Governor for the success of the plan that he offered to loan Virginia her quota from his personal funds without interest. Despite the increasingly provincial attitude of the Virginia Burgesses, who continued to urge the necessity of local defense, he finally deposited £900 in personal bills of exchange with the Governor of New York in order to fulfill Virginia's obligation. The fact that his offer was cancelled by



authority of the British government, which complimented him highly for his enthusiasm, precludes the possibility that Nicholson had deposited the funds with Governor Lord Cornbury with the understanding that the action should be used to bring pressure to bear on the Virginia Burgesses.

Of more local interest was the protection of the carrying trade. While this protection was furnished by the British Navy at no cost to the colonies, its regulation depended entirely on the Governor. His duties were not always easy. Despite the grave dangers of capture by the enemy, ship masters, anxious to reach markets with the Chesapeake staple, were often too impatient to await the arrival of the convoy or the making up of the fleet. It was imperative that protection of the tobacco trade should be effective from the standpoint not only of colonial planter and English merchant but also the British government. The trade brought considerable revenue into the British exchequer and hence the British government was interested to the extent of hiring ships for convoy service when the British fleet was busy in European waters. The figures representing the size of the fleets which left Virginia and Maryland, indicate that the number of vessels was constant except when increased during certain years and that adequate protection was a factor in maintaining the trade at that level. numerous letters from the Board of Trade compliment the Governor on the way he carried out his instructions for regulating the protection of the carrying trade. Ship owners and trading companies also testified to his efficient work.

Protection also included the safeguarding of the Chesapeake trade against pirates. For this purpose the British government furnished patrol ships. During Governor Nicholson's stay in Virginia and Maryland there were numerous reports of pirates in the Chesapeake, but the capture of only one is recorded. This was the capture of the pirate ship *La Paix* by the British patrol ship *Shoreham*. In this encounter of ten hours, Governor Nicholson took an active part. He remained aboard the *Shoreham* and from the quarter-deck of the vessel encouraged the men, narrowly escaping death when a Virginian, Peter Hayman, at the Governor's side, was killed by a ball.

Illicit trade in Virginia gave Governor Nicholson no concern, but when he became Governor of Maryland in 1694, he reported that this type of trade was practiced chiefly with Scotland. Following the revolution in 1689 the government of Maryland had been poorly

administered. A provisional government by unscrupulous men acted until Governor Lionel Coplay, the British appointee, took charge. Even during his administration there had been laxity, and the period between his death and Nicholson's arrival offered an opportunity for the continuation of inefficient government. The British government coöperated in the suppression of this trade by reporting the departure of vessels from Scotland to Maryland and the arrival of vessels in Scotland from the colony. Twelve vessels were seized in 1694 and the general conditions of trade were improved when the Governor pressed the trial and punishment of many cases which had either lapsed or had been acquitted in the provincial courts. In 1697 twenty-eight vessels were condemned for violations of various laws of trade. Governor Nicholson's exposure of the illicit trade between Maryland and Pennsylvania greatly influenced the Board of Trade to recommend a patrol boat for the apprehension of violators. Violations consisted chiefly in shipping rum in casks purporting to contain flour. The Governor appointed Thomas Meech for this service and later added two "Riding Surveyors" as land patrols. He also designated Annapolis and William Stadt as the only ports of entry for the Pennsylvania trade.

The rangers guarded the colonial frontiers but their chief duty was to deal with the Indians and particularly to report the presence of strange Indians. Neither Virginia nor Maryland suffered any serious Indian troubles during Governor Nicholson's administrations. The Governor was on friendly terms with the Indians and always looked after their interests, especially to safeguard their lands from the encroachment of land-hungry settlers. On only one occasion did the Indians cause the Governor any concern. In 1697 the Piscataway Indians moved out of Maryland and settled in Virginia, charging mistreatment by the agents appointed to supervise their welfare. The murder of a negro boy was rumored to have been committed by the Indians, who, professing their innocence, moved out of Maryland and refused to return. Governor Nicholson showed much concern over their departure and appointed a committee to meet the Indians and induce them to return. Although the meeting was held, the Indians remained in Virginia and no further trouble developed. This affair, in itself not serious, indicates his interest in the Indians and their welfare. He realized the importance of maintaining peace with the Indians and he was especially fearful



lest they would leave the province and enter into relations with the French. To anticipate the French economic aggression Governor Nicholson proposed the formation of a company to engage in the western trade. While the proposal met with the approval of the Board of Trade, providing it did not interfere with the tobacco industry, the plan was not realized until the administration of Alexander Spotswood.

Governor Nicholson's interest in the welfare of the Chesapeake colonies found expression not only within the scope of routine administrative affairs but also beyond conventional matters. During his stay in Maryland he used his influence in having the capital moved from St. Mary's to Ann Arundell, renamed Annapolis in 1695. He personally urged this change for economic and administrative reasons, despite the vigorous protests of the residents of St. Mary's. He purchased property in the new town and took an active part in managing the construction of the new statehouse. He gave every encouragement to the undertaking, which was completed in March, 1698 during the closing month of his administration.

His experience stood him in good stead, for when he returned to Virginia as Governor of that province in December, 1698, he was faced with the problem of providing the colony with a statehouse to replace the one destroyed by fire the previous October. Again he was in a large measure responsible for changing the location of the capital to Williamsburg. He personally planned the town and named the streets.

Governor Nicholson sought to improve the economic welfare of Virginia by urging the construction and maintenance of adequate ferries, bridges, and roads. He inaugurated a postal system in Maryland which included regular postal service between Annapolis and other stations in the province, and Philadelphia. His interest in the welfare of the people assumed a humanitarian character when he donated funds to provide material and spiritual comforts to those who sought the healing waters of Cool Springs in St. Mary's County, during an epidemic which swept through Maryland in 1697. He also used his influence to induce the legislature to appropriate funds for the same purpose.

Governor Nicholson's greatest claim to success in the Chesapeake colonies was his support of education and the advance of the Anglican Church. Although the founding of Virginia had been undertaken as

an economic venture, the cultural and religious welfare of the inhabitants had not been neglected. Education in the Old Dominion was first intended for the Indians and two schools were soon founded for that purpose. But these early ventures were short-lived. The first endowed free school dates from the bequest of Benjamin Symmes in February 1625. An institution founded soon afterward by Thomas Eaton was joined with the Symmes school over a century and a half later and the union of these two schools in Hampton Academy has survived until our own times. Provision had also been made in early Virginia for higher education, but the surrender of its charter by the London Company and the strong opposition to education during the Berkeley administration operated against success.

It remained for Governor Nicholson and his associate in this work, the Reverend James Blair, to revive the project of a college in Virginia and to carry it to a successful consummation. The newly appointed executive had been in the colony scarcely three months when he took the initiative in the effort to found a college in 1691. The Lieutenant-Governor supported the project with money and used his influence with the members of his Council and the Burgesses to do likewise, so that £2,000 was subscribed for the college in the province. Among other gifts Nicholson donated to the cause £150, one-half of the sum voted by the Burgesses as a gift to him in 1691. Other donors included such well-known men in Virginia history as Col. Philip Ludwell and Henry Hartwell. Dr. Blair was appointed agent for the colony to secure the charter for the college in England, and returned with it in 1693. Through his acquaintance with important officials in England, especially in the Church, he obtained a liberal charter containing provisions for the grant of almost £2,000 from the quit-rents of Virginia, a gift of 20,000 acres of land, the income derived from a tax of a penny per pound on all tobacco exported from the colony in the intercolonial trade, and the fees from the office of Surveyor-General in the province. Local taxes on furs and skins also brought some revenue. The Governor supported Dr. Blair in his mission to England as his numerous letters to high officials in church and state testify. A gift from Perry and Lane, a firm of London tobacco merchants, with whom Nicholson carried on private business, was probably secured through his efforts.

Dr. Blair, the first president of the college, served for forty-nine years. Governor Nicholson was made a member of the board of



trustees. He continued his support even when he became Governor of Maryland, his attendance at meetings being as regular as when he lived in Virginia, even though the journey of a hundred and fifty miles was often made under adverse conditions.

While the College of William and Mary did not develop beyond the stage of a grammar school during Governor Nicholson's stay in the Chesapeake, the Governor and the Burgesses first witnessed the results of their efforts when they attended a May Day program at the college in 1699. In their address to the Governor, the Burgesses praised his work and acknowledged Nicholson second only to the King as the chief friend of the institution.

During the period 1694-1698 when Nicholson served as Governor of Maryland he continued his zeal for the cause of education. He founded the first free school in the province and gave £50 toward the project and £25 annually during his tenure of office toward the maintenance of a master. Again, his influence brought contributions from prominent officials, such as Sir Thomas Lawrence, Lord Baltimore's agent in Maryland, and Edward Randolph. He urged the matter before the Council and the Assembly, many of whose members also contributed toward the undertaking. With his Virginia experience as an impetus, the Governor urged the consummation of a plan for a free school in each of the ten counties. He again carried on correspondence with friends in England and secured the charter for King William's School at Annapolis, named, at the suggestion of the Governor, in honor of the sovereign. Through the coöperation of the Bishop of London, a schoolmaster, Andrew Geddes, was sent to the colony in 1696, but since the school was not completed, Governor Nicholson arranged to have him teach at William and Mary. The free school at Annapolis was not finished until 1701, three years after he had left the colony to serve as Governor of Virginia. However, as in the case of the College of William and Mary, King William's School has survived through the conveyance of the property to St. John's College in 1785.

Aside from his interest in education, which extended to a proposal for the education of negroes, his love of books and his support of libraries marked him as a man of considerable cultural interests. His own library in 1696 contained more than two hundred titles of religious works besides books on "science, gardening, commerce, travel and other departments." He urged the establishment of public libraries

and was a donor of books to the library of Yale College. With Dr. Thomas Bray, Commissary of Maryland, he worked for the establishment of libraries in that colony and in 1705 he donated £20 for the purchase of law books for the courts of Gloucester County, Virginia. In recognition of his zeal for the cause of education in America he was appointed in 1700 to membership in the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, an organization which numbered among its members many of the leading scholars and high officials of church and state.

Royal governors were instructed to further the interests of the Anglican Church in their respective colonies. Governor Nicholson's respect for his instructions, and his enthusiasm and liberality, made him a most zealous worker for the welfare of the Church, not only in the colony where he served as executive but in other colonies as well.

Several problems confronted the Governor in this important work. The geography of the Chesapeake was in itself a hindrance, for the plantations developed lengthwise out of all proportion to breadth and the parishes assumed much the same proportions. Hence, parishoners were often many miles from a church and the minister who served more than one parish endured the hardships of much travel. Governor Nicholson attempted to relocate the parish boundaries on the basis of the number of parishoners, but he met with only moderate success because the plantation system was so thoroughly a part of the life of the people that it could not well be changed to coincide with different parish boundaries.

Far more important than the adjustment of parish boundaries was the work of supplying ministers. As the representative of the Bishop of London it was the Governor's duty to induct the clergy into benefices, while the Commissary exercised the power to hold visitations and conventions and to superintend the conduct of the clergy. The power of induction would have been easily exercised because there was a constant need of ministers, especially in Maryland. Inductions were not frequent since they followed normally only after the vestry had made a presentation to the Governor, and an induction usually fixed the minister in the parish for life. The chief reason for this was that the vestries preferred the services of a temporary minister to the lifetime tenure which followed induction. Governor Nicholson's failure to induct clergymen was the basis of one of Dr. Blair's



accusations against the Governor in 1705. In defense of his policy it may be said that while he could induct ministers without presentation by the vestry after a parish had been vacant six months, his failure to exercise this power is more than offset by his zeal for the advancement of the church and especially by the support given him by a majority of the Virginia clergy during his quarrel with the Council and Dr. Blair. In this they indicated that they were satisfied with the Governor's administration of his power of induction and did not insist upon the lifetime tenure of a benefice. Numerous instances appear of clergymen who retained their benefices over a long period of time through annual election by the vestry without presentation or induction.

While the fifty parishes in Virginia were served by twenty-two clergymen in 1697, the situation in Maryland was much worse. When Nicholson became Governor of that province there were only three clergymen in the colony. Although it was not the duty of the Governor to supply clergymen for work in the American mission fields, his zeal for the cause and his liberality for its support often met the expense of a clergyman's voyage as well as his living in the colony until he could be placed in a parish. For this enthusiasm he was highly praised not only by Commissary Blair and Commissary Bray but also by numerous clergymen whom he had befriended. Two prominent missionaries, the Reverend John Talbot and the Reverend George Kieth, sent to America in 1702 by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, were also among Governor Nicholson's many admirers. Nicholas Moreau, one of Virginia's clergy, testified to the Governor's importance in church affairs: "When I do think with myself of Governor Nicholson I do call him the Right hand of God, the father of the church, and more, the father of the poor. An eminent Bishop of that same character being sent over here with him will make Hell tremble and settle the church of England in these parts forever."

Governor Nicholson's support of the Anglican Church was also expressed in his liberality toward the erection of churches and chapels-of-ease. As Governor of Maryland he gave £100 toward the erection of the brick church at Annapolis. Particularly in this type of support his generosity was felt in practically all of the American colonies. In 1689 he contributed £25 toward the erection of King's Chapel at Boston. The Reverend George Kieth, who assisted at the laying of

the cornerstone of St. Mary's Church at Burlington, New Jersey, in 1703 referred to Governor Nicholson as "the chief founder of this as well as many other churches in the colonies." The account of the building of St. Paul's Church at Chester, Pennsylvania, contains this tribute: "We may safely say no man parted more freely with his money to promote the interest of the Church in these parts, nor contributed so universally towards ye erection of Christian Synagogues in different and distant plantations in America." His contribution of £100 toward the erection of King George's Church in South Carolina is another example of his support. In commenting on Governor Nicholson's activity for the advancement of the Church in this colony, William Stevens Perry stated that he "conducted himself so as to throw a lustre over the closing years" of his service in America. His enthusiasm for the welfare of the church was acknowledged both in the colonies and in England. In his will he left all his lands in Virginia, New England and Maryland to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel for the education of young men for service in the Anglican Church in New England.

From the administrative point of view Governor Nicholson's career in the Chesapeake colonies was characterized both by success and failure. His first administration in Virginia, 1690-1692, was entirely successful, but when he became Governor of Maryland in 1694 he encountered difficulties, chiefly with the lower house of the legislature. However, Maryland had been loosely governed by Copley, who had also misappropriated funds, and by Andros, who made a show of taking over the government prior to Nicholson's arrival. The Andros administration cost the province several hundred pounds sterling, most of which was recovered by Governor Nicholson, who contended that the commission held by Andros did not authorize his taking over the government or accepting pay for his services. Under these circumstances it must be conceded that his difficulties were brought about, in part at least, by the misdeeds of his predecessors rather than by misgovernment on his part.

John Coode, an unscrupulous clergyman, and a few of his relatives and friends in St. Mary's County, supported by the legislature, gave Governor Nicholson considerable trouble. Coode had served as Receiver of Customs in Maryland from 1689 to 1690. An examination of his accounts by Governor Nicholson and George Plater, the local Attorney-General, showed a deficit of some £500 and a



suit was instituted against him. When Coode was elected to the lower house of the legislature in 1696 the Governor refused to seat him on the ground that according to English law he could not serve because he was a clergyman. Having sat in the legislature before, Coode was supported by that body. The Governor refused to change his decision and was supported by the opinion of the provincial attorneys. Coode stated that he had renounced his vows to the Church, but the Governor, as the representative of the Bishop of London, maintained that such action could come only with consent of the authorities in England who had administered his ordination. Coode withdrew from the legislature but became the leader of any dissatisfaction which arose in the colony. When Governor Nicholson heard that Coode was guilty of blasphemy he ordered him removed as sheriff of St. Mary's County and his records seized. Coode fled to Virginia where the Governor claimed he enjoyed the protection of Andros who made no effort to arrest him and return him to Maryland. Coode's son-in-law, Gerard Slye, took part in the quarrel and in 1697 preferred charges against Governor Nicholson before the Lords Justices in England. When word of this action reached the Governor he caused his arrest and Slye soon offered his apology. Other partners in the cabal were also brought before the provincial courts and they also sought the Governor's pardon. When it became known that Nicholson was soon to become Governor of Virginia, the lower house of the legislature joined with the Council and grand jury in a complimentary address to the executive which was accepted with good grace.

When Governor Nicholson returned to Virginia in 1698 he found the colony in debt to the amount of £4,000 and only scanty records by his predecessor, Andros. While the Governor set about the task of instituting efficient government with his customary zeal, he came into difficulty with the members of his Council, especially when the execution of his program touched several of the members of that body.

The two phases of Nicholson's program which incurred the ill-will of the Council were the appointment of officers and the preparation of an accurate rent roll. His reforms in offices began with the proposal that the posts of Deputy-Auditor and Receiver-General should be separated. Originally distinct, they had been joined under Nathaniel Bacon, who was succeeded in 1687 by William Byrd.

The combination was a lucrative one, paying seven and one-half per cent on all public funds collected. The Byrd family was prominent in Virginia both in society and politics. It was not only wealthy but also related to other great families by intermarriage. Several members of the Council belonged to the Byrd family group and of course the Governor's proposals were sure to be opposed. He also favored a wider distribution of the various offices held by members of the Council, claiming that the execution of the duties was left too much in the hands of deputies.

While it was the policy of the British government to appoint men of means to the Council, the preparation of an accurate rent roll would incur the ill-will of that group because all were owners of extensive properties which carried a quit-rent fee of two shillings per one hundred acres, payable in tobacco at one pence per pound. As the work of preparing the rent roll progressed it was evident that much of the quit-rent money had not been collected because the owners of large estates concealed their holdings. The quit-rent problem was further complicated because members of the Council had been buying the quit-rent tobacco "by inch of candle" at a low price, a situation which Governor Nicholson also proposed to remedy.

To these reforms the Council naturally objected and set about to secure the recall of the Governor. Both parties brought their case before the authorities in England. Exorbitant charges on both sides makes it difficult to judge the merits of the case. Governor Nicholson denied all charges but was recalled. The Queen informed him that the decision was made for the best of the service and was not to be interpreted as a mark of personal disfavor. His subsequent appointments in the British colonial service are ample proof of the point. The later separation of the two offices in question and the doubled royal revenues from quit-rents after the completion of the rent roll in 1704 indicate that the Governor's program was well chosen.

While Governor Nicholson was removed from office through the efforts of such members of the Council as Dr. Blair, Benjamin Harrison, Philip Ludwell, John Lightfoot, Robert Carter, and Mathew Page, he might have gathered some consolation from the fact that his predecessor, Andros, had been removed by the same body and one of his successors, Spotswood, also suffered the same treatment. His removal was not regarded as serious in England for he was



retained in the colonial service until 1725 and was honored with knighthood in 1720, eight years before his death.

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Of the sources consulted, the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies*, was of inestimable value, particularly for the reports and correspondence between the Governor and various departments and officials in the British government. The reports were often in reply to requests for information as well as voluntary information furnished by the Governor. The available records of both the Council and lower house of each colony are: *Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland*; *Proceedings of the Council of Maryland*; *Journals of the House of Burgesses in Virginia*; the *Legislative Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia*; and *Hening's Statutes at Large*. Debate was not recorded, but the Governor's recommendations and the reactions of the legislature as shown in the statutes furnished indirect information of the success of the administration. Almost every session of the lower house closed with an address to the Governor which reflected their attitude toward the executive and his government. Information on the Anglican Church was taken largely from *Historical Collections Relating to the American Colonial Church*, edited by William Stevens Perry, *The History of the American Episcopal Church* by the same author and Francis L. Hawks, *Contributions to the Ecclesiastical History of the United States of America*. Of these the *Collections* proved the most valuable, especially since it contained accounts of important ecclesiastical conferences in England as well as information relating to the American establishment.

Charles William Sommerville's two articles, "Early Career of Governor Francis Nicholson," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, Vol. IV, June and September 1909, furnished much information. A monograph, *Colonial Trade of Maryland, 1689-1715*, by Margaret Shove Morriss furnished much valuable economic data. "Papers Relating to the Administration of Governor Nicholson and to the Founding of William and Mary College," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vols. VII, VIII, and IX, 1889-1902, contain pertinent information regarding Governor Nicholson's part in the founding of the college and also a complete account of the documentary evidence in his quarrel with the members of the Virginia Council. A valuable contemporary account of Virginia during the period is "Report of the

Journey of Francis Louis Michel from Berne, Switzerland to Virginia, October 2, 1701—December 1, 1702," translated and edited by Prof. Wm. J. Hinke, *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. XXIV, January, April, July, 1916. *The Writings of Colonel William Byrd of Westover in Virginia, Esqr.*, John Spencer Bassett, editor, furnished valuable information regarding this important Virginia family and its relatives in the Council. "Virginia Quit-Rent Rolls, 1704," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vols. XXVIII-XXXIV, contain information covering Governor Nicholson's important work in instituting a more accurate account of land holdings.



## CREDIT RELATIONS BETWEEN COLONIAL AND ENGLISH MERCHANTS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY\*

By ARTHUR SHELBURN WILLIAMSON

American colonial history is well supplied with scholarly accounts of the commercial policy which England adopted toward her American colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There has been wanting, however, a study of the colonial merchant himself as he worked in his counting-house and played out the several roles for which his New World community cast him. He touched colonial life at many points. He was at once importer, middleman, retailer, banker, and political lobbyist. His business affairs and the perplexing problems he was called upon to meet are not well known. The present study attempts to investigate one especially persistent problem which the colonial merchant faced—his credit relations with commercial houses in England. This problem harassed him throughout the eighteenth century, particularly during the years following 1760.

The kind Providence had endowed the New World with unlimited natural resources. The potential wealth in these resources was early seen by colonial entrepreneurs who applied themselves assiduously to its development. By the beginning of the eighteenth century active trading centers had already been established at Boston, Newport, Philadelphia, and New York, and vessels from these points were making profitable calls at ports throughout the world. The colonies were still pioneer communities, however, and had little capital of their own. Extensive development of their resources was contingent upon the assistance of outside capital. For this financial assistance the colonies depended upon England. The Mother Country already possessed surplus capital, and during the eighteenth century its trade and com-

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Winfred T. Root

merce experienced an expansion which created additional supplies of exportable capital. In the years which followed the War of the Spanish Succession, much of this capital found its way by devious paths to the colonies of America.

The capital which the colonies borrowed in England was transferred to America in the form of credits. Money as such was of little use in developing resources, except in so far as it served as a circulating medium. What the colonies needed was capital goods—equipment, utensils, supplies, clothing—for immediate use and consumption while they conquered the frontier world about them. This credit entered the colonies through the colonial merchants who traded with England. From the larger merchants into whose hands it first came, credit was distributed through successive trading operations to the smaller merchants, storekeepers, and shopkeepers, and thence wherever it was needed, until it had penetrated the farthest boundaries of the colonies.

An interesting aspect of this movement of credit, or capital, from England to the colonies was the absence of any conscious design in effecting it. There was no central planning board, political or otherwise, to coördinate the supply of capital with the demand for it. So long as England's economic life was dominated by mercantilist thought, there could be no calculated assistance for the colonists in developing a many-sided economic life that would result in increased competition for the merchant and manufacturer in the mother country. Capital was attracted to the colonies but supplied in the guise of credit; and it was utilized not only in the production of those commodities which colonies were expected to provide, but in the production and accumulation of a domestic supply of capital which nourished the beginnings of new industries after political independence in 1783.

Since the northern colonies lacked those preferred staple commodities which could be easily exchanged for the manufactured goods imported from England, the balance of trade tended to run strongly in favor of the Mother Country. The adverse balance of trade made debtor communities of the northern colonies and compelled their merchants to seek every possible means of settling their credit balances in England. They sent their ships out over the most diverse trade routes, searching for markets and carrying trade that would yield the profits with which to settle balances in England. The



bulk of the export trade of the northern colonies was not with England but with the West Indies, both British and foreign, with the other continental colonies, with southern Europe, and with Africa and Newfoundland.

By means of this diversified trade the northern colonies were able to liquidate accounts with English merchants. Settlement was made by remitting to England either cash, raw materials, or bills of exchange. Gold and silver coins were a common means of remittance, but the quantity of hard coin available in the colonies at any given time was seldom sufficient to pay off the unfavorable balance of trade, and other forms of remittance had to be used. Raw materials—whale oil, turpentine, skins and furs, logwood, sugar—were shipped to England in large quantities and served as direct means of remittance. Other classes of raw materials, such as corn, wheat, flour, bread, staves, pork, and live stock, all found markets in the southern colonies, the West Indies, or southern Europe and occupied a large place in colonial commerce and served indirectly to place remittances in the hands of English merchants.

The greater portion of colonial indebtedness in England was liquidated by bills of exchange which the colonial merchants purchased in the colonies or secured indirectly through their trading activities and then remitted to England. The supply of bills was dependent on the existence of available credits in England, and on the willingness or need of the owners of those credits to draw against them and then offer the bills for sale. Since the balance of trade was usually against the northern colonies, there could be no permanent and dependable source north of Maryland for the supply of bills. The most important source was in the plantation colonies, where the trade balance was more generally in favor of the colonies. The northern colonies thus became markets for the sale of bills drawn in the south, although, of course, large numbers of bills were drawn also in the north by merchants who from time to time had credit balances in England.

A considerable share of the business which English merchants carried on with the colonies was done on a commission basis, with the colonial merchants acting as factors. Even some of the more substantial colonial merchants, with an independent trade of their own, carried on a more or less extensive commission business, although their fortunes were made in private ventures. Among the smaller mer-

chants the volume of commission business done was proportionately larger. It was a type of business which was especially fitted for the lesser merchants who had no great amounts of capital of their own to invest or risk in business. It also had its advantages for the English merchant. The supply of local capital in the colonies was insufficient to support all of the business which English merchants were capable of doing and which the colonies were capable of sustaining. The commission business was therefore one means by which the English merchant was able to introduce and invest his own capital in the colonies.

The English merchants by no means confined themselves to the commission business. The bulk of the trade was carried on with independent colonial merchants who did an extensive business on their own private accounts. It is in this class of trade that the problem of credit relations enters. Both the well-established, prosperous colonial merchant and the weaker independent merchant engaged in this trade. Their profits were made in the course of an exchange of trade by which they received European goods which they sold in the colonies, and in return for which they sent to England raw materials and other forms of remittance. Capital was required for such undertakings, and much of it was furnished by the English merchants in the form of credit.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, credit relations between colonial and English merchants fashioned a framework of their own that met fairly well the needs of the time, and merits the term "system" in referring to it. Merchants on both sides of the Atlantic followed fairly definite policies in their credit dealings with each other. But since there was no conscious planning back of the system, such inherent strength as it possessed was capable of meeting only ordinary strains and crises. Whenever the commercial world suffered from depressions or major disturbances of any kind, the credit system was subjected to an additional strain which an inflexible mercantilist policy did nothing to lighten.

The credit system operated on the assumption that colonial merchants would buy in England on short-term credit and sell in the colonies for cash or on short credit. The usual term of credit was nine or twelve months, within which period a covering remittance would be expected by the English merchant. No reputable colonial merchant had any desire to stretch his credit commitments much



beyond these reasonable limits; and certainly no prudent English merchant would encourage his client to venture beyond his depth in these matters. Yet the problem of how to keep abreast of the debits on his account in England seemed to be of constant concern to the colonial merchant. The problem became increasingly vexing as the eighteenth century wore on, and after 1760 it baffled both the colonial and the English merchant much of the time.

That such unhappy situations could arise to distract both colonial and English merchants, despite the best intentions on both sides, was due partly to the natural difficulties under which trans-Atlantic trade was carried on, and partly to weaknesses in the credit structure itself. Three thousand miles of water separated North America from England, and communication between the two was slow and difficult. Business was conducted almost exclusively by correspondence. Even under the most favorable conditions, answers to letters sent to England could not be expected in the colonies until three months had elapsed, and the average wait was longer. The uncertainty and the delays to which correspondence was subjected were responsible for a good deal of the inefficiency which characterized much colonial business. Colonial merchants complained that their English correspondents failed to keep them posted as to the state of their accounts, and also as to matters of general interest in the commercial and political world. Without knowledge as to the terms on which his order for the purchase or sale of goods had been executed, the colonial merchant was obliged to act in the dark. John Hancock wrote confidentially on this subject to Barnard & Harrison in 1764: "Give us leave out of friendship just to mention that we think you are not altogether so Regular in Your answers to Letters & Sending accotts of Sales, etc. as is Expected; we have Heard many Complaints of that Sort. . . . We could not say so much, as could have wished, as there is a great Proof of it as to our own accotts."

The insufficiency of a circulating medium in the colonies was another obstacle to free and easy credit relations. The colonies suffered all through the eighteenth century from a scarcity of precious metals. Such gold and silver as they possessed at any given time was generally not enough for their own local needs; and, whatever the amount, it fell short of what was required to take care of the adverse balance of trade. The merchants' letter-books of the period contain great numbers of references to this scarcity of money, par-

ticularly to the inconveniences resulting therefrom to local trade. Thomas Moffatt, Boston merchant, wrote in 1715: "As for Trade here with us it's at p'sent at a very low Ebb mostly for want of a medium of Exg to carry it on. . . ." Another merchant, Thomas Griffith of Philadelphia, wrote in 1721: ". . . money is so Extreemly Scarce that we begin to be or rather have been for sometime pinch'd for Want of some proper medium for Currency. . . ." In 1756 Philip Cuyler of New York wrote: ". . . you Can't Conceive the Scarcity of Cash in this place."

The colonies were never able to cope very successfully with this scarcity of money. Paper bills of credit, which as a cure for the deficiency of currency came to be reckoned by both colonial and English merchants as possibly worse than the disease itself, relieved the want of a medium of exchange to some extent. But complaints of the lack of money are heard throughout the eighteenth century, before, during, and after the paper money régime. Throughout it all, the British government did practically nothing to provide the colonies with an adequate and dependable medium of exchange. The act of 1707 was meant to stabilize such currency as already existed, but it made no provision for increasing the supply of money. The acts of 1751 and 1764, which imposed much-needed restrictions on the emissions of paper money, were constructive in abolishing the worst abuses connected with the use of paper currency, but beyond that they did not go. The colonies went their way throughout the eighteenth century without constructive assistance from England in the management of their financial systems, and both colonial and English merchants suffered in their credit relations as a consequence of this defect in the British colonial policy.

The greater portion of colonial indebtedness in England was settled by bills of exchange. The very general use which the colonial merchants made of this form of remittance is attributable not only to the scarcity of gold and silver coins and to the lack of that economic diversity that would have permitted more extensive payment in kind, but also to the advantages which bills of exchange enjoyed over other forms of remittance. The danger of loss through theft, forgery, or destruction was negligible. But inconveniences of various sorts accompanied their use, and these interposed delays and uncertainties in the settlement of accounts. There were times when the high rates of exchange on bills made it cheaper to ship gold and



silver coins, if the latter were obtainable; or when the scarcity of bills left the colonial merchant without any ready means of making a remittance. Bills drawn for small amounts were almost always difficult to obtain, and bills drawn for very large sums were as difficult to dispose of. The rate of exchange for bills in the colonies showed considerable fluctuation, caused chiefly by the relation between the demand for bills and their supply, and by the effects of the depreciation of paper currency. This fluctuation produced disturbances in trade and at times had a direct bearing on the volume of remittances to England. Much more troublesome than the high cost or the scarcity of bills of exchange was their unreliability. There was wide-spread complaint over the worthlessness of bills and the delay and expense experienced before final payment was secured. Out of fifteen bills remitted in one batch to Hayley & Hopkins of London by Christopher Champlin of Newport, Rhode Island, in 1773, ten were noted for non-acceptance.

When once a colonial merchant had established credit relations with an English house, it was not difficult for him to obtain additional extensions of credit. That credit was indispensable was a fact altogether obvious to both the colonial and the English merchant. The need for it was accepted as a condition to be met rather than avoided. The English merchants therefore faced the situation frankly and provided credit in generous amounts and usually on liberal terms. Various factors and situations, however, conspired to make it difficult for the colonial merchant to discharge his debits and easy for him to allow them to accumulate. The English merchant, on the other hand, was ordinarily content to allow the debits to accumulate within reasonable limits. In a sense they represented his earnings and surplus capital, by means of which he financed and expanded his foreign trade. All this was well and good so long as the normal course of trade was not obstructed or dislocated by unexpected strokes of fate.

It must suffice to call attention to only a few of the more important factors which operated to keep the colonial merchant in debt to his correspondent in England. One of these was his propensity for overdrawing his account. There were several reasons why he might take this liberty with his English merchant. Throughout the eighteenth century, the advantageous purchase of raw materials in the colonies depended upon a supply of ready cash with which to

make the purchase. The colonial merchant as a rule did not have a large supply of cash at hand, and the only means available for securing the necessary amounts was that of drawing bills of exchange on his English merchant for whatever sums were required. These bills he then sold for cash to buyers who wished to make remittances to England. Not infrequently the colonial merchant lacked sufficient credits in England to meet the drafts. He was therefore using his foreign correspondent as a banker and was operating on borrowed capital. Precisely the same routine was followed when the colonial merchant, acting in the capacity of a local banker, drew bills on his English merchant and sold them to friends or customers in the colonies who wished to transmit sums of money safely to distant points.

It should be noted that the colonial merchants were not disposed to allow their credits in England to stand idle. They deliberately used them up, and not infrequently overdrew their accounts, or over-ordered when making purchases, with the full knowledge that their surplus would be exhausted. In other words, the profits of the colonial merchant were promptly invested in his business and not allowed to accumulate as book balances in England. This arrangement was quite satisfactory to both parties. The colonial merchant put his earnings to work as new capital, and frequently received fresh loans of capital from his creditor. The English merchant, on the other hand, was investing his capital in foreign trade through the most convenient channel at his command.

Overdrafts were sometimes inadvertent, however. The colonial merchant rarely knew exactly how his account in England stood, and he was prone to be quite sanguine in estimating the size of his credit balance. He was likewise in the dark as to the net proceeds of any consignment of goods which he shipped to England for sale or on account. Many months elapsed before he received a statement as to the disposition and proceeds of the shipment. But to him a shipment at once became the equivalent of a deposit on his merchant's books in his favor—that is, it was a credit that could be drawn against. In those cases where the shipment was sold on credit in England, the colonial merchant's draft against anticipated proceeds simply meant that he had set up the equivalent of a banking account with his foreign creditor.



The course of business, like the course of love, never did run smoothly. Errors and mistaken judgments gave rise to problems and difficulties. Brief mention of a few of the causes of complaint on the part of colonial merchants will contribute to an understanding of the problems which confronted the merchants on both sides and which, in unsettled times, complicated the credit relations between them.

The letters of colonial merchants abound in complaints of goods that did not please for one reason or another. The quality was poor, the colors unsuitable, the material too coarse, or the goods had arrived out of season. The colonial merchant was given to making comparisons between his own goods and those which his competitors received from their merchants. Any difference in favor of his competitors was promptly made the subject of complaint. Philip Cuyler of New York wrote sharply to his Liverpool merchant in 1758, complaining of unsatisfactory goods and prices and asking him if he thought him a fool or an ass. Such treatment, he declared, would bring on a discontinuance of their connection. High prices touched an especially tender spot in the colonial merchant. He was exceedingly sensitive to overcharges and to prices which gave his competitors an advantage over himself. This matter of unsatisfactory goods was related very directly to credit relations. Remittances to England depended among other things upon the regular turnover of stocks and on reasonably good profits. Poorly selected goods, or goods of inferior quality or of excessive cost, found a slow sale in the colonies; and goods which arrived after the season had to wait for the return of the market or be sold at a sacrifice.

A study of the credit relations between colonial and English merchants must view the colonial merchant not merely as the second party in a dual relationship, but also as the middle party in a trade transaction involving at least three groups of tradesmen. The colonial merchant-importer bought from firms in England and sold to retailers in the colonies. As middleman his successes and failures could not be dissociated from those of his customers in the colonies. The debtor-creditor relation existing between himself and his English correspondent was reproduced in the relations between himself and the colonial shopkeeper. The chain of cause and effect reached from the ultimate consumer in the colonies to the merchant on the other side of the Atlantic. If the consumer was unable to pay the

debts which he owed the storekeeper, the latter was unable to meet his obligations to the colonial merchant; and the colonial merchant, of course, was forced to pass the burden on to his creditor in England.

The colonial merchant was encouraged by circumstances to be generous in his extension of credit to his storekeepers and shopkeepers. When crops failed or cash became scarce, he had his choice between seeing his goods remain on the shelves, or selling them at a sacrifice for cash, or accommodating his customers by supplying them with goods on credit. In normal times the extension of credit tended to stimulate trade and commerce and in many cases was a much-appreciated accommodation. Twelve months was the common credit term taken by colonial debtors, although longer periods were not infrequent. A request for four months' credit was declared by William Pollard in 1772 to be merely an excuse for taking twelve months. The worst feature of these extensions of credit was the protracted delay in getting the money. Peter Faneuil of Boston remarked in 1737 that the shopkeepers always took twelve months and sometimes two years in making payment.

Colonial merchants found through experience, just as their merchants in England did, that obliging their customers with grants of credit was accompanied by many annoying inconveniences to themselves. So similar were the complaints and protests which such difficulties evoked that it is sometimes quite impossible to say from the tone of a letter whether it is an English merchant or a colonial merchant who is writing. The following sentence is from a letter written in 1774: "We would rather pay Interest ourselves than receive it, our situation in business requiring all the Moneys we can collect. . . ." Such a sentence might have been written at any time after 1760 by any one of a large number of English firms. Actually it appears in a letter from Stocker & Wharton, Philadelphia merchants, to Christopher Champlin of Newport, Rhode Island. Colonial merchants themselves were responsible for the consequences of their credit policies when the credit was granted voluntarily or under only slight pressure. When they tightened up their credit terms, the move was generally viewed with approbation by their merchants in England. In April 1762, Mildred & Roberts of London noted favorably the decision of Stephen Collins of Philadelphia to reduce his credit term. "We greatly commend your Intentions," they wrote, "of shortening the Time of Credit given on the Sale of your Goods



& heartily wish you Success in it for its attended with many Inconveniencys, besides a very great additional risque."

One of the worst mischiefs with which colonial merchants had to contend and for which they themselves were partly to blame was that of overstocking. Of the several factors which acted to slow up remittances to England, overstocking was one of the most certain in its operation. Surplus goods became a drug on the market, paralyzing sales and retarding remittances. The years 1772 and 1773 were especially bad in this respect, probably the worst in the history of the colonies, although the evil had made sporadic appearances in the decade 1760-1770. Instances of overstocking before 1760 appear to have been isolated events which had no prolonged important bearing on credit relations. But after 1760 overstocking was a factor which produced pernicious results, and it must be reckoned with in any treatment of credit relations.

Overstocking can not be explained by any one set of factors. In some instances it resulted from certain practices of the English merchants. The latter sometimes shipped goods that were unsuited for the colonial market because they were priced too high, or were not well chosen, or were out of season. Such merchandise cluttered up the shelves of colonial stores. At times English merchants seemed deliberately to have "dumped" goods on the colonial market. What the colonial merchant called "unsaleable goods" was frequently nothing else than goods which the English merchant had sent him without orders, expecting him to find a market for them in the colonies. In other cases overstocking resulted from errors in judgment of colonial merchants. The fault here was that of overestimating the capacity of the market to absorb goods. The colonial merchant was allowed to have his own way with his order so long as he remained in good financial standing with his English correspondents. But the whole outlook for business in the colonies could undergo a radical change in the interval between the order and the receipt of the goods. Baynton & Wharton wrote their English merchant in 1761: "We observe you intended to ship the Goods directed in the Order gave you—Which we now sincerely Wish We had reserv'd for another year, As there is no Demand for them—However if They should arrive, we must do the best we can with Them." Unforeseen developments, such as depressions and political disturbances, were likely to have very serious consequences for colonial trade.

One other qualification should be made in connection with overstocking. In 1772 and 1773 in particular the excessive quantities of European goods on hand were due not only to overexpansion on the part of the well-established colonial merchants but also to a superfluity of tradesmen in the field of merchandising, most of whom were importing goods from England. The resulting overexpansion was a condition of the whole mercantile calling rather than of any particular merchant's business. It was precipitated by a wave of speculation which swept over the European commercial world in those years and which brought forth a reckless liberality in the extension of credit. There are many references in the letters of colonial merchants during these years to the "huge supplies" of goods on hand.

So long as the colonial world was free from disturbances which might upset its commercial balance, the course of credit relations tended to run smoothly and evenly. From time to time, however, the equilibrium of the credit structure was disturbed by defects in England's colonial policy and by unlooked-for interruptions in the commercial world. Such adverse conditions and events as depressions, shortages in the currency supply, crop failures, restrictions on trading activities as those imposed by the Sugar Act of 1764, wars, and non-importation agreements, all subjected credit relations to unusual strains. Under these burdens the colonial merchants encountered difficulties in meeting their obligations, and their English creditors, especially after 1760, were often sorely distressed over the state of their investments in the colonies. Perhaps the classic example of a troubled debtor and a harried creditor is that of Aaron Lopez of Newport, Rhode Island, and Henry Cruger, Jr. of Bristol. In 1766 Cruger's books showed a debit balance against Lopez of £10,784.8.4, and he was sending eloquent ultimatums to Lopez for remittances. In 1772 the burdensome account had been reduced to £2,452.15.11, exclusive of interest, but Cruger was still pleading desperately for a final settlement of the account. "Do, good Sir!", he wrote, "contrive to pay me off this fatal ballance."

There was a danger that the colonial merchant-importer would emerge from this account of his credit affairs as little more than a tradesman who was almost perennially in debt to his merchant in England. Such an impression would obscure the picture of a wealthy country across the sea supplying needed capital to a pioneer country through the medium of local merchants. The colonial merchant was



unconsciously performing the service of tapping, through his own debts in England, the credit reserves of the Mother Country. Viewed only as a merchant, he was in debt to his English correspondent. Viewed as a banker-merchant, he was floating loans in England for the development of a country that had as yet little capital of its own. Since the Mother Country provided no imperial banking system, it was only through the colonial merchants that capital from England was able to enter the colonies and ultimately reach all those regions where capital was needed. The colonial merchant was more than a tradesman in debt. He was a social agent engaged in moving capital from a creditor region to a pioneer region.

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The study has been based largely on the letter-books and miscellaneous commercial papers of merchants in the northern colonies. The merchant south of Mason and Dixon's Line does not come within the purview of the study. This material, taken as a whole, is broadly representative of the colonial period of the eighteenth century and of the important commercial centers of the northern colonies. Certain letter-books and papers deserve citation. The *Papers of Stephen Collins & Son* of Philadelphia in the Library of Congress, were particularly useful. They comprise fifty-six volumes of material and extend over the period 1758-1838. The letter-books of Thomas Fitch of Boston and William Pollard of Philadelphia, found respectively at the Massachusetts Historical Society and the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, throw considerable light on mercantile transactions of the time. The former collection covers the years 1723-1734 and the latter extends over the period March 2, 1772 to July 20, 1774. Other useful collections were: the *Samuel P. Savage Papers* from Boston, two volumes of which cover the long period 1702-1829; the letter-books of Samuel Powell, Jr. of Philadelphia, two of which cover the periods January 5, 1740 to August 25, 1746 and September 3, 1746 to September 11, 1747; the letter-book of Thomas Moffatt of Boston, extending over the period February 8, 1715 to October 22, 1716; the letter-book of Thomas Hancock, the miscellaneous Hancock papers relating to the mercantile affairs of both Thomas and John Hancock; and the well-known collections of letters published in two volumes by the Massachusetts Historical Society under the title *Commerce of Rhode Island*. A considerable amount of correspondence

from the English merchants themselves has also been utilized. This material, however, is restricted to letters written to a very few colonial firms and does not give a comprehensive view of relations between English merchants and their colonial customers. Until access has been had to the letter-books and general files of the English merchants, the colonial side of these credit relations will remain more fully developed than the English side.



## ANGLO-SPANISH COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, 1700-1750\*

By JAMES HAMILTON ST. JOHN

The chief purposes of this study are to present a connected account of commercial relations between Great Britain and Spain during the first half of the eighteenth century, to treat the subject from the standpoint of its connection with British history as a whole, and to indicate particularly the importance to Great Britain of the Spanish trade proper, the complications that ensued from various British attempts to exploit the commercial possibilities of Spanish America, and the influence of commercial considerations in helping to determine at critical moments British policy toward Spain.

The period was chosen because it marks a well-defined epoch in the history of Anglo-Spanish relations. In the generation just before 1700, during the reign of Charles II of Spain, England had been enjoying a fairly peaceful and very profitable trade not only with Old Spain itself but also with some parts of Spanish America. The flourishing American trade was made possible by the comparative supineness of the Spanish colonial administration at that time. The death of Charles II without direct heirs in 1700, followed as it was by the War of the Spanish Succession, ultimately delivered the throne of Spain and the Spanish Indies into the hands of the French prince, Philip V, and his successors, whose ideas were different from, and more aggressive than those of the last sluggish Hapsburg. At the same time, the treaty of peace gave England the famous *Asiento* or contract for supplying Spanish America with negro slaves.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the years following the Peace of Utrecht were troubled. Friction between England and Spain soon became chronic, no small part of it being due to commercial difficulties, which accumulated with alarming rapidity. After two minor conflicts, in 1718 and in 1727, the climax came

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Winfred T. Root

in 1739 with the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear, which soon merged with the greater War of the Austrian Succession. As one of the results of this struggle, British commercial relations with Spain were once more readjusted, and the period that had begun in 1700 with the death of Charles II came to a natural end in 1750 when England formally relinquished the Asiento.

Two sets of earlier developments—traditions and treaties—have to be considered as a prelude to understanding Anglo-Spanish commercial relations during the eighteenth century; for the roots of the War of Jenkins' Ear extend back in English history at least as deeply as the reigns of Mary Tudor and Elizabeth. The normal, legitimate commerce between England and Old Spain in the time of Sir Robert Walpole was conducted on the basis of treaties made during the seventeenth century.

The threat of Spanish domination that emanated from the looming figure of Mary Tudor's husband and Elizabeth's suitor, Philip II of Spain, the horrors of the Marian persecutions, and the nerve-racking crisis of the Armada, all combined to create in England a tradition of national hostility to Spain and of bitter antipathy toward Spain's religion, the Roman Catholic faith. This tradition could not create a war of itself, to be sure. But it formed a dormant part of the national consciousness of the English people for at least two centuries, and was appealed to by partisan politicians or chauvinistic demagogues in every crisis between 1700 and 1750. Its existence made the task of Sir Robert Walpole and those who worked for the maintenance of friendly commercial relations with Spain many times more difficult than it would otherwise have been. The exploits of the Hawkinses, Sir Francis Drake, and their many compeers, also infused the minds of Englishmen with the conviction that war with Spain was not only necessary and natural but positively desirable as a paying commercial proposition—a conviction that was confirmed and deepened during subsequent generations by the victories of Cromwell's captains and the successful plundering expeditions of Sir Henry Morgan and other buccaneers. This tradition, also, was invoked in every crisis of the eighteenth century, blinding the British public to the real issues then at stake, and hampering the ministry in its efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement of conflicting commercial claims. One writer of 1741, for example, even went so far as to cite an imposing array of figures to prove that England had already made



a national profit of £1,005,400 from its captures of Spanish shipping since the outbreak of war with Spain in 1739.

Besides giving rise to traditions of national hostility and greedy belligerency, the reign of Elizabeth had more practical results. The victories of the Elizabethan seamen broke the shell of protection with which Spain had tried to surround her possessions in the New World, and encouraged subsequent generations of Englishmen to challenge Spain's monopolistic claims by trading, whether peacefully or forcibly, with Spanish America. Elizabeth's attitude in countenancing privateering while ostensibly at peace with Philip created the impression that whatever might be the situation in Europe all was fair in the Caribbean. And in contrast to these tendencies, the defeat of the Armada, by freeing England from fear of Spain, prepared the way for the resumption of the friendly commercial intercourse between England and Old Spain that was needed by both nations.

James I lost no time in bringing common sense to bear on the policy. On August 19, 1604, he swore to observe a treaty of peace and commerce with Spain and the Spanish Netherlands. This restored peace and made a beginning on the working out of provisions under which Englishmen might live and trade peacefully in Spain or Spaniards in England. Nothing was said, however, about commerce with Spanish America, because Spain would not sanction it as legal and England would not promise to give up carrying it on illegally. In 1645, by royal *cedulas* dated March 19, June 26, and November 9, Philip IV granted to the English "nation" in Spain the special privilege of choosing and paying a judge conservator of its own, to have cognizance of all lawsuits arising between English merchants in Spain and of all other cases in which English merchants were defendants.

These *cedulas* were confirmed by the highly important treaty of Madrid, signed May 13/23, 1667, which reestablished ordinary commercial relations between England and Spain after the rupture arising from the Cromwellian war and was destined to serve as the basis of normal Anglo-Spanish commerce for more than a century. The negotiators of this treaty, Edward Montagu, first Earl of Sandwich, and William Godolphin, worked out with painstaking care such stipulations that English merchants and their families might live and trade in alien Spain and still be safeguarded in their lives,

their personal liberty, the peaceful exercise of their religion, the handling of their merchandise and other property, the execution of their contracts, and the enjoyment of their special privileges, such as that of the judge conservator. A real "most favored nation" clause also inserted in this treaty, was a means of insuring England's Spanish trade against the encroachments of any other country in the future. Finally, on July 8/18, 1670, Godolphin signed a supplementary treaty by which the pacification of 1667 was definitely extended to America and all commerce between English and Spanish subjects in America was strictly forbidden, except in case of the granting of such a contract as the Asiento. With this "American" treaty of 1670, the groundwork of England's commercial dealings with Spain in the eighteenth century was completed.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Englishmen were profiting by their economic relations with Spaniards in a number of ways. First and foremost, there was the Spanish trade proper, or the legitimate commerce between England and Old Spain, which was being fostered and protected by the treaties just described. Besides buying many commodities of minor importance, such as lead, tin, tobacco, and leather, Spain was one of England's best markets for her two outstanding staple products, woolen goods—particularly bays and says—and fish. In return, Spain was able to supply wines, fruits, and other consumption goods, raw iron, salt, for the return cargoes of the fishing boats, and several commodities essential to the English woolen manufacture, such as fine Spanish wool, olive oil and barilla or soda for making soap, cochineal, indigo, and other dyes. Many of the English imports from Spain were thus raw materials to be used in the home manufactures, and were valued accordingly. But what endeared the Spanish trade especially to English merchants and statesmen alike was the fact that Spain always had to pay for most of the English goods she imported with her own most plentiful commodities, the gold and silver from her colonies. With the bullionist theory of wealth generally accepted in England, which had then no means of obtaining the precious metals except her foreign commerce, it is no wonder that English pamphleteers lauded the Spanish trade as "the Darling, and Silver Mine of *England*," or that English statesmen were up in arms when the ambitions of Louis XIV seemed to threaten the continuance of this happy state of affairs.



The Spanish import duties on English woolens, though nominally high—approximately 25 per cent, *ad valorem*—were reduced so much in practice at this time by a system of *gratias* or abatements and by favorable valuations, that they actually amounted to less than 10 per cent, and profits of 20 per cent in the Spanish trade were not unusual. Many of the English merchants in Spain stretched their profits to still larger figures by employing Spanish factors and shipping goods in their names by the galleons and the flotas to Spanish America, where much higher prices could be commanded. This method of trade was strictly forbidden by the laws of Spain, which sought to restrict the benefits of her colonial trade wholly to Spaniards. It was widely practiced, however, by English, French, and Dutch alike, and in general was successful.

The highest profits, from dealings with the Spaniards—sometimes as high as "*Cent per Cent*, all paid for in Bullion"—were being secured at this time by the enterprising sloop traders of Jamaica and Barbados. These ignored laws, treaties, and dangers with equal hardihood, took a voyage of six hundred miles in search of a market as a matter of course, slipped by the Spanish *guarda costas* at every opportunity, and sold negroes, dry goods, flour, and other provisions to the inhabitants of Spanish America. This sloop trade, illicit though it was, had been especially flourishing since the beginning of William III's reign, when some Spanish grandees had been allowed to establish an Asiento factory at Jamaica. It continued throughout the period of this study, and was one of the most vexing obstacles in the way of maintaining friendly relations between Spain and England.

Another source of constant friction was to be found in the activities of the English logwood-cutters in the bays of Campeche and Honduras. These reckless but determined settlers were deliberately poaching one of Spain's valuable colonial commodities; they had supplied the English clothiers with so much of this useful dyewood that the price had fallen from £100 per ton in 1660 to £15 per ton in 1700. They were almost always mentioned when claims and accusations were being exchanged between the two countries.

Such was the general status of commercial relations between England and Spain in 1700, when the death of the Hapsburg Charles II focused the eyes of European statesmen on Louis XIV of France in hopeful or fearful suspense. England's motives for entering the

war that finally ensued were admittedly many and varied. But they undoubtedly included a very real belief, first, that with a French prince on her throne Spain would adopt French fashions, reserve her fine wool for the French manufacturers alone, raise a prohibitive customs barrier against English woolen goods and fish, and practically freeze England out of the market she valued so highly; and secondly, that if France once got possession of the Spanish West Indies she would be able to monopolize their commerce much more exclusively than Spain had ever done. France would probably interfere seriously with the English plantation trade, and perhaps with the plantations themselves, and would become an invincible force in the affairs of Europe through her control of the Spanish bullion supply. Pamphlet after pamphlet strove to impress these points upon the receptive mind of the English public, starting the moment the news of Charles II's death reached London, and both points were mentioned explicitly in Article 8 of William III's Grand Alliance, signed September 7, 1701, N. S.

Queen Anne's declaration of war against France and Spain, dated May 4, 1702, contained the usual prohibition of all correspondence or communication with the enemy countries. This prohibition was not removed as against Old Spain until the beginning of 1705, when the possession of Gibraltar and the prospect of military successes in Catalonia and along the Portuguese frontier led England to reverse this policy in the hope of reviving the Spanish commerce. In the fall of 1705 the Duke of Anjou himself issued a declaration opening all the ports of Spain and the Canaries to commerce carried in Spanish or neutral shipping, and during the latter part of the war a very considerable trade was carried on between England and even the hostile parts of Spain by mutual agreement between the courts of London and Madrid. Both issued passes protecting the vessels engaged in this trade from its own ships of war and privateers. The English merchants used either Spanish vessels or heavily armed galleys for the bulk of this commerce. In spite of official encouragement, however, the volume of the Spanish trade during the war fell deplorably short of peacetime standards. The depression was felt especially by the English clothiers, through the loss of their usual markets and the failure of their regular supplies of cochineal.

The reopening of what had hitherto been illicit commerce with the Spaniards in America, except in stores of war, ammunition, and



enumerated goods, was sanctioned by the English government as early as February, 1704. This trade was reopened because of the representations of the Jamaicans, who had been the chief participants in the clandestine sloop trade before the war, because the Dutch had already set the example, and because the Spanish Indies had turned a cold shoulder to England's ally, the Austrian archduke, "Charles III," and were coming more and more under the control of the French. The Jamaicans, promptly taking full advantage of this permission, vigorously prosecuted their trade with Spanish America during the remainder of the war. They complained bitterly when the raids of privateers from their own island interfered with the success of their business dealings. They took as a matter of course the commercial rivalry of the Dutch and the hostile activities of French privateers and Spanish *guarda costas*. They also did their best to meet the business competition of the French, who held the Asiento from 1701 to 1711 and were flooding the Spanish Indies with large importations of negroes and European goods. The Jamaica sloop traders met their many difficulties and handicaps quite successfully. Several reputable writers estimated that during the last half of the war they drew between £200,000 and £250,000 annually from their traffic with Spanish America.

When peace came to be made at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the treaties of commerce with France and Spain aroused a widespread storm of protest and opposition. Some of it was due to political or personal factionalism, but much was based on a real concern for the maintenance of sound economic principles and for the continued welfare of Britain's trade. Two famous periodicals—the *Mercator*, which defended the treaties and the ministry; and the *British Merchant*, which attacked them—bore leading parts in the public discussion, which was carried on also through pamphlets, petitions to Parliament, hearings before the Board of Trade, and numerous other channels of expression. The Parliamentary bill giving effect to the French treaty was defeated in the House of Commons—largely because the treaty was a dangerous departure from the principles of mercantilism by placing French consumption goods on too favorable a footing in England and partly because the lowering of the duty on French wines would have injured the British trade with Spain and Portugal. The treaty of commerce with Spain, signed at Utrecht November 28/December 9, 1713, after repeated careful con-

sultations between the Board of Trade and the leading "Spanish merchants," and modified by three "explanatory articles" of February, 1713/4, as parts of the instrument of ratification, was attacked principally on two points. Its opponents maintained that profitable commerce with Spain would be impossible under its terms, since the new basic duty of ten per cent on imports and exports as an intended improvement over the complicated old system of *gratias*, did not include the Spanish excises—the *alcabalas*, *cientos*, and *millónes*. They also argued that the negotiators of this treaty had made a vital mistake in giving up the "absolutely necessary" privilege of the judge conservator. The upshot of the whole agitation was that the merchants got exactly what they wanted. On December 3/14, 1715, George Bubb signed at Madrid a new commercial treaty with Spain, by which the Spanish trade of England was completely restored from the "good old days" of Charles II. Nor was this status of affairs materially altered during the remainder of the half-century.

The peace settlement of 1713 also brought to England the far-famed Asiento. A similar contract had been held at one time by the Genoese, more recently by the Portuguese, and during the War of the Spanish Succession by the French Guinea Company. The British Asiento, signed by Philip V at Madrid on March 26, 1713, N. S., and later assigned by Queen Anne to the British South Sea Company, was to run for a period of thirty years, beginning May 1, 1713. Only three of its forty-two detailed articles may be noted in this brief summary: it granted to the South Sea or Asiento Company a complete monopoly of the negro trade of Spanish America; it made the King of Spain a one-fourth partner in the undertaking; and it stipulated that in case of a declaration of war between Spain and Great Britain, though the Asiento was to be suspended, the asientists were to have eighteen months in which to remove themselves and their effects from Spanish territory. In general, it may be remarked that Spain's habitual attitude of extreme jealousy in safeguarding her colonies from foreign influence or interference led to the insertion of so many conditions and restrictions in this contract that it was a very difficult business agreement to carry out. Even the "Additional Article," which gave the Asiento Company each year the unique privilege of sending one ship of five hundred tons, laden with general merchandise, to trade in the Spanish West In-



dies, was granted by the King of Spain with the frank admission that all previous holders of Asientos had lost money on their ventures. Even this compensatory privilege was hedged about with deadening conditions and provisos. The outlook for the South Sea Company, as holder of the British Asiento, was not bright.

Up to May 15/26, 1716, when a convention for explaining the terms of the Asiento was concluded at Madrid by George Bubb, no annual ship had yet been despatched. The South Sea Company was forced to unload at an alleged loss in the British colonies the negroes it had brought up to satisfy the Asiento quota for the year 1713-1714, since the Spanish colonial officials had refused to permit their sale in Spanish America on the ground that peace had not yet been proclaimed there. In consideration of these facts, the convention of 1716 shifted the beginning date of the Asiento from May 1, 1713 to May 1, 1714 and provided that for the next ten years the annual ship might have a burden of 650 instead of 500 tons. This was to compensate the Company for the 1500 tons of goods not shipped during the three years 1714, 1715, and 1716. The attitude of mutual dissatisfaction, distrust, and suspicion engendered by this untoward beginning soon became the normal relationship between the Asiento Company and the Spanish authorities. Instead of enriching the Company with splendid profits from the commercial exploitation of Spanish America, the English Asiento proved to be little more than a trouble-breeder between Great Britain and Spain, and a source of constant friction between the South Sea Company and the Jamaica sloop traders, who were far too independent to acquiesce meekly in the Company's treaty-given monopoly.

Up to this point, the development of Anglo-Spanish commercial relations as they existed between 1700 and 1750 has been treated chronologically, as the best means of presenting the various factors concerned, their origins, and their distinctive characteristics. The remainder of the discussion, to combine clearness with brevity, will have to take the form of an analytical summary.

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It is evident that the War of the Spanish Succession, together with the peace settlement at its close, affected the commercial relations between England and Spain in three ways. The normal, legitimate British commerce with Old Spain was finally reinstated under the new French king, Philip V, on the same favorable terms that

had obtained under the last Hapsburg, Charles II. The illegal, treaty-defying sloop trade of Jamaica, after suffering a brief check when all intercourse with Spaniards was prohibited at the beginning of the war, ultimately received a fresh stimulus through actual official encouragement during the later years of the conflict. And, the British Asiento, held by the South Sea Company, was added to complicate the already dangerous situation in the lawless Caribbean.

Under the fostering influence of the treaty of 1715, which renewed the basic commercial treaties of the seventeenth century, the Spanish trade proper soon regained in Great Britain the outstanding prestige enjoyed previous to 1700. It continued to be valued very highly by British merchants, manufacturers, statesmen, and publicists throughout the period of this study. Although the swing toward French fashions foreseen by the pamphleteers of 1700 caused some falling off in the demand for British woolens, the competition of French-made goods in general was an ever-present factor and always hard to meet. Even Spain herself, imbued with new life by the energetic Bourbons, showed some signs of an industrial awakening.

The complementary nature of the commerce with Spain, and its value in supplying Great Britain with many essential commodities that she could not produce herself, were evidenced on many occasions and in a variety of interesting ways. When the Spanish *Flotilla* was wrecked in 1716 in the Gulf of Florida on its return voyage, and Europe's usual supply of cochineal failed to arrive, the woolen interests of southern England rushed through Parliament a bill freeing the importation of cochineal temporarily from the restrictions of the Acts of Trade. This bill was to prevent their "losing the Trade of several great Branches" of the woolen industry, which was using cochineal exclusively for dyeing "into Grain Colours." Whenever the unstable mixture of conflicting Anglo-Spanish claims and policies seemed on the verge of a warlike explosion, as in 1726, British vintners hastened to lay in an extra stock of Spanish wines, dyers bought up emergency supplies of cochineal, indigo, and other dye-stuffs. They hoped thereby to retain their custom by working as cheaply as in times of peace. The country clothiers sent in special orders to their Spanish correspondents in an effort to anticipate their needs of olive oil for their carders and combers and of Spanish wool for their fine cloths.



During the War of the Austrian Succession the usual prohibition of intercourse with enemy countries was enforced as a matter of general policy. The ministry then granted without demur a request from the House of Commons that this prohibition be removed so far as it applied to "Wool and Barilla" of the growth or produce of Old Spain or the Canaries. Many groups of clothiers also complained of the excessively high price of olive oil since the war with Spain had begun; but the opposition of London and Bristol merchants who were working up a good trade in this commodity with Italy prevented any legislation for their relief. The British desire for the resumption of trade with Spain during this war was strong. The Commons therefore asked the King on February 24, 1746/7, to remove the ban on commerce with Spain as soon as he had reason to believe that Spain would do the same for Great Britain. But Spain took no action to make such a mutual agreement possible.

At the end of the war, Article III of the definitive treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, dated October 7/18, 1748, prescribed the terms on which commerce between England and Spain was to be restored by reinstating the discarded treaties of Utrecht. This article was attacked at once, on the same grounds that had been advanced against the treaty of 1713, with the result that a separate treaty between Great Britain and Spain was signed at Madrid on October 5, 1750, N. S. By repeating almost verbatim all the chief provisions of the treaty of 1715, this treaty of 1750 once more revived the traditional stipulations of the seventeenth century Anglo-Spanish commerce, and thus restored Britain's Spanish trade to the favorable status of 1700, at the death of the Hapsburg Charles II. The "Spanish merchants" of Great Britain could once more resume that profitable interchange of goods which always resulted in relieving Spain of much of her fascinating burden of bullion.

The experience of the South Sea Company with the Asiento was so unfortunate that by the early 1730's both the Company and the King of Spain had become thoroughly disgusted with their partnership. By that time the Company had lost, through Spanish seizures of its property in 1718 and 1726 in violation of the contract, a sum that British writers of 1739 asserted had been estimated by the Spanish courts themselves at more than 1,500,000 Spanish dollars or £340,000 sterling. It was required to pay duties on 4,000 negroes per year at Madrid, but had been able to import into Spanish

America little more than half that number. Its opponents sometimes alleged that it had lost money even on the negroes it had sold. The Company had been unable to send out "annual ships" with any approach to regularity; and, except for the last two voyages, was seemingly a loser even by this privilege, intended by the King of Spain to indemnify it for its probable losses in handling negroes.

The Company's directors themselves had hampered its operations by their personal dissensions, and many of its servants in Spanish America had proved to be incapable, dishonest, and disloyal. The Company complained of untimely embargoes or exorbitant port-charges on its ships; of interference with its vessels by Spanish *guarda costas*; of the unlawful importation of large numbers of negroes into various parts of Spanish America by the French and others, partly with the connivance of the royal officers; and of other improper actions on the part of Spanish colonial officials that had prevented it from importing and selling its prescribed number of negroes. It even charged the King of Spain himself with partial responsibility for its failure, asserting that on several occasions he had refused to issue the requisite license for its annual ship, and that at other times he had allowed rich cargoes to rot or feed the moths in the warehouses of tropical America when the regular Spanish fleets had not sailed and no fairs had been held.

The Spaniards, on their part, complained that the Company had fallen down on its contract by failing to provide their colonies with the required number of slaves; that both the Company and its employees as individuals had abused their contractual privileges in Spanish America by carrying on illicit, clandestine trade in commodities other than negroes; that the Company had developed the pernicious practice of sending several smaller vessels as tenders to refill the hold of its annual ship by night as fast as its cargo was sold, so that its supposed burden of five hundred tons had been multiplied many times over; and that normal business in Spanish-American ports suffered a severe slump whenever an annual ship arrived, since the local merchants, who procured their goods through the galleons or the flotas, could not compete with the Asiento Company, whose annual ships did not have to pay the royal *indultos* levied on all other colonial commerce.

The Company's last annual ship, the *Royal Caroline*, returned to England in 1737 and it was discovered that she had made a profit.



The Spanish King's prompt demand that he be paid his share of this profit although he had never borne his share in the Company's losses, was one of the factors that precipitated the crisis between Spain and Great Britain in 1739. As has been stated, the treaty of 1750 finally cancelled the British Asiento and the King of Spain undertaking to pay the Company £100,000 in full settlement of all reciprocal claims and obligations.

While the South Sea Company was struggling unsuccessfully to realize the rich gains that were popularly supposed to accrue to the holder of the Asiento, the daring sloop traders of Jamaica were doing their impudent best to discount the intrusion of this new factor in the affairs of the Caribbean, and to retain for themselves the full benefits of the illegal commercial connections they had already built up in Spanish America. They violated the legal monopoly conferred by the Asiento upon the South Sea Company with the same cheerful recklessness they had always shown in ignoring the treaty of 1670, which forbade all commerce between Spaniards and Englishmen in America. From their viewpoint, the granting of the British Asiento meant merely that they would now have to trick or fight both the Company and the Spanish authorities, instead of continuing their old, familiar duel with the *guarda costas* alone. Though the Company established an agency at Jamaica, and though public opinion in the island was divided as to whether this was or was not an advantage to the local inhabitants, the loudest and most energetic faction was always that of the sloop traders, who maintained that they were the real source and mainstay of the island's prosperity.

The real importance of the Jamaica sloop trade in this discussion lies, however, not so much in the rights or wrongs of its feud with the South Sea Company as in the effects it had upon the general relations between Spain and Great Britain. These effects were twofold. In the first place Spain would always have good reason for irritation, indignation, and suspicion, and her diplomatic relations with Great Britain could not be really cordial, friendly, or secure—especially with Bourbons on the Spanish throne. Such relations continued as long as a large and influential group of Jamaicans infringed Spain's cherished monopoly of her colonial trade, defied laws, treaties, and *guarda costas* with impartial contempt and used whatever blend of force and fraud their occasions might require, as long as the English did not fulfill its treaty obligations and suppress them. The

only move the British ministers made toward satisfying Spain's repeated demands for the suppression of this unlawful trade was their promise, a joint declaration of February 8, 1732, N. S., that British colonial governors should not authorize or encourage it, nor British ships of war protect it. Since the Jamaicans armed their own sloops and defied their own governors when necessary, this promise meant, really, nothing. In the second place, the activities of British subjects in carrying on illegal trade with Spanish America led to reprisals and counter-offensives by Spain, and these in turn inflamed the minds of Britons against the authors of the reported outrages, so that it was always easy for the Opposition to arouse the old, latent hostility to everything Spanish and the old desire for quick, fabulous gains through privateering.

Reprisals against those actually engaged in illicit trading were to be expected, and drew public attention only when accompanied by alleged "Spanish barbarities." But it was quite another thing when the inhabitants of the British island plantations complained that Spanish *guarda costas* and privateers were interfering with the legitimate commerce of the British colonies and were even daring at times to land plundering expeditions on British colonial soil. The tide of these complaints began to flow, almost imperceptibly, in the years immediately following the Peace of Utrecht, and reached its flood in 1738-1739, when the Opposition leaders took skillful advantage of its accumulated momentum in their attack on the pacific policy of Sir Robert Walpole. In the meantime, the failure of Spain's efforts to maintain the sanctity of her American preserves in any other way had induced her to advance, early in 1738, what amounted to a claim to prescribe the courses to be followed by British shipping in American waters—to search all craft caught wandering from these courses, and to seize all vessels in which cocoanuts, logwood, or pieces of eight might be found. She contended, rather unreasonably, that the possession of any of these commodities constituted *ipso facto* proof of illicit trade. Spain thus donated another effective weapon to the already large arsenal of the Opposition, whose orators used with telling effect the attractive slogan, "No Search." While no complete analysis of the causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear, to which the crisis of 1739 led, can even be attempted here, it is evident that the Jamaica sloop trade contributed, either directly or indirectly, several factors that had very great importance at that critical time.



By way of conclusion, it may fairly be said that Anglo-Spanish commercial relations of one sort or another exercised a distinct and considerable influence upon the history of Great Britain between 1700 and 1750. In general, the reachings of illicit traders for unlawful gains and the friction between the South Sea Company and the Spanish Crown tended to stir up antagonism between the two countries concerned; while the legitimate commerce between Great Britain and Old Spain drew them toward each other through the force of mutual advantage. This trade could always command the respectful attention of British statesmen because in actual operation their ideal conception of what Britain's foreign trade should be was realized.

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This study is based on materials available in this country, most of them British in their origin, but nevertheless sufficient in volume and scope to insure a proper understanding of the elements involved and reasonable certainty in the general conclusions reached. The sources consulted include several official collections of treaties; published official records such as the *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, *Colonial Series*, the *British Calendar of State Papers*, in its various series, the *Journals of the House of Commons*, the *Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España*, and other similar works; and authoritative longhand transcriptions of other official records, such as the transcripts of the journals and papers of the British Board of Trade in the library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia. A special effort has also been made to locate and use more extensively than has hitherto been done the voluminous descriptive and controversial contemporary pamphlet literature dealing either directly or indirectly with Anglo-Spanish commercial relations. In the furtherance of this effort, Professor Edwin R. A. Seligman generously offered the use of his wonderful collection, now in the hands of Columbia University, which includes an almost unique complete copy of the *Mercator*. The Library of Congress likewise extended its usual splendid facilities. Though the statements of pamphleteers and descriptive writers had to be treated with considerable caution, they were invaluable in explaining the psychological background of the period, while at the same time they furnished a wealth of illustrative detail and "atmosphere."

# THE EDUCATIONAL POLICY OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH PRIOR TO 1860\*

By FRANCIS IRELAND MOATS

Secular education by the Christian churches in America has received much less attention by students than have the religious activities of the various denominations. In the Methodist Church some histories of individual educational institutions have been written and one valuable work, *The Early Schools of Methodism*, by the Reverend A. W. Cummings, contains short sketches of many early schools of Methodism.

The aim of the study is to trace the progress of the denomination in overcoming the ever present obstacles to an educational program. The membership of the Methodists was composed largely of the less educated classes and the first great problem was to arouse within the church itself a desire for intellectual improvement.

Like other new religious sects with a special evangelistic note the early Methodists made an appeal to the downtrodden masses in England which the older sects ignored. Though at first attempting to preach his democratic doctrines through the pulpits of the Established Church, John Wesley quickly abandoned the plan as hopeless and recruited men with religious zeal but without the customary intellectual training common to those of the cloth. With a remarkable capacity for organization and with tireless energy, the new religious leader with a devoted group of followers was soon to stir all England and then to reach out to the New World.

Organized Methodism had its beginnings in the United States in 1766 when a class was formed in New York City under the leadership of Philip Embury and Barbara Heck. Within a year Robert Strawbridge was establishing Methodism in Maryland. From these two points the new church was to be extended into the New World.

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Louis Pelzer



Regular preachers were sent by Wesley in 1768 to minister to the new classes. In 1771 came Francis Asbury, the great circuit rider, who was to be the guiding force in determining the character of Methodism in America for almost forty-five years.

From the date of Asbury's arrival the rise of Methodism was rapid. The membership approached five thousand in 1776 and, in spite of the hostility to them from the charge of Toryism, they numbered almost 14,000 in 1783 of whom almost ninety per cent resided south of the Mason and Dixon line. The impetus given to the new denomination by the formation of a distinctly American church in 1784 resulted in a rapid increase in numbers and by 1800 the membership exceeded 65,000.

From its beginning in America the new church was primarily a frontier organization. Its peculiar doctrines and methods of appeal were particularly effective among the frontiersmen. When the great westward movement began, Methodists were in the vanguard and soon after 1800 had outstripped all others in their work of evangelizing the new settlements. Membership increased at an unprecedented rate. By 1810 it had reached 175,000 and 476,000 in 1830. When the schism came in 1844, it had grown to 1,171,000 of whom fully one-half were west of the mountains.

Methodism had become the most numerous religious sect in the United States by 1845. The nearest competitor, the Baptists, numbered 650,000, while the Presbyterians and Congregationalists trailed with memberships of 350,000 and 202,250. Even greater than the disparity in total membership was the tremendous preponderance of Methodists in the Mississippi Valley, where it is probable that from 1840 to 1845 they could claim a membership equal to, or even greater than, all other denominations combined.

The Methodists had made this remarkable record in the face of competition with the older and well established denominations. The Congregational church had grown up with New England while the Episcopal church was equally well established in the South. The Presbyterians, always with a following in New England, gained much from the Scotch-Irish immigration and when the Revolution broke in 1775 it had a strong intellectual leadership throughout the colonies. The Baptists, late in the field, were appealing to the poorer classes and were strongly intrenched in many sections of the back country when Methodism made its appearance.

In 1801, by an agreement for mutual interests, the Congregationalists abandoned the West in favor of their more aggressive allies, the Presbyterians, and for forty years the Congregationalists confined their efforts to New England. Their mission was not to be frontier evangelization. The Episcopalians had received a blow from the Revolution from which they did not quickly recover. With its organization disrupted, its source of revenue cut off, and with little spiritual vitality this church was in no position after the Revolution to bend to a great task of evangelization on the frontier.

The Presbyterians, with an intellectual predominance outside of New England, were first in the field in the New West, but were appalled at the religious excesses in the great camp meetings. Torn by dissension regarding the classical education as a qualification for the ministry on the frontier and by doctrinal controversy, they were unable, with their insistence on a doctrine of limited salvation that was ill-suited to extreme democracy, to appeal to the great mass of illiterate frontiersmen. The Baptists, full of spiritual vigor, had the zeal of the Methodists but lacked in organization and administration. Insurmountable demands arose from scattered stations and funds were scarce. But to such obstacles the Baptists added the impossible condition of self support for their gospel emissaries. Calvinistic though they were, yet little emphasis was placed by them on the peculiar tenets of that religious leader. However, their insistence on immersion as the only true method of baptism served to limit their effectiveness even in the illiterate West.

Circuit riding became a peculiar characteristic of the Methodists. The circuit rider sought out the scattered settlements and no community was too small to be overlooked. Like the Jesuit of an earlier period, he was as much at home when preaching to a half dozen as to a large assembly in the camp meeting. Log cabins, public buildings, or the camp meeting served for his sanctuary. He was accustomed to the hardships of the frontier and bore them without a murmur.

The superior organization of the Methodists was peculiarly adapted to the sparsely settled areas. Circuits, districts, and conferences were moulded into an harmonious whole. As the circuit rider advanced he left behind him a chain of stations. No community was too small for his ministrations. The circuit rider was familiar to all communities. The preachers were largely frontiersmen well suited



to the hardships so much a part of western life. Few of them were schooled in the classics and fewer still were schooled in theology. The *Methodist Discipline* was his guide on questions of doctrine. Of the two hundred and eighty Methodist preachers in the West in 1820, Peter Cartwright relates that not one had a literary education. Educated men could not have been obtained for the frontier, but had they been available, it is doubtful whether they could have been effective in establishing contact with the frontiersmen. The unlettered Methodists utilized the camp meeting to win whole communities while college trained Presbyterians were making their appeal to the more cultured few. "The illiterate Methodist preachers set the western world afire," declared Peter Cartwright, "while the other denominations were lighting their matches." Methodist organization, the circuit rider, the drafting of the zealous frontiersmen as preachers, and the extensive use of the camp meeting to reach large groups—all these factors had contributed to give the denomination its overwhelming rank in numbers.

While Methodism had drawn in great numbers, it had made little appeal to the more cultured classes. The great emotionalism and religious excesses engendered by the unlettered western preachers made little appeal to the more cultured few. And, in a field where literacy was low, only a few of the more highly educated were in the ranks of the early Methodists.

The Christmas Conference in 1784 authorized the founding of Cokesbury College and already at least one academy had been provided for in Virginia. By the close of the eighteenth century not less than five secondary schools had been founded by the Methodists. But Cokesbury met with a disastrous fate in 1795. Asbury, never enthusiastic for a college, after struggling a few more years to maintain the academies, finally diverted these efforts to the work of evangelization. For the first twenty years of the nineteenth century Methodism did not have an educational institution worthy of the name of an academy and for more than thirty years it had no school offering a college course.

While education was languishing among the Methodists, the Congregationalists and Presbyterians, though far fewer in numbers, were taking a lead in founding institutions of higher learning that were to give them an intellectual leadership for many years. With Harvard, Yale, and Princeton to train leaders for educational work they

were ready to establish new colleges even before the Revolution. New institutions under their control multiplied after 1783. Zealous Presbyterians were early in the field in the West and were as secure in their intellectual predominance as were the Methodists in their evangelistic leadership. Of the ninety to one hundred institutions of higher learning in the United States in 1840, fully two-thirds were under the control of the two denominations. Nearly all in the West were under that of the Presbyterians. All state universities in the western region also came under the guidance of this denomination, for all higher education was still directed by the clergy and only Presbyterians or Congregationalists had the men trained for educational leadership.

It is not difficult to understand the failure of the Methodists to establish permanent educational institutions early in the nineteenth century. Their appeal to the less educated groups had first of all provided the denomination with but little intellectual background. With but few preachers with a college education, the denomination lacked educational leadership. "The calls for workers in the far flung fields of Methodism were so urgent," said one Methodist, "and the workers so few that there was no time for education, nor could any be spared for work in education."

"There were not a half dozen Methodist graduates in the entire country in 1821," said Stephen Olin, "and in several conferences of the church there was not a single minister or layman who had any collegiate instruction."

The attitude of the founders of American Methodism toward education is strikingly set forth in the first discipline. "Gaining knowledge is a good thing," it reads, "but saving souls is better." . . . "If you can do but one let your studies alone. I would throw by all the libraries in the world rather than be guilty of the loss of one soul." Only the very meagre conference course of study laid down in 1816 saved their ministry from the charge of universal ignorance during this period.

The remarkable success of the Methodist preachers on the frontier in soul winning stood in sharp contrast to the results of the efforts of the more highly educated Presbyterian and Congregational preachers. This fact led many Methodists to doubt the wisdom of education. "I have seen so many of the educated preachers who forcibly remind me of lettuce growing under the shade of a peach



tree or like a duckling that has got the straddles from wading in the dew that I turn away sick and faint. Now this educated ministry and theological training are no longer an experiment. Other denominations have tried them and they have proved a perfect failure." Thus wrote Peter Cartwright, and in this view he undoubtedly represented a large section of Methodism.

The establishing of an academy at New Market, Vermont, in 1817 presaged a new movement in education among the Methodists. Three new academies were in operation by 1820 and in that year the General Conference, which had been silent on the question of education since 1796, adopted a committee report that was of great significance to the church. The report declared that "almost all seminaries of learning in our country are under the control of the Calvinistic or of the Hopkinsian principles, or otherwise are managed by men denying the fundamentals of the gospel." The conference recommended that each annual conference should establish one or more academies and that by the coöperation of groups of conferences colleges should be founded.

The impetus given to the educational movement by this action resulted in much greater activity among the Methodists. A half dozen first class academies were in operation by 1828 and the number was increased to twenty-nine by 1840. Of even greater importance to the church was the founding of Augusta College in Kentucky in 1822. For a decade it was the most prominent school in Methodism and from 1825 to about 1833 the only Methodist college offering a classical course. With the founding of Wesleyan University (Connecticut) in 1831 the first permanent Methodist college was established. It was followed the next year by Randolph-Macon College in Virginia and in 1833 the Pennsylvania conferences took over Dickinson and Allegheny colleges, the former of which had had a long history and carried prestige in intellectual circles. McKendreean Academy at Lebanon, Delaware, added a college course in 1834, and Indiana Asbury University, now DePauw University, founded in 1837 was able to announce a college course in 1839. Ohio Wesleyan University, soon to lead all other Methodist colleges in enrollment, opened its doors in 1844 and when the schism came not less than eleven institutions under Methodist control were announcing a full college course.

The founding of a few colleges did not, however, give Methodism a place in the intellectual world. Until after the Civil War not a single Methodist educational institution of higher learning commanded the respect of scholastic leaders. The Methodist constituency possessed neither men of wealth nor of position. Coming from the less cultured classes with much positive hostility toward higher education, it is not surprising that little support could be obtained for the institutions founded. Said a prominent Methodist in 1845: "Of all posts of honor—legislator, judge, justice, author, editor, professors in colleges, principals and teachers in high schools and academies, physicians, ministers, and missionaries—of these positions comparatively few are in the hands of Methodists. While we constitute one-fourth of the population . . . yet scarcely one in fifty of the public functionaries and the professional men of the country is a Methodist."

Of the scores of Methodists who were obtaining a liberal education few were being trained under Methodist tutelage. "The result was," declared Stephen Olin in 1845, then president of Wesleyan University, "that three-fourths of all who have been educated in colleges not under our direction are lost to our cause." . . . "The church must train them [its young men] if it will save them," said he, "they are going to be educated—for us if we train them—against us if others train them."

Even the Methodist preachers with a liberal education had been mostly trained by others. "We found them educated to our hands," declared a New England Methodist in 1845. "Two-thirds, if not three-fifths, of the educated men within the Methodist ministry and in our Methodist high schools and academies are graduates of other colleges. The consequence is that of the 1,500 students annually instructed in over fifty-four academies, not one-third of those who matriculate do so at our colleges. They go where the sympathies of their tutors and pastors lie . . . and in graduating have the advantage which attaches to age, wealth and fame."

The deeply rooted prejudice against education for the ministry had not disappeared at the middle of the nineteenth century. "If God calls men He will provide what is needed," declared a prominent Methodist in 1840. "Students go to college to prepare for one of the learned professions—law, medicine or the ministry. Not many Methodists enter the two former professions, and Methodists are opposed to preparation for the ministry as a profession, hence not



many of our students repair to colleges from this motive." Thus wrote the Rev. J. P. Durbin, president of Dickinson College, but he continued, "A good academic English education and the elements of Latin and Greek ought to be obtained." Even as late as 1853 the editor of the *Western Christian Advocate* declared that, "The church needs preachers from the plow, the shop and the professions as well as from the college hall. We fear there has been a mistake in urging so many men to enter the colleges rather than the ministry."

Educational institutions could not prosper in such prejudice—if not hostility—which existed in Methodism in 1840. The General Conference of that year warned against the multiplicity of colleges when lack of financial support was threatening the very existence of most of the eleven colleges. Nor was the enrollment more encouraging than the financial support. In 1842 not more than six hundred students were enrolled in these Methodist colleges, and it is probable that many of these were of sub-collegiate grade.

Calvinistic control of western state institutions remained unchallenged for the first third of the nineteenth century. The western Baptists were even more hostile to education for their ministry than were the Methodists, and other sects springing from the disrupted Presbyterians gave little attention to learning. Consequently they offered no opposition to this control by the Presbyterians. Soon after 1830, Methodists began to challenge this Presbyterian domination of the schools. The University of Georgia, often called Franklin College, was the first of these universities to come under the direct control of that denomination. "They (the Presbyterians) from the first had a vast preponderance in the board of instruction," wrote the editor of the *Christian Advocate* in 1834. "We think it probable that this was the natural result of things as they were many years ago. They had the suitable men to spare who could be drawn from any part of the country to the Presidency or professorships of the college." "They have fallen heir to the state institutions as soon as they have been founded," said he. "We do not blame them but we shall protest steadily against their efforts to exclude others."

The Presbyterians retorted that the positions were thrust upon them because no others were qualified to fill them. Such an explanation did not satisfy the Methodists who insisted that such a condition might have been accepted but for the fact that the entire board of instruction was of one denomination.

The controversy was extended to the University of Kentucky, to the two state schools of Ohio at Athens and Miami and to Indiana University. All of the presidents and most of the instructional staff were from the one denomination until after 1840. The Methodists did not desire to eliminate sectarian influence in these institutions. They proposed that all sects should share in their advantages, in proportion to their members—a scheme highly advantageous to the Methodists. But while contending for participation, fair-minded Methodists admitted that it would first be necessary to have at least one good University where men could be trained to fill the positions.

The controversy was most bitter in Indiana. Methodists, said the Indiana Conference in 1832, could no longer send their sons to an institution where doctrines contrary to their views were set forth. What virtually amounted to a boycott by the Methodists was given as the chief reason for the languishing condition of western state institutions. The Indiana Conference drew up a memorial to the state legislature in 1834 praying that body to devise some means whereby the principal denominations may have their due proportion of influence in the faculty of the State College at Bloomington. They complained that the self-perpetuating character of the board of trustees enabled the Presbyterians to maintain this control.

Methodists protested against the alleged claims of Presbyterians that "none but Calvinistic gentlemen were competent to fill professorial chairs." Presbyterians, said the Indiana resolutions, charged that "Methodists were an inferior caste, and incompetent for university positions. They were, perhaps, good men but they did not understand Greek; honest, but they had never digged among Hebrew roots, hence they were surely incompetent as teachers." Failing to gain control or even a share in the management of the State University, the Methodists founded Indiana Asbury University in 1837.

Soon after 1840, Methodists gained control of Transylvania University at Lexington, Kentucky. They persisted in their struggle for the management of other state schools and by 1852 were choosing the presidents for the Indiana and Ohio state universities. Methodists, after a long struggle, were controlling the state schools of the West.

Opposition to education among the Methodists was directed most persistently against special schools for training men for the ministry.



The course of study provided by the conference of 1816 came to include many of the subjects regularly taught in the theological schools of other denominations. But the prejudice against offering these courses in any school was so strong that the new Methodist colleges, to escape the charge of being theological schools, avoided offering any courses that might warrant the charge. Wesleyan University rigidly excluded all Bible courses from its curriculum for several years.

There were about thirty-five theological schools in operation in the United States in 1840. Of these, twelve were Presbyterian, seven Congregationalist, nine Baptist, and three Episcopal. More than 1,200 students were enrolled in them and so eager were the Presbyterians and Congregationalists to promote training for the ministry that in 1815 the American Education Society was formed in New England to provide funds for the education of indigent young men looking to the ministry. Though nominally non-denominational, the society was predominantly Congregationalist and in 1819 the Presbyterians organized a similar society. From the date of organization, the success of both societies was remarkable. In 1837 the American Society was expending over \$14,000, aiding 779 students and in 1849, \$30,000 on 435 students. By 1849 the Presbyterian Society had carried 1,876 students through a regular course and had almost 400 in training.

The Methodists not only had no theological schools in 1840 but were doing nothing in an organized way to encourage ministerial students to obtain a college education. Of the few hundred attending Methodist colleges, it does appear that a large proportion were preparing to enter the ministry. As early as 1832 a few Methodists had advocated theological schools through the *Christian Advocate*, but the opposition was so strong and so bitter that the editor of this paper closed his columns to the controversy.

In 1838 some Methodists in New England began planning for a theological school in defiance of the wishes of a large proportion of the membership. A convention for the purpose in 1839 took the first definite action relative to such a school and soon had the support of the New England, New Hampshire, and Maine conferences. A storm of protest arose. The *Western Christian Advocate* declared "we will not oppose theological education, but we shall make known our full conviction, that a theological seminary will be only evil in the

Methodist Episcopal Church." In even stronger language did the New York *Christian Advocate* assail the small group of New Englanders who were defying the wishes of the great body of Methodists in establishing "a school of the prophets." The Bishop's address to the General Conference in 1840 was strong in its condemnation of "establishing schools of divinity, for the exclusive purpose of training men for the sacred office as for a profession."

The control of education had long since passed into the hands of local conferences and in spite of bitter denunciation from many sources the Newbury Biblical Institute was opened at Newbury, Vermont, in 1843. Only the conference course of study was to be offered here and students would be required to fill a regular pastorate while pursuing their course. That location was too far from centers of population to obtain preaching appointments for the candidates and too far removed from the centers of Methodism for patronage. It was, accordingly, removed in 1847 to Concord, New Hampshire, under the name of the Methodist General Biblical Institute. The same problems confronted it here as at Newbury and soon after the Civil War it was removed to Boston.

Although the Concord school was soon sending out annually twenty students who had completed the course, this number could do little to raise the general standard of education among several thousand preachers. Already many leaders in the church were clamoring for a trained ministry. The young preacher was no longer able to obtain his training while riding a circuit. Two new sermons for each month would not suffice for the preachers in permanent stations. Untrained ministers could not attract and hold the more educated classes and the denomination was compelled to witness the more highly educated of their constituency constantly deserting to other churches. A great calamity threatened the denomination. Either it must provide trained preachers or find its place permanently as a church of the less cultured. A determined assault against the old order was begun about 1850 with the determination to found theological schools and colleges worthy of the denomination. The movement begun about 1850 showed much greater strength than that of ten years earlier and the opposition was much less formidable though still bitter. In the midst of the controversy the will of Mrs. Eliza Garrett was made providing for the founding of Garrett Biblical In-



stitute. The funds became available in 1854 and in January of the next year the Institute was opened.

The new Institute was provided with funds that insured its permanency. Time would make of it an institution of which the Church could be proud. The days of controversy had passed. The General Conference of 1856 declared that it was no longer a question of whether the Church should have theological schools, for it already had them; it was a question of policy regarding schools already established. A new era in education for the ministry had dawned.

The new interest was not confined to the theological schools alone. Wesleyan University, Dickinson College, Allegheny College, and Ohio Wesleyan University were making rapid progress in the fifteen years prior to the Civil War. All along the frontier the Methodists were turning their energy toward education with the same zeal that they had turned toward evangelization in the early part of the century. Secondary educational institutions were established in large numbers and the last decade before the Civil War saw the foundations laid for Northwestern University, Lawrence University, Iowa Wesleyan College, Hamline College, Illinois Wesleyan College, Baker University, Cornell College, and Willamette College. There was lack of coördination and much duplication of effort in the new enthusiasm for education. The General Conference never attempted to coördinate an educational system; but with all the misguided effort the foundation for the present educational system of the church was laid before 1860.

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The best material for the study was found in the libraries of the University of Chicago, Garrett Biblical Institute, Drew Theological Seminary, Ohio Wesleyan University, and DePauw University. Other sources were found in the collections of the Methodist Historical Societies of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The Methodist Book Concern at Cincinnati has a useful collection relating to western Methodism.

No study of early Methodism in the United States could be made without the use of the *Journal of Francis Asbury*. His close connection with every phase of the activities of the early church gave him a knowledge of its inner workings scarcely equalled by any other man of his day. Of a similar character but much less comprehensive is a group of autobiographies of early Methodists and

others very closely associated with the religious and educational activities of the churches. Of the many such works consulted, those of William Burke (in J. B. Finley, *Sketches of Western Methodism*), J. B. Finley, Peter Cartwright, Jesse Lee, B. W. Stone, and Julian M. Sturtevant are most useful.

The best source for the period after 1825 is the *Christian Advocate* (Methodist) published in New York City under various titles beginning in 1826. While primarily religious in character, it served as a general newspaper as well and carried much information regarding the educational efforts of the church. Similar and almost equally valuable is the *Western Christian Advocate*, Cincinnati, 1834—.

The *Journals of the General Conference* are indispensable. Beginning with the general conference of 1820, they contain much material relating to education. The records of annual conferences are not so satisfactory, as only excerpts were printed and most of the manuscripts were apparently lost or destroyed. The manuscripts of the Western Conference and its successor, the Ohio Conference, have been preserved, dating from 1800. Those of the Indiana Conference dating from 1832 are extant.

The first *Methodist Discipline*, printed in 1785, contains the plan and rules for Cokesbury College. These were reprinted in successive disciplines up to and including the year 1795.

The *American Almanac*, published annually in Boston, 1830-1860, and the *Methodist Almanac*, published annually in New York, 1833-1860, are particularly valuable for statistics as are also the annual reports of the American Education Society, 1827-1872. College catalogues, records of college trustees, pamphlets, and a few college histories have been used. While the many books written on Methodism serve as an excellent background for a proper perspective of the denomination, not many have touched on the field of education. Histories of education are silent on the work of the churches.



# THE SETTLEMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA\*

By HAROLD E. BRIGGS

Writings on Dakota history up to the present have been largely political in nature. This study stresses not only the settlement and economic development of the territory but also attempts to give the reader a glimpse of the life of the Dakota pioneer. The period covered is approximately from 1860 to 1890.

The settlement of Dakota is described in four chapters: Early Settlements and Townsites; Settlement and Immigration to 1870; Settlement, Prosperity and Depression, 1870 to 1878; and The Great Dakota Boom, 1879 to 1886. The economic development is dealt with under the headings of Agriculture; Ranching and Stock-raising; The Black Hills Gold Rush; and Transportation. Each of the first three topics is handled in a single chapter, while the latter is divided into three: Pioneer Steamboating; Freight and Stage Lines; and Railroads. Five maps show the advance of the frontier line of settlement: Settlements and Townsites, 1860; Dakota Forts, 1868; Dakota in 1870; Organized Counties, 1878; and Organized Counties, 1885.

Although various land and townsite companies were active in southeastern Dakota in 1857 and 1858, permanent legal settlement was not possible in that region until the formal withdrawal of the various Sioux tribes in July, 1859. The only settlement at that time in the Red River Valley was at Pembina. By 1860 settlements had been definitely established along the Missouri, Big Sioux, Vermilion, James, and Red rivers and there was a tendency for these frontier communities to grow and expand. The population of the region subsequently included in the Territory of Dakota was 4,837, the most important towns being Sioux Falls, Vermilion, Yankton, and Pembina. But as yet these pioneer districts lacked laws and local

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Louis Pelzer

government, without which they could not hope to develop. The greatest need of the Dakota settlements in 1860 was the organization of a territorial government.

After considerable activity and agitation on the part of the Dakota settlements, a bill creating the territory was signed by the President on March 2, 1860. William Jayne of Springfield, Illinois, appointed as territorial governor, arrived in Dakota in May and chose Yankton as the capital. In the fall of 1861 there were eleven post offices in the territory.

Although the homestead act became a law about this time, settlement of the Dakota area was slow. There were several reasons for this. With the Civil War came serious Indian troubles in the Dakota region which not only tended to keep out new settlers, but caused many of the older settlers to leave. The existence of much good government land farther east, lack of transportation facilities, the prevalence of drouth and grasshoppers, all worked against immigration. There was fear of the lack of timber except along the streams. The military authorities opposed and discouraged settlement by reporting the soil and climate unfit for agriculture. Writers depicted Dakota as a land of blizzards and Indians, drouth and grasshoppers. As late as 1866, George Catlin, a writer of some note, stated that the Dakotas were a part of that region known as the great plains, "which is, and ever must be, useless and unfit for civilized man to cultivate." The population of the Big Sioux Valley in 1868 was less than it had been in 1858.

In spite of the many factors and adverse conditions reacting strongly against settlement in the territory during the early sixties, some influences tended to favor immigration to that area. The provisions of the homestead act were liberal, while some refused to admit that the climate and soil of Dakota were unfit for agriculture even when conditions were at their worst. Surveyor-General George D. Hill at Yankton in his first report to the Secretary of the Interior in 1862, spoke favorably concerning the soil and climate of Dakota. The coming of a New York colony to Dakota in 1863 and the creation of a territorial board of immigration gave favorable publicity to the territory.

Most of the settlement of the Dakota area took place during two boom periods. The first began in 1868 and terminated in 1874, while the second, or "Great Dakota Boom," when the largest addition in pop-



ulation was made, was inaugurated in 1878 and ended in 1886 and 1887. Between these periods of rapid settlement the population increased but little, and sometimes not at all. Each of the booms was produced largely by railroad expansion and a series of wet years, and each was terminated by poor crops due to drouth or grasshoppers.

General conditions were favorable in 1868 for settlement. The five year period beginning in 1868 was one of prosperity throughout the United States. Every line of business felt the stimulus of war tariffs and high prices. Crops were good in 1867 and 1868, and several favorable treaties had been made with the Indians. The best government land had been taken in Iowa and Minnesota and it was necessary for the prospective farmer to go farther west to find a desirable location. In 1868 the Sioux City and Pacific Railroad was completed to Sioux City, Iowa, thus placing railroad connections with the east within four miles of the eastern line of Dakota and bringing the territory within two days travel of Chicago. Considerable money had been expended on government wagon roads while land and real estate agents were active. Prices for articles purchased by the farmer were not high and his products brought a fair price. Taxes were not heavy and there was a demand for all kinds of labor.

The census for 1870 shows a population of 14,181 in Dakota, of which six-sevenths resided in the Missouri River Valley in the southeastern portion of the territory. The early settlers were of three classes: those who had been unfortunate in business and desired to make a new start in life; young men, impatient with the conservatism of the older communities, who came west for a better opportunity to make a livelihood; and soldiers who took advantage of the homestead privileges. The early settlements of Dakota had all the characteristics of frontier life.

The boom which began in 1868 ended in 1873, and the period from 1873 to 1877 was one of rather pronounced economic depression throughout the nation. Grasshoppers appeared in enormous swarms in the mid-western region in 1874-76. They destroyed the crops and left many of the farmers destitute. In addition to these hardships the winter of 1874-1875 was very severe. By 1877 conditions began to improve and the Black Hills gold rush paved the way for the "Great Dakota Boom" in 1878-1886. During those years much of the Territory of Dakota was settled and what a few years before had been an almost uninhabited expanse of prairie, became a fairly

populous region soon to be divided and admitted into the union as two states.

The causes for the boom were numerous. The abundant moisture for several years suggested a humid climate. Extensive railroad expansion furnished transportation facilities to the various sections. But the railroads supplied far more than that. They printed pamphlets for free distribution and published advertisements in newspapers and magazines which described the country and enumerated its advantages. Other sources of advertising were the various land and townsite companies, the colonizing associations, and the territorial board of immigration. Another potent factor was the rapid occupation of much of the more desirable land farther east and its gradual rise in price accompanied by an increase in taxes. Capital was available at this time for reasonable business ventures.

Settlement was rapid in the early eighties and the population of the territory increased from 135,177 in 1880 to approximately 210,000 in 1882 and to about 330,000 in 1883. In 1880 there were eight land offices operating in Dakota. These were located at Bismarck, Deadwood, Fargo, Grand Forks, Sioux Falls, Springfield, Watertown, and Yankton. Fargo reported the largest number of acres filed upon—722,000. Sioux Falls was second with 498,000. In 1884 Bismarck reported 2,563,534 acres filed upon.

The magnitude of the "Dakota Boom" is indicated strikingly by the following comparisons: During the first five years of the territorial government (1861-1866) only 100,000 acres of government land were filed upon, and by 1870 less than 500,000 acres had been taken. Nearly two-fifths of the entire acreage filed upon in the United States in the year ending June 30, 1883, was in Dakota. This was nearly twice as much land (seven and one-half million acres) as was taken in Minnesota, Nebraska, and Kansas combined. In 1884 there was nearly a sixty per cent increase over the previous year. During the decade ending June 30, 1889, nearly forty-two million acres, nearly half the area of Dakota, were filed upon. By 1887 no free land remained in twenty-two counties, and nine others had only an area of 2,500 acres each, most of which was undesirable.

The growth in population during the boom period shows most clearly the magnitude of the immigration. According to the federal census of 1880, the population of Dakota was 135,177, of which 92,268



were in southern Dakota, including 16,487 in the Black Hills. In 1885 the territory had a population of 415,610, of which 152,199 were located in northern Dakota with 263,411 in the southern section, of whom 14,842 were in the Black Hills. In 1890 the population of South Dakota was 328,808, and that of North Dakota was 182,719, making a total of 501,527. The enumeration for 1880 was made after the influx was well started, while that of 1890 was made after there had been an exodus due to two or more crop failures and to many disappointments on the part of town builders and speculators. It is therefore impossible to give accurately the total influx to Dakota during the boom period. The rapid invasion of settlers continued for some time after the enumeration of 1885. The Bureau of Immigration estimated that the increase for 1886 was more than 85,000 and that the population on the last day of June 1887 was 568,477. Allowing a liberal deduction for overestimation, the increase over 1880 would be at least 400 per cent. The increase over the estimated population for 1878 would be approximately 750 per cent in about nine years.

Striking as the immigration to Dakota is during this period, when considered in its larger aspects, it may well be illustrated even more vividly in the smaller units. Beadle County in 1880 had a population of 1,290; in 1885 it had 10,318. Brown County in 1880 had 353 inhabitants and only 468 acres under cultivation; by 1885 the population was 12,241, and 248,346 acres of land were being cultivated. Spink County, with a population of 477 in 1880, had 10,446 inhabitants in 1885.

With the year 1885 the high level of the boom passed, although it was not realized at the time. There were several causes for the close of the boom, the chief one being crop failures due to drouth. Railroad expansion had stopped and most of the desirable free land east of the Missouri River had been taken by the summer of 1887. Over speculation in land and failures in business added to the handicaps caused by drouth.

Prior to the creation of the Territory of Dakota, farming operations had been carried on by the white settlers, Indians, and half breeds in the Red River Valley. The census reports for 1860 show 2,146 acres under cultivation. The period from 1862 to 1868 was one of agricultural stagnation in Dakota, the result of drouth, grasshoppers, and Indian troubles. The Civil War also left its burdens

upon the Dakota farmer. The period of prosperity from 1868 to 1873 was followed by five years of hard times caused by grasshoppers and the financial depression resulting from the panic of 1873. In addition many homesteaders made reckless by continued prosperity purchased improved machinery at high prices, often mortgaging their farms at high interest rates. The winter of 1874 and 1875 was exceptionally severe, causing much hardship and privation.

The completion of the Dakota Southern Railroad from Sioux City, Iowa, to Yankton in January 1873 provided the greatest advantage to the farmers of southeastern Dakota. It was now possible to get rid of their surplus agricultural products. The effect of the railroad is shown in the rapid increase in farm products and in the price of land. There were 2,275,000 bushels of wheat produced in the Territory in 1873 as compared with 170,662 bushels in 1870. All of this was raised in southeastern Dakota with the exception of 150,000 bushels. Improved land which sold for \$8 to \$15 per acre in 1870 sold for \$15 to \$30 per acre in 1873. The Northern Pacific Railway was completed to the east side of the Red River of the North in the fall of 1871 and in the summer of 1872 was pushed rapidly toward the Missouri River. Thus transportation facilities were furnished to the farmer of northeastern Dakota.

The life of the pioneer farmer was a hard one, as it was not an easy task to make a home and develop a farm from the raw, pathless prairie, remote from neighbors, without schools or any of the advantages and comforts which the inhabitants of compact settlements enjoy. It was a hero's and almost a martyr's life and it is difficult to estimate properly the trials and discomforts of such an experience without having passed through them. With few social events, infrequent neighborly calls, and only an occasional visiting minister, the prairie dweller led a lonely life.

The period from 1875 to 1889 was one of large wheat farms in the Red River Valley. In 1875 a number of bond holders of the Northern Pacific Railway exchanged their bonds, worth ten cents on the dollar, for a great block of land in the valley region. Other tracts were soon taken over, and in the spring of 1875, Oliver Dalrymple, an experienced wheat grower from Minnesota, entered into a contract with some of the owners to take charge. He broke 1,280 acres during the summer and his first harvest in 1876 yielded 32,000 bushels of choice wheat.



As soon as the results of the experiment became known, there was a rapid shift from mixed farming to large scale wheat production. The primary reasons for the development of wheat as a single crop were: cheap land in the Red River Valley and the increasing price of land farther east, the composition of the soil, climate, advertising, the demand for American flour, and the invention of labor-saving machinery.

By 1880 the movement had made a good start and by 1885 nearly all of the original "Bonanza Farms" had been established. The census of 1890 shows 323 farms in the Red River region exceeding 1,000 acres, with 1,353 of more than 500 acres. Although the large wheat farms of the Red River country received a great deal of attention during the eighties, their importance was no doubt overemphasized. In fact there was far more land owned and farmed by the small farmers than by the large wheat growers. In Cass County, the very center of the "Bonanza" district in 1880, the farms averaged 325 acres. In 1890 there were in North Dakota 27,611 farms whose size averaged 277 acres. At that time only 8.07 per cent of the farm land of North Dakota was planted to wheat.

The reasons for the decline of the great wheat farms in the early nineties were drouth, economic depression, an increase in the price of land, and a decrease in the price of wheat. While many of the large wheat growers with capital were able for a time partially to overcome these handicaps by more scientific methods, labor-saving machinery, and careful management, a gradual shift from wheat as a single crop to diversified farming was inevitable. The big contribution of bonanza farming to Dakota was advertising.

The period of boom and prosperity which began in 1877 developed in volume from 1878 to 1886 and although wheat continued to be the money crop in the Dakota area, diversified agriculture was the general rule. By reading carefully the territorial newspapers of the late eighties, it is easy to see that by 1886 the best days of the agricultural boom were over and Dakota was entering upon a period of reaction caused largely by drouth. During 1887 and 1888 the drouth was local in nature and did not affect the different parts of the territory with equal severity. In 1889 the lack of rain was widespread throughout the central portion of the United States and severely affected Dakota. The Dakota farmer was also affected by

the general business depression of the time. The crop report for 1890 shows a marked decrease in the yield of all farm products.

The early pioneer farmer of Dakota, fully realizing the importance of stock, combined the raising of cattle and farming operations. The nutritious native grasses, cured to hay during the dry autumn, the presence of much unsettled land allowing free and unlimited pasture, the light snowfall of the average winter, and the ability of stock to travel many miles to market or to shipping points, gave grazing a distinct advantage over cereal farming.

Notwithstanding these favorable factors, the livestock business, involving a considerable investment as well as various improvements in buildings and fences, did not develop rapidly as a separate industry. Mixed farming, in which stock raising formed a prominent part, proved more profitable than either cereal farming or stock raising alone. This type of farming developed rapidly from 1860 to 1870 in southeastern Dakota before that section was served efficiently by a railroad. The Indian agencies and military posts of the territory were excellent markets for beef not needed in the towns and on the farms of the region. The raising of stock gradually became very profitable and capital invested in it often brought a return of fifty per cent per annum. According to the census of 1870 there were in the Territory of Dakota, 56,724 meat cattle.

In the period after the Civil War many cattle were driven "up trail" from the overstocked ranges of Texas in search of markets and new feeding grounds. The first Texas cattle arrived in Dakota in the summer of 1871 and were driven to the southeastern section along the Missouri River. By 1874 and 1875 they were coming in rapidly. Until 1875 no cattle were raised in the territory west of the Missouri River. The Black Hills area was early reported as being favorable for cattle raising and some of the first people going into that region in 1875 took cattle with them. In 1876 the rapid increase of miners and prospectors created a demand for beef and dairy products. By 1878 there were at least 100,000 cattle in the Black Hills area, many of which had been driven from Texas. The Black Hills Live-Stock Association estimated in the spring of 1884 that there were 500,000 head of cattle in that district and that as many as 200,000 had been marketed in 1883.

By 1878 and 1879 the country north and east of the Black Hills filled up with herds while in the following years the cattle ranges



were extended into the Little Missouri region of the northern Badlands. During the years from 1883 to 1885 cattle came into the Little Missouri country very rapidly. They were allowed to run at large during the winter months, no provision being made for feeding. Some sheep and horse ranches existed in western Dakota in the eighties but they were the exception rather than the rule.

In the "Hard Winter" of 1886-87 thousands of cattle perished on the overstocked ranges and many ranchers went bankrupt. The cattle business was badly hurt for the time being but the Dakota cattlemen had learned their lesson. The days of the big cattle outfits had gone never to return. After the experience of 1886 and 1887, the herds were comparatively small, and provisions were made for feeding in case of emergency. Other events also tended to change the status of ranching in western Dakota. The coming in of homesteaders and farmers in the late eighties who began to construct fences around their little tracts interfered with the freedom of the range and cut off the water holes from public use. There was a period of contest between the ranchers and the "nesters," as the farmers were called, which ended in an ultimate victory for the tillers of the soil. Although the picturesque days of the open range were over, ranching still continued to be the most important industry west of the Missouri River.

Before the coming of the steamboat, the navigation of the Missouri River was not extensive and was associated chiefly with the fur trade. In 1831 the steamboat *Yellowstone* entered the confines of the Territory of Dakota. In 1859 the steamer *Chippewa* reached a point fifteen miles below Fort Benton. The Harney expedition of 1855, and later the construction of Fort Randall, gave temporary employment to two or three extra vessels, and at times additional steamers were put into operation in the fur trade. Gold was discovered on the Salmon River in 1862 in what later became Montana. This event brought a rapid increase in steamboat traffic by the people of the new mining district who soon saw that the Missouri River was the most economical route for immigration and freight.

The Indian Bureau of the United States government transported its annuity goods up the Missouri to the Indian tribes along the river. The government also sent troops and laborers as well as supplies by this route to its military posts along the Missouri and to its exploring and road building parties in the northwest. The

number of vessels making the trip to Fort Benton rose from 4 in 1864 to 37 in 1867, but declined to 11 in 1875. Yankton was the most important landing in southern Dakota and the local river trade was reflected in its steamboat business. Steamboats usually loaded both ways—made large profits.

Freight rates from St. Louis to Fort Benton were as high as 18 cents per pound down to 1865. In 1866 they dropped to 11 and 12 cents and in 1867 to 9 cents per pound. Rates from Sioux City, Iowa, to Fort Benton in 1868 were  $1\frac{1}{4}$  cents. Insurance rates were high, often being as much as 15 to 20 per cent. The fare for cabin passengers from St. Louis to Fort Benton was \$150 to \$300 for the round trip, board costing \$4.80 per day extra.

In spite of the rapid development of river traffic there were many obstacles to Missouri River navigation. The channel was made uncertain and dangerous by swift currents, sandbars, and other obstructions. Danger of breakage of engine parts on the trip made it necessary to carry hundreds of parts for repair purposes. The scarcity of fuel was another very serious handicap. Steamers consumed large amounts of wood which was expensive when purchased from the "wood-hawks" and entailed danger and delay when it was necessary for the crew to find and cut it.

The great rival of the Missouri River steamboat was the railroad and the struggle between the two lasted from 1859, when the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad reached St. Joseph, Missouri, until 1887 when the Great Northern Railroad reached Helena, Montana. The base of river trade was gradually shifted up the river by the completion of railroad facilities to the various Missouri River towns. The discovery of gold in the Black Hills tended to revive river traffic between Sioux City, Pierre, and Bismarck. The Hills trade was at its height from 1876 to 1881.

The steamboat in its long and hopeless struggle with the railroad found an ally in the United States government which undertook to maintain freight traffic on the Missouri. For many years its work consisted largely of removing snags and obstructions which caused about seventy per cent of the Missouri River steamboat wrecks. Considerable money was spent, but little material benefit was gained. By the early eighties Missouri River navigation was dead beyond the hope of resurrection.



Steamboat navigation on the Missouri had relatively little influence on the settlement of the Territory of Dakota since agricultural settlement was not extensive until after the coming of the railroad had caused a rapid decline in river traffic. Transportation on the Missouri was always uncertain and expensive. The Dakota area exported little but imported considerable freight by steamboat. Missouri River traffic had very little influence on the economic development of Dakota, partly because of certain characteristics of the stream. It was swift, crooked, shifting, subject to very marked fluctuations in volume, and at many points often very shallow. It was obstructed by many snags and sandbars and was frozen over for several months during the year. Under these circumstances it was impossible for steamboats to compete successfully with the railroad.

The navigation of the Red River of the North began in 1857, with the transportation of goods through the United States by the Hudson's Bay Company. In 1858 three consignments of goods were made to St. Paul. The first steamboat, the *Anson Northup*, was launched in the spring of 1859. The steamer *International* was put to work in 1862, between Fort Abercrombie and Georgetown. The traffic increased in the seventies. The Merchants International Steamboat Company in 1875 carried 24,500 tons of freight and 7,690 passengers. Grandin, the big wheat farmer, operated the Grandin Steamboat Line from the spring of 1879 until the early nineties. The Red River traffic was entirely of a local nature and even that was done under handicap as the stream was not suitable for extensive steamboat navigation.

In any frontier community, before the coming of railroads, overland freight and stage lines are bound to be important. In the early forties, goods were carried from St. Paul to Pembina in Red River carts. After arrangements were completed in 1857 for the carrying of goods in bond for the Hudson's Bay Company, the cart trade from St. Paul to the northwest grew very rapidly. The Minnesota Stage Company was organized in the spring of 1859 to handle mail contracts from St. Paul to Fort Abercrombie and other northwest points. In 1860 the stage line was extended to Georgetown and mail service to Pembina. The Indian troubles of the early Civil War period greatly handicapped the rapidly increasing stage and express business. In the late sixties and early seventies, Red River navigation developed. As roads were improved and bridges built, the stage companies did an extensive business and extended their lines. A line

of stages was established between Fort Abercombie and Winnepeg in 1871. The first mail from Fort Randall to Sioux City was carried by individual carriers hired directly by the United States government. A regular mail and express line carrying mail once a week was established in 1860. With the discovery of gold in the northwest and the establishment of the Missouri River route, various expeditions passed through Dakota to the newly discovered mines of the west.

At its session in 1865, Congress attempted to remedy the lack of roads and bridges by appropriating considerable amounts of money for their construction in Dakota as well as in various other parts of the west to facilitate the rapidly growing travel to the gold fields of Idaho and Montana. After the establishment of Fort Dakota at Sioux Falls in 1865, all supplies and freight for the garrison were hauled from Sioux City. After the connection of Sioux City with Chicago by rail in 1868 and the beginning of immigration to southeastern Dakota there was a rapid extension of mail and stage connections between that place and various points along the Missouri, Big Sioux, Vermilion, and James rivers. By 1870 a Yankton newspaper advertised four stage lines operating out of the territorial capital. In the same year mail and stage connections were established between Bismarck and Fort Buford and from there to Fort Keogh. With the extension of settlement north and west, transportation facilities followed the line of settlement.

With the discovery of gold in the Black Hills and the rush to that region in 1876, stage lines were established from Yankton, Pierre, and Bismarck. Freight was carried by boat from Yankton to Pierre and the Merchants Transportation Company operated by Bramble and Miner ran a weekly train of freight wagons in the spring of 1877 direct from Fort Pierre to Deadwood. The rate per hundred pounds was \$4.75. It took a month to make a round trip. In 1880 more than 5,000 tons of freight were carried by the line. In 1876 the Northwestern Express, Stage and Transportation Company established freight and stage lines out of Bismarck which had been connected with the east by rail in 1873. From 1876 to 1880, in which year Chamberlain, Pierre, and Dickinson were reached by rail, Bismarck was the most important point of approach to the Hills from the east. From 1880 to 1885 when railroad connections were made to the Hills from the south, Pierre was the most important shipping



point. In 1883 the stage fare between Pierre and Deadwood was twenty dollars. Baggage cost ten cents per pound.

The greatest factor in the settlement and development of the Territory of Dakota, except its fertile land, was the railroad. The early homesteaders often retained their claims in the hope that a railroad would appear and make their land valuable. There was no incentive to the raising of a surplus of farm products until there was some means of disposing of it. The first railroad constructed in Dakota was the Dakota Southern, which was opened in 1873 for general passenger traffic between Sioux City and Yankton.

The first train on the Northern Pacific arrived at Moorhead, Minnesota, and crossed the Red River into Dakota in January 1872. The construction was laid to Bismarck in June 1873, and the road was opened to traffic in July. With the financial crisis of 1873 all railroad construction stopped, and nothing further was done on the Northern Pacific until in the fall of 1878 when grading began west of the Missouri. The Northern Pacific began the construction of its Casselton branch twenty miles west of Fargo in July 1879. There was a rapid extension of railroad lines in all sections of the territory.

A few comparative figures show the development of railroads in the territory after the panic of 1873. In 1879 there were 449 miles of railroad in Dakota, which increased to 825 miles in 1880. There was very rapid extension during the next year, the mileage increasing to 1,596 at the end of the year. In 1882 the mileage was 1,947 and by the end of 1883 it was 2,475. In 1884 and 1885 the increase was not so rapid. The leading addition in 1885 was that of the Fremont, Elkhorn and Missouri Valley Line of the Chicago and Northwestern system, from Valentine, Nebraska, west and north 191 miles to Buffalo Gap, Dakota. It was extended to Rapid City in the spring of 1886. On June 30, 1886, the total railroad mileage for Dakota was 2,898 and by December 1889 there were eleven systems in the territory with a total of 4,463 miles.

The Black Hills region covering an approximate area of 3,500 square miles is located in the southwestern corner of Dakota between the Belle Fourche River and the south fork of the Big Cheyenne. Early explorers visited this district and a tradition grew up that it was rich in gold. The Sioux Indians are supposed to have discovered it, but at what time is uncertain. That the Hills country was prospected for gold almost fifty years before its lawful settlement in

1876 and 1877 has been well authenticated by the discovery of various remains and abandoned "diggings," of early prospectors who left many traces of their activities.

The first regularly organized military expedition into the Black Hills was led by Lieutenant G. K. Warren, accompanied by Dr. F. V. Hayden, a geologist. The early frontier communities of southeastern Dakota were interested in the Black Hills, which naturally became the object of proposed projects and expeditions in quest of gold. The Black Hills Exploring and Mining Association was organized at Yankton in January 1861. An expedition, planned by the Association in the winter of 1866 and 1867, was stopped by the United States government, which considered it an encroachment upon Indian territory. By 1872 the gold fever and agitation for the opening of the area had reached nearly every portion of the country. The Custer expedition in 1874 reported gold in paying quantities and caused the gold rush of 1874 to 1877. The Sioux City and Yankton newspapers contained evidence of activities early in 1874.

Since the region was still Indian country, the military authorities made every effort to stop gold seekers from entering. They drove out many parties but in spite of their opposition many miners went into the hills. An attempt on the part of the government to come to an agreement with the Indians failed in the summer of 1875, and was followed by a withdrawal of all active military opposition to occupation. There immediately followed a rapid rush to the region, as many as 15,000 miners assembling there during the fall and winter. Even the Indian troubles following the Custer Massacre did not deter immigration. The peak of the gold rush was reached in the spring of 1877 and soon the influx of gold seekers practically ceased. This was brought about largely by the shift of emphasis from placer to lode or deep vein mining. All available claims had been taken by the summer of 1877 and nothing was left for the newcomer. Population shifted as new discoveries were made and towns arose like mushrooms and as quickly declined. Speculation in town lots often became a furore of the wildest kind. Life in the camps was typical of mining communities, and there was, of course, a great deal of crime. Towns were far from being permanent and often deteriorated as rapidly as they had developed. Custer City in the spring of 1876 was a place of almost 6,000 population. Late in May the news of a rich gold discovery in Deadwood Gulch began to circulate and



a stampede began. As many as a thousand people left Custer City in a single day and within a few weeks its population had diminished to less than one hundred.

In 1877 the principal towns were Deadwood, Gayeville, Central City, Lead City, Lancaster City, Pennington, and Galena City. Deadwood had about 4,000 inhabitants, while Central City contained about 1,500. In 1880 the total population was reported at about 16,000, while in 1885 it had declined to 14,842.

After 1877 there was very little placer mining, the largest amount of the gold being obtained from quartz mines. The output of gold for 1878 and 1879 was \$3,000,000 annually, \$5,000,000 for 1880, and \$4,000,000 for 1881. The amount gradually decreased to \$3,350,000 in 1883 and to \$3,150,000 in 1885.

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## A HISTORY OF THE DANES IN IOWA\*

By THOMAS PETER CHRISTENSEN

A study of European background is as necessary for an understanding of Danish-American history as it is for colonial history. The introductory chapter, therefore, deals with Denmark in the nineteenth century. This is followed by chapters on Danish emigration, settlement, and organizations in the United States. The main portion treats of the Danish immigrants and their descendants in Iowa—immigration, settlement, organizations, press, schools, some leading personalities, and general contributions of the group to the development of the state. The narrative does not aim at any fullness of treatment later than 1920.

The Napoleonic wars brought a series of disasters to Denmark—the loss of the fleet in 1807, the bankruptcy of the national bank in 1813, and the loss of Norway in 1814. Social and political agitation followed. Absolutism, paternal and generous though it may have been, crumbled and a liberal constitution was granted in 1849 by the last absolutist king. It was soon revised, however, in favor of the conservative Rights, who supported an upper house with special privileges. But the liberal Lefts gave the Rights no rest until the administration of the government conformed to liberal demands and the cabinet was made responsible to the lower house of *Rigsdagen* (the Danish Parliament) in 1901.

In the duchies, Schleswig-Holstein, a part of the Danish monarchy largely German in population—nationalism and constitutionalism mingled and demanded an independent Schleswig-Holstein. This dream did not come true, but the duchies became a part of Prussia after the second Danish-German war in 1864. To Denmark it was the second territorial loss of the century and one which deeply affected Danish character. A common saying in Danish has since been: What we lost "without" we must regain "within." But the Danes,

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Louis Pelzer

nevertheless, also continued to hope for a return of at least a part of Schleswig.

In spite of the loss of territory the population of Denmark nearly doubled during the nineteenth century. There were "lean years" and political agitation in the first half of the century, but steady economic improvement in the second half. Coöperative enterprises multiplied and the small producer was favored by legislation. Near the close of the century, Denmark was on the road to be what it has since been called, "the most valuable political experiment in the modern world."

The century in general was one of social and spiritual growth. In the second decade normal schools were provided for and attendance in the common schools made compulsory. In the forties and fifties folk high schools began to give the youth of the common people some of the benefits of a secondary and collegiate education. The normal schools also afforded new opportunities to the sons and daughters of the common people. But at the regular secondary schools and at the University of Copenhagen high costs restricted attendance largely to the upper classes.

At the opening of the century Denmark was, in the Danish idiom, "chemically free" from dissenters or Non-Lutherans. Theoretically at least, practically all the people were members of the Lutheran state church. At the close of the century there were a number of well-established though small groups of dissenters, such as Baptists, Methodists, Latter-Day Saints, and Adventists, some of which had been formed by missionaries sent by the corresponding American churches. Many of the dissenters emigrated.

Within the state church two factions developed, largely through the work of Bishop N. F. S. Grundtvig and Reverend Wilhelm Beck. Poet, preacher, politician, and educator, Grundtvig was one of the most outstanding Danes of the nineteenth century. Generally speaking he was both a medievalist and a modernist. When he suggested that the departed might have "a second chance" of conversion in the realm of the dead, he reintroduced an idea akin to that of Purgatory. As the perfect and inspired word of God he put the Creed before the Bible. He believed in the general enlightenment of the century and sought to realize his educational ideal mainly through the folk high school. Liberal in politics he stressed the importance of freedom rather than of authority. The economic ideal he believed



would be attained "when few had too much and fewer too little." Through the influence of Grundtvig and his followers the Danish Parliament passed a law granting them the freedom to organize within the state church, but the law did not exempt them from paying the regular church dues.

Contrary to Grundtvig, Beck laid down as his fundamentals: that the Bible is the inspired and infallible word of God, that conversion without any hope of "a second chance" is necessary for salvation, and that the individual Christian must give proof of his faith through a life of piety. Some of Beck's followers, the Inner (Home) Mission people, carried the latter to the point of asceticism. Also, contrary to Grundtvig, Beck made much use of home missionaries or lay preachers. Besides, he had but few of Grundtvig's national and cultural interests. At the turn of the century one-sixth of the ministers in the state church belonged to the Inner Mission group and three twelfths to the Grundtvigian. The remainder formed the high church group to whom ritualism and church polity were main considerations. A considerable portion of the Danish emigrants were Grundtvigians and Inner Mission people, and their bickerings in the United States form a well documented chapter in Danish-American history.

A third personality loomed large in the life of the Danish people of the nineteenth century, that of Georg Brandes, sometimes called the Voltaire of the North. Brandes drew his inspiration from the contemporary Danish philosophers, Soren Kirkegaard and Harold Höffding; the British philosopher, John Stuart Mill, and the French critic, Hippolyte Taine. He admired Henrick Ibsen and Nietzsche. By his vigorous realism he attempted to expose the illusions of Romanticism and the obscurantism of the church and drew down upon himself the wrath of "respectable" Danish society. One of his followers significantly translated Darwin's *Origin of Species* and *Descent of Man*. Brandes and his early followers were known as *Gennembrudsmaendene* (the men who broke through). Their influence through the students at the University of Copenhagen reached the rank and file of the people, but it waned after the close of the century. With the Danish emigrants came a number of admirers of Brandes, who generally settled in the cities.

A sporadic immigration to America continued until the thirties and forties. Then the greater influx began, which reached its highest

peaks in 1882, 1891, and 1905 when respectively about eleven, ten, and nine thousand immigrants from Denmark entered the United States. Between 1820 and 1920 Danish immigration totaled approximately 300,000.

The first permanent Danish settlement was founded in southern Wisconsin in 1845 and three years later Danish immigrants settled New Denmark farther north in the territory. At the same time Danish immigrants appeared in the eastern and mid-western cities. Having worked and saved some money, they frequently went farther west, and in common with fresh arrivals from Denmark built up the larger Danish settlements in Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. There were Danes among the early American settlers in the Far West, particularly in Utah, where large numbers settled during the fifties, sixties, and seventies. Later a few larger settlements were made in California, Oregon, and Washington. With the single exception of Dannevang, Texas, none of the larger Danish settlements are found in the Southern states. Most of them are located in the Middle West.

In many instances the first settlements grew up under leaders sometimes referred to as "kings" who, because of a combination of traits and powers, possessed the confidence of the settlers. Later the Lutheran churches and the Danish People's Society directed the formation of some of the most successful settlements but these organizations never entirely supplanted "the kings."

With the planting of settlements, various kinds of organizations followed. Linguistically speaking there were three stages in the early history of many such organizations. In the first, Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes combined; in the second, Danes and Norwegians; in the third, only Danes. For the secular societies the first two stages were of brief duration, and the same holds for the Lutheran churches. In the case of some of the dissenters the last stage was never reached, since there were too few of each nationality to form a strong group.

The year 1872 is an important one in Danish-American church history. Before that year the dissenters were in the ascendant, whereas subsequently the Lutherans more and more put the dissenters on the defensive.

Excepting the small number of Danes who joined the reorganized branch of Latter-Day Saints in Iowa, most of the Danish Mormons



who emigrated settled in Utah. Since they did not carry on missionary work among other Danish immigrants, they had little religious influence on the Danish settlements outside of Utah. Methodists and Adventists made some converts, but most successful of all the dissenters were the Baptists. First, the Baptists organized their churches in conjunction with the Norwegians, later they formed purely Danish churches united in a general association.

Before 1872 the Danish Lutherans frequently joined churches belonging to the Norwegian Lutheran synods, which were much like the Inner Mission in practice and creed. A few of the pastors of these synods were Danes who had been encouraged to emigrate by the Inner Mission leaders and later trained at the synodical seminaries. Influenced by national feeling, these "Danish brethren" withdrew to form their own synod or association (*Lamfund*) as they called it.

If there had been no Grundtvigians in the settlements, the Inner Mission people might have organized all of the Lutherans into one strong Danish-Lutheran church. But a large proportion of the immigrants were Grundtvigians who deemed themselves upon a higher intellectuality and a more humanistic conception of Christianity than the pietistic Inner Mission people. In Denmark a committee mainly of Grundtvigian composition was formed for the propagation of Lutheran Christianity among the Danish immigrants. This committee sent out ministers who organized a Danish Lutheran Church, not as a synod, but as a branch of the Danish state church. This, they hoped would gather under it all Danish immigrants, particularly those who had not become dissenters. In this they were disappointed. Those who had left the Norwegian synods continued their own organization. The Inner Mission people who had joined the church organized in 1872 withdrew in 1894. Together with those who had withdrawn from the Norwegian synods they formed the United Church, consisting thus mostly of Inner Mission people, while the Church of 1872, usually known as the Danish Church, continued mainly as a Grundtvigian organization.

The United Church and the Danish Church had similar organizations in which each congregation was quite independent. The congregations called their own pastors and managed their own affairs without much interference from the general association. Every year the congregations sent delegates to an annual meeting. At these

meetings the officers of the association were elected and ways provided for maintaining the charitable and educational institutions of the Church. Each Church supported one or more orphanages, an old people's home, home and foreign missions, several schools among which was a theological seminary and in the case of the United Church, a publishing house.

Until the World War, Danish was generally used in all church work and quite exclusively in the Danish Church. The war did not initiate but hastened the change to the wider use of English, much to the regret of many of the older and some of the younger people.

In 1921 the United Church had a population of about 26,000, the Danish Church about 21,000, and the Danish Baptists about 9,000. Possibly about twice as many affiliated in some way. Thus, scarcely more than one-fifth of the nearly one-half million people of Danish descent in the United States had relations with the Danish Churches.

Less permanent than the churches but of much interest were the numerous secular societies formed by the Danish immigrants, recreational, linguistic, gymnastic, musical, patriotic, educational, fraternal (or secret), and economic. Above all, two stand out conspicuously: the Danish (or Dania) Societies and the Danish Brotherhood, each a general organization of local societies of men, but with women auxiliaries. Both effected their general organizations in 1882, the Brotherhood not without stiff opposition from the Danish Church, some of whose members at that time had strong anti-Masonic feelings. The Danish Societies were recreational and cultural with some of the benefit features of the secret societies.

The local organizations of the Danish Societies were organized chiefly in the larger towns, whereas the Brotherhood formed locals in both town and country. Both have used mainly the Danish language in their social as well as in their business affairs. In 1922 the Brotherhood and the Sisterhood had a combined membership of about 30,000 and the Danish Societies 8,000.

Of the smaller societies the Danish People's Society and the Danish-American Association deserve mention. The former dates from 1887, the latter from 1906. It was chiefly through the efforts of Reverend F. L. Grundtvig, the son of Bishop N. F. S. Grundtvig, that the Danish People's Society made its appearance. Its aim was to conserve the social heritage of the Danish immigrants and to keep intact the spiritual bridge between the Danes on both sides of the Atlantic.



The chief exploit of the Danish-American Association was the establishment of a national park on the moorlands of Jutland, Denmark, where under *Dannebrog* (the Danish flag) and the Star Spangled Banner, Danes and visiting Danish-Americans celebrate the Fourth of July regularly.

Having settled at various places in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Illinois, Danish immigrants next took to Iowa and Minnesota which the Swedish authoress, Fredrika Bremer, had prophesied would be a new Scandinavia. She mentioned the Danish Lutheran pastor, Claus Laurits Clausen, who led a colony of Norwegians to Iowa in 1853. From that date until 1872 he lived a busy and useful life, taking a deep interest in Danish immigration, and through his letters and a visit to Denmark, Iowa became known as a desirable place for settlements.

At this time Iowa began the organized encouragement of immigration from both the older states and Europe. With the strong support of the foreign group the state appointed immigration commissions from 1860 to 1882. The immigrants left the old country in the hope of large opportunities in the new. The new country invited them in the hope that they would create new opportunities for the people already there. Thus there were two sets of causes in immigration, a fact, which until recently, has been generally overlooked by American historians.

There are no definite statistics of immigration to Iowa, but approximate figures may be obtained from the state and national census reports of the number of foreign-born in the census years. In 1870 the number of Danish-born residents was less than 3,000. In 1920 the number of Danish descent was close to 50,000. Between 1890 and 1920 Iowa was the leading state in the number of residents of Danish descent.

The Danish immigrants represented various districts in Denmark and practically all classes. Large numbers came from the peninsula of Jutland, from the island of Seeland and from other islands. In the seventies and eighties the married men with their families constituted a large proportion. Later young unmarried men and women predominated. There were urban laborers, but especially farm laborers, cotters (*Husmaend*), and a considerable number of skilled mechanics. The percentage of undesirables was almost negligible. Practically all could read and write and not a few of both the men and the women had attended the folk high schools, and in the case

of the men, technical schools. Only a few, principally ministers of the gospel and an occasional doctor of medicine, had attended the normal schools, higher special schools, or the University of Copenhagen. When the representative Danish immigrant arrived in Iowa, either directly from Denmark or indirectly from other states, he was in good health, able and willing to work, and usually secured work at once. If he came from one of the other states, he might have money enough to start farming on his own land.

The immigrants scattered widely to nearly all the counties of the state. But there was from the beginning of the greater influx a decided preference for certain localities. In 1854 a small settlement was begun in Le Roy Township, Benton County, which, however, never became large enough to maintain any organizations. The more permanent groups began to congregate in the sixties and seventies in the counties of Shelby, Audubon, Pottawattamie, Grundy, Black Hawk, Cedar, Story, Hamilton, Franklin, Buena Vista, Clay, and Pocahontas. The group in Shelby and Audubon counties became the largest compact settlement of Danes outside the kingdom of Denmark and North Slesvig. The last rural settlement was founded in 1881 in Emmet County and named Ringsted after a city of the same name on the island of Seeland. Groups large enough to have churches and societies located also in the cities of Davenport, Clinton, Waterloo, Cedar Falls, Des Moines, Council Bluffs, Audubon, Harlan, and Sioux City. Most of the Danish immigrants settled in the central and northwestern part of the state.

Once settled, the Danish immigrants were affected by general population trends. Large numbers left the rural districts for the cities, east and west. Others migrated to western and northern states as well as to Canada.

In the founding and development of the settlements, strong individuals made themselves felt. None of the settlements, however, appears to have been at any time a one-man affair. The "king" was not conspicuous in Iowa. Nearly everywhere the church was an influence to reckon with, and in some cases it directed the establishment and growth of the community. This was true of Ringsted where the local church contracted for the purchase of a large tract of land belonging to the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company.



In the towns and cities the Danish immigrants engaged in merchandising, sometimes in manufacturing, banking, and professional work. Many worked as skilled and unskilled laborers. In the country diversified farming was looked upon as highly desirable. Dairying was thought of as a branch of farming for which they had special aptitude. In the early eighties a Danish immigrant living near Cedar Falls imported from Denmark a cream separator, then a novelty in Iowa. Coöperative associations usually met a ready and hearty response in Danish communities. There are still such associations in a flourishing condition both among the urban and rural groups.

Life in the immigrant groups flowed on in two main channels; the in-group and the out-group. The latter is the general economic and political group, the former is represented by the home, the church, the church schools, the press, and the literature of the in-group.

Danish church history in Iowa falls into three distinct periods. The first, which lasted until about 1872, has not inaptly been termed a period of "sinful confusion" when Lutherans and various dissenters strove for the spiritual conquest of the Danish settlements. This was followed by a Lutheran controversy which narrowed down to a debate in press and on platform between the Grundtvigians and the Inner Mission people over the question of the verbal inspiration of the Bible. This controversy was embittered by personal animosities and disgraced—in the later opinion of both parties—by lawsuits. During this controversy the Grundtvigians were forced to face the conclusion that if the Bible is not the inspired word of God, it becomes source material to historians to be treated like other historical sources. This controversy ended with the disruption of the Church in 1894, after which the Inner Mission people and the Grundtvigians maintained separate church associations, known respectively as the United Church and the Danish Church. After the nineties both churches settled down to constructive work, building churches, parsonages, assembly halls, schools, orphanages, homes for old people, the support of home and foreign missions, and the general enrichment of church life.

The United Church (Inner Mission) was very active in home and foreign mission work. Its people developed a pronounced emotional spirit and strong loyalties toward farms and organizations. The Danish Church gave much attention to educational work. It was

more nationalistic and cultural in its aims and its loyalties were more toward ideas and principles.

The total membership of the Danish Churches in Iowa—Lutheran and dissenters—was in 1920 about 12,000. Possibly an equal number affiliated indirectly. Thus about one-half of the total number of Danes in the state had some connection with these churches.

A large number of non-religious organizations appeared. Locals of the Danish Societies were organized generally only in the larger cities, but lodges of the Danish Brotherhood appeared in most Danish communities. In 1923 the total membership of the Danish Brotherhood was close to 2,000. The membership of the Sisterhood was smaller. The Danish People's Society in Iowa had in 1922 a membership of less than 200.

The dissenters limited their school activities to Sunday schools and schools for the education of ministers. The same was largely true of the United Church, though here some attention was given to continuation schools and to academic and collegiate training. The Danish Church aimed at a more complete system of education to consist of elementary parish schools, a seminary and a college. The parish schools after a successful operation for some years declined. The last was closed in 1905.

Dear to the members of the Danish Church as the parish schools were, even dearer were the folk high schools of which the first in the United States was opened at Elk Horn, Shelby County in 1878 "for the inspiration and enlightenment of our youth." To the great sorrow of the Grundtvigians it was closed as a Grundtvigian school as a consequence of the church split in 1894. For a number of years thereafter the United Church operated it as a secondary school of the American type. During the World War it had to be closed for the lack of students. The building now stands vacant. In the oft-quoted phrase, the school had become *en saga blott*—mere history.

After the church split, the Danish Church built up Grand View College in Des Moines as a folk high school, secondary school, and seminary. Since the World War efforts have been made to advance the school to the status of a junior college.

Each of the Churches had its periodical publications. Besides these, there has always been a secular Danish-American press. In Iowa this was represented by several periodicals. The only Danish-American periodical for women *Kvinden og Hjemmet* (Woman and Home)



has been published monthly in Cedar Rapids since 1888 and edited by Mrs. N. Fr. Hansen. In 1924 it reported a circulation of 34,000. For Iowa it was 3,000. It should be remembered, however, that this monthly is Dano-Norwegian. The weekly *Dannevicke* dates its appearance from 1880. It was published first at Elk Horn and later permanently at Cedar Falls. During the greater part of its existence it has been edited by Mr. M. Holst. Though not an organ of the Danish Church it has always been a distinctly Grundtvigian paper. In 1922 it reported a circulation of 3,000 of which about one-fourth was in Iowa. A Danish Christmas magazine has been published in Cedar Falls by Mr. P. Falkenberg since the later nineties. Its special features are Christmas songs, poems, and stories, but it also contains other matter of more general interest.

Much poetry, many short stories, and some novels were written in Danish for the periodicals. Some of the poems and novels were published in book form. The three most noted Danish-American poets—F. L. Grundtvig, Adam Dan, and Christian Ostergaard, all ministers, lived for several years in Iowa. So also did the Danish-American publicists, J. C. Bay and C. B. Christensen. In an environment strange and often baffling, but filled with the possibilities of the future, these and others voiced the hopes and aspirations of the Danish immigrant.

Of all Danish immigrants, Reverend F. L. Grundtvig fills the largest place in Danish-American history. He was a graduate of the University of Copenhagen. While living on a farm in the woods of Wisconsin Grundtvig became interested in the spiritual welfare of his Danish-American countrymen. After a brief preparation he was ordained a minister in the Danish Church and served a congregation in Clinton, Iowa, from 1883 to 1900, when he returned to Denmark. Shortly after, he died at the age of forty-eight.

As a leader of Danish-Americans he sought first of all to establish the Danish Church as a Grundtvigian church and advocated the development of settlements under the direction of the church. He vigorously fought the Danish Brotherhood, which he regarded as an anti-church organization. For the promotion of a nationalistic, cultural, and a spiritual Danish-American ideal, he created the Danish People's Society, through which he also aided materially in bringing on the church split. Through his songs he sought to inculcate a love of the spirit of Danish culture, but he always counselled loyalty

to the adopted country and its institutions. His conception of the United States as "the land of the trysting place of nations" (*Folk-estaevnets Land*) was taken up enthusiastically by his followers and repeated over and over in song and prose. In accordance with this conception, Americanization is not a process of absorption, but a fruitful interchange of social heritages resulting ultimately in something finer and nobler than any of its component strains.

The Danish immigrants in Iowa as a rule learned enough English in a few years "to get along" and became naturalized when the residence requirements could be satisfied. Most of their children have attended public schools. They participated in political life without showing any decided preference for either of the two major parties. Often they voted with the progressive factions. Without evincing any special liking for officialdom, they have held local county and state offices. To the three wars in which the United States have been engaged since 1860 they contributed respectable quotas. They have given the authorities but little trouble and the percentage of delinquency is small. Rarely have they acted as a political unit. The only instance on record was during the World War when together with other foreign groups they protested against the language proclamation of Governor W. L. Harding, but without effecting any organization.

A few general conclusions from the study may be stated. The ardent patriotism developed in Denmark during the nineteenth century definitely marked Danish immigrants and their descendants. The religious factions within the Danish state church, in Iowa, became independent churches. Practically all parts of Denmark contributed immigrants to Iowa. From 1860 to 1882 the State of Iowa encouraged immigration from Denmark. Most of the Danish immigrants settled in the north central and northwestern parts of the state. Though the majority of Danish immigrants coming to Iowa were farmers, skilled and unskilled laborers and other classes were represented. Only in pioneer times did the Danes in Iowa coöperate with Swedes and Norwegians in the formation and maintenance of churches and societies. The Danish Lutherans in Iowa attempted the establishment of a complete system of education. In 1920 there were no elementary parochial schools, except vacation schools and no school of a secondary character except the folk high school department at Grand View College. There is still antimasonic feeling in



some Danish Lutheran congregations. The Danish Lutheran Church polity in Iowa is principally congregational, unlike that of the mother church which has bishops. The only strong non-Lutheran Church among the Iowa Danes is the Danish Baptist Church. A controversy over fundamentalism and modernism disrupted the Danish Lutheran Church in 1894. About one-half of the Danes in Iowa are affiliated directly or indirectly with the Danish Church. Numerous secular societies were organized by the Danish immigrants in Iowa. The percentage of Danish delinquency in Iowa before 1920 was small. Reverend F. L. Grundtvig, pastor of a Danish Lutheran congregation in Clinton from 1883 to 1900 thought of Americanization not so much as a process of absorption as an interplay of social forces. The idea gained a permanent hold on Danish immigrants and their descendants.

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The sources are numerous, but widely scattered and fragmentary. The statistical data were obtained from the census reports of Iowa and the United States and from reports of churches and societies. County histories yielded some biographical data as did also several memoirs by Danish-Americans. Of the few available biographies Reverend R. Andersen's *Pastor Claus Laurits Clausen* proved valuable, especially the diary, which it includes, by Clausen during his voyage from Denmark to the United States in 1843. Much information was obtained from Reverend N. S. Lawdahl's detailed and carefully written *De Danske Baptisters Historie i Amerika*; Henrik Cavling's *Fra Amerika* is a dashing, journalistic description of the Danes in the United States in 1896. John Bille's *A History of the Danes in America* deals mainly with the bickerings of the Grundtvigians and Inner Mission people. *Danske i Amerika* in two volumes by Dr. P. L. Vig and others contain longer historical accounts of Danish emigration, the Danish-American churches, societies, and some of the settlements. Old files of Danish-American newspapers were studied, particularly *Kirkelig Samler* (1872-), the official organ of the Danish Church, and *Dannevirke* (1880-), a Grundtvigian weekly containing varied information about practically every phase of Danish-American life. Some manuscript material, mostly church registers and minutes, were used. Particularly interesting letters were received from Danish members of the Reformed Church of Latter-Day Saints in Iowa and from the Church of Latter-Day Saints in Utah.

One of the most valuable primary sources of Danish-American history is the *Meddelelser fra den dansk -amerikanske Mission*, a periodical published in Denmark and giving information about the establishment and growth of the Danish Lutheran churches in the United States until 1894. Bound volumes of the files of this periodical are at Grand View College, Des Moines, Iowa.

Most of the sources used are in Danish, some in English, and a few in Swedish and in German.



## STEAMBOATING ON THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI 1823-1861\*

By WILLIAM JOHN PETERSEN

The year 1823 marks the first successful undertaking of a steamboat to navigate the waters of the upper Mississippi from the foot of the Des Moines or Lower Rapids to Fort Snelling, eight miles below the Falls of St. Anthony. The advent of the steamboat on these waters was the death-blow to the barge, the raft, the keel boat, the pirogue, and other boats that had been the only craft on the upper Mississippi.

In a survey of steamboating prior to 1823, the hazardous voyage late in the fall of 1811 of the *New Orleans* from Pittsburgh down the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers to New Orleans is the outstanding event on western waters. During the next five years the evolution and growth of steamboating was slow. Less than a score of boats were built on the Ohio and the lower Mississippi and the mortality rate was very high. The great cost, the danger from snags and sand bars, the difficulty of passing the falls of the Ohio, and the War of 1812 all served to hinder construction and navigation on these streams. The danger of explosions during these experimental years also made navigators wary.

Strange as it may seem, no steamboat ventured up the Mississippi above the mouth of the Ohio during the years from 1812 to 1817. The small number of the boats and the increasing volume of trade seem to have kept them running on the Ohio and lower Mississippi. Finally, on August 2, 1817, the *General Pike* arrived at the St. Louis levee, the first boat to ascend to that city. During 1818 there were several arrivals at St. Louis and from that time forward the number gradually increased.

In the spring of 1819 plans were being made for the building of a fort at the mouth of the Minnesota River. The War Department

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Louis Pelzer

ordered two thousand dollars worth of goods shipped up the Mississippi by steamboat to the Sioux Indians in payment for the site which had been ceded to Lieutenant Zebulon M. Pike by the treaty of 1805. It was believed impracticable to navigate such craft on the upper Mississippi and the provisions and supplies were transported by keel boats. The following year the steamboat *Western Engineer* ascended the Mississippi to the mouth of the Des Moines River.

In the years 1818 and 1819 more than fifty steamboats were built for western commerce—more than had been constructed in the previous seven years. It was quite natural, therefore, that there should be a gradual increase and expansion in their use. But even with this added number it is not likely that more than a third of the total trade on western waters was carried by steamboats. Earlier, however, in 1817 nine-tenths of the trade had been carried by other types of boats. After a slight decline in building, the number again began to increase until in 1826 it reached the high mark of fifty-two. This number was not surpassed during the following five years.

The *Virginia*, the "Clermont" of the upper Mississippi, was a small stern-wheeler of 109.32 tons, built at Wheeling, Virginia, in 1819 and owned by Redick McKee, James Pemberton, and seven others. It was 118 feet long; 18 feet, 10 inches wide; and its depth was 5 feet, 2 inches. It had a small cabin on its deck but no pilot house, being run by a tiller at the back. According to her enrollment at the port of New Orleans the *Virginia* was the fifty-first boat built and documented on western waters. The *Virginia* completed two successful trips to the mouth of the St. Peter's River and one to Prairie du Chien during the year 1823. Her maiden voyage up the Mississippi was done in twenty days, of which four were spent in getting over the Lower Rapids and one in stemming the Upper Rapids. No fuel had been prepared in advance and the *Virginia* had been forced to stop while fresh supplies were cut by the crew. The engines had stopped each day at sundown, because it would have been foolhardy to attempt to travel at night on a river hitherto unnavigated by steamboats.

The voyage of the *Virginia* was an important one, for it established the practicability of navigating the upper Mississippi by steamboat. Late in the summer of 1823 a second boat, the *Rambler*, made the ascent to Fort Snelling. After the trip of the *Virginia*, the govern-



ment did not hesitate to use a quicker and more reliable way than previously used of moving troops and supplies. With the advent of steam navigation it became evident that the Mississippi provided the most expeditious and natural outlet for the huge quantities of lead that were just beginning to be produced and were soon to reach enormous volumes. The river also was to become the main artery along which the great waves of immigration moved steadily into the upper Mississippi Valley. No other means of transportation was capable of serving this region so well during the period before the Civil War.

Three inter-related factors—the Indian, the fur trader, and the soldier—were responsible for a steady growth of steamboating on the upper Mississippi following the voyage of the *Virginia*. The Indian played an important rôle, both directly and indirectly, in developing steamboating. Thus, before the Civil War, steamboats carried the fur companies' goods upstream and returned with cargoes of furs and pelts. The transportation of troops and supplies also resulted from the presence of the Indian on the frontier. Steamboating was stimulated directly by carrying delegations to treaty grounds, by the delivery of annuity goods as provided by these treaties, and by the ultimate removal of whole tribes to new reservations. Each process severed a link in the claim of the Indian to the lands of the upper Mississippi Valley.

Steamboat captains were constantly on the alert to secure the contract for transporting Indian delegations. Outbreaks between tribes were frequent and the government often acted as arbitrator in settling disputes and restoring peace. Indian agents were appointed to supervise and regulate the Indian trade, to settle disputes among the various tribes and between the Indian and the white man, and finally to persuade the red man to cede his lands and move farther westward. The activities of such agents as William Clark, Henry R. Schoolcraft, Joseph M. Street, and Lawrence Taliaferro, may be measured by the score of treaties to which they affixed their signatures.

Prior to the Black Hawk War most of the councils in the upper Mississippi Valley were called at some point near a military post. Fort Crawford and Fort Armstrong were favorite treaty grounds. Thus, Sioux and Chippewa, Sauk and Fox, Menominee, Iowa, and Winnebago, as well as a portion of the Ottawa and Potawatomi were assembled at Prairie du Chien at the Great Council of 1825. Most of these

tribes reassembled at Fort Crawford in 1829 and again in 1830. The whole tribe usually attended. Indians living near the treaty grounds came by canoe, on horseback, or on foot. The more distant tribes were usually conveyed by steamboat. In 1830 the *Planet* carried a delegation of three hundred Sauk, Fox, Iowa, and Oto, together with a small deputation of Missouri Sioux and Winnebago to Prairie du Chien. The expense of transportation, the many and lengthy orations delivered, and the danger from outbreaks by discontented red men, finally led the government to inaugurate the policy of transporting small delegations to Washington. It was also hoped that the Indian would be overawed by the prosperity and power of the government. The profits of steamboat captains formed no small portion of the expenditures for such delegations. In 1837 the *Rolla* received \$1,450 or \$55 per passage for the twenty-six Indians and their attendants for transportation and fare from St. Louis to Fort Snelling. This sum was far in excess of the usual amount paid for such a trip.

More prosaic but also more important was the transportation of Indian annuities. Each year goods were despatched to the various tribes along the upper Mississippi, but where the movement of delegations and tribes required but one trip, the traffic in annuity goods called for many voyages to the points designated in the treaty. These annuities consisted of tobacco, powder, bar lead, Chinese vermilion, verdigris, gun flints, shot guns, blankets, blue and red stroudings, Selem pores calico, thread, needles, brass kettles, garden hoes, fine combs, box wood fire steels, scissors, butcher knives, looking glasses, gartering, ribbon, finger rings, Madras handkerchiefs, shirts, arm bands, wrist bands, and other trinkets.

Large sums of money and goods were often granted in the treaties. In 1851 the Treaty of Traverse des Sioux provided for the disbursement of \$3,075,000 as follows: money for the chiefs, money for agricultural purposes, and money to be held in trust at five per cent interest to be paid the Indians annually for a period of fifty years. Eastern markets furnished a considerable portion of the goods brought to the upper Mississippi, but it was bustling St. Louis which claimed the lion's share of the trade. Indeed, as early as 1829 Caleb Atwater observed that the Indian Department had expended millions of dollars in St. Louis. While the entire western country was included in this commerce no small share belonged to the upper Mississippi. In



1853 the trade in goods purchased by the citizens of St. Paul and by white settlers throughout the surrounding country amounted to \$390,000. The government trade during the same year amounted to fully \$400,000.

Each flourishing community between St. Louis and St. Paul made strong bids for a portion of this trade and often received a generous share. For a long time Galena, Illinois, played a leading rôle but in the decade preceding the Civil War other river towns cut deeply into her trade. In 1857 Davenport and the surrounding territory in Iowa furnished goods to the value of \$28,000 for the Sioux of the Minnesota River alone.

The delivery of annuity goods continued until such time as the Indians agreed to remove to their new homes in the West. This was the climax of a drama which held the center of the stage while the pageant of westward expansion and settlement in the upper Mississippi Valley was in progress. It occupied the four decades following the trip of the *Virginia* in 1823. Rich profits were made whenever an Indian tribe was removed by steamboat. Thousands of dollars were expended in removing the Winnebago in 1848 and one newspaper bitterly assailed Governor Alexander Ramsay for originally estimating the cost of transporting the Winnebago at \$5,000 and then demanding \$100,000.

But the removal of whole tribes does not compare in importance with the transportation of delegations or the delivery of annuities. The three combined, however, were a constant source of profit to steamboats. When the season was dull or competition keen, a tramp voyage to Fort Snelling or the tributaries of the Mississippi always brought with it a handsome return. Furthermore, captains became familiar with the channel of the Mississippi and its tributaries, a fact which was to stand them in good stead a little later. More important still, Indian commissioners and other witnesses wrote glowing accounts of the rich lands of the upper Mississippi. These were eagerly read by the discontented in the more settled areas of the United States and helped to turn the tide of immigration northward.

The fur trader also furnished a lucrative steamboat traffic. Supplies and equipment for the traders and Indian goods formed the principal upstream cargo and large quantities of furs and pelts were shipped downstream. Trading posts were planted at strategic points, usually at the confluence of a tributary stream with the Mississippi.

Few places exhibited a greater activity than the region about the Falls of St. Anthony. A steadily receding fur frontier is indicated by the activity of steamboats. In 1828 there were 99 steamboat arrivals at Galena while St. Paul had 85 arrivals in 1849 and 104 the following year. In 1838 the soldiers at Fort Snelling were astonished to see two steamboats lying below the fort but in 1857 a fleet of 22 craft lay moored at the St. Paul levee. In all 965 trips were made by the 99 different steamboats which docked at St. Paul that year.

Abundant information about steamboats is entombed in the correspondence between Hercules L. Dousman and Henry Hastings Sibley. Franklin Steele, Joseph Laframboise, Martin McLeod, Alexis Bailly, and Norman W. Kittson were important minor characters. Dousman, Sibley, and Steele held interests in upper Mississippi craft.

St. Louis was the entrepôt for the fur trade on the upper Mississippi as well as on the Missouri. "The American Fur Company," Caleb Atwater noted in 1829, "have here a large establishment and the furs, skins and peltry which are brought down the Mississippi and Missouri rivers cannot amount to less than one million dollars annually." Not all the furs from the upper Mississippi came to St. Louis, however, for the trading posts above Prairie du Chien forwarded most of their goods by way of the Wisconsin-Fox rivers and Green Bay route. But in 1835 Dousman informed Ramsay Crooks that it was almost impossible to ship pelts by way of Green Bay because of the damage to the furs. No immediate action was taken on Dousman's proposal but the subject was revived each year and gradually more and more goods were shipped downstream by steamboat.

Before 1850 the cost of transportation was generally greater between Galena and Fort Snelling than a decade later from St. Louis to St. Paul. Despite these exorbitant prices upper Mississippi steamboats did not always reap rich profits and in 1844 the *Lynx* netted only \$161.04 for the season after deducting losses sustained by injury to the boat. The following year, however, the *Lynx* made \$11,194.73 and had a considerable amount still due her from tardy shippers. This was probably nearer the average yearly earnings.

A unique steamboat traffic arose from the planting of the Selkirk Colony on the Red River of the North. Even before the arrival of the *Virginia* the importance of the Mississippi as a highway to the outside world was recognized by the isolated Selkirk settlement. The



advent of the steamboat on the upper Mississippi was naturally hailed with delight. Fort Snelling and later St. Paul became the entrepôt for a rich trade. Heavily loaded with the spoils of the chase, long caravans of ox carts jolted southward each spring to the head of navigation, there to await the arrival of their supplies on steamboats. St. Louis, Galena, and Dubuque were important centers for this trade but after 1850 St. Paul sought a complete monopoly. Steamboats continued to transport such goods after the Civil War for as late as 1866 the shipment of 1,600 packages of goods to the Red River Colony was noted in a Dubuque newspaper.

The fur trade on the upper Mississippi was important because it offered a supplementary cargo to the stores and troops shipped by the government to the Indians of that region. The financial encouragement of the American Fur Company was also significant for neither the Indian nor the soldier had capital invested in steamboats. Immigrants were likewise attracted to the region with the increased knowledge from frequent steamboat voyages on the fur trading frontier.

The presence of troops gave steamboating its initial impetus for both the *Virginia* and the *Rambler* had carried public stores to Fort Snelling in 1823. Approximately four decades intervened between the building of Fort Edwards in Illinois and Fort Ridgely on the Minnesota River. This steadily receding military frontier prompted more frequent and distant steamboat voyages.

Prior to 1823 keel boats were employed in carrying troops and supplies to the newly erected posts. Transportation by keels was slow, uncertain, and expensive, and the risk infinitely greater. In 1819 three cents per pound was charged for taking goods from Bellefontaine near the mouth of the Missouri River to Fort Crawford.

Steamboats enjoyed several ways of reaping profits. Scientific and exploring expeditions were generally dependent on them for transportation of equipment and supplies. Tours of inspection of the military posts occurred almost yearly. Moreover, troops assisted in conducting Indians to their new homes or to treaty grounds, thereby fattening the pocketbook of steamboat captains and owners. But more important than these was the transportation of troops during times of war, the yearly movement of troops from post to post during times of peace, and the hauling of supplies and equipment.

It would be as difficult to estimate the extent of the trade for which

the presence of the military was indirectly responsible as it would be to overestimate the importance of the trade itself. In 1853 the trade at St. Paul in government supplies actually exceeded that resulting from the presence of settlers. The receipts from transporting supplies must have been as great as those derived from conveying troops during times of peace so that approximately the sum of \$1,500,000 was earned by steamboats engaged in this work. An additional \$500,000 was probable netted during the Black Hawk, the Mexican, and the Civil War. For transporting scientific expeditions, assisting in engineering projects, and conveying United States Army officers on tours of inspection of the military posts steamboats probably earned an additional \$750,000 before the Civil War. The commerce arising from the military frontier before the close of the Civil War, therefore, must have yielded upper Mississippi steamboats almost \$3,000,000. While the trade with the Indian and the fur trader did not equal this steady traffic in military forces and supplies, the three combined were significant factors in stimulating steamboating far beyond the fringe of settlement.

The shipment of lead was the most important factor during the quarter century ending in 1848 in developing steamboating on the upper Mississippi. This valuable mineral was found in abundance in northwestern Illinois, southwestern Wisconsin, and in that portion of eastern Iowa immediately adjoining the first two states. More precisely, it was found in what are now Jo Daviess and Carroll counties, Illinois; Grant, Iowa, and Lafayette counties, Wisconsin; and Dubuque County, Iowa.

The movement to the lead mines about Galena had begun as early as 1819, and a government agent was soon appointed to supervise the district. This was the signal for a slow but steady influx of squatters from Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and southern Illinois. On July 1, 1825, there were 100 miners at the Fever River lead mines. On August 21, 1826, there were 453 with the number steadily increasing. The population of Galena alone, in 1830, was almost 1,000, while that of the surrounding lead district was about 10,000.

Galena, the metropolis and entrepôt for this region, was situated on the west bank of the Fever River, about seven miles from its mouth. It was 425 miles from St. Louis, 175 miles from Chicago, and almost 400 miles from Green Bay. Dubuque, Potosi, and Cassville vied with Galena because of their favorable location on the



Mississippi, but the latter remained supreme throughout this period. Dodgeville, Lancaster, Platteville, Shullsburg, Mineral Point, and New Diggings were some of the more important inland towns.

The history of lead mining from 1823 to 1848 divides itself into three distinct stages. The period from 1823 to 1829 is one of beginnings in which the whole mineral region witnessed a rapid and steady growth both in population and production. In 1824, there were 175,220 pounds of lead taken from the mines. By 1829 this amount had increased to 13,994,432 pounds. A period of decline is noted from 1829 to 1835. The years 1835 to 1848 may be termed the stage of greatest activity when the annual production rose from 11,000,000 pounds to 55,000,000. In a quarter of a century, approximately 472,000,000 pounds, or 6,728,000 pigs had been mined and shipped down the Mississippi River. The value of the lead mined from 1841 to 1848 was \$8,676,647.39, while the total value of the mineral extracted in the quarter century beginning with 1823, was approximately \$14,178,000. In 1848 the value of the fur trade in St. Louis was estimated at \$300,000. The value of the produce on the Santa Fé Trail was \$500,000. For the year 1847 alone the total value of lead mined on the upper Mississippi was \$1,654,077.60.

Prior to 1827 scarcely a dozen different steamboats frequented the waters of the upper Mississippi, but none engaged solely in the lead traffic. In the spring of 1827 a wild stampede for the Fever River lead mines began, and by the close of navigation almost 7,000,000 pounds of lead were mined and transported downstream. Twelve steamboats had plied fairly regularly in the lead trade that year. From 1823 to 1829 inclusive, about 300 trips were made by steamboats to the upper Mississippi. Approximately 35 different steamboats made about 550 trips during this period. From 1823 to 1834 inclusive, about 65 different craft made approximately 850 trips above the rapids. By 1847, approximately 40 different steamboats were visiting the lead mines, 30 of which were regulars in the trade. A total of 662 steamboats docked at St. Louis from the upper Mississippi in 1846, fully one-fourth of the total reaching that port.

Over 95 per cent of the lead shipped eastward during the period from 1823 to 1848 made its way down the Mississippi River to New Orleans and thence by ocean to the eastern markets. Notwithstanding the objection to high and fluctuating freight rates, the obstructions and difficulties which confronted the steamboat, and the comparatively short

season for transportation, the Mississippi offered the most logical route and the best facilities for transporting the ever-increasing lead output.

The influence of the lead mines upon the development of steamboating on the upper Mississippi in the first quarter of a century of navigation on the river is apparent. First, it encouraged the immigration of thousands of adventurous settlers. Most of these came up the Mississippi from St. Louis to a point far in advance of the frontier line and thereby caused it to be extended. Secondly, the influx made necessary an ever-increasing supply of importations to a region which, for a large part of the period under survey, was not self-sufficient. Thirdly, it created an article for exportation which gave to the steamboat owners approximately two-fifths of the total revenue from upstream trade. Finally, the large number of steamboats required on the upper Mississippi prepared them for an even more lucrative traffic than that of lead transportation. Steady waves of immigrants poured into the region after the creation of the Territory of Minnesota. These required commodities for consumption. And vast quantities of agricultural products found their way to market down the broad highway of the Mississippi. Had the steamboat failed to establish itself as the dominant factor in this transportation and in communication with the upper Mississippi, the construction of railroads might have taken place a decade earlier and a picturesque phase of upper Mississippi Valley life would have been lost to posterity. After 1848, the steamboat was so strongly entrenched in the economic life of the region that it was able to wage a thrilling, albeit a losing, battle against the railroad.

Transportation of immigrants on upper Mississippi steamboats beginning with the voyage of the *Virginia* reached its heyday in the two decades following the creation of the Territory of Minnesota in 1849. Before 1850 the majority of those who settled along the river in Illinois, Missouri, and Iowa, came from Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, although the Atlantic and Gulf states were well represented. Only one-eighth of the population of Missouri, Illinois, and Iowa was foreign born in 1850, the remainder being almost equally divided between those born within the borders of these states and migrants from other states. The growth in population of the counties adjoining the Mississippi between St. Louis and St. Paul presents in miniature the astonishing development of the entire upper Mississippi Valley.



Immigrants came overland by covered wagon, by Great Lakes craft, and by steamboats from the Ohio and lower Mississippi rivers. Only six thousand miles of railroads had been constructed in the United States by 1848 and through service to Illinois was not possible for several years. The steamboat was the quickest, the cheapest, and the most reliable means of travel for prospective immigrants.

St. Louis was the point of departure for upstream craft and was surpassed only by New York and New Orleans in enrolled tonnage. New York enrolled 101,484 tons, New Orleans 57,174 tons, and St. Louis 48,557 tons of which about one-seventh was engaged in transporting immigrants to the upper Mississippi. Immigration was the principal factor in increasing the number of steamboat arrivals at St. Louis from the upper Mississippi from 697 in 1848 to 1,524 in 1860. Measured by steamboat arrivals, the activity of upper Mississippi craft in 1860 almost equalled that of the lower Mississippi, Missouri, Illinois, Ohio, Tennessee, Cumberland, and Arkansas rivers combined. Two years before, in 1858, St. Paul registered 1,068 arrivals at her bustling wharves. The aggregate tonnage of the 63 boats which docked at St. Paul that year was 12,703 or about one-half the enrolled tonnage of Philadelphia. St. Louis and the Ohio River towns employed 7,065 tons in the St. Paul trade, Galena, Dubuque, and Dunleith 3,141 tons, Prairie du Chien 977 tons, the Minnesota River 1,254 tons, and two craft totalling 266 tons hailed from no particular port. Immigration was the life of the St. Louis and St. Paul trade between 1850 and 1870.

But not all the tonnage employed on the upper Mississippi came to St. Paul. Three fairly equal sections of trade developed between the mouth of the Missouri and the Falls of St. Anthony. The first covered the 200 mile stretch between the mouth of the Missouri and Keokuk where the Lower Rapids presented a physical barrier to navigation. The second extended 225 miles upstream to the lead district where a human element in the form of a dense population attracted steam craft. The third and longest section embraced the 275 miles between the lead mines and the Falls of St. Anthony. Along this liquid trough, thousands of immigrants were carried by steamboats for a period of fifty years. In 1854 Thurlow Weed of the *Albany Journal* found the St. Louis levee lined for more than a mile with steamboats which gave a highly commercial aspect to the city.

Situated at the other end, St. Pual presented the same activity when more than a score of boats flanked its levee in May of 1857.

Prior to 1850 the freight receipts from the lead traffic had exceeded those from any other single steamboat cargo. The creation of the Territory of Minnesota in 1849 had opened up the whole upper Mississippi Valley to settlement. During the late forties the famines in Ireland and the revolutions on the continent were responsible for a tremendous influx of immigrants. While it would be difficult to set a definite date at which to say that passenger receipts became greater than those on freight, the turn of the half century seems to mark the transition. By 1857 the difference had become so great that the balance sheet of the steamboat *Milwaukee* showed the sum of \$53,939.65 from passengers while freight receipts totalled only \$22,809.66.

The influx of immigrants gave captains and owners their richest profits during the prosperous days of upper Mississippi steamboating. In diverting immigrants northward, steamboats shaped the political, economic, social, and religious structure of the upper Mississippi Valley. Thousands of immigrants, both native and foreign, were led to the land of Canaan by letters from those who had gone before and were delighted with the facility of transportation as well as the soil and climate. Accordingly, each steamboat bequeathed its farmers, landseekers, tradesmen, soldiers, and others who helped to settle the upper Mississippi Valley.

Not only was the traffic in immigrants heavy but a considerable revenue accrued each year from the tens of thousands of excursionists who visited the historic shrines and beauty spots of the West. Prior to the Civil War no excursion was so popular as that which George Catlin designated in 1835 as the "Fashionable Tour," a steamboat trip to the Falls of St. Anthony. By 1837 this trade had reached such proportions that steamboat captains advertised trips in the various river towns throughout the summer months. The decade of the Fabulous Forties witnessed many excursions from the thriving cities of the Ohio and lower Mississippi as far distant as Pittsburgh and New Orleans. Realizing that tourists would patronize only those boats which offered the best facilities, steamboat captains were quick to introduce the latest in accommodations. River craft soon were in a position to offer satisfactory accommodations to the most fastidious. In 1854 the Minnesota Packet Company carried the twelve



hundred notable guests of the Chicago & Rock Island Railroad on an excursion to the Falls of St. Anthony. Throughout the excursion the press of the nation was filled with glowing accounts of the beauty of the scenery and the fertility of the upper Mississippi Valley. Probably no other single factor was so important in popularizing the Fashionable Tour with Easterners as this Grand Excursion.

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A wealth of unpublished material was consulted in the compilation and writing of this dissertation. Particularly fruitful were the rich manuscripts contained in the Minnesota Historical Library at Saint Paul. The *Taliaferro Journal*, 1820-1840, recorded the arrival of boats and captains, the cargoes carried, the stage of the water, and innumerable miscellaneous items. Letters of Hercules L. Dousman and Henry Sibley form a large portion of the *Sibley Papers* extending over a period of thirty-five years beginning with 1815. The *Dousman Papers* and the *Dousman Photostats* contain some of the richest material extant on upper Mississippi steamboating. They consist chiefly of itemized accounts of earnings of corporations and boats, ownership of shares, original cost of boats, itemized operating expenses, and expenditures in offices and warehouses prior to 1868. The *Connolly Collection*, *Franklin Steele Papers*, and *J. H. Stevens Papers*, were lesser but valuable sources.

The rich collections of the Wisconsin Historical Society were consulted. Of these mention should be made of the *Merrick Papers*. The writer has in his possession such manuscripts as the *Killeen Papers*, the *Wellington Papers*, and the *Ihm Manuscript*. He also has acquired numerous bills of lading, diaries, and journals. Thus, a *Lead Book* (1828-1830), is a priceless portion of this collection. The manuscripts and printed material of the Chicago Historical Library, the Newberry Library, and the John Crerar Library of Chicago were also consulted. Weeks were spent at the Jefferson Memorial Library and the Mercantile Library at St. Louis.

A hitherto unworked source of information was unearthed in the various offices of the United States Steamboat Inspectors at Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, and Dubuque. The United States Engineers Office at Rock Island and St. Louis also contain material relating to the later decades of steamboating. Invaluable material as yet not consulted by the researcher is found in the Collector of Customs Offices at Dubuque, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Pitts-

burgh. The enrollment of vessels at these places gives the name of the vessel, date of enrollment, captains and owners, exact measurements, and descriptions of the craft. Significant conclusions may be drawn from these manuscripts.

The published documents consulted include the *American State Papers*, Senate and House, and *Executive Documents*, *Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs*, *Proceedings of the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels*, *United States Engineers Reports to the War Department*, and similar sources. Diaries, letters, gazetteers, books of travel, and contemporary sources of like nature have greatly enriched the economic background of the picture. The names of C. C. Andrews, Caleb Atwater, Robert Baird, Giacomo Beltrami, Morris Birkbeck, Harriet Bishop, Fredrika Bremer, and George Catlin are examples of contemporary writers consulted.

No source was more fruitful than the newspapers. Materials gleaned from the files of periodicals as far distant as New York and St. Paul, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis, form an important part of the structure around which the dissertation is built. Approximately one hundred years of the files of the *Missouri Republican*, the *Galena Gazette*, the *Miner's Express*, *Iowa News*, and *Telegraph-Herald* of Dubuque, and the *Minnesota Pioneer* and *Minnesota Democrat* were used. The files of the Chicago, Cincinnati, Iowa City, Keokuk, Muscatine, Burlington, and Davenport papers together with those of such Minnesota cities as Red Wing, Wabasha, Lake City, and Winona were consulted. *Niles' Weekly Register*, *The Merchants' Magazine* and *Commercial Review*, the *American Almanac* and *Repository of Useful Knowledge*, the *Army and Navy Chronicle*, and the *Waterways Journal* contained important materials on steamboating.

Valuable light came also from the publications of the various state and private historical societies. Particularly important are the *Minnesota Historical Collections* and *Minnesota History*, the *Wisconsin Historical Collections* and *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, the three series of the *Annals of Iowa*, the *Iowa Historical Record*, *The Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, and *The Palimpsest*; the *Missouri Historical Collections* and the *Missouri Historical Review*, the *Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association* and the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. The books consulted on steamboating, transportation, immigration, and the economic development of the upper Mississippi Valley form another part of the bibliography.



## WILLIAM BOYD ALLISON\*

By VERNOM COOPER

William Boyd Allison was born near Ashland, Ohio, March 2, 1829, of Scotch-Irish stock. His grandfather and father lived to advanced ages and seem to have had considerable physical vigor. Allison himself enjoyed good health and a long life. He served in Congress a little more than forty-three years. His name is attached to few important measures, though he had a fair share in legislation ranging from fiscal reforms fathered by David A. Wells to the railroad legislation which Theodore Roosevelt complacently regarded as a solid achievement of his administration.

Allison could not, like Joseph H. Choate, boast that his education began one hundred years before his birth. He attended a rural school; he went to a neighboring academy; he spent a year in the more distant academy of Allegheny College; and a year in Western Reserve College completed his formal education. Making no allowance for the possible diligence of an aspiring country lad, one may evaluate his schooling as equal to graduation from high school. His intellectual range was severely limited. His correspondence and speeches betray no curiosity about science. He did buy in 1865 Lyell's *The Geographical Evidences of the Antiquity of Man*; he died in 1908 without having cut its pages. He rarely had recourse to the literary allusions so dear to those scholars in politics, Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge.

He taught two years in rural schools, and he read law while copying records in the county clerk's office. He married and began the practice of law in his native county. He spent too little time at the bar to become a learned lawyer. He did not often venture to discuss in Congress and still less before his constituents questions of constitutionality. Politics was his profession. County court house gossips seem to have been his early political mentors; and he served his apprenticeship in local and state conventions which nominated

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Louis Pelzer

Salmon P. Chase for governor. He actively supported John C. Fremont for President.

He located in Dubuque in 1857. He was at the beginning of the Civil War attached to the staff of Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood, whom he had known in Ohio. He raised and equipped two regiments and then retired from the army to enter politics. He was from 1863 to 1871 a member of the House of Representatives. He supported the proposal of confiscating all the property of rebels, violently attacked Andrew Johnson, and ably opposed the protective measures of his party in the late sixties. Acquisition of stock of an Iowa railroad which needed extension of time on land grants, a furtive connection with one of the earlier whisky frauds, acceptance of *Credit Mobilier* stock, and promotion of local enterprises "to boom" Dubuque marked a man whose scruples did not separate him from the prevailing taste of the time. It is certain that patronage was the decisive means by which he controlled the conventions, county and district, which gave him his third and fourth nominations for the Lower House. Though the *Credit Mobilier* tempest for a time threatened his career, he derived from these connections one immense advantage: he had become what Hilaire Belloc calls "one of us," that is, he was admitted into the freemasonry of the privileged circles, experienced and to a degree calloused. It was the support of the railroads and office-holders that enabled him to muster in the first effort an impressive strength and in the second a majority for the United States Senate. The vested interests counted on his never leading forlorn charges. He seems to have learned that political wisdom consisted in never flouting the public nor in being prompted by its vagaries into attacking the railroads, the spoilsmen, and those Pennsylvania interests which contributed funds to the Iowa Republicans.

Allison's remaining career can be summarized by appraising his mental furniture, by explaining the acknowledged and hidden sources of his political strength, by discovering the currents upon which he drifted or the winds into which he tacked, and by analyzing the personal traits and bonds of interest which excited and held loyalties. It should be added here that seniority gave him important committee appointments, and that, when he was privileged to choose the chairmanship either of the Finance Committee or of the Committee on Appropriations, he took the latter. He acquired a great deal of de-



tailed information about political and governmental functions. He made frequent suggestions concerning technical points, mainly of an administrative nature, in a wide variety of legislation. For example, he watched for repetitions and contradictions in tax bills through four decades; he introduced and secured the passage of a bill revising the customs service; his suggestions of detailed improvements of the Civil Service Act were accepted by the reformers; and banking measures frequently received minor improvements from his practiced hand. The amount of such labor tossed off by him even in old age amazed younger men. It was generally done without pretension, save it was occasionally played up in Iowa to represent him a great man at Washington.

In one field of public affairs, finance, he was reputed to have studied seriously, and here his admirers claimed for him considerable technical knowledge and comprehensive views. In the sixties he seems to have been influenced by such men as David A. Wells and Horace White, and he acquired exact information in the laboratory of the Committee on Ways and Means. Political expediency dictated moderate tariff views after the early seventies, which left him no great authority on either side. His own party used him to conceal its true character as the popular current mounted against protection only to thrust him aside after the victories of 1888 and 1896. He groped for some feature of elasticity in the national banking system; but public apathy, opposition, an incurable optimism, or instinctive caution silenced him; and the financial disorders of Roosevelt's second administration awakened an interest dormant for twenty-five years.

Allison shared with Coin Harvey and J. Laurence Laughlin an interest in silver. He understood and always kept as a point of reference that the establishment of a legal ratio of silver and gold which overvalued the former would drive the latter from the country. That is no very impressive title to distinction for one who long supported a policy of circulating silver certificates, in practice, redeemable in gold. Nor did his veiled references to the "crime of '73," without exactly subscribing to that indictment, allay the suspicion of voters unschooled in money questions. It is one of the amusing turns of history that, when his party was driven to defend the gold standard, he labored desperately to teach his constituents sound and respectable views which he had studiously avoided in previous years. The storm from the Platte startled him, and shaken out of his feeling

of calm, he ominously and solemnly warned the public of the dangers of remonetizing silver. One of his most intimate friends claimed that the Allison pre-convention campaign in 1896 was pressed to compel McKinley to accept sound monetary views. The secret, however, was so well kept that even the "gold bugs" failed to understand the game and ungratefully withheld their affection and confidence.

The mildest thing that can be said is that Allison seems not to have understood the dangers of the silver question until the catastrophe was upon him, or that he lacked courage to try to warn his constituents beforehand, even on the eve of the storm.

His intellectual temper betrayed no bitterness after the trying days of Iowa "copperheads" and President Johnson. His partisanship was kept within the decent limit of congratulating the people for wisely ordering their destiny by Republican victories or of showing them how obvious and remediable were their errors. If the Democrats should be driven out, lost opportunities could be retrieved. He had a great deal to say in the way of flattering his constituents on the increase of wealth, but he was silent about its distribution. Nor did he raise disturbing questions about the incidence of taxation. He aggressively defended resumption after it had become a law, though he had opposed the heroic program of deflation proposed by Hugh McCulloch. So far as appearances go he became the most powerful figure in Iowa in molding public opinion on questions of finance. But he did not lead. Rather he followed untutored opinion. He never got beyond cautious schemes of inflation, which caused him anxieties in 1896.

He made late in life one curious pretension to intellectual leadership. In his last campaign he suggested to his friends that the measures fixing the national policy in insular affairs had almost all come before the Senate Committee on Appropriations and that he had largely determined them. The public never suspected this at the time nor has any historian since discovered it. His correspondence reveals no interest in the issue at the time. It was an unfounded boast quite contrary to his usually unpretentious character.

Though Allison's speeches seem dull, they show a practical intelligence. Iowans were obsessed, save during occasional fits of misgivings, by the belief that they would hasten the material development of the state by granting privileges to railroads. The obvious and superficial facts justified that conviction, if one did not trouble him-



self to inquire whether those terms yielded the largest product of public welfare multiplied by private gain. Connected with this question, so important at a time when the exploitation of an undeveloped region was undertaken with the new technology, was the use of patronage to establish political control and to influence public opinion. Exact ledgers were not kept to enable historians confidently to balance accounts, but there is no reason to suppose that Allison was over-scrupulous in political appointments. A state convention controlled by him and his friends condemned the efforts of President Rutherford B. Hayes to check the spoilsmen. A Dubuque paper devoted to his interests not only criticized civil service reform but rashly committed itself to the principle succinctly stated by William L. Marcy.

This game had to be played with skill and a due regard for the proprieties of popular control of affairs. It required lip service to the Granger doctrines and ideals; but those very Granger leaders, "old seeds," who preferred to "reign in hell than serve in heaven," were secretly thwarted in their efforts to abolish the plums that sustained the Allison "gang." Skilled and adept hands, too, combined various bills to regulate the railroads into one less offensive measure. This triumph was promptly reported by a trusted friend to Allison in Washington. The loyalty of the latter to the Iowa Republicans' espousal of the Grangers can be further gauged by his borrowings from railroads like the Illinois Central and the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. He and his disciplined band defeated James B. Weaver in 1875 for the Republican nomination for governor by conscripting the war governor of Iowa, Samuel J. Kirkwood—a magic name in that State. Then, while Allison pretended to be neutral in the senatorial contest, his friends supported Kirkwood against James Harlan, all the time keeping their leader advised. Their success in this campaign excited their pride; they boasted among themselves that the sceptre of political power had passed to them. The correspondence shows only one obstacle to Allison's election to a second term: George W. McCrary from the southern part of the state seemed a possible candidate who could unite all opposing factions. By good management or luck—the record is incomplete—or certainly by conscious effort, McCrary was provided with a berth in the cabinet of President Hayes. Allison was reelected without difficulty.

The next twelve years (1878-1890) required dexterity and assiduity. One of his henchmen, experienced and hardened in politics, who showed an understanding of the rules by dividing the spoils of the pension bureau with other members of the "gang," admired Allison's application to the minutiae of politics. He distributed rewards so tactfully that he was plagued with the minimum of disappointment. The magic word patronage excited loyalties and removed threatening complications. But Allison was never an imperious master. He was rather the mild and conciliatory member of the firm of the Iowa Republican party. One rule he seems never to have violated: not to reward open opposition. He willingly sought accommodation with rivals. He yielded a great deal to some, but he always kept his eye on the main chance—his seat in the Senate. He does not appear to have been jealous of ability so long as it did not threaten too much his political control.

Since Allison was not a compelling personality in the whole nation, an examination of his management of Iowa politics will probably be more instructive than following his career in the Senate. But national and Iowa politics intertwine and the true explanation of some curiosities of cabinet-making lies in Iowa. The year 1881 presented stubborn difficulties. Mutiny threatened the Allison "machine." John H. Gear, who had reached the Governor's office with Allison's help, was preparing to dispute Kirkwood's reelection. Allison was offered the Treasury Department by President Garfield, which he, after long delay, accepted and then refused. He could have, of course, washed his hands of the Iowa factional fight by accepting promotion to that office. But there were certain hazards of policy, of Eastern suspicion of his views on money, of tenure, as well as the ill health of his wife, which deterred him. There were other decisive reasons: he loved the Senate; his "machine" was threatened, and pride would prompt him to save it. He had with others signed a statement recommending the appointment of James Wilson as Secretary of the Treasury. The correspondence shows that this was done not without consideration of policy and that prudence required convincing evidence of loyalty to Wilson. Allison was also importunate for the appointment of Kirkwood as Secretary of the Interior. Though Garfield would not appoint Wilson, he was persuaded to give a place to Kirkwood. That left the Allison, Kirkwood, and Wilson forces free to support the last against Gear. The rail-



road support was divided. A bitter campaign resulted in another triumph for the Allison faction. Gear retired to private life till penance and the intercession of the President of the Burlington Railroad persuaded his former enemies to allow him to enter the Lower House and finally to succeed Wilson upon the latter's retirement.

That a proper regard for the prerogatives of Allison as the leader of the Iowa Republicans was the open sesame to promotion and even to continued tenure is shown by the fortune and grief which came to various lieutenants or rivals besides Gear. John A. Kasson was taught a lesson; and after he had learned it, he was treated with consideration and given foreign appointments. Intractable members of Congress from Allison's home district were sunk without trace. David B. Henderson profited by their mistakes. The rôle of a satellite to the movements of the Dubuque "boss" gave him a long tenure in Congress and finally the speakership. William Larrabee followed Allison's advice and gracefully deferred his ambitions to the nomination of Buren R. Sherman for the governorship, and then he became governor in his turn. Since Larrabee was suspected of great designs, Henderson obtained from him a promise never to aspire to the United States Senate. Personal ambition or devotion to the popular cause against the railroads caused him to challenge Allison. He too was sunk, but vast concentric waves marked his disappearance.

Allison's victory over Larrabee in 1890 broke a long legislative deadlock. The evidence justifies the conclusion that he relied upon Democratic members devoted to the railroads to elect him, should he have failed to wear out the opposition in his party. When Gear died Governor Leslie M. Shaw had the members of the legislature canvassed for their preference. If a majority of the Republican caucus should support Jonathan P. Dolliver they might perform their constitutional function of electing him in special session. If not the Governor promised to appoint him. Dolliver had begun his career by asking Allison's permission to run for Congress.

But it was difficult to distribute the political plums, whether elective or appointive, with satisfaction to all. Allison's later years were troubled by another revolt. Albert B. Cummins, frankly wet, vigorous and eloquent, had become exasperated at Allison's equivocation on prohibition and the tardy recognition of his talent. He took advantage of a growing suspicion in Iowa that vested interests were too tenderly treated, and was in 1901 elected Governor over Allison's

opposition. There followed a few years of intrigue over such matters as delegates to the national convention and articles of the Republican creed. Allison was inclined to conciliate and to restrain chafing railroad lawyers. They wanted to crush this new rival who unbecomingly argued his case before the people. Finally, Cummins broke a pledge not to dispute Allison's reelection. The *esprit de corps* of a "machine" long triumphant and disciplined, the money necessary for an organization which reached into every community of the state, and the prestige of a national reputation somewhat inflated for the campaign, determined the outcome in Iowa's first senatorial primary. Allison whose physical condition had been concealed from the public died a few weeks after his last victory.

It appears then that skill in adjusting political rivalries in a conciliatory spirit was one of the chief causes of his constant success. His attention to the exacting details of politics commanded the respect of a lieutenant who sought the explanation in his philosophy or in his tough hide. He relied upon the strong bonds of privilege, whether of spoils of office or of economic advantages, to stimulate loyalty. These explain his success, and the result in Iowa determined his career in national politics. He also had the wisdom of knowing what was obtainable. The allurements of a cabinet post never turned him from preoccupation with Iowa politics. The seductive beckonings of the presidency never caused him to venture too much. Thomas C. Platt and Matthew S. Quay decided during the convention in 1888 to nominate him, but Chauncey M. Depew, who confused Larabee's hostility to the railroads with Allison's policy, wrecked the agreement. In 1895 Allison declared that the vexations and disappointments of those who had aspired to the presidency but failed to attain it and even of those who had won it taught detachment and indifference. Devoted friends, however, resolved to further his candidacy not without the prospect of powerful journalistic support and the good will of anticipated favorite-son delegations. The persuasive resources of Mark Hanna caused the desertion of newspapers and partially pledged delegates. Those realists in Iowa politics were amazed at the vulgar realities of national politics.

Allison's views on public questions were not exactly rigid. In his early years in the House, he showed a zeal for a custom-house in Dubuque, canals, railroads subsidized by grants of public land, a high tariff required for revenue, and the Wade-Davis Bill. Support



of these measures required neither originality nor courage. As public opinion became more exasperated by President Johnson and the South, Allison's temperature rose. His candidly expressed favor for the railroads was not restated after he was caught with *Credit Mobilier* stock which was to have been paid for out of dividends. Protection caused some uneasiness among agrarian Republicans. Allison and his colleague, Kasson, resisted extreme protective rates which weighed unequally upon their section. Kasson's leniency toward the South resulted in his defeat by one regarded as a better patriot.

But Allison remained longer and waged the most splendid fight of his whole life—a struggle cited in after years by protectionists to embarrass him and by free traders to enlist him in the cause of moderation. For example, when the Wilson Bill was before the Senate, Edward Atkinson appealed to him to return to his early views and lead, if need be, dissatisfied Republicans in revolt. The term, "most splendid fight," is used only in comment on courage, on an argument ably sustained, and on an understanding of perils ahead. His speech on the tariff question, delivered in 1870 in Congress, is distinguished by an amount of exact information, by a balanced consideration of the varied interests of the country, and by a lack of vagueness which marks his speeches in later life. But his caution reasserted itself, and a few months later he was assuring Iowa Republicans of his orthodoxy in terms which would have satisfied a Pennsylvania protectionist. Such caution was a part of the price that he paid to enter the Senate.

The tariff question, so sensitive to changing technology, so provocative of sectional rivalries, was never solved by a happy and permanent compromise among the interests and passions of politics. As the surplus in the Treasury mounted in the early eighties and renewed resentment spread throughout the country, Allison began to prod his party colleagues for those moderate reductions calculated to appease the impending popular wrath. He asserted that he knew perfectly well the kind of tariff act he wanted and that the subterfuge of creating a tariff commission, which cleverly promised delays, violated the dictates of prudence, not to say his urgent convictions. But he agreed to a reduction of the excises, which gave the protectionists an advantage. Though he took little part in the debates on the tariff bill of 1883, he did oppose the rates on steel, sugar, and wool. This bill, which he probably disapproved, he defended

with the tricks of partisan oratory in the Iowa campaign of 1883. And the man who in 1870 had declared the tariff of 1846 the most perfect in the history of the country identified protection as one of the principles of the Revolutionary fathers.

Allison's somewhat moderate views on the tariff qualified him for useful party service in 1888. He reported out of the Finance Committee the Senate substitute for the Mills Bill. Though its rates may properly be called vicious, and though he treated with protectionists who were sending money to the doubtful State of Iowa, his leadership was designed to reassure the public of the self-restraint of chastened Republicans. In the excesses of 1890 he was brushed aside.

Since Allison had a sentimental attachment for silver, he found himself after 1893 in a position embarrassing to a gentleman of intellectual integrity. His devotion to silver was stronger than his convictions on the tariff. He attributed the disaster of that year to the very prospect of awkward Democratic revision of the tariff. This course gave McKinley, who was a more consistent protectionist, an advantage in the presidential campaign of 1896. Within a month after the election of that year, Allison gave out an interview opposing any considerable increase of duties. He mildly opposed the Dingley Bill in committee, but he later praised it for restoring prosperity.

His course on the tariff question during the first decade of the century was so true to form, so inconsistent, and so inconsequential except to aid his reelection as Senator, that the pertinent details should be sketched. One complicating factor intruded itself. The Iowa Republican convention of 1901 declared in a plank, about which he was certainly consulted, for a "modification of the tariff schedules that may be required to prevent their affording shelter to the monopoly." The next year he proposed a substantial repetition of this platform with a commitment to protection. At a White House conference he voted with the minority to take up the question of tariff revision. Yet he thought it unwise in 1905 to put iron and steel on the free list. The rivalry between him and Cummins seems to have caused him to rely more heavily upon the "standpat" element. The diluted tariff plank in 1906 presaged his advice the following year not to revise the tariff during a presidential campaign,



for it "should be revised as a business proposition"—a phrase which has more than once disguised the wolf.

Nor did Allison assert a vigorous leadership in the silver controversy. The compromise measure which he reported to the Senate as a substitute for the Bland Bill did not solve the problem caused by the appreciation of gold. He afterwards refused to acknowledge the defects of that act which Presidents Arthur and Cleveland both condemned. Indeed, he defended it with a touch of paternal pride in spite of the fact that George F. Edmunds treated him with that superior scorn usually shown by the advocates of "sound money" towards the silverites. While the Bland-Allison Act was in operation and under criticism, he sometimes blamed Democrats for proposing the free coinage of silver, for urging the repeal of the Bland-Allison Act, and for buying only the minimum required by law. His measure, he felt, was the wise and happy mean, and he was annoyed that his "western friends" failed "to appreciate the distinguished service I did there," for "that saved the country."

He assured his constituents in 1885 that silver was not a redundant specie and would not drive gold from the country, so happily was he unaware of the impending caprices of gold within the next ten years. He preferred that silver bullion purchased by the Treasury Department be coined rather than kept as a basis for silver certificates. But since public opinion seemed to require the certificates, he yielded on that point and defended it as a Republican policy. He thought that there was some peculiar virtue in the Republicans' providing a home market for the larger portion of silver produced in this country. Though he always held that bimetallism could be established only by international agreement, he did not aggressively lead public opinion in that direction. His vague reference to the "crime of '73" and his accusing the government of the United States of bad faith for failure to secure an international agreement remonetizing silver hardly increased the wisdom of the public. His own efforts at the Brussels Silver Conference were fruitless. He had no specific instructions, and his leadership of the American delegation was timid. He did not call his colleagues together before the opening of the Conference. Yet his labored apology in the Senate betrayed little embarrassment and no humor.

Allison's long career in Congress resembles that of Justin Smith Morrill both in its length and in its freedom from exciting contests.

But the latter's steady and candid support of protection and of "sound finance" was the opposite of Allison's shifting views on those questions. Nor is the reason for this difference far to seek. While Morrill represented a constituency fixed in its opinion, Allison had to adjust himself to popular changes. Rural Iowa Republicans after the defeat of the Grangers toyed with inflation and with revolt against protection and sheltered monopolies. Allison easily acquired the varied hues of this mixture of disillusionment and expectancy of a "boom community." Greater pride of intellect or more rigid views would certainly have brought defeat. His practical mind never hesitated between the attainable good which was whatever a majority wanted and the impossible best.

But he did not scruple to use devious means to influence this majority. Iowa editors were given the spoils of office, Eastern protectionists sent money to the State, and the railroads were a constant force whose interests were understood. Such were the materials he adapted to his own ends. If his course showed no punctilious sense of honor in supporting the popular cause against vested interests, it may be argued that he was convinced of the identity of the public and vested interests.

An element of success, however, lay in his self-restraint. His sole desire was to remain in the Senate. Nothing higher attracted him. His chastened ambition never caused him to neglect Iowa politics. Success did not turn his head.

Allison had less pride of intellect than Elihu Root or Thomas B. Reed. He violated less openly the forms of popular government than did Platt and Quay. He was less frankly the instrument of privilege than John C. Spooner and Nelson W. Aldrich. His mediocrity and moderation the more certainly indicate the effectiveness of the political methods upon which he relied. Without commanding qualities of inventive intellect or resolute courage, unembarrassed by positive convictions, he followed the current of public opinion so skillfully that his long career depended upon the nice adjustment of political details to which his deft hands and wakeful, if pedestrian, mind so readily lent themselves.

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This study is based mainly upon the following: *Allison Papers*; this collection numbers 525 cases of which 377 are devoted to personal and political correspondence; in addition to these there are other



*Allison Papers* which fill a box of considerable size, and which had not yet been systematically arranged when examined; *The Allison Papers* are composed chiefly of letters to William Boyd Allison.

He seems to have been a poor letter writer and to have put his views on paper with painful difficulty. The political correspondence is chiefly concerned with patronage. There are a few biographical sketches, clippings, and speeches. The *Dodge Records* is a large collection of the papers of Grenville M. Dodge, among which were consulted twenty-one bound volumes of copies of letters and of notes, selected and copied under his direction. The *Kirkwood Correspondence* contains letters from and to Samuel J. Kirkwood. The above are in the Archives of the State Historical Department of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa. Permission to use them was granted by Curator Edgar R. Harlan to whom the author acknowledges his obligation. Mr. Lee McNeeley, of Dubuque, Iowa, private secretary to Allison for a time, has a few valuable letters and clippings, the use of which he kindly granted.

In addition newspapers, public documents, and local histories were consulted.

## THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF BELGIUM 1813-1839\*

By HOWARD RICHMOND ANDERSON

The large plain of northern Europe is divided into two areas: the German, drained by rivers running from south to north into the North Sea and the Baltic; the French, whose waters run from east to west into the Atlantic Ocean. These wide expanses are connected by a narrow plain, less than one hundred miles wide from Namur to Ostend, which, from the continental point of view serves the same purpose as the Strait of Dover off its northern coast. Belgium not only is situated on this natural highway, but in addition the Strait is in such close proximity to the continental narrows that the natural route from Great Britain to central Europe crosses the natural route from France to Germany, making Belgium in truth, "the cross-roads of Europe."

During the Middle Ages the great danger to Flanders arose from the expansionist policies of the French kings. In consequence there occurred as early as 1187 an example of what was to become the traditional policy of the Low Countries—dependence upon England for support against France. On more than one occasion in the years that followed, the plan of neutralizing Belgium was proposed only to be set aside because of the exigencies of European politics. The repeated aggressions of Louis XIV, however, finally convinced British statesmen of the necessity of devising some plan for safeguarding the Low Countries. The result was a series of barrier treaties, tripartite agreements between Great Britain, the United Provinces, and the Emperor, guaranteeing the inviolability of the Belgian frontier. This arrangement never proved satisfactory. At the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession, the Dutch government withdrew the garrisons from the barrier fortresses in order to maintain its neutrality during that struggle. The alliance between Austria

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor George Gordon Andrews



and France, and the breakup of the Anglo-Dutch alliance during the war for American independence, made the whole scheme out of the question.

The amazing victories of the French during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era left Great Britain powerless to defend the Scheldt estuary and the neighboring coast. In the course of the negotiations leading up to the second and third coalitions, however, British statesmen repeatedly proposed the annexation of Belgium to either the Netherlands or Prussia in order to establish a powerful barrier state. When disaster overtook Napoleon in the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, the allied powers came to an agreement that Belgium and the Netherlands should be united under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange. Following the final overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo this union was consummated. At the same time, under the immediate supervision of the Duke of Wellington, the work was begun of repairing and modernizing the chain of twenty-five fortresses along the French frontier. The expense of this undertaking amounted to more than £7,250,000, and was financed in almost equal proportions from the French indemnity, from contributions of the Netherland government, and from sums donated by Great Britain. This was the price British statesmen were willing to pay to secure the Low Countries against French aggression, and thereby insure the security and maritime supremacy of Great Britain.

It proved far easier to declare the people of Belgium and the Netherlands formally united under one ruler than to make them in any real sense citizens of a single country. Dutchmen and Belgians remained divided because of differences in their historic evolution, in their language and religion, and in their economic life and principles. A desire for self-government had been instilled in the Belgians at the time of the French Revolution. Though thwarted in 1815, it operated with increasing strength throughout the period of union with the Netherlands. When a whole nation is disaffected because of grievances too long endured, little is needed to provoke an open revolt. In this case the impetus to revolution came from the "July days" in Paris which drove the Bourbons into exile. The rioting first broke out in Brussels but rapidly swept through the southern provinces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The garrisons of both Dutch and Belgian soldiers in the barrier fortresses soon became untrustworthy. In consequence the revolutionists gained con-

trol of all but four of these strongholds within a period of a few weeks. The Netherlands were wide open to invasion by France. The barrier plan had failed to meet even the challenge of a revolution.

At the outset the Belgians would have been satisfied with a grant of self-government under William of Orange, thus making their union with the Netherlands merely personal. The Dutch king, loath to grant concessions, appealed to the powers—Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia—to consider the problem of restoring tranquility in the southern provinces of the kingdom. The Belgian provisional government, in turn, urged France to enforce the principle of non-intervention, and sought to negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance between the two countries.

The outbreak of a general war seemed imminent. That it was averted may be attributed primarily to the improved relations between France and Great Britain. Louis Philippe and his trusted adviser, Talleyrand, perceived clearly that the Orleans dynasty must enjoy a period of peace in order to become firmly established. The intervention of the powers in Belgium would precipitate a revolution in France; the intervention of France in that country would be the signal for the renewal of the Quadruple Alliance, to be followed by a general war. The only solution to the dilemma was non-intervention. Great Britain, at the same time, was groaning under a huge debt incurred during the Napoleonic wars, and was seething with unrest. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that these two powers came to an agreement that the affairs of Belgium should be discussed at an international conference. The British government also refused to grant the request of the King of the Netherlands for armed intervention. The stand taken by Great Britain greatly influenced the other powers. Metternich held that it was the mission of Austria to meet the expected revolutionary outbreak in Italy. Prussia, guided by her peace-loving king, was disinclined to act alone, or even to act in concert with other powers unless France sought to extend her boundaries. Russia alone armed for war, but the outbreak of a revolution in Poland put an end to Russian intervention and intrigue, and compelled Nicholas I to use all the military resources at his command against the luckless Poles.

Even though all the powers came to favor a peaceful solution of the Belgian question, the future status of the barrier fortresses raised an



issue which would militate against perfect coöperation. Under no circumstances could France accept a plan whereby these strongholds would be garrisoned by any soldiers other than Belgians. Indeed to this country the happiest solution was to raze some or all of the fortresses. The other powers, though unable for the moment to devise any plan which seemed altogether satisfactory, were naturally reluctant to surrender entirely the idea of a barrier against their former enemy. Logically enough, Louis Philippe favored the establishment of an independent Belgium, and, in order to make his plan acceptable to the other powers, urged the candidacy of the Prince of Orange, the eldest son of the King of the Netherlands, for the new throne. This scheme was ruined by the precipitate haste of the newly elected Belgian National Congress in voting the exclusion of all members of the House of Orange from the succession. To complicate the situation further, this body also voted in favor of establishing a Kingdom of Belgium which would include Luxemburg within its frontiers. The question of boundaries thus raised was certain to provoke the ire of both the Netherlands and Prussia.

In the meantime the plenipotentiaries of the powers, assembled in London, were putting forth every effort to arrange an armistice between the warring factions. The Belgian provisional government conditionally accepted the terms proposed, but the King of the Netherlands, hoping to gain some military advantage, continued his dilatory and provocative tactics. In order to speed a peaceful settlement, the London Conference, on December 20, 1830, formally recognized the independence of Belgium, and announced its determination to proceed immediately to a consideration of the details involved in the final separation of the two countries. The powers took this step not only because they were in agreement that intervention was out of the question, but also in order to silence the military party in France which was openly declaring its opposition to any settlement which would not permit a future union of Belgium with France. The action of the conference was perfectly acceptable to Louis Philippe and Talleyrand inasmuch as it indirectly weakened the barrier, and at the same time tended to restrain the jingoes who constituted a serious menace to the Orleans monarchy.

The situation both in France and Belgium, however, continued critical. The French war party demanded that the king approve the candidacy of his son, the Duc de Nemours, for the Belgian throne.

The Belgian radicals, hoping thereby to gain French support for uniting Luxemburg to Belgium, favored the same candidate. When the French government persisted in refusing its sanction to this mad scheme, the radicals in both countries transferred their allegiance to the Duc de Leuchtenberg, the son of Eugene Beauharnais. Even the Belgian National Congress was affected; it became increasingly blunt in its communications with the London Conference; it insisted on its right to annex Luxemburg; and refused to suspend military operations against the Dutch.

Fearful lest an act of aggression might lead to a general war, Palmerston, the British foreign secretary, persuaded the other plenipotentiaries that the best policy would be to neutralize Belgium in the interests of peace. This proposal meeting with comparatively little opposition, the London Conference on January 20, 1831, issued a protocol which stipulated in part, "Belgium will form a neutral state in perpetuity. The five Powers guarantee her this perpetual neutrality, as well as the integrity and inviolability of her territory. . . ." Although the plan of neutralization was Palmerston's, Talleyrand, who as French ambassador in London represented his country at the Conference, perceived that it offered distinct advantages to France. Just as the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands favored France by weakening the barrier erected against her, so the neutralization of Belgium favored that country by guaranteeing her a friendly neighbor. So long as France herself respected Belgian neutrality, she could, in the event of war with either Prussia or Great Britain, count on whichever of these countries was at peace to be as greatly interested as herself in preserving this neutrality.

Having decided on the neutralization of Belgium, the London Conference proceeded to outline the fundamental conditions of the separation of the two countries. Generally speaking these terms favored the Netherlands at the expense of Belgium, and consequently were speedily accepted by King William. The Belgian National Congress meanwhile sought to further the interests of that country by threatening to elect the Duc de Leuchtenberg to the kingship. The real intention was not so much to choose this Bonapartist prince as to compel the French government to agree to the candidacy of the Duc de Nemours in order to head it off. In this way, the Belgians reasoned, they might enlist the aid of France in the securing of more favorable terms of separation. Again, the French government was



confronted by a cruel dilemma. Fearful of revolution at home, French statesmen sounded the powers on the question of Duc de Nemours' candidacy. Meeting with opposition in every quarter, Louis Philippe was compelled definitely to reject the crown offered his son.

For a time conditions in Belgium bordered upon anarchy. Gradually the statesmen of that country became convinced that the London Conference could not be ignored. They came to realize also that more favorable terms of separation could be obtained only by conciliating Great Britain which resented the continued intrigues looking toward the union of Belgium and France. Diagnosing the situation in this fashion, many of the Belgian leaders came to favor the candidacy of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. This prince had been the husband of the late Princess Charlotte, and was British in everything but birth. The new plan of the Belgian National Congress was essentially to make the election of Prince Leopold to the kingship contingent on obtaining more favorable terms of separation. Sensing the advantage of such an arrangement to his country, Palmerston, the British plenipotentiary, prevailed upon the Conference to draw up a new series of proposals for the separation of Belgium and the Netherlands. These new terms proved acceptable to the Belgian National Congress, and the very day following their ratification Leopold was elected King of the Belgians. The situation was truly perplexing. Belgium had ignored the original terms of separation, but had accepted the new terms and had elected a king. The Netherlands, which had accepted the original conditions proposed by the conference, now rejected the new terms and refused to recognize Prince Leopold.

The King of the Netherlands proceeded to untangle this Gordian knot in a manner which might have been expected from a soldier who had fought in the Napoleonic wars. Early in August the Dutch armies streamed across the frontiers, sweeping everything before them. Their victorious march was arrested only because the French government, in response to the plea made by Leopold, ordered an army corps into Belgium.

If possible the Belgian question was in a worse muddle than ever. The relations of the Netherlands and Belgium had been complicated. Now a French army was in Belgium. The very thing which British statesmen dreaded had transpired. Worst of all, the French government, having lost caste in the dispute over the Duc de Nemours' candidacy, seemed inclined to insist on the demolition of the barrier

fortresses as the price for their evacuation of Belgian territory. Although the Conference, realizing the impracticability of requiring Belgium to keep up a huge military establishment, had agreed in principle to the demolition of certain of these fortresses, yet the plenipotentiaries of the four powers now refused to associate the question of the withdrawal of the French troops with that of the eventual demolition of the barrier posts. Though the question of the fortresses was a vital one both to the French and British, the former were compelled to yield. By the end of September the French troops had withdrawn from Belgium.

In order to speed the final separation of Belgium and the Netherlands, the London Conference asked these two countries to communicate their suggestions for a definitive treaty. In response to this request, the former country submitted the terms accepted at the time of the election of Leopold to the kingship; the latter those embodied in the original proposal by the Conference. Despairing of reaching a settlement in this manner, the London Conference itself then proceeded to draw up a series of articles to serve as a definitive treaty between the two countries. These new terms were communicated on October 14, 1831, and in the words of the Conference were declared to be "final and irrevocable."

The promulgation of the new terms of settlement provoked indignant protests from both the interested parties. This fact is the best evidence that the new arrangement was in reality a compromise between the terms outlined in the first and second proposals made by the Conference. Bringing heavy pressure to bear on the Belgian government, the powers soon obtained the ratification of that state in the treaty of November 15, 1831. The King of the Netherlands, on the other hand, refused to yield, confident that the eastern powers would never resort to force to coerce him.

For about a year the London Conference made fruitless efforts to initiate direct negotiations between Belgium and the Netherlands concerning the points in dispute. With the domestic question of parliamentary reform distracting the attention of Great Britain, no power was vitally interested in bringing the negotiations to a close. Upon the enactment of the reform bill of 1832, however, Palmerston, the British minister of foreign affairs, again was able to concentrate his energy upon effecting a solution of the Belgian question. The Belgian government having signified its willingness to engage in direct nego-



tiations, though without prejudice to the terms outlined in the treaty of November 15, 1831, and the Netherland government having refused to participate in such discussions, the Conference once again faced a crisis. The Belgians having yielded everything that might reasonably be expected of them, the only thing to do was to coerce the Netherlands. The plenipotentiaries of the three eastern powers forthwith announced the refusal of their countries to act in conjunction with France and Great Britain in such an undertaking.

Despite this lack of coöperation, Palmerston and Talleyrand, on the evening of October 22, 1832, signed a convention whereby their respective countries bound themselves to carry into effect the terms of the treaty which the plenipotentiaries of the five powers had signed nearly a year before. The great task confronting the two powers was to compel the Dutch to evacuate the citadel of Antwerp which they had held since the early days of the Belgian Revolution. This was accomplished by a French army acting in coöperation with a British fleet which blockaded the coast of the Netherlands. Before the end of the year the military operations of the French had been brought to a successful close, but the Dutch government nevertheless persisted in its policy of ignoring the treaty of November 15, and just as stubbornly refused to open the Scheldt to navigation. The ruinous Anglo-French blockade, however, finally compelled the Dutch to seek a temporary settlement, even though their king still refused to ratify the definitive treaty. The convention of May 21, 1833, greatly favored Belgium in that it safeguarded that country from invasion, and secured to it the commercial advantages necessary for prosperity. It even permitted the occupation of the disputed territory in Luxemburg and the non-payment of interest on the common debt until such a time as the King of the Netherlands might see fit to yield.

For nearly six years Belgium was left to enjoy the advantageous terms of this convention. During this period, however, the government signally failed to consolidate its international position. Serious quarrels grew out of the complicated situation in the Duchy of Luxemburg. This territory was provisionally held by the Belgians. At the same time it made up a part of the ancestral domain of William of Orange; constituted a part of the Germanic Confederation; and housed a Prussian garrison in its chief fortress. Another quarrel developed out of the Belgian plans for fortifying the northeastern

frontier in order to meet any possible aggression on the part of the Netherlands. Prussia held that Belgium's fears were groundless inasmuch as that state was neutral and its neutrality was guaranteed by the powers. The German states in general felt that Belgium's attitude on the academic question of defense depended largely upon whether the fortifications affected were built along the French or the German frontier. Even though Belgium was within its rights, there can be no doubt that she gave the impression of being motivated by pro-French considerations in matters of foreign policy. During the period 1833 to 1839, the people of the Netherlands, oppressed by the financial burdens imposed upon them anxiously looked forward to the time when the Belgian question would finally be settled.

On March 14, 1838, the King of the Netherlands, at last convinced of the futility of further delay, announced his willingness to accept the terms outlined in the treaty of November 15, 1831. Now it was the turn of Belgium to seek to delay the final settlement. The neutralized state received little encouragement. The three eastern powers were distinctly prejudiced against her. Great Britain, now the ally of France in name only, was interested largely in maintaining Belgian independence. The only point on which Palmerston was inclined to yield was in the matter of scaling down the terms of the debt settlement. This was done because Belgium, in resisting the provocative policy pursued by the King of the Netherlands had been compelled to make heavy expenditures for military purposes. France, acting alone, made a final effort to persuade a Dutch government to reopen negotiations in order to arrange a territorial settlement acceptable to Belgium. When confronted by the refusal of the Netherlands government and the united opposition of the other powers, there was nothing left for France to do but to yield.

Realizing the hopelessness of resistance, the Belgian government communicated its acceptance of the final settlement, on April 19, 1839. That very day the plenipotentiaries formally signed the treaties which embodied the final solution of the Belgian question. By the terms of these treaties Belgium became an independent and perpetually neutral state under the guarantee of the five great powers. Neutrality, as the union with the Netherlands at an earlier period, was imposed largely at the instance of Great Britain, desirous always of keeping France at a distance from the territory around the mouth of the Scheldt. Barrier fortresses and a barrier state had proved impotent



and impracticable; perhaps "neutralization in the interest of peace" would prove more effective.

It is an anomaly of history that France shared with Great Britain the rôle of champion of Belgian rights in the period 1830 to 1839. Yet in the final analysis, a neutral Belgium was to prove as favorable to French interests as to British. Though neutrality doubtlessly was in the real interest of their country, the Belgians had not wished it. Realizing the dangers his native land might be called upon to face, Sylvain van de Weyer, the Belgian statesman, remarked caustically, "The neutrality of Belgium is *guaranteed*, without doubt, but guaranteed by what? By a treaty. Are there no examples of treaties of a most sacred nature that have been violated?"

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This study, based on materials available in this country, discloses gaps in the sources not consulted: (1) materials in the archives of the European powers, (2) the journals of the period, and (3) private correspondence of the statesmen and leaders of that day. The seriousness of these deficiencies is lessened considerably because much of the official correspondence relating to the Belgian question was printed and because complete files of several contemporary magazines and periodicals are readily available in the United States.

The most important sources for the study of the negotiations leading to the union of Belgium and the Netherlands, and for the work of the London Conference were *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vols. I to XX, and the complete collection of treaties edited by Martens, *Recueil de traités*, Tomes III-VIII, *Nouveau recueil de traités*, Tomes I-XVI, and *Nouveau suppléments au recueil de traités*, Tomes I-III. The parliamentary debates of Great Britain and France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Third Series, Vols. I to VI, and *Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860*, Deuxième Série, Tomes LXVII-CXXIII, are valuable also largely because of the facts brought out at the times when the opposition would challenge the policies of the ministry.

Two British statesmen greatly influenced developments in Belgium in the period 1813 to 1839. Castlereagh was largely responsible for the union of Belgium and the Netherlands; Wellington was responsible for the construction of the barrier fortresses during the years 1815 to 1830 and was head of the British ministry at the outbreak of the Belgian Revolution. It is not strange therefore that a wealth of material bearing on the Belgian question is to be found in the *Cor-*

*response, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh*, Vols. IX to XII, the *Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*, Vols. VII and VIII, and the *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*, Vols. XI and XII.

Talleyrand, too, played a leading rôle in the negotiations leading to the independence and neutralization of Belgium. A valuable though prejudiced account of his efforts may be found in his *Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand*, Vols. II to V, which also contain generous extracts from his correspondence. The part played by Palmerston in the neutralization of Belgium may be inferred from reading Bulwer, *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston: with Selections from His Diaries and Correspondence*. Two other great European statesmen have left some record of the part they played in this drama: Metternich in the *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, Vols. I and V, and Nesselrode in the *Lettres et papiers de chancelier comte de Nesselrode*, Tome VII.

It often happens that lesser personalities can throw a clear light on certain details of a long series of events. For this reason the writings of Jean L. Joseph Lebeau who urged the candidacy of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg to the Belgian throne, and of Stockmar who had the confidence of this prince are important. These are to be found in the *Souvenirs personnels et correspondance diplomatique de Joseph Lebeau* and in the *Memoirs of Baron Stockmar*, Vol. I.

The devious rôle played by Russia in the period following the overthrow of Napoleon is revealed in Aleksandr A. Polovtsoff, *Correspondance diplomatique des ambassadeurs et ministres de Russie en France et de France en Russie avec leurs gouvernements de 1814 a 1830*, Tomes I-III. The stand taken by this power in the Belgian question is revealed in the curiously frank correspondence of the wife of the Russian ambassador in London with the head of the British ministry as printed in the volumes edited by Alfred G. Le Strange, *Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey*, Vols. II and III. This charming Russian betrays other confidences in the following volumes: *Letters of Dorothea, Princess Lieven, during Her Residence in London, 1812-1834*, and in *The Unpublished Diary and Political Sketches of Princess Lieven*.

Various articles and news items are to be found in the volumes of the following magazines published during the period under consid-



eration: *Edinburgh Review*, *Westminster Review*, *Blackwood's Magazine*, *Foreign Quarterly Review*, *Frasier's Magazine*, *Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle*, and the *London and Westminster Review*. Penetrating yearly summaries of conditions in Belgium are found in *The Annual Register*, Vols. XXVII to LXXXI. A graphic account of the strife between Belgium and the Netherlands is contained in the writings of a British diplomatic agent who was on the scene—White, *The Belgic Revolution*, 2 Vols.

# ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN THE FAR EAST 1895-1905\*

By WILLIS GEORGE SWARTZ

The present significance of the Far Eastern Problem in relation to contemporary international ills is universally recognized. Numerous treatises relative to the "Opium War," the Sino-Japanese conflict, the Boxer Movement, the Russo-Japanese struggle, the Revolution of 1911, all attest the importance of this background.

Hitherto, however, scarcely more than passing reference has been made to the militant rivalry in eastern Asia between Great Britain and Russia, particularly during the decade from Shimonoseki to Portsmouth. An inadequate treatment of this important subject may be due to several factors. For one thing, the antagonism between Briton and Slav did not lead to a formal military conflict, with the result that it was overshadowed by the more spectacular struggles of 1894-1895, 1900-1901, and 1904-1905. To this may be added that only with the publication of the British, German, and Russian documents relating to pre-war diplomacy have the most striking details of the Anglo-Russian rivalry been brought to light.

The aim of the present study is an adequate portrayal of the Far Eastern relations of Great Britain and Russia, as revealed in contemporary documents, periodicals, and newspapers. Too broad to be encompassed in a single monograph, this study has been confined to the period 1895-1905—the decade when Anglo-Russian rivalry reached its climax. The Japan-China War, the "battle of concessions," the Boxer uprising, the struggle over Manchuria, the Russo-Japanese War—all were profoundly influenced by the jealousy and antagonism between Russia and Great Britain. This significant relationship justifies such a study.

Great Britain was the first offender in the modern invasion of the Celestial Empire when, by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, she acquired Hongkong and the neighboring territory of Kowloon. Russia

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Harry Grant Plum.



followed in 1858-1860 with the acquisition of the extensive area north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri rivers. During the eighties the scene shifted briefly to Korea, where Great Britain joined China in opposing both Russian and Japanese aggression. By seizing the strategically important island of Port Hamilton the British succeeded in halting temporarily the Russian avalanche, but the Japanese inroads continued and resulted in the Japan-China war of 1894-1895.

During this brief struggle the British policy was indecisive and unstable, with the result that her prestige in eastern Asia suffered a notable decline. At the beginning of October, and again in November, Great Britain proposed intervention by the powers; but by March, when France, Germany, and Russia were prepared to intervene, the British government declined to support any form of coercion against the Japanese. In European capitals this action on the part of Great Britain was viewed as disloyal; actually the London government had merely concluded that intervention was no longer necessary or desirable. Despite this deflection on Britain's part, the triumvirate of Russia, France, and Germany, proceeded to coerce the Japanese into returning the Liaotung Peninsula to China, upon the payment of an additional Chinese indemnity. Although Great Britain advised Japan to accede to the demands of the Dreibund, the successful intervention of Russia on this occasion marks an abrupt reversal of British policy toward Japan, from one of opposition to aggression against China to one of friendship and support against Russia in Manchuria and Korea.

The period immediately following Shimonoseki found Japan dominant in Korea and Russia supreme in Peking. British influence in the Celestial Empire had suffered a decided eclipse by virtue of her own failure and Russia's success in averting serious Chinese territorial losses. Count Cassini, Russia's shrewd representative in Peking, was now in a position to obtain far-reaching concessions from his country, but Great Britain's fiery-tempered Sir Nicholas O'Connor chafed in vain under Britain's new position of inferiority. However, beyond securing the first loan to China toward meeting her Japanese indemnity, the Russians for several months wisely refrained from any overt attempts to capitalize her recent assistance to China. A second Chinese loan was permitted to go to an Anglo-German syndicate, after a feeble Franco-Russian effort had failed through lack of confidence on the part of Parisian financiers.

In Korea Russia seemed content to see Japan make herself predominant at Seoul. This indifference of Russia might have continued indefinitely had Japan used her power in Korea wisely. But the assassination of the hostile Korean Queen by Japanese officers forfeited foreign respect and drove the terrified King into the arms of Russia. When the Korean monarch in February, 1896, sought and obtained refuge in the Russian legation at Seoul, the dominant position in the Hermit Kingdom shifted automatically to the same place. To be sure, Russia used her predominance wisely, and was even criticized for not taking advantage of her opportunities. Nevertheless valuable concessions were obtained, especially in timber cutting, which were to become highly important later.

In St. Petersburg the plan was developing as early as August, 1895, for the concession from China of the right to construct the Trans-Siberian Railway across a portion of Manchuria, in order to avoid the longer and more mountainous route beyond the Amur. During autumn of that year engineers and surveyors were busy studying the Manchurian terrain to determine the most favorable right-of-way through the province. Their investigations were completed by February, 1896, and Count Cassini was instructed to open negotiations with the Chinese. Unfortunately, one of the Russians sent to assist in the *pourparlers* became ill and the negotiations were postponed for several months.

Meanwhile, China had been invited by Russia to send a suitable representative to attend the coronation of the young Tsar Nicholas II at Moscow in May, 1896. Through adroit maneuvering on Russia's part, Li Hung Chang, known to be a Russophil, and the one whom, as negotiator at Shimonoseki, Russia had saved from humiliation through the three-power intervention, was chosen for this mission. Upon his arrival at Moscow, it was decided to transfer the Cassini negotiations to Russia. In the ensuing *pourparlers* the Russians urged the railway concession as a guarantee of China's future integrity against Japan, in that the improved transportation facilities would permit the rapid transit of Russian troops into the zone of Sino-Japanese military operations. The Chinese envoy not only accepted this proposition but also agreed to a formal Russo-Chinese alliance, whereby each country was to assist the other against any future Japanese aggression. Russia's supremacy in China now appeared complete. The fact was, however, that the alliance proved to be



hardly more than a mere formality and, for all practical purposes, inoperative.

Just as in the case of Russia, the stirring events of 1894-1895 in the Far East had inspired Germany with the desire for a strategic and commercial foothold on the Chinese coast. In the summer of 1897 German representatives cleverly secured the Tsar's consent to the appropriation of Kiaochow Bay, and in the following November the murder of two German Catholic missionaries supplied the necessary excuse for an enforced lease of the port. Count Muraviev, Russia's foreign minister, protested in vain that Russia had a prior claim on Tsingtao. The Tsar's government proceeded to anchor its Pacific fleet at Port Arthur.

Great Britain accepted the German *fâit accompli* but became genuinely alarmed over Russia's "temporary" anchorage at Port Arthur. It was rumored that the English and Japanese had arrived at some sort of an understanding to check the Russian advance on Korea and Peking, but the Salisbury government preferred, first of all, to negotiate directly with Russia. Accordingly, in February, 1898, the Russian officials were startled by a British proposal for a mutual settlement of all Asiatic differences between the two governments. The Tsar and his ministers displayed an encouraging interest in the proposition, and the negotiations continued for several weeks, until brought to an abrupt close by the Russian lease of Port Arthur and the neighboring commercial port of Talienwan. To offset the advantages thus gained by her Russian rival, Great Britain obtained a lease of Wei-hai-wei, on terms similar to those of Russia at Port Arthur. Nevertheless, the Russians had won another decided victory.

The Queen's government had been compelled by Germany's and Russia's forward policies in China to make a wide departure from her traditional policy in eastern Asia. Consistently opposed in the past to anything that smacked of partition or special privileges in that region, Britain was now participating in a partition, as well as recognizing Germany's special economic interests in the Shantung. Many in Great Britain felt that a firmness toward Russia as displayed toward France in the Fashoda crisis, would have saved the Liaotung for China. Others, like Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, declared their readiness to withdraw all opposition to Russian domination in Manchuria and to concentrate British efforts toward preventing further Muscovite aggression. In this connection Mr. Chamberlain

openly advocated an alliance with Germany or the United States, in order to protect more effectively the interests and prestige of Great Britain. Thus, the leasing of Port Arthur by Russia was an important factor in Britain's increasing determination to end her "splendid isolation."

Up to this point the St. Petersburg government had been uniformly successful in its political and naval programs in the Far East. Nor was this all. A corresponding success had been attained in the realm of commerce and finance, largely under the superb leadership of Count Witte who developed the plan for a Russo-Chinese bank, as a convenient agency for promoting the policy of "peaceful penetration." As a supposedly private institution, the bank thus organized was able to obtain concessions, such as the branch railway from the Trans-Siberian line to Port Arthur, which could not possibly have been secured by the Russian government directly. Thanks to its capable management, the new banking institution was soon on the road to obtain a monopoly control of commerce and finances in the northern Chinese provinces.

The recognition of this new economic menace, on the part of British traders and financiers, led to an active demand for effective action in London. Consequently, a special commissioner was despatched to eastern Asia to investigate conditions. In Manchuria and adjacent provinces the same story was repeated everywhere: British commercial interests were declining constantly in the face of the advancing Muscovite. Indeed, the Russians did not conceal their determination to obtain an economic monopoly in northern China. When, therefore, China negotiated a railway loan of £2,300,000 with certain British banks, the Tsar's representatives protested against any such financial activities by Great Britain in the Manchurian area.

In a further effort to prevent further British railway activities in North China, the St. Petersburg government in the summer of 1898 proposed a joint understanding with Great Britain, in which each country should agree to recognize and respect the other's special sphere of interest—Russia in Manchuria and Britain in the Yangtze Valley. The Queen's ministers tried in vain to have the scope of the agreement extended to include all specific disputes then pending over railway matters in China. After much delay and negotiation, an agreement was concluded in April, 1899, whereby Great Britain undertook not to finance or construct railways north of the Great Wall, and Russia prom-



ised the same with respect to the Yangtze Valley. The importance of this agreement cannot be overestimated. Li Hung Chang referred to it as the "Partition of China" in that it marked the extension of the idea of the "sphere-of-interest" to financial and commercial affairs. Nevertheless, it did not prevent further railway disputes between Britain and Russia. The latter was accused of being a participant in the Peking-Hankow railway project, as well as of negotiating for the right to build a road from the Manchurian Railway to Peking.

This growing economic and political rivalry among the powers in China was undoubtedly an outstanding factor leading to the anti-foreign aspects of the Boxer movement. The occasion found Great Britain deeply involved in the South African war and Russian officials anxious to secure advantages and privileges in China. Because of their relative proximity, Russia and Japan were in a position to anticipate the other powers in sending relief to the besieged legations in Peking and Tientsin. The British were afraid lest Russia would take advantage of such a contingency to extend her control over China. Consequently, the London government urged the granting of a special mandate to the Japanese, whereby they could send a large enough force to suppress the uprising. Week after week passed, with the plight of the besieged foreigners becoming increasingly more desperate. Still, Russia persistently refused to approve the British proposal, until the Tsar's government was in a position to despatch an equal or superior force into the northern provinces. When it had become evident that the struggle was destined to be a long and bitter one, and an international army was assembled near the scene of the uprising, the British and Russian statesmen retarded the rescue activities still further by wrangling over the leadership of the combined armed forces. Both powers wanted the honor and the German Emperor eventually took advantage of the ensuing rivalry to secure the appointment of a German as generalissimo.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that every attempt to cope with the Boxer menace was colored and hampered by Anglo-Russian antagonism. But chiefly it was Russia who stood at cross-purposes with all the other allied powers, except possibly France. Nor was Russia at all consistent in her behavior. As soon as the Peking legations were relieved, the Tsar's representatives insisted on the withdrawal of the allied troops and legations to Tientsin. Yet, all the

while Russian troops were pouring by the thousands into the defenseless province of Manchuria. In fact, the Tsar's forces assumed military control of all Chinese territory and railways north of Peking. British railway managers and their staffs were turned out in favor of Russians, and British railway materials were seized in large quantities.

To understand England's position during this crisis, it must be remembered that she was still engrossed in the South African War, and besides was forced to cope with Russian advances in central Asia. She had already abandoned Manchuria to Russian economic supremacy and believing, like other powers, that the inevitable break-up of China was impending, was anxious to preserve the Yangtze Valley for herself. For Russia to secure complete military control of Manchuria, and more particularly of the province of Chili to the south, was to endanger very seriously Britain's position in the Yangtze. To strengthen its position against further Russian encroachments the London government negotiated the so-called Yangtze agreement of October, 1900. Therefore, when the Germans "altered it to make it agreeable to Russia by excluding Manchuria from its operation," British statesmen were "not very much in love" with the agreement.

Although the Germans told the Russians in January, 1901, that they could go as far as they liked in Manchuria, the Tsar's foreign office maintained emphatically its intention to evacuate that province as soon as circumstances would permit. In this, however, the foreign office officials failed to give sufficient consideration to the plans of the militarists and other imperialists. Even Count Witte insisted upon a special Russian priority in all railway, mining, or industrial enterprises in the northern provinces of China. In the face of this combined military and commercial menace, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States formed what amounted to a triple alliance against Russia. At the same time, the London government entered into serious negotiations for alliance with Germany and Japan. The *pour-parlers* with Germany were unfruitful, but those with Japan were to culminate, a year later, in an alliance.

As a matter of fact, Germany considered her interests in the Far East as only secondary, whereas those of Japan were more directly involved. The Japanese were willing to fight Russia in order to preserve Korean integrity, provided they were assured of English and German neutrality. Consequently, the British tried in vain to secure



Germany's promise to warn France, in the event of war, to remain neutral. Nevertheless, the manifold evidence of foreign hostility led the Russians to modify considerably their demands upon China, and for a time to drop the negotiations entirely. At the same time, the foreign opposition to Russia strengthened the determination of the Chinese not to make any far-reaching concessions to St. Petersburg. When, therefore, the Russians reopened the negotiations with China, the Peking government made haste to notify Great Britain and Japan. The receipt of this news hastened the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The Japanese made it clear that their interests in Manchuria were only secondary and their chief concern was the protection of their interests in Korea. The British were particularly anxious to secure Japanese support in protecting India. Thus, the outcome of the negotiations really turned on the question of India. The Japanese were unwilling to have the scope of the alliance extend beyond the Yangtze Valley. In the end the British gave way. In doing so, they were influenced to a considerable extent by what appeared to be an effort to reach a Russo-Japanese understanding. The announcement of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a profound shock to Russia. She immediately declared her own adherence to the terms of the alliance, yet attempted at the same time to secure French and German support to a counter-declaration. Germany refused, but France permitted Russia to issue a notice to the effect that the scope of the Dual Alliance was thereby extended to the Far East. The net result of the Anglo-Japanese treaty was the conclusion of a Russo-Chinese agreement, whereby Russia agreed to evacuate Manchuria within eighteen months.

Had the Russians lived up to the agreement of April, 1902, further complications need not have developed. The truth was, however, that the extreme military group in St. Petersburg had found a new excuse for aggression in supporting the new timber-cutting enterprise on the Yalu River. The irresolute Tsar was easily won over to the Korean project, with the result that the evacuation of Manchuria, as provided in the Russo-Chinese agreement, was not completed. Indeed, the Russians even went so far as to revive their demands for a monopoly control over Manchuria. The British and Japanese viewed these activities with growing apprehension. Their respective governments, acting with the United States, induced the Chinese to reject

the new demands, and admonished the Russians for their perfidy. In the face of this opposition, the Tsar's representatives withdrew their demands one by one until few were left. While the British and Americans were inclined to be satisfied with these economic concessions, the Japanese were concerned primarily with strategic considerations—particularly as they applied to Korea.

The Japanese, in fact, were becoming greatly alarmed over the new Russian activities in the Hermit Kingdom. Especially alarming were the Russian demands for a railway concession from Seoul to the Yalu and a lease of Yongampo at the mouth of the Yalu. When the Japanese, in desperation, submitted what amounted to an ultimatum to the Korean government in order to forestall those concessions, the Tsar decided in June, 1903, to open negotiations with Japan. Great Britain, of course, was directly concerned in this struggle, because the Anglo-Japanese Alliance included within its scope the territorial integrity of Korea, and the British might therefore be drawn into a Russo-Japanese war.

The negotiations dragged on through the summer and autumn of 1903 while Japan kept both Great Britain and America constantly informed on all developments. The attitude of British statesmen during this critical period is especially noteworthy. Constant pressure was brought to bear on Tokyo to prevent any modification of their demands. This was unnecessary in the case of Korea, because of that country's primary interest to Japan. But with Manchuria it was different. Japan's interests there being only secondary, the Mikado's government was more inclined to compromise with the Russians. Britain's insistence that Japan adhere strictly to her original demands was unquestionably an important factor in the failure of the negotiations.

The Russians obstinately refused to recognize the earnestness of their Japanese opponents, but the British entertained no doubts whatever on that score. At the rupture of relations in February, 1904, the Russians were taken completely by surprise, and appealed to Britain for mediation between themselves and Japan. The request was rejected. In the words of Foreign Minister Lansdowne, "nothing would stop Japan but [a] Treaty engagement by Russia to respect [the] sovereignty and integrity of China in Manchuria," and it was too late to avoid the conflict even on those terms. Indeed, the London gov-



ernment, throughout the final crisis, appeared convinced that a war between Russia and Japan was necessary and inevitable.

Peaceful negotiations once ended, Great Britain's chief concern was to limit the scope of the conflict to the original contestants. With Britain herself an ally of Japan, and France an ally of Russia, a rupture might develop at any moment between Paris and London. As early as 1903 King Edward had expressed to French statesmen his hope that France would maintain neutrality in such a war. Genuine relief, therefore, was felt in London when France issued a proclamation of neutrality. Both countries were anxious to remain at peace, and the Entente Cordiale was hurriedly concluded, a form of co-operation to prevent other powers from becoming participants in the war.

Throughout the conflict, British sentiment was strongly pro-Japanese, the more so because of constantly recurring friction between London and St. Petersburg. At the very outset, Russia aroused strong British resentment by listing foodstuffs, cotton, and coal as absolute contraband. Great Britain retaliated by refusing belligerent warships permission to take on coal supplies in British ports. Further irritation was caused by the escape of several Russian war vessels, disguised as merchantmen, through the Dardanelles, and by their subsequent depredations upon neutral commerce in the Red Sea and Suez Canal regions. But the most threatening issue was precipitated by the Dogger Bank affair in August, 1904, when the Russian Baltic fleet bombarded a British trawler outfit, under the illusion that it was a fleet of Japanese torpedo boats. The British naval facilities were immediately prepared for action, and war was narrowly averted.

The German Emperor took advantage of every occasion to poison the pliable mind of Nicholas II against his British rivals, and all but succeeded in consummating a Russo-German alliance, in the famous Björkö treaty. At the same time, however, Edward VII was already envisaging an Anglo-Russian entente, and consequently displayed a more sympathetic attitude toward Russia than his pro-Japanese compatriots were prone to do. Leading British statesmen hoped that both the warring states would become exhausted without a decisive victory. That proving impossible, a Japanese victory was much preferable to one by Russia. In the midst of the negotiations at Portsmouth, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed, and its scope significantly broadened in regard to Korea and India.

Thanks to Japan's victorious encounter with the Muscovite, the Russian menace in eastern Asia had now been eliminated, and the way was thereby paved for the Russo-British entente of 1907. With the victory of British Liberals in 1905, the movement for a friendly agreement received additional impetus, and from then on the two countries were brought step by step to the conclusion of the *entente*. While the agreement of 1907 did not include the Far East in its scope, it did much toward moderating the Russian forward movement in Central Asia and Persia. Thus, either by virtue of the Japanese victory or through the agreement of 1907, the principal causes of Anglo-Russian friction were removed.

From this brief sketch it is evident that Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Far East, during the decade from Shimonoseki to Portsmouth, was of genuine international significance. Russia had stood out as the chief menace to Chinese economic and political independence and integrity; Great Britain as one of the strongest proponents of the Open-Door in the Chinese Empire. To be sure, both powers pursued policies of purely self-interest. Yet there was a significant divergence in their respective programs. The British were concerned primarily with obtaining commercial advantages, but Russia desired expansion largely for its own sake. It is true that Russia was anxious to obtain an ice-free port on the Pacific, and the warm waters of China offered such an advantage. Nevertheless, as long as the immense hinterland of Siberia remained undeveloped, the acquisition of a commercial port could scarcely be justified.

During the first part of the ten-year period, British prestige and influence suffered a humiliating decline which became an important motive in reversing Great Britain's traditional policy of isolation. Russia, with few exceptions, enjoyed a spectacular success in her forward movement in China and Korea, until halted rather abruptly by the Anglo-Japanese combination of 1902-1905. The Tsar's government, through its persistent employment of intrigue and deceit, forfeits all claims to the sympathy of any fair-minded individual. Yet, despite this continual perfidy on Russia's part, one can scarcely approve Britain's refusal to mediate between St. Petersburg and Tokyo, on the eve of the war. The London government by this refusal added weight to the assertion that it was secretly promoting the war, in order that the Japanese might revoke the Russian menace in Asia, without any effort or expense on Great Britain's part. At



all events, that is what happened. Japan's victory made it possible for Great Britain and Russia to settle their principal Asiatic differences, and thus to coöperate against what was felt to be a growing German menace in the Far East.

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The dissertation is based almost entirely on government documents. Of the British sources, the following were especially useful: *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold J. Temperly (London, 1927ff) Vols. I-V; *Parliamentary Papers* (Blue Books) relative to China and Russia, 1898-1905; *British Foreign and State Papers*, 1895-1905; and *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 4th Ser., Vols. 30-151, 1894-1905. The principal German documentary collections are: *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, edited by Lepsius, Mendelsson Bartholdy and Thimme (Berlin, 1922ff), Vols. IX, XIV, XVI, XVII, XIX; and *Zur Europäischen Politik*, 1897-1914, edited by Bernard Schwertfeger (Berlin, 1919), 5 volumes. *Krasny Arkhiv* (Red Archives), edited by the Tsentralnii Arkhiv of the U. S. S. R. (Moscow, 1923ff) contains relatively little on this particular subject. Some helpful material is in the French *Documents Diplomatiques: Chine, 1899-1900*, and in the *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1895-1905. The standard collection of Chinese treaties is, of course, J. V. A. McMurray's *Treaties with and Concerning China* (New York, 1921), 2 volumes.

Outstanding among the biographies and memoirs are: Baron von Eckardstein, *Ten Years at the Court of St. James*, (New York, 1922); A Gérard, *Ma Mission en Chine, 1893-1897*, (Paris, 1918); Tadasu Hayashi, *The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi*, (London, 1915); Sir Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII*, (London, 1925, 1927), 2 volumes; Count von Waldersee, *A Field Marshal's Memoirs*, (London, 1924); and Count Witte, *Memoirs*, (New York, 1921).

Especially helpful among the secondary sources are: Lord Charles Beresford, *The Break-Up of China*, (New York, 1910); Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, (New York, 1922), and *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, (New York, 1925); E. J. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia*, (London, 1918); Philip Joseph, *Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894-1900* (London, 1928); and Pierre Marc, *Quelques Années de Politique Internationale; Antecedents de la Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, (Leipzig, 1914). The last book is a translation of the

important Russian work by Glinski, *Prolog Russko-Japanskoi Voini*, based largely upon material from the Witte archives. Mention should also be made of H. B. Morse's monumental work, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, (London, 1910-1918), 3 volumes.

Two magazine articles stand out above all others: W. L. Langer, "Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg," in *Europäische Gespräche*, IV, (Hamburg, 1926), pp. 279-322; and M. van Larlarsky, "Why Russia Went to War with Japan," *The Fortnightly Review*, XCIII (Old Series), pp. 816-831; 1030-1044. Both articles are based upon extensive Russian sources, and are invaluable for this study. Unfortunately, M. van Larlarsky's series of articles were interrupted before completion, evidently on account of official pressure from St. Petersburg.

Likewise generous use was made of newspaper material, particularly that in the London *Times*.



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
Number 3

## ABSTRACTS IN HISTORY II

From Dissertations for the Degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy as Accepted by the Graduate  
College of the State University of Iowa  
1927-1934

Published by the University, Iowa City, Iowa

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**Volume X**

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
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## FOREWORD

The appearance of this second volume of *Abstracts in History* indicates that the Graduate College of the State University of Iowa is convinced that the publication of *Abstracts* meets a very definite need. In the first place, the summarized contribution of the investigator is put into manageable form and made immediately available to the scholarly public. Secondly, the investigator is thus enabled to meet the University requirement that his dissertation be published within a three year period.

The *Abstracts* here presented are based upon selected and unabridged doctoral dissertations in history filed in the Library of the State University of Iowa. A scholar interested in one of these dissertations is free to borrow a typewritten copy from the Library. The publication of these *Abstracts* will not preclude the publication of any dissertation in full later. The writer of each *Abstract* is responsible for the facts and interpretations that appear.

The Department of History again finds itself in the debt of the editor, Professor Louis Pelzer, for his prompt and careful work in preparing the manuscripts for the press.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY,  
STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

November, 1934  
Iowa City, Iowa

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## THE BALTIC IN THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR\*

By FRANCIS JOHN BOWMAN

Two generations have passed since Captain A. T. Mahan's epoch-making *The Influence of Sea-Power upon History, 1660-1763* appeared. The emphasis in the history of the Thirty Years' War has been placed, and rightly, upon the political and religious values involved in that struggle and Swedish and German scholars have centered their efforts on the diplomatic and political features of the contest. The naval history has been neglected, so work was begun to discover what control over Baltic waters meant to the Northern powers during the years when Sweden and Denmark lay under the threat of Hapsburg naval plans based on German and Polish harbors. This study shows that her navy secured to Denmark the safety of Copenhagen and of the islands which made up the heart of the kingdom. It reveals that for Sweden the fight for Protestantism included the possession of the Baltic waters as a province, the safety of the commerce of the realm, the security of its ancient revenues, and the acquisition of new sources of income by the institution of the Danzig customs.

The center of the picture, therefore, is an account of the coöperation of land and sea forces in the Danish campaigns of 1626-1629 and the Swedish campaigns of 1626-1631. *The political events* are retold in so far as the diplomatic and economic factors determined the action of the fleets. The special significance of the "Lordship of the Baltic" during this period makes the happenings upon northern waters a matter of the greatest importance to the Europe of that age.

The necessary preliminary to this study was an appreciation of the area of conflict, of the possible bases of operation, and of the forces, actual and potential, for naval war. Investigation disclosed that the Norwegian-Danish and Swedish-Finnish coastal regions had achieved national solidarity, recognized the importance of the navy, and were carrying out definite programs of harbor and fleet movement. By contrast, the German and Polish areas were still mediaeval in their political and maritime policies. As a result, Lübeck, Stralsund, Wismar

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\*From a dissertation by Professors H. G. Plum and G. G. Benjamin.

and Danzig could not vie with Copenhagen and Stockholm as homes for fighting ships. Gabriel Posse, the Polish naval commissioner at Danzig, Gabriel de Roy and Philip von Mansfeld, the Hapaburg marine agents at Wismar, and George von Schwarzenberg, who directed Austran efforts at Lübeck, worked under such handicaps that they achieved little comparable to what was done by the energetic Christian IV of Denmark or by Karl Karlsson Gyllenhjelm and Klas Fleming, the admirals of Gustavus II Adolphus.

The struggle for control of the Baltic falls into two nearly equal divisions. In the years 1626-1629 the Swedes and the Poles bickered continually outside Danzig, with two battles to enliven the tedium of the blockade. Meanwhile, in a western sphere of activity, Christian IV of Denmark successfully opposed Wallenstein's efforts to create in Wismar an Imperialist fleet to attack the Danish islands. These wars merged when Imperialist troops appeared in Prussia to aid the Poles against Gustavus II Adolphus and Swedish ships and regiments relieved the Danes in the defense of Stralsund. The peace treaties of Lübeck and Altmärk removed Denmark and Poland from the rôle of participants in the great European war, leaving Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire to dispute the mastery of the Baltic.

In the second phase of the naval struggle, 1629-1632, such was the confidence of Gustavus II Adolphus in his fleet that he repeated on the German theatre of war the same procedure crowned with signal success in the Livonian and Prussian campaigns against Poland. He used the navy as a necessary auxiliary force and transferred the scene of battle to north Germany with full assurance that his fleet would maintain communications with the homeland. The occupation of Pomerania and Mecklenburg, completed by the capture in Wismar of the Austrian fleet, assured the safety of Sweden, and permitted Gustavus II Adolphus to inaugurate his great campaign in the Rhine and Danube valleys. The "Lion of the North" had made the Baltic a Swedish sea before his death in 1632. The best proof of this statement is the transfer of his customs frontier from his own shores to the borders of Prussia, Pomerania, and Mecklenburg. Danzig, "Queen of the Baltic," was paying tribute on a hitherto free commerce in such huge sums as to maintain the Swedish forces in Germany.

The profits of the Swedish treasury equalled the sums Christian IV extorted through the Sound Dues. Furthermore, the acquisition of Ingria, Livonia, the Prussian harbors, and the German coast line brought Sweden almost to the achievement of her dream. The Baltic,



a free sea, became in a few years a "mare clausum" in which eighty-five per cent of the commerce was subjected to Swedish inspection and imposts. The work of the Swedish fleet invites also a discussion of the value of control of the Baltic to the Swedish transport service. Twenty-five thousand and more men each year, with food, clothing, cannon, ammunition, and money were carried across the northern waters by Swedish warships and auxiliary vessels.

The King of Denmark, when he began his retreat toward the Baltic littoral after the defeat at Lutter in 1626, could dispose of a fleet adequate to cover his movement to the Danish islands. Early in 1627 he equipped a number of small squadrons, each of which watched a seaport or a strip of coast in danger of occupation by the Imperialist forces. His fleet exerted a definite and threatening pressure upon Lübeck. Time and again this chief Hanse town refused to allow the use of its harbor or ships to Schwarzenberg or Wallenstein, who urged that it participate in the Hapsburg naval program. In September the Danish transports came to Wismar in time to carry off entire the 14,000 men Christian IV had saved from his armies east of the Elbe. But the fleet could not protect Kiel, Rostock, or Aarhus from Imperialist occupation, and in the absence of the ships, a Danish detachment in Jutland was attacked a month later by Count Schlick, and cut down or captured. The loss of so many men and of his mainland holdings so weakened Christian IV that Sweden felt impelled to succour him. Spurred on by reports from such agents as Christopher Rasch, Jonas Buraeus, and Anders Svensson, the Swedish king in a treaty of alliance with the Danes promised men and ships for the naval campaign of 1628.

During the winter of 1627-1628 the Austro-Spanish plans were revealed. Schwarzenberg tried to get Lübeck to grant ships and men while Wallenstein sent General von Arnim to occupy all harbors along the Baltic coast and to gather freighters, smacks, and flatboats for a descent upon Denmark. Gabriel de Roy and Philip von Mansfeld began their task of developing an Austrian naval base at Wismar. Danish and Swedish diplomatists opposed these efforts at Lübeck and Hamburg, and their missives stirred Christian IV to early action in 1628. He raided Rostock, Warnemünde, and Wismar as soon as the ice was out. He made descents upon the Austrian garrisons at Fehmarn, Kiel and Eckernförde. Beaten off in these, he turned upon Greifswald and destroyed seven ships in its harbor.

In Pomerania the city of Stralsund had kept free from Imperialist occupation. In the spring of 1628 von Arnim occupied an island dominating its harbor. But this so roused the town that it forced the surrender of the island and broke off all intercourse with the Austrian forces. With Wallenstein organizing a coercive effort Sweden and Denmark sent aid to the town. Several shipments of munitions came from Copenhagen and in May 1,000 men. The plight of the town became desperate, but a Swedish regiment under Colonel Fritz Rosladin arrived in time to hurl back three successive attempts to carry the walls by assault, June 26-28, 1628. More Danes, some 1,500 in all, came in July while the Swedes were reënforced by 1,200 veterans from Prussia. Early in August Christian IV organized a diversion on the flank of von Arnim's besieging forces but his army was crushed at Wolgast by a rapid concentration engineered by Wallenstein. Most of the Danes regained the ships, although 1,100 were killed and 1,200 captured. For the rest of the year naval activity consisted of skirmishes outside Wismar and Danish routine patrols along the rest of the coast.

The intervention of the Swedish king at Stralsund confirmed the Hanse towns in their refusal to aid the Imperial design for a Baltic fleet. But Wallenstein persuaded the King of Poland to order his Danzig flotilla to join the Wismar armada. In January, 1629, eight Polish vessels came to Wismar, but were kept safely in harbor by the ubiquitous Danish squadrons. The Danish main fleet made it possible for Christian IV to undertake the reconquest of Jutland and Schleswig by landing armies simultaneously on the east and west sides of the Danish peninsula. But the 1629 campaign was cut short by the signing of the Peace of Lübeck in June, 1629. Wallenstein, opposed to the Swedes both in Prussia and at Stralsund, restored all occupied Danish territory in return for Danish withdrawal from any pretension to German lands or influence.

In 1626 the Swedish king, Gustavus II Adolphus, decided to transfer the scene of the dynastic dispute between his realm and Poland to the plains of Royal Prussia. Nearer the German battlefields, he checked the advance of Wallenstein upon Denmark, brought under his control the fertile plains of the lower Vistula, and anticipated a Spanish plan, proposed at Cracow by Count von Solre, of assisting Poland by gathering a Spanish fleet in Danzig to act against Sweden. The Swedish invasion of Prussia went over Pillau to Elbing, but did not include an attack upon the great port of Danzig. However, even the neutrality of that city could not be secured, and the arrival there of Gabriel Posse,



a Swedish exile who became naval commissioner for Sigismund III of Poland, was followed by the equipping of a small Polish fleet in the harbor.

The campaigning season of 1627 was for the Swedish fleet a most active one. From earliest spring until the storms of autumn constant skirmishes enlivened the long months of blockade outside Danzig, where the Swedish squadron based its watch on Hela and Putzig. Against it the Catholic diplomatists prepared a bold stroke. Gabriel Posse fitted his small flotilla for sea, and embarked heavy drafts of soldiers. As soon as the Swedish blockading fleet withdrew to winter quarters, his ships would put to sea and make their way westward to Wismar, where Count Philip von Mansfeld watched the preparation of some ships against Denmark. Mansfeld planned to carry Wallenstein's veterans to the Danish islands, and hoped that Lübeck would now open its harbor to the Hapsburgs and accede to the eager requests of Schwarzenberg for tonnage and men.

Sunday, November 18/28, 1627, saw these plans shattered. The Polish fleet of ten vessels under Admiral Arndt Dickman engaged the blockading fleet under Colonel Nicholas Stjernsköld in a four-hour battle which ruined both. One Swedish captain, his decks swarming with Polish boarders, threw a torch into the powder magazines rather than surrender. With him died his crew and twice their number of enemies. Half the Danzig fleet set upon the Swedish admiral and when he saw no hope of escape he strove to emulate his gallant subordinate. He sent his page to fire the magazine, but a barshot sheared the boy's head from his body and another took off the admiral's arm as he seized the torch. Two days after his men had yielded the ship, Stjernsköld was dead. The Swedes had lost two ships and some two hundred men, about seventy of them taken prisoner. The Danzig fleet lost its admiral, one of its captains, and nearly four hundred men dead and wounded. It had broken the blockade, but was in no condition to sail westward to the aid of Wallenstein in the crucial struggle soon to rage under the walls of Stralsund.

Within two weeks the Swedes had replaced the lost vessels and their strangle hold upon the commerce of the Baltic emporium continued. In the spring of 1628 they recaptured in the very mouth of the river four prizes made by Danzig privateers and early in June secured their revenge for the disaster of the previous winter. Gustavus II Adolphus advanced his regiments to the very banks of the Vistula between Danzig and Weichselmünde and caught some of the Danzig fleet at anchor in

this reach of the river. His artillery destroyed two of its largest vessels with red-hot shot, and badly damaged a third one. Yet the blockading fleet did not escape disaster. A new ship foundered on its trial trip outside Stockholm, a second was beaten to pieces on a lee shore at Hela, while a third stranded off Wijksten and went to pieces with heavy loss in men and munitions. Sickness and the casualties of hard service ran the death rate on the blockading squadron to half the crews, yet the Swedes kept so close a check on Polish commerce that the price of rye, the great export of the Vistula Valley, soared from ninety gold gulden a last (14 barrels) at Amsterdam in 1627 to four hundred sixty-two gulden a last in 1629 when peace was made.

Late in the fall of 1629 came orders to concentrate the Catholic naval forces in Wismar. The Polish fleet lost a ship in an unsuccessful attempt to leave harbor in December, and two others were wrecked when a second trial succeeded a month later. Eight of the ships arrived at Wismar, and the Swedes at once transferred their naval strength to the waters of the western Baltic. When Denmark withdrew from the war in June, 1629, a squadron under Colonel Erik Ryning, based at Kalmar and Stralsund, took up the task of keeping the coalition fleet in Wismar. By the Truce of Altmärk, September, 1629, Poland yielded to Sweden control of the Prussian coastal strip, and subjected the commerce of Danzig in time of peace to the tolls which Gustavus II Adolphus had collected in time of war.

With the pacts of Lübeck and Altmärk, the struggle for the Baltic entered a new phase in which Sweden faced the Holy Roman Empire and its forces. Gabriel de Roy's vessels came out of Wismar in September, 1629, for a skirmish with their new enemy, but after a long range cannon duel with negligible loss to either side, returned to harbor without shaking the Swedish blockade. In 1630 Gustavus II Adolphus made great use of his fleet, not only in conveying to Pomerania the men, munitions, and equipment of his German expeditionary force, but also in operations against the seaports of Anklam, Wollin, and Stettin. Late in the fall two sea-fights took place outside Wismar. The first was indecisive, but in the second Mansfeld's largest ship, the *King David* of forty guns, was cut off from the rest of the Austrian fleet and driven to seek refuge in Travemünde. There the city of Lübeck sequestered it as reimbursement for losses suffered by its citizens from Austrian privateers during the war.

Early in March, 1631, the Swedish besieging forces foiled an attempt by four Austrian ships to reënforce and re-provision the fortress



of Kolberg. Its surrender was followed in June by that of Greifswald, and this in turn by an aggressive campaign in Mecklenburg by a Swedish army under General Ake Tott. He began the siege of Rostock on August 21, took Warnemünde on August 26, and encircled Wismar on August 30. Meanwhile Colonel Rynig watched the ports from the sea. Rostock surrendered on October 6/16 and five days later Tott began to concentrate his forces outside the last seaport remaining to the Imperialists on the Baltic shores. Rynig, by a daring cutting-out expedition, carried off the *Tiger*, of fourteen guns, and his fleet hung off Wismar day and night during the long months of the siege. His fleet lacked much, at times even being reduced to half-rations, yet he persevered and at last the city surrendered on January 2/12, 1632. To Rynig, as admiral of the fleet, were yielded twelve ships large and small, one hundred ninety-six copper and ninety iron cannon, twenty-five thousand cannon balls, forty-four tons of powder, twenty-four barrels of saltpeter, the navy yard and the best harbor on the German Baltic coast.

With the fall of Wismar the undisputed "Lordship of the Baltic" became the possession of the Swedish crown. The application of the Sound Dues by Denmark had in some degree made it a "mare clausum" but the initiation in 1626 by Sweden of the Danzig tolls, their application to the trade of the Duchy of Prussia in 1627, their incorporation into the Truce of Altmärk in 1629, and their extension to Pomerania and Mecklenburg in 1630 and 1632 created a new situation. Sweden took first place in the Baltic, and the possession of these new revenues became a "fundamenta regni," for over half a million riksdaler poured into Sweden's treasury each year from Danzig's commerce. Sixty per cent of the Baltic trade came from the Vistula, but the extension of Swedish control to the German coast, and its continuance in Finland, Estonia and Livonia allowed the Swedes to inspect and tax some eighty-five per cent of all commercial activity in the Baltic sea.

The reënforcement of the Swedish army by mercenary troops enlisted in the British Isles, in Germany, France and Holland depended upon control of Baltic waters. Shipments of men ranging in number from forty to nine thousand at a time came to the army of Gustavus from overseas. The documents of the time afford invaluable details as to the part played by the Swedish fleet in provisioning and equipping the army in the field. For instance, on May 7, 1629, seven Swedish ships came to the base at Elbing with meal, grain, meat, and fish for the army, while on June 17 of the same year nine vessels reached

Prussia with grain for the army from Pernau, Revel and Riga. In 1631 the Baltic provinces sent 86,000 barrels of grain to Germany for the use of the army.

However, the most important single service which the fleet performed for the army was the transport of the fighting forces from the homeland to the fields of battle. Each year one or two large convoys brought out numbers of men to Prussia and Pomerania, and smaller groups were always being despatched as opportunity afforded. Then the fleet carried home the wounded and unfit; brought to Sweden the discharged and furloughed; carried regiments from one garrison to another, from Finland to Livonia, and from Prussia to Sweden; moved back to Finland and Sweden the cadres ordered home to recruit and re-equip; and brought to the regiments of the line the militiamen selected to replace men fallen in battle. During the years 1626-1631 a total of 168,000 men were moved by sea, an average of 28,000 a year. Of all this number, only some two score soldiers fell into the hands of the enemy, and no large convoy ever failed to bring in adequate time the reinforcements needed by the army in the field.

The control of the seas projected the defense of Sweden from her own and the Finnish shores to those of Prussia and Pomerania, and made possible those campaigns which checked the military progress of the Catholic Counter Reformation in Germany. Before his death at Lützen the Swedish hero-king had acquired for his successor on the throne an inheritance of the highest value. The "Lordship of the Baltic," with its resultant military and financial pre-eminence in the North, had been transferred to Sweden by the work of her navy, and its continuance and possession rested upon her sea-power.

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The sources for this study are in large part the manuscript collections in Sweden and Denmark. In Riks-Arkivet (National Archives) at Stockholm, *Riks-Registraturet*, *Rådets Registratur*, and *Latinskt-Tyska Registraturet* for 1626-1631 contain valuable material. The *Gustaf II Adolfs Brev*, *Brev till Konung Gustaf II Adolf*, *Brev till Rikets Råd*, and *Rådets Brev till Konungen* for 1626-1631 also furnished data of importance. The *Diplomatica* of the Stockholm archives are rich in detail. In their divisions *Danica I*, *IV* and *VII* contain the reports of Jonas Buræus and Johan Fegraeus, Swedish agents at the Danish court; while in *Germanica A-III*, *C-IV*, *D-II*, *D-V*, and *D-VIII* rests a major share of the documentary evidence concerning Stralsund. Here also are the valuable and interesting letters which Christopher Rasche sent



to the Swedish king from Germany. In the *Hollandica* are the reports of Ludwig Camerarius, Swedish resident at the Hague, with information as to Swedish finance and the diplomatic service, while in the *Extranea* of the *Polonica* papers were hidden some details of interest.

The *Oxenstjerna Collection* was levied upon for *A-I*, letters to Axel Oxenstjerna from Swedish agents and spies abroad; for *B-III* and *C-IV*, letters from cities in Germany; *C-VI*, documents concerning the army and its maintenance; *C-VIII*, papers dealing with the Polish war and the Prussian administration; and *C-IX*, papers concerning Germany and the German war. *C-VIII* contains the letters of Gabriel Posse to King Sigismund III of Poland, intercepted by Swedish patrols outside Danzig, as well as many other such papers and letters. From the *Falkenberg Collection* some documents were extracted which deal with Danzig in 1626, and from the *Gyllenhjelm Papers* the reports of that admiral as to his command of the Swedish fleet from 1626 to 1631. The *Tott* and *Skokloster Collections* have much of a military nature, while the *Papers of J. Adler-Salvius*, secretary to the Swedish king, contain several letters illuminating the course of naval operations. The *Fleet Papers, Section B-2, Naval Expeditions, 1600-1648* provided Folders 15-16, 18-20 for the years 1626-1632. In the Naval Archives at Stockholm the *Admiralty College Registry 1630-1633*, the *Projects and Inventories 1628-1629*, and the *Papers concerning the administration of the Battle-fleet* proved to be of the utmost value.

The War Archives at Stockholm furnished *Pomeranian Documents 1630-1631* and *Military Accounts* for 1629, 1631, and 1633. Some hitherto unused Pomeranian documents for 1629 and 1631 were discovered in the archives of the Chambers of Government at Stockholm. At the University of Upsala the *General Manuscript Collection*, the *Nordin Collection*, the *Nordin Papers*, the *Palmsköld Collection* and the *Westrin Papers* were examined. At Copenhagen the studies were not so thorough, yet much material was found at the Rigs-Arkiv and in Kongelige Biblioteket.

The most valuable published source materials are found in Julius Mankell's *Arkiv till upplysning om Svenska Krigens och Krigsinrättningarnes Historia, 1630-1632*; in Christian IV's *Breve*, as printed by Bricka and Fridericia; in Kristian Erslev's *Rigsdagars och Staendermodernes Historie under Kristian IV*; in the collections of Wallenstein material published by Fr. Förster, Herman Hallwich, F. Tadra, and A. Zober; in the monumental *Oxenstjerna Skrifter och Brevvexling*, begun in 1888, of which eighteen volumes appeared in time for

use; in the Danish and Swedish *Treaties and Agreements*, now being published under governmental supervision; and in the *Letters of Sir Thomas Roe*, edited for the Camden Society by Samuel Rawson Gardiner. Among works contemporary or nearly so the most valuable is Philip Boguslaw von Chemnitz's *Belli-Sveco-Germanici*, which appeared in 1648. Dross and gold are much mixed in Khevenhüller's *Annalium Ferdinandeorum*, X-XI, and in the *Theatrum Europaeum*, while somewhat of value can be extracted from Fredrik Spanheim's *Le Soldat Suedois* and J. Abelin's *Arma Svecica*.

Of modern volumes the study is most indebted to Nils Ahnlund's *Gustaf Adolf inför Tyska Kriget*, to Gustaf Droysen's *Gustaf Adolf*, and to J. Opel's *Die niedersächsische-dänische Kriege*. Much concerning the activity of the Danish fleet was found in H. Garde's *Den dansk-norske Somagts Historie*, while Axel Zettersten's *Svenska Flottans Historia* proved to be a mine of details as to the Swedish navy. One other group of volumes must be given separate mention: the studies which concern themselves with the maritime plans of the Hapsburgs. In this field fall the works of Friedrich Mares, Anton Gindely, Otto Schmitz, and Konrad Reichard. *Die Maritimen Pläne der Hapsburger*, which Reichard published in 1867, is earliest in time, most inclusive in scope, and perhaps first in value.



## EDUCATION IN THE SOUTHERN COLONIES, 1607-1776\*

By ALLEN GEORGE UMBREIT

The history of early institutions in English America is the history of civilization in transit. English institutions, law, government, and religion, were transplanted in the new world. This was true of ideas about education, for the majority of the earliest settlers with education had obtained it in England. The purpose of this dissertation is to trace the educational practices of the southern colonies from their beginnings in the mother country to the new world, realizing, however, that these transplanted institutions, both in theory and practice, were subject to powerful modifying influences in America. The study explains the conditions in the five southern colonies which made educational progress difficult, the reasons why their colonial legislatures paid comparatively little attention to the question, and the work the people did for themselves. Attention is given to the work of the tutors, to the non-English elements in the population, to the efforts to promote higher education, and to a survey of other educational agencies, such as libraries and newspapers. The seventeenth century was an age of great missionary zeal, and since both religion and education were frequently the sole concern of the clergy, the religious factor must aid in developing the general picture.

Educational progress was slow and the reasons therefore are readily discerned. During much of the period covered by this study communication in Virginia, Maryland, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, with their few roads and sparsely settled communities, was very difficult. It was not until well after the beginning of the eighteenth century that population increased to a point which made possible community coöperation in matters like education. Life on the frontier was hard, and making a living was for a considerable period the principal concern of a majority of the population. It was sometime before there came that increase in wealth with its attendant opportunity for the

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Winfred T. Root.

development of culture, which in turn requires that schools be established, lest culture and learning be lost. The common practice of cultivating a single crop—tobacco in Virginia, and rice in Carolina and Georgia—lead to the development of large plantations, a factor which had much to do with moulding the social classes and the political structure of the colonies. To meet transportation needs, many of the earlier plantations had a river frontage, and the use of slave labor on a considerable scale sharpened class distinctions, made possible larger plantations, and dispersed the inhabitants still more widely. The lack of town life, the general difficulty of communication, together with the natural rigors of the frontier, made necessary the modification of the old educational ideas and practices to meet the needs of the new environment.

Education today is well recognized in America as the obligation of the state, and is, within well defined limits, compulsory, but such a concept did not rule in colonial days. Public compulsory education concerned itself with such orphans, and other children, who, because of neglect, were liable to become public charges. The great mass of the common people was not considered entitled to state supported schools. The famous Poor Law of Elizabeth of 1601 was the basis for English and colonial thought on this question. It emphasized the care and treatment of children who were unable by their own efforts or by those of their parents to secure the training which would develop them into self-supporting citizens. The American colonies went a step further in their poor laws and required that such children should not only be taught a trade but to read and write as well. Legislative enactments concerning elementary education dealt primarily with orphaned and neglected children, while to the individual householder was left the burden of educating his own children, or not, as he chose. The financial burden for the education of orphans and other children who came within the provisions of the acts was placed upon the communities in which these children lived, under the supervision of the vestrymen of the parish, or overseers of the poor. As the colonies increased in population other acts clarified earlier practices, but their fundamental nature was not changed by the later revisions.

Some attempts were made to set up a school system by law. The Maryland law of 1723 was in intent the most important educational measure enacted in the South during the colonial era. The design was to set up a system of schools, one within each of the twelve counties in the province, to be supported by a tax on imports and by certain fines



and forfeitures. Students were to contribute tuition to the support of the schools but those unable to pay were not to be denied admission. Here was a distinct advance in educational theory and if the results were meager the reason was that conditions did not warrant so elaborate a system. Indifference and the antipathy of many of the inhabitants toward the Anglican Church, which was to have considerable influence in the management of these schools, together with the hostility of the wealthy, made impossible the hopes of those responsible for the passage of the law. But between its passage and the Revolution at least eight county schools were founded—the seeds for future harvest.

Public education in practice was similar in all the southern provinces. Each concerned itself only with orphans and children likely to become paupers because their parents were too shiftless to teach them or have them taught a trade, or were too poor to do so. All, excepting South Carolina, required that children who came under the provisions of the laws, should be taught to read and write, as well as taught a trade. South Carolina in 1722 considered a system of county schools supported by a tax on land and slaves. But nothing came of the idea, and the wealthy continued to engage tutors for their own children, while the poor sent their children to charity schools or neglected them altogether. The principle concern seems to have been, not the welfare of the child, but the desire to reduce pauperism to a minimum, which would in turn reduce public expenses to a considerable degree.

To determine the actual interest of the people in education one must seek beyond the laws, which were neither extensive nor well enforced. The theory that education was the concern of the individual rather than the state, induced many persons to leave bequests that their children might receive such learning as the times afforded. Others left money or land for the founding and endowment of schools, in which practice English precedent guided the early Americans. Gifts and legacies for the education of children or for the endowing of schools were not uncommon in England. Elementary schools in the mother country were, almost without exception, the result of private benefactions, and similar schools in the south were established in the same manner.

A study of colonial wills reveals the concern of parents for the educational well-being of their children. It was not uncommon to leave the entire proceeds of estates for this purpose and in some cases if the income did not suffice to give proper schooling the executors were directed to use part of the principal. Girls as well as boys were in-

cluded in the bequests, and in some cases provision was made for the education of negro slaves, which, however, became less frequent as population and wealth increased. Education for girls was, as a rule, limited to reading, writing, and sewing. The slaves, if taught at all, were usually confined to the reading of the Scriptures, a requirement for salvation.

In 1671 Sir William Berkeley, royal governor of Virginia, thanked God that there were no free schools in the colony. This fortunately was not true for at that time there were at least seven free schools in the province, and a number of laws provided for the instruction of apprentices in reading and writing. Support for these schools had been provided by bequests, and Sir William himself had signed the acts which made acceptance of some of the bequests possible.

The term "free school" is found frequently in the records of the colonial period. The phrase "free school" would imply that no fees were charged, but such was not the case. A "free school" was one open to anyone able to pay the required tuition or fees. The fees were paid, either by the parents of the children attending the school, by the parish, or from funds left for that purpose. It was not uncommon, however, to admit the children of the very poor, or orphans, and exempt them from payment of tuition, but their number was strictly limited.

The earliest foundation for a free school made by a citizen of English North America was provided by the will of Benjamin Symmes in 1635, who made the inhabitants of Elizabeth City County, Virginia, the principal beneficiaries. The grant of two hundred acres of land and eight cows was confirmed by the legislature in 1643. By 1647 the school house had been built, the school was in active operation, and the herd of cattle had shown considerable increase. The second endowed school was also located in Elizabeth City County. A few years after the Symmes bequest, Thomas Eaton, a physician, left an estate of five hundred acres of land, two negroes, twelve cows, two bulls, and twenty hogs for the founding of a school. Only children of parents living within the county were expected to attend. It appears to have been Eaton's intention to limit attendance to poor children, for some years later the trustees excluded any who were able to pay for their schooling elsewhere. Those who could pay were provided for by the Symmes school, where attendance was not restricted to charity pupils. Little is known concerning the subjects taught in these schools aside



from the fact that the master was required to teach English grammar which in the seventeenth century included Latin.

While the Symmes and the Eaton schools were the most widely known of their kind, at least three other free schools were founded in Virginia before 1724, and between this date and 1776 funds were left for four additional schools. These schools were located in seven parishes. Of the ninety parishes in Virginia in 1776 eighty-three were without such schools. The conclusion is that endowed schools served a very small part of the population.

The endowed school idea did not take root in Maryland, nor were there such schools in North Carolina, although one attempt was made, in 1754, to endow a school in the latter province. In that year a liberal offer was made by George Vaughn, a London merchant, who offered to devote £1000 yearly to the propagation of the gospel among the Indians in or near North Carolina. A counter proposal was made by the legislature that the gift be made available for an academy or seminary for both Indians and whites, and offering to levy a tax on each negro in the province to augment the yearly bequest. This offer was not accepted and the effort came to nothing. There were a few endowments for educational purposes in colonial North Carolina but these furnished, as a rule, free tuition and fees for only a limited number of students.

South Carolina had a number of free endowed schools. In some cases the school district was incorporated by the legislature, but whether incorporated or not, the principal sources of support were the funds left for that purpose. One such school was located in Charlestown and another in Dorchester, Parish of St. George, Berkley County. Both were supported in part by a small annual grant from the public treasury but mainly by gifts and bequests. There was an endowed school at Childsbury and another in the Parish of St. Thomas and St. Denis, near Charlestown. The former was made possible by James Child who died in 1720, while the latter was founded by Richard Beresford who in 1722 left the sum of £6500 currency in trust to the vestry of the Anglican Church in the parish for the education of the poor children within its borders. Altogether there were six free and charitable schools in the province by 1737, but no new endowments are reported after this date. Georgia had no endowed schools and for the most part, the education of the children was a private matter. Each family determined for itself the educational opportunity to be given its children.

As population increased and community coöperation became increasingly possible, there were established here and there through the colonies a group of schools with the picturesque designation of "Old Field Schools." Neither church nor the state had any voice in their control except that the law set minimum qualifications for teachers and required a license for them. These schools may well be considered the forerunners of the present American public school system, for they were the product of community interest and a desire to give the children the best education possible. They were not, however, financed by a general tax, but were supported by tuition fees which placed the burden of support only upon those who had children enrolled.

The scattered population of the plantation and the belief that each man should educate his own children, made necessary the employment of private tutors who devoted their time and talents to the children on the plantation. In many cases a child's entire education was obtained by the tutorial method. In other cases only an elementary education was obtained in this way, after which the sons of the families were sent to colleges in America or abroad, while the daughters remained at home until they married. Many of the earlier tutors were of Scotch descent, some of whom were indentured servants. Teachers were also sent from England, and of these, some were poor men sold for a certain number of years of labor, usually four or five, to pay for their passage, while others were unfortunate victims of the harsh English penal code, sent to America instead of being jailed at home. If the owner of their services had no work for them, he would sell their time to some one desiring a teacher, and so recompense himself. It was not uncommon for members of the clergy to serve as tutors to augment their incomes, and frequently the parish clerk taught the children in the parish during his leisure time. Women sometimes were employed as tutors for quite young children, combining the positions of nurse and teacher.

Two of the best known tutors who left diaries which tell of their work, were Philip Fithian and John Harrower. The former was a native of America, educated at Princeton and was employed to instruct the children and nephews of Robert Carter of Nomini Hall, Virginia. Harrower was a Scotchman, an indentured servant, who sold his services to Colonel William Daingerfield, teaching his children and others who might be able to pay a fee for instruction. Both were men of better than average training and ability, whose work was a credit to their profession. Fithian and Harrower spent their time only in teaching, but it was not uncommon for tutors to be required to help with



the regular work of the plantation. It is difficult to say how many tutors there were in the Southern colonies, for few left records of their work, and the names of very few of them are known. Many eminent Americans received their early, and in some cases their only training from tutors and if the achievements of the pupils may be credited to their teachers, then the tutorial system must be considered to have been highly successful.

Much of what has been said about education concerned only those persons who came to America from England. But after 1700 a new element invaded the population in the colonies. The circumstances which drove men from England to America during the seventeenth century no longer prevailed in the succeeding century and immigration from England declined. The growth of population in English America after 1700 was due to the natural increase in the families of the settlers and to immigration from Scotland, Ireland, and the continent of Europe. Coming after the coastal plain had been occupied, these newcomers, Scotch, Germans, French, Moravians, and Swiss, were compelled to settle in the back country. These new elements in the population attempted more or less successfully to reproduce in America the religious and educational practices with which they were familiar. The Scotch, whether from Scotland, or from North Ireland—the Scotch-Irish—were mainly Presbyterians. The Germans and Swiss were largely Lutheran, and the Moravians were a distinct sect which had its origins in the teachings of John Huss. Whatever their creed or country of origin, they believed in education for their children. Secular and religious instruction went together and it was not uncommon in a Presbyterian or Lutheran settlement to find that the preacher and the teacher were one. Undoubtedly the most notable school founded under Presbyterian auspices was that of the Reverend David Caldwell. This school was founded in 1767 in what is now Guilford County, North Carolina, and was one of those effective schools of the period known as “log colleges,” exerting an influence far beyond the county in which it was located.

The Anglican Church through the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel carried on missionary and educational work in the Carolinas. After 1740 it conducted a day school for negro children and an evening school for adult negroes in Charlestown, besides doing considerable work in Maryland and Virginia.

The Moravians who settled in the Carolinas in the 1740's were as diligent in their efforts to improve the minds of their children as were

the Presbyterians. They combined religious and secular training and provided evening schools for young men whose daily work kept them from the classroom. They charged fees to support the master and included in their limited curriculum such subjects as spelling, reading, writing, Bible study, and the learning of hymns. In this they were only following precedent, for all these foreign groups or sects imitated their English-American neighbors—educated their children in a manner and method similar to old-country practice, modified as such practices always are by limitations of environment. They introduced no startling innovations, but there was progress in the direction of a free public school system, for their schools were open to all on equal terms. The parochial idea was still dominant and the school was not only a place where a child learned to read and write but where he was grounded in the faith of his fathers.

During the entire colonial period efforts looked to the founding of a college—in fact the first steps taken for the advancement of education in the South were in this direction. In 1617 King James urged the Bishops and clergy throughout England to take collections in their churches, to be used to finance a college for the Indians in the new world. Some money was raised, lands set aside in Virginia, and a manager appointed to oversee construction. But the massacre of 1622 and the revocation of the charter of the London Company in 1624 ended these early efforts. The question lay dormant for nearly forty years when in 1660 and 1661, because of a serious lack of a trained clergy for the Anglican Church, acts were passed by the Virginia legislature to found both a free school and a college. But this project failed also. The colony was in the midst of a depression, tobacco was selling at a very low price, and the people were in no mood to furnish the necessary money.

In spite of these discouragements hope did not abate for by 1690 the situation in the Anglican Church had become serious. Ministers of ability were loath to leave England and there was no place in America to educate a ministry in colonial conditions and needs. A college, it was thought, would remedy the situation and by 1690 the population had grown to a point where with some help from England it could be built and maintained. The Governor, Francis Nicholson, and the Commissary, the Reverend James Blair, were the men most responsible for the renewed interest in the project. The Governor on a number of occasions had shown his interest in education while Blair was a man of energy and foresight who felt that only through a trained



clergy could the Anglican Church prosper in Virginia. In 1691 the legislature passed the necessary laws for the founding of a college and Dr. Blair was sent to England to obtain a charter from the King. The proposed college was to be named the "College of King William and Queen Mary." Dr. Blair was able to enlist support for the undertaking in England, secured an audience with the King and, despite considerable opposition from commercial interests, secured both a charter and grants of money and land.

Construction was begun in 1695 and two years later the work in the grammar school began. From time to time during the colonial period grants of money were made by the legislature for the support of the institution. For some years only preparatory work was done, for the college was in the unique position of having to prepare its students for more advanced work. Hence, until about 1705 William and Mary was only a free school. Dr. Blair, the first President, held this office for fifty years. During the entire colonial period it was the practice to combine the offices of commissary and president of the college. The student body was never large. In 1702 twenty-nine were enrolled in the grammar school, and in 1770 the total in all classes, both preparatory and college, did not exceed one hundred and twenty-five. William and Mary was essentially a college for the training of ministers for the Anglican Church, and for a considerable period little encouragement was given those who might be interested in other learned professions. The wealthy planters were wont to send their sons abroad to be educated and the enrollment was further diminished because of the notorious conduct of some of the teachers. But in spite of handicaps it filled a need in the South which could not have been met in any other way. When Williamsburg became the capital the college became not only a school for clergymen but one for statesmen as well. Many men who achieved prominence in the service of their state and nation received their early training in the college, which, because of its location, brought its students into contact with the leading political figures of the period. Although it was intended to found in America a new Oxford or Cambridge, conditions in Virginia were unfavorable for so ambitious a plan. The country was too young and raw to permit the refinements of living observed in the older colleges in England.

No other colleges were actually established in the South during the colonial era. At least five attempts were made in Maryland to follow the example set in Virginia. There is evidence that the Jesuits con-

templated founding a college about 1640, but they incurred the displeasure of the proprietor who took away their lands. With the end of the prosperity of the missions, the proposed college could not be built. In 1670 the Council agitated the question of founding a college for "the education of youth in learning and virtue," but the effort did not succeed. Again in 1732 the question was discussed in the legislature but without result. Then in 1761 it was proposed to found a college in Annapolis, and its citizens, hoping to profit from the sale of real estate, sought to influence some members of the legislature in favor of the measure. This attitude alienated the Governor's support and the matter was dropped for the time being. Another effort was made in 1773 with Governor Eden taking the initiative, but already the impending revolution occupied the attention of the legislature. Until independence had been achieved nothing more was done for the cause of higher education in Maryland.

Only one effort was made to found a college in North Carolina and that was due to the interest of Governor William Tryon who assumed office in 1765. In 1771 a law was actually passed to establish Queen's College at Charlotte in Mecklenburg County. This act was disallowed however by the King on advice of the Board of Trade on the grounds that it would be unwise to permit the Presbyterian Church, which would control the policies of the college, to gain too strong a hold in a province where dissenters had already given the established Anglican Church considerable trouble. The loose wording of a tax clause which simply provided a "tax of sixpence on liquor" without specifying whether on a barrel or a gallon, was likewise mentioned by the Board as a reason for disallowance. The school was opened without a charter under the name of Liberty Hall Academy, but it did not develop beyond the status of a grammar school.

During the seventeenth century persons from the South wishing an education other than that afforded at home had either to attend Harvard, colleges in England or the continent, to obtain it. Even with an increase in the number of American colleges during the succeeding century, it remained the practice for many of the wealthy planters to send their sons, and in a few cases, daughters, abroad. Europe, and especially England, offered many advantages to persons sent there to be educated. Aside from the schools themselves there were the benefits to be derived from residence in a long established society, association with members of the family who had not gone to the new world, and the opportunity for those contacts which make for culture and under-



standing. During the seventeenth century the favored colleges were Oxford or Cambridge, the best England afforded. A considerable number of the first settlers at Jamestown had attended one or the other of these colleges, and several of the later clergymen and governors were graduates.

The practice of sending young men abroad to be educated began soon after conditions in the colonies became stable. It is difficult to determine the number attending the various schools abroad. Many did not graduate and the rolls of the universities during this period list only the names of the graduates and do not indicate the place of birth or residence of the students.

There was a gradual change in the subjects pursued by Americans abroad. During the seventeenth century a considerable number chose theology, but a century later law became the favorite subject. Law was studied at the Inns of Court in London, usually after some preliminary training in the universities. The prospective lawyer would attach himself to some notable barrister who practiced in the courts and who guided his studies, while the student assisted in the preparation of cases and obtained practical experience by visiting the courts. The Inns were simply the dwellings in which the students lived and studied. The four Inns to which a majority of Americans went for training were Gray's Inn, The Inner Temple, The Middle Temple, and Lincoln's Inn. By far the greater number from the South attended the Middle Temple, South Carolina leading all the rest. Among those who studied abroad and returned to America to win more than local distinction were Charles Pinckney, Thomas Lynch, Arthur Middleton, and John Laurens, from South Carolina; Arthur Lee, William Byrd, Peyton and John Randolph, from Virginia; Charles Carroll of Carrollton, from Maryland; and many others who were active in the political turmoil before the Revolution, members of the Continental Congresses, signers of the Declaration of Independence, and later, participants in the framing of the Constitution of the United States. But not all espoused the cause of their native America for many distinguished members of the Inns remained true to England during the war, among whom were Daniel Dulany the younger, of Maryland, John Randolph of Virginia, and William Wragg of South Carolina.

During the quarter century preceeding the American Revolution, South Carolina sent more of her sons abroad for study than either Virginia or Maryland. Charlestown was the center of wealth and culture in the South and her citizens were probably better acquainted

with the streets of London than with those of Boston, New York or Philadelphia. England was the source of inspiration and culture and those who could afford it chose the old world. William and Mary was but a small college, and the society and culture of Williamsburg, the colonial capital, rivalled only by Charlestown in its elegance and tone, was pale and unsatisfying when compared with that of London.

For those unable or unwilling to cross the seas the principle American colleges were Harvard, William and Mary, and Princeton. Here men from the South and North were on common ground and this mingling of students during the twenty years preceding the Revolution could not but help make for a better understanding between the sections, and promote a unity of purpose which moved the provinces when decisive action was taken against England.

In 1697 Reverend Thomas Bray, Commissary for Maryland, launched a plan for the establishment of libraries throughout the British Empire, with the idea of augmenting the meagre opportunities for learning then available. He conceived knowledge to be the "fairest ornament of the soul of man," and for such as were unable to attend grammar schools or colleges the reading of good books would afford a profitable substitute. He proposed, therefore, to include works on theology, history, geography, agriculture, medicine, law, and mathematics to enable anyone to taste the culture of the times and gain thereby. There were not more than three libraries in the South available to the public when Dr. Bray announced his plans. His original thought was to furnish the clergy with books, many of whom were too poor to provide their own, but later he devised a scheme of "Layman's Libraries" in the keeping of the parish minister, to be loaned to any who cared to read. These books were intended to reach persons, who, because of the remoteness of their homes, were unable to attend divine service regularly.

Maryland was the principal beneficiary of Dr. Bray's plan, for her welfare was first in his mind. He was ably seconded by the Governor, Francis Nicholson. Nicholson went so far as to propose to the legislature that some part of the public revenue appropriated for military defense be diverted to the buying of books for a library at Annapolis. North and South Carolina were also given libraries through the efforts of Dr. Bray. A library was placed in Charlestown as early as 1697, and in 1700 some books were sent to North Carolina. There was no provision for the replacement or repair of damaged books and these collections were practically destroyed within a few years. *The Colonial*



*Records of North Carolina* mentioned several other libraries provided by Bray or by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, but no mention is made of the number of books or their titles.

The libraries founded by Dr. Bray were largely religious in content. This was to be expected for they were to take the place of the clergy in those remote districts which a clergyman could visit only at rare intervals. The plan did not do all that had been hoped for it. The frontier was too busy with its own problems to pay much attention to books.

Fortunately the inhabitants of the South were not entirely dependent upon parish libraries for reading matter. A considerable number owned and purchased books of their own. There were comparatively few large collections of books but the many small libraries mentioned in the wills and the inventories of estates indicate that books were fairly well distributed among the landowners and merchants. It is not possible to determine the number of books owned in the colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for the wills, inventories, and other available papers too frequently mention books without indicating number, title, or value. But enough evidence is available to indicate that during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries libraries included a considerable number, perhaps a majority, of books on religious subjects. Later, books on law, history, and the classics became more numerous, but throughout the colonial era few inventories are to be found which omit titles on religion.

The first newspaper was published in English America as early as 1690, and the first one in the South dates from 1727. This was Park's *Maryland Gazette*, the seventh to be published regularly in British North America. Printing was begun in Virginia in 1682, but the hostility of the government compelled the printer to remove from the province. The most notable of the colonial printers was Jonas Green, publisher of one of the numerous *Maryland Gazettes*, whose fame as a printer rests upon his publication of the *Laws of Maryland* compiled by Thomas Bacon. This specimen of typography was not exceeded in dignity and beauty by any production of an American colonial press.

Newspapers were published in all the Southern colonies, and as a rule they were called *Gazettes*. In South Carolina this was necessary if they wished a share of the public printing for the law required public notices to be published in the "*Gazette*." How extensive a circulation the newspapers enjoyed cannot be accurately determined. With limited postal facilities their influence was largely confined to the

towns which contained the presses, the plantations whose owners were able to visit the towns frequently, and such other communities as had a regular means of transportation. The newspapers exerted their greatest influence in the quarter-century preceding the Revolution by which time communication between the colonies had become less difficult.

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The writer has utilized materials which are widely scattered through the colonial records and other state papers, letters, diaries, parish records, correspondence, newspapers, inventories of estates, and wills. The best sources for the legal aspects of the question are: *Proceedings and acts of the General Assembly of Maryland*, (Archives of Maryland, Vols. I, II, XIII, XIX, XXIV, XXXVII, XL, XLVI; *Proceedings of the Council of Maryland*, (Archives of Maryland, Vols. XX, XXIII); *Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia*, 1619-1776; *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia*, June 11, 1690 to October 28, 1739; Henning's *Statutes at Large of Virginia*, 13 volumes; *The Colonial Records of North Carolina*, edited by William L. Saunders, 10 volumes; *The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia*, edited by Allen D. Chandler, 25 volumes; and *The Statutes at Large of South Carolina*, Thomas Cooper, editor, 5 volumes. On life in the colonial colleges the best account is *Glimpses of Colonial Society and the Life at Princeton College, 1766-1773*, edited by W. J. Mills. Information on the Anglican Church was taken largely from *Historical Collections Relating to the American Colonial Church*, edited by William Stevens Perry, especially valuable because it contains the reports of the clergy relative to education in their parishes and material on the founding of William and Mary College. J. Bryan Grimes, *North Carolina Wills and Inventories*, was invaluable in tracing the ownership of books, as were the various numbers of the *William and Mary College Quarterly*. The first series of this quarterly consist almost wholly of source material, most of it pertaining to the period of this study.

"The Diary of John Harrower," *The American Historical Review*, VI, No. 1 (October, 1900) and "The Journal of Philip Fithian," kept at Nomini Hall, Virginia, 1773-1774, *The American Historical Review*, V, No. 2 (January, 1900) contain valuable material on the life and work of the tutors. Of the newspapers, the various *Gazettes*—Dunlap's *Maryland Gazette*, 1775-1776; Rind's *Virginia Gazette*, 1766-1773; The *Georgia Gazette*, 1763-1776; The *South Carolina Gazette*, 1760, and the *Virginia Gazette*, 1736-1750 are full of references to matters of colonial interest.



In addition to the *William and Mary College Quarterly*, the *Maryland Historical Magazine*; *Annual Reports*, American Historical Association; *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*; Tyler's *Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine*; and the *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, are indispensable, although the references to education are scattered.

There is much secondary material on the colonial era, with educational matter, as in the sources, scattered. Perhaps the most helpful works, especially on education abroad, were E. Alfred Jones, *American Members of the Inns of Court*, London, 1924; and David Murray, *Memories of the Old College of Glasgow*, Glasgow, 1927. The writings of Edward D. Neill, especially his *Earliest Efforts to Promote Education in English North America*, St. Paul, 1892; and *The History of Education in Virginia during the Seventeenth Century*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1867, contribute much to an understanding of the period.

## ENGLAND'S COLONIAL NAVAL STORES POLICY, 1588-1776\*

By JUSTIN WILLIAMS

England throughout the colonial era maintained a lively interest in New World shipbuilding resources, and from 1705 to 1776 Parliament offered bounties to encourage the production and importation of these materials. Any general history of the colonies contains some reference to naval stores and a few special studies in the field of colonial economy and English commerce draw generously from the vast storehouse of data on naval stores to support a major thesis. But the story of England's colonial naval stores policy, as such, its origin and achievements, has not been told before. It is the purpose of this dissertation, therefore, to survey for the first time the subject of British colonial naval stores in its entirety, from the age of Elizabeth to the American Revolution, with emphasis on England's bounty policy in the eighteenth century; *why* and *how* the bounty policy was adopted and *what* results it attained.

Under the Tudors England turned to the sea, convinced that ships could furnish the only effective instrument of national defense. At the same time ships could seize and defend distant territories, provide a sufficiency of exotic products, and serve as an outlet for English wares. To construct these sailing vessels large quantities of timber, masts, cables, sail-cloth, pitch, and tar were needed. But England was practically destitute of the "furniture of shipping": her soil and climate were not friendly to hemp and flax culture and pine trees were not indigenous to her hills and valleys. The island's only native shipbuilding product came from its oak forests which, by 1600, were reduced "to such a sicknesse and wasting consumption. as all the physick in England cannot cure."

This deficiency underlay the early development of commercial relations between England and the Baltic countries where naval stores were plentiful. Timber came principally from Norway, Poland and

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Winfred T. Root.



Germany; hemp from Russia; flax from East Country (the territory between the Oder and the Gulf of Finland); and pitch and tar from Sweden. But England feared a dependence on foreign powers for indispensable ship commodities. The supply might be cut off during war to impair the efficiency of the royal navy and merchant marine; the carrying of such bulky articles, which stimulated shipbuilding, trained seamen, and brought profits in freightage, was too often monopolized by the Baltic countries themselves; and this branch of trade always left England with an adverse balance to be liquidated in gold and silver, a practice contrary to the economic concepts of the time.

Elizabethan England looked to colonization as a means of rectifying these evils, as most of the writings on America before 1607 will show. Soon after the first colony was planted we are told that "Virginia hath no want of many marchandize (which we in England accomplish in Denmark, Norway, Prussia, Poland, etc; fetch far and buy deare) which advaunce much, and assured increase, with less exchaung of our owne, with so few hazards by sea, and which would maintaine as frequent and goodly a navie as what runs the Levant stage." At the outset Virginia and New England began producing the desired naval stores for English consumption; but their efforts came to naught in the Stuart period because of their inability to compete with the cheaper labor and lower carrying charges of the Baltic. An exception was a shipload of New England masts sent in 1634 to the old country, and in another decade "no colonial product excited so much attention in England as masts, especially the larger ones destined for the royal navy." From this time until the Revolution a goodly portion of the mainmasts for the navy were taken from the white pine forests of the Puritan commonwealths.

Several forces at work near the end of the century were conducive to a revival of interest in colonial naval stores. First and perhaps foremost of these was the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697). In this England's heavy losses caused a tremendous demand on the Baltic countries for fresh supplies of shipbuilding materials. A second factor of importance was the abundance of liquid capital available for investment which, coupled with the rampant mania for speculation and the high cost of Baltic products, encouraged the formation of companies chartered ostensibly to import colonial naval stores. A third influence was England's recognition of the ever-increasing value of the colonies as a market, a source of raw materials, and a

spur to shipping and navigation. Finally, Whig supremacy, following the Glorious Revolution, was not the least significant of the forces that brought a renewed eagerness for colonial ship materials. Extreme mercantilists, the Whigs were guided to a large extent by the balance sheet.

At the behest of Parliament the Board of Trade was established in 1696 with instructions *inter alia* to ferret out hurtful trades. Between 1697 and 1705 the Board closely scrutinized every angle of the naval stores situation, delving not only into the commercial relations between England and each of the Baltic powers but also into the feasibility of procuring plantation materials. The searching inquiry brought to light two undesirable trends that might be ameliorated by importing naval commodities from the colonies.

The more disquieting of these was the distressing state of the Anglo-Baltic trade in the sixteen nineties, which was glaringly at odds with the principles of mercantilism. The Easterlings drained England of precious metals, discriminated against English manufactures, crowded Englishmen out of the carrying trade, and often supplied naval stores on onerous terms. In December 1697, the Board of Trade reported that the importation of naval stores from Sweden and the south side of the Baltic "hath much increased upon us," that the ships employed of late in that trade were no more than half English bottoms, and that England was therefore overbalanced £200,000 yearly in goods and freight. From 1691 to 1696, only 39 English, but 1070 foreign ships entered London with timber from Norway and Denmark. Wars from 1689 to 1721 multiplied the difficulties of importing Eastland naval stores: the war between England and France lasting from 1689 to 1713 except for a brief breathing spell and the struggle between Sweden and Russia (The Great Northern War, 1699-1721) for supremacy in the Baltic. The former increased the demand for naval stores, the latter interfered with the supply.

Sweden furnished the immediate cause for the Naval Stores Act of 1705. The pine trees of Sweden and Finland (a Swedish colony) made the best and cheapest tar of Europe. Two events in the reign of William III virtually forced England to seek another source of pitch and tar than the kingdom of Charles XII. First, the Stockholm Tar Company was given a monopoly of Sweden's resinous products in 1689; and second, upon the outbreak of the Northern War in 1699, Russia overran Finland, the source of Sweden's tar exports, causing that province to fall "vastly short" of its former deliveries of tar.



England was not long in feeling the effects of these events. In 1700 the Board of Trade asked why the price of tar had risen from £5 15s per last (12 bbl.) to £11 per last since 1687. English merchants were able to purchase only 6,654 barrels of pitch and tar in 1702, whereas in the previous year they had imported 30,117 barrels. In 1703 the directors of the Stockholm company announced—in the words of Joshua Gee—that they would deliver no more pitch and tar to London “otherwise than in their own shipping, from their own tar company here, at their own price, and only in such quantities as they thought fit.”

English merchants “thought it a hardship to be debarred bringing home what pitch and tar they had occasion for in their own shipping; for losing that navigation, was putting a number of ships out of employment, and, consequently, paying our neighbors for work whilst our people were unemployed.” Dr. Robinson, English minister at Stockholm, wrote home in 1703 that in case the war between Sweden and Russia was of long duration Sweden could not meet Europe’s demand for tar. “What difficulties there are in making and bringing it from New England,” he went on to say, “I am not acquainted with, but take it for granted, England had better give one third more from thence, than have it at such uncertainties, and in so precarious a manner, from other countries.” The result was that the people of England “soon took alarm; the merchants made strong application for making these commodities in our plantations, and therefore that matter was brought before the parliament.”

Thus the precarious aspects of the Baltic trade were a strong incentive for encouraging colonial naval stores at the turn of the eighteenth century. The second unfavorable tendency that the Board of Trade believed might be set straight by importing plantation ship supplies was the drift of the northern colonies toward economic independence. Colonies were founded, says Mr. G. L. Beer, “to free England from the necessity of purchasing from foreigners.” But in the process of fulfilling this mission they were to employ and increase English shipping and navigation, assist “in the Vent of English woolen and other manufactures,” and make England the staple for their exports and imports. New England, Pennsylvania, and New York fell far short of this standard. Circumstances forced them to ship building, cod fishing, and commerce, occupations that competed with rather than reinforced the economic pursuits of England. From the outset these provinces worked at cross purposes to the mother country, but not until near the end of the century did the Board of Trade learn that

"New England, and other Northern Colonies, have applied themselves too much, besides other things, to the improvement of woollen manufactures amongst themselves; which . . . ought to be prohibited, or discouraged, by the most coercive and proper means."

The fundamental trouble was that the northern colonies produced no staples such as tobacco and sugar with which to make returns for English manufactures. Consequently, the Board acknowledged that they

have been of late years under a Necessity of applying themselves very much to the Woollen Linnen & other Manufactures, in order to Cloath themselves, to the great Disadvantage of the Trade of this Kingdom; And we do not see how the same can be prevented otherways than by engaging them to Turn their Thoughts and Industry another way to their own Profit; which we humbly conceive may be most advantageously done by giving Encouragement to the Production & Importation of Naval Stores from thence.

This will not only occasion an Encrease in the Exportation of Our Woollen & other Manufactures, but also enable us to purchase Naval Stores by such Manufactures instead of buying them with Bullion.

The Baltic condition, then, on the one hand, and the paucity of staples in the northern plantations, on the other, were the two major reasons why England encouraged colonial naval stores in the eighteenth century. Complete expression was given to these impelling motives in the preamble to the Naval Stores Act of 1705. Complaint was first made of naval stores "being now brought in mostly from foreign Parts, in foreign Shipping, at exorbitant and arbitrary Rates, to the great Prejudice and Discouragement of the Trade and Navigation of this Kingdom." Then there was the design to render the colonies "as useful as may be to England, and the Labour and Industry of the People there, profitable to themselves." Colonial naval stores, in one instance, would "tend, not only to further Employment and Increase of English Shipping and Seamen, but also to the enlarging, in a great Measure, the Trade and Vent of Woollen and other Manufactures . . . in exchange for such Naval Stores, which are now purchased from foreign Countries with Money and Bullion." More than this, they would enable colonists "to make due and sufficient Returns in the Course of their Trade."

So much for the motives for encouraging colonial naval stores. The question now arises: Why should England offer bounties to stimulate the production and importation of these products? The answer is that they otherwise would not have been obtained in sufficient quantities



to meet the desired ends. But this conclusion was not reached in a day; instead it slowly evolved through the eventful years 1690-1705.

Elsewhere it has been stated that capital was abundant in England near the end of the seventeenth century and that people were eager to "get-rich-quick." Stock jobbing was one of the commonest of many schemes to fleece the public. In 1692 when the murmur of rising prices of naval stores was first heard, some wealthy Londoners under the leadership of Sir Matthew Dudley petitioned the crown for a charter to import these products from New England. Shortly several such companies were seeking to be incorporated for the same purpose. But their path was beset with certain obstacles. The Attorney-General recommended that they receive letters patent provided they insert a clause to prevent the unpopular practice of stock-jobbing. The Admiralty urged that they have all fitting encouragement, "without Exclusion to any others who shall desire to follow the like Trade," and with the understanding that the Navy Board was not obliged to purchase any imported articles. The Treasury was importuned by the agents of New England to withhold its sanction of the charters until Massachusetts might have an opportunity to study them. And the Lords of Trade embarrassed the petitioners by asking them to submit prices at which they would agree to import various shipbuilding items.

Months dragged by while the applicants for charters endeavored to hurdle these barriers. Anxious to clarify the issues, the Lords of Trade invited all interested parties to the Council Chamber at Whitehall in March 1694. This meeting derives its importance from the intelligence submitted by John Taylor, a prominent and reputable naval stores contractor. Some of the companies had submitted price lists at the request of the Lords of Trade, and Taylor had been asked to do likewise. Instead he declared that he could not make price estimates until he had: (1) assurance that the materials abounded in New England and that they were of suitable quality to meet with the approval of the Navy; (2) a guarantee that they would always be on hand ready to ship, so that the vessels employed to transport them would not "lye upon Demurrage, hyre of Shiping being the greatest article in this Trade"; and (3) knowledge of what the Navy would pay for them before shipment. If Taylor did not know these things, neither did the stock companies.

Further remarks by Taylor prove that the gentlemen wanting charters were either crass or else primarily interested in stock-jobbing. "I will not pretend to love my Country better than my Self," he stated sar-

castically, "and to encourage a Trade which would be to my prejudice . . . I must still speak as a merchant, who guides his trade by the measure of Profit, and under that Consideration arises the difficulty, how shall we bring bulky-Goods from a very remote part, So cheap as we do from Countrys that are near us, which indeed I cannot solve." This was the crux of the matter, as evidenced by the policy adopted in 1705. Taylor aptly pointed out three reasons why New England could not compete on equal terms with the Baltic nations: first, because naval stores were more plentiful in the latter; secondly, because these commodities were largely the "effect of Labour," which cost only one-sixth as much in Sweden and Denmark as in New England; and finally, because transportation was the greatest charge, "2 or 3 Voyages into ye Baltique and 4 or 5 to Norway, may be made for one Voyage to New England, Especially in times of Peace."

Sir Henry Ashurst, Agent for Massachusetts, also suspected chicanery, and he foresaw the ruin of New England if patents were granted enabling corporations to engross its trade. Bidding for time, he and Sir Stephen Evance proposed to import a shipload of naval stores, and to obtain from the Governor and Assembly of Massachusetts an estimate of what supplies could be sent over annually. If their plan proved successful, they argued, chartered companies were unnecessary. The Lords of Trade agreed, and from 1694 to 1696 England marked time waiting for the arrival of the naval stores ship.

In the meantime English trade became distressed by the long war. Blaming the Lords of Trade for the commercial disasters, the House of Commons moved for a more efficient and responsible trade council, which the crown established in May 1696. The new Board of Trade promptly began to devise a plan for obtaining colonial naval stores. Just then Ashurst's naval stores cargo arrived from the Bay Colony and found little favor with the dockyard officials at Woolwich. Heartened by this setback, the Dudley group renewed its campaign for a patent of incorporation. Word trickled in of incipient textile manufactures in New England. Difficulties of importing Baltic ship materials were increasing. Edward Randolph wrote from America that the colonial resources were sufficient to supply England and most of Europe.

The Board of Trade was confounded, of course. To get its bearings, it decided to send a fact-finding commission to the woods of New England. Equipped with instructions from the Admiralty, this com-



mission, headed by John Bridger, a Portsmouth shipwright, reached America in the summer of 1698.

The Dudley group continued to press for a charter. Fearing its success the merchants trading to New England memorialized the Board of Trade in 1697 that Dudley's design was to monopolize the whole New England trade under the pretext of supplying naval stores. Ashurst presented no less than nine strong objections to incorporating the affluent London gentleman, the last of which was the unreasonableness of such a course when New England's forests were being examined by commissioners. The Board of Trade thereupon decided "to let the matter lie as it now does."

The special investigation was of little value in itself. In 1700 the purveyors sent samples of naval stores to England, only to have them pronounced unfit for the navy. Whereupon the Navy Board recommended that the agents be called home, "they being far from serving as expected." But Bridger and his associates made one important contribution to the cause. They aroused Earl Bellomont, Governor of New York, to the seriousness of England's naval stores problem. During his brief tenure of office this zealous Irishman made a thorough study of the resources of the northern colonies to relieve the situation. He, more than anyone else, convinced the Board of Trade that New York and New England could adequately supply the mother country with pitch, tar, and timber.

While the investigation of colonial materials was in progress, the Board of Trade was probing other aspects of the naval supply problem. The unfavorable balance with the Baltic, the machinations of the Stockholm Tar Company, the outbreak of the Great Northern War, the tar shortage in 1702-1703, and the proposals of individual merchant-shippers, in addition to the stock companies, to import colonial naval stores—all were given careful consideration. Their net effect was to satisfy the Board that colonial materials must be procured at all costs. There was still doubt as to the best method or methods of carrying on the trade.

Three courses were open: stock companies might be granted charters, contracts might be made with a few traders, and bounties might be offered to attract many merchants to this business. After due deliberation, the Board rejected the chartered companies because they would not forego the "pernicious practice of stock-jobbing." Dependence on the system of private contracts alone was turned down because, granting the fulfillment of all proposed contracts, the quantity would still

fall far short of the demand. Payment of sufficient premiums to equalize the difference between Baltic and colonial production costs was therefore adjudged the only means of building up a considerable trade in colonial naval stores. In December 1704, a bill drafted by the Board of Trade provided for the payment of premiums on all pitch, tar, rosin, turpentine, masts, spars, and hemp imported from the plantations. In February 1705, it passed both the Commons and Lords.

That additional products to the much needed pitch and tar were encouraged at this time was mainly due to England's desire to "induce merchants and traders to turn their stock and thoughts to the trade in these commodities." Should this project succeed, naval stores would no longer be precariously obtained, the adverse Baltic balance would be wiped out, the problem of returns in the northern colonies would be solved, and English shipping would be augmented. But it was fancied that importation of tar and pitch apart from other products would not engage many ships, or draw New Englanders away from their spinning wheels to an appreciable degree, or measurably affect the unfavorable balance of trade with the Baltic. In order to accomplish any one of these ends, it was deemed necessary to set up the machinery for accomplishing them all. This point has been overlooked by students of England's colonial system.

The act of 1705 provided a bounty of £1 per ton on masts, spars, and bowsprits, £6 per ton on hemp, £4 per ton (8 bbl. of 31½ gal. each) on pitch and tar, and £3 per ton on turpentine and rosin. These goods were added to the enumerated list and the Navy was given a twenty day refusal of such as were imported. In 1713 the act was extended eleven years, or to January 1, 1725. At the end of this period the bounties were discontinued for nearly four years. In 1719 a more rigid inspection law was passed to prevent the importation of pitch and tar containing dirt and dross. In 1722 the act of 1705 was completely recast, but did not become operative until the reestablishment of the bounty system in 1729. The act of 1729 reduced the premiums on tar, pitch, and turpentine, and dropped rosin from the favored list. Otherwise it was the same as the original act and remained in force until 1776.

As regards the production of colonial hemp the bounty system was a total failure. England annually consumed some 7,000 tons of hemp, yet only a few dozen tons were brought from America previous to the War for Independence. The colonies zealously attempted to grow this valuable crop, however. Virginia, South Carolina, and Pennsyl-



vania in 1722, Maryland in 1727, New York in 1763, New Jersey in 1765, and Virginia again in 1769, offered rewards—over and above the English bounty of £6 per ton—to encourage its cultivation. But to all intents and purposes they might as well have whistled jigs to a mile-stone; for hemp culture required a special technique that the colonists could not master.

The bounty of £1 per ton on masts and spars accomplished nothing that would not have otherwise been accomplished. From the reign of Charles I to the Declaration of Independence England yearly imported a few American masts, but these rather supplemented than superseded the Baltic mast supply. A sailing vessel, whether large or small, required twenty-three masts, yards, and bowsprits of various lengths and breadths. The mainmast in a first-rate ship had to be forty inches in diameter and forty yards long, while the dimensions of a similar mast in a frigate were twenty inches and twenty yards. Mizzenmasts, maintopmasts, foremasts, bowsprits, main yards, jib booms and the like, for each class of ships, were of many sizes, but all were narrower and shorter than mainmasts. The fir of Germany and Russia excelled as a mast tree but owing to the absence of accessible virgin forests in those countries firs above twenty-seven inches were seldom available. Mainmasts for the big ships of the English navy were therefore of necessity and not from choice taken from the white pine forests of New England. Size, rather than desire to strike a blow at the unfavorable Baltic trade or to enhance the commercial value of the colonies, recommended the use of American masts.

Statistics show that the colonial mast trade was based on nothing more than the deficiency of great timbers in the East Country. During the reign of Queen Anne, England annually purchased about 1,000 "great masts" (any mast twenty inches or more in diameter). In the years 1706-1713, when the bounty was supposedly exerting influence, a yearly average of only 136 of these big timbers—nearly all above 27 inches in thickness—was furnished by New England. For fourteen years following the Treaty of Utrecht, when England's maritime affairs were rapidly expanding, America supplied an average of 179 great masts each year, mostly the sizes not to be obtained in the Baltic. In 1775 the Navy had on hand a three-year supply of big sticks, 2134 in all, of which 634 had the colonial stamp. Of these 634, a total of 394 were more than 27 inches thick, 188 were between 25 and 27 inches, while only 49 were of a width less than 25 inches.

"Middle masts" and "small masts" were more plentiful in America than the larger, but they were scarcely used in England. In the first fifteen years of the seventeenth century, the Navy and merchant marine bought 17,204 middle masts, of which 333 were supplied by the colonies. In the same year 29,767 small masts were received from abroad and but 115 of these bore the colonial mark. This condition prevailed until the end of the colonial period. The acts of Parliament restricting the cutting of New England pines without a royal permit cannot be blamed for the scant trade in small-sized masts, for, the contractors who felled the great timbers, were also privileged to take the smaller ones.

Concisely, the mast bounty had no effect on Anglo-Baltic trade relations or colonial economy. In fact it was impossible to "induce merchants and traders to turn their stock and thoughts" to the mast business, simply because they lacked the necessary experience and financial backing. From 1652 to 1775 four men, Sir William Warren, John Taylor, William Gulston, and John Henniker, held most of the contracts for supplying colonial masts to the Navy (private shipping used the less expensive Baltic masts). But these men did not undertake to fetch the big sticks, valued at £100 (\$2,500 modern money) or more each, except on a commission basis, and thus ran no risk of losing their fortunes. Residing in England, they retained agents in New England who hired colonists to cut and haul the logs to the riverside, where they were loaded and shipped across the Atlantic.

Unlike the bounty on hemp and masts, the reward offered for the shipment of resinous commodities all but produced the desired results. Concerning turpentine and rosin the Board of Trade observed in 1717:

Turpentine from the Plantations is allowed to be as good and useful as any whatever (very little of that Commodity having for severall Years past been imported from any other Parts.

And as Rozin is made out of Turpentine, We observe that the Importation of the former has very much decreased from all parts in Proportion as the Importation of the other has encreased.

In other words, England no longer depended on European turpentine and the benefits of the trade in that commodity were transferred to English and colonial merchants and shippers. Very little rosin came from the colonies and after 1729 the bounty on it was discontinued.

The greatest success of the bounty policy was achieved in connection with pitch and tar, the articles so precariously procured from Sweden around 1700. Of the 40,000 barrels annually consumed by English shipping, the colonies, previous to the act of 1705, supplied



little or none. But in the nine years 1716-1724, the smallest batch of pitch and tar brought from America in any one year consisted of 35,367 barrels and the largest, 84,501, the mean being 61,488. During the same period, owing to the disturbance of the Northern War, the supply of Baltic tar and pitch was perceptibly reduced. Because of the "very ill quality" of the American tar and the excessive sums paid out in premiums—over £50,000 in 1718 alone—the bounty act was not renewed upon its expiration in 1725. From 81,032 barrels in 1725, the importation of colonial pitch and tar dropped to 66,667 in 1726 and to 34,277 in 1727. How far the figure would have fallen had the bounties not been restored in 1729, it is impossible to say, but the necessity of premiums was demonstrated. Even though the bounty was now only slightly more than half of what it had been the trade was quickly revived. From 33,062 barrels in 1730, the plantation supply jumped to 47,451 barrels in 1731, to 70,428 in 1732, and to 73,487 in 1733. Thirty-five years later (1768) England imported 135,000 barrels of colonial pitch, tar, and turpentine; in 1770 the amount was 107,550 barrels; while in 1775 North Carolina alone exported 130,000 barrels of these three resinous products.

Contrary to England's sanguine expectation, the preponderance of these resinous products was manufactured in the Carolinas, and not in the northern colonies. The reason for this is clear. The southeastern seaboard is the natural habitat of the longleaf pine, which yields more tar than any other North American conifer. Even the tar exported from New England, and used in New England shipyards, was mostly the product of the Carolinas. From these southern provinces Yankee shippers picked up "A very great Quantity of the best Pitch and Tar," which they carried "first to New England and then to Great Britain." In 1716 England imported 45,452 barrels of colonial pitch and tar, of which only 9,147 barrels came from the Puritan provinces. Conversing with the Board of Trade about this poor showing, Jeremiah Dummer, Agent for Massachusetts, remarked: "Whereas Y[ou]r Lord[shi]pps were pleased to observe that New England made but little tar themselves notwithstanding the encouragement given, I can only say that seeing their account in fetching it from Carolina to bring here, there's no doubt but as the demand rises, and Carolina has not tarr enough to answer it, the people in New England will in course fall the more heartily into it themselves." The prophecy was never realized.

Many benefits to England and the Carolinas followed in the wake of the stupendous shipments of pitch and tar. First, as Joshua Gee

would have it, "we are discharged from the Yoke we were under to the Swedes and Russians for that Comodity." Secondly, English commerce was greatly stimulated. By 1725 it was alleged that 120 vessels, or 12,000 tons of shipping, were annually engaged in transporting naval stores from the Carolinas to the mother country, a business as valuable in all respects as the Maryland tobacco trade a generation later. In the third place, according to the Board of Trade (1721), plantation pitch and tar "are made . . . in such plenty as will enable us to supply foreign parts, since it has reduced the common price of those commodities one third . . . , whereby the importation of pitch and tar from the Baltick is greatly decreased, & much money saved in the balance of our trade." Fourth, increased purchasing power resulting from tar production enlarged the sale of English manufactures in the Carolinas. Fifth, the tar industry enlivened the slave trade. Colonel Spotswood, for example, purchased 400 blacks from the Royal African Company "to be used in the naval stores undertaking." Finally, so far as this new occupation directly or indirectly gave employment to some of England's "indolent wretches," as the unemployed were called, it served as a form of constructive poor relief.

Thus the encouragement given to colonial pitch, tar, and turpentine effectuated beyond reckoning the hopes of the bounty advocates. In contrast to the experience with hemp and masts, the conifer products employed thousands of tons of English shipping, went far toward liquidating the perennial balance against the southern colonies, particularly North Carolina, deprived Sweden of its tar monopoly, and interrupted the drain of English bullion to northern Europe. The conspicuous failure of the bounty system was in the matter of returns for the northern colonies. Yet no better example of mercantilism than this, in theory or in practice, is furnished in colonial history.

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This study is based primarily on unpublished manuscript materials in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the Library of Congress, and the Public Record Office, London. Since the Board of Trade formulated and supervised the bounty system, the following unpublished collections are most valuable: *Board of Trade Papers*, Plantation General; *Board of Trade Papers*, Proprietary; *Board of Trade Journals*. Indispensable are the *Colonial Office Papers*, London, which contains a mine of information on colonial naval stores; statistics, re-



ports, memorials, petitions, representations, particularly for the years 1700-1730.

The most important published sources for tracing England's naval stores problem from the reign of Elizabeth to the reign of George I are the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, American and West Indies*, 1574-1718, the *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series*, 1547-1703, the *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign*, the *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, and the *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII*. Particularly useful reports and hearings on naval stores in the years 1714-1725 are found in the *Journals for the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations*, 1704-1738. *The Colonial Records of North Carolina* treat of the colony that produced and shipped more tar, pitch and turpentine than any other American province. The work of Earl Bellomont, Governor of New York, is easy to follow in the *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*. The *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments respecting North America*, a Carnegie Institute of Washington publication, contains a few important reports on naval stores by the Board of Trade, and quotes from speeches on that subject by members of Parliament.

Many interesting bits of information are picked up in the works of such contemporaries as William Byrd, John Smith, Richard Hakluyt, Samuel Purchas, William Strackey, Edward Randolph, Josiah Child, Joshua Gee, George Marie Butel-Dumont, Charles Davenant, Walter Raleigh, Malachy Postlethwayt, Hugh Williamson, and John Lawson.

## THE DEFENSE OF THE FRONTIER, 1760-1775\*

By PAUL OMEGA CARR

The conquest of Canada and the eastern portion of the Mississippi Valley in 1763 forced England to face sharply heavy and perplexing problems demanding prompt solution. Not the least was the management of the territory lying west of the older colonies and containing a number of French settlements and a broad belt of hostile Indian nations. To prevent the French from recovering the valuable fur trade recently lost, and to pacify the Indians then in rebellion against British authority, this new territory was taken under direct royal control by virtue of the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763. This act temporarily closed the region west of the mountains to settlement by proclaiming the Appalachian divide the western boundary of colonial expansion. It was expected that land purchases would be made from time to time by proper authorities and thus new areas would be opened to colonization. The Proclamation represented a definite step in substituting British authority for scattered colonial control in the West. The proclamation line was a galling restriction to the colonies with charter rights to the unoccupied land of the transmontane region and to the land companies interested in the indiscriminate exploitation of the West. Moreover, the pioneer home-seekers, angry at this restriction on their freedom to move at liberty across the mountains in search for better lands, paid little heed to the boundary line.

It is the purpose of this study to describe and explain the military and political control of the frontier line against the westward movement of population. An attempt is made to study the policies of the British and provincial governments to defend the Indian lands against the pushing and predatory whites, to regulate trading activities west of the established boundary, and to protect the border settlers from Indian depredations. Occupation and organization of the new territory, distribution of troops for defensive purposes against internal and external enemies, the Indian uprising of 1763, the Indian boundary,

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Winfred T. Root.



the withdrawal of the British army from the West after 1768, and the collapse of Indian resistance to westward expansion in 1774 are the main subjects.

A system of defense for the new territory was one of the major problems demanding immediate attention by the British government. In the face of the disunited condition of the colonies and their indifference to frontier defense a regular army was needed, not only to protect the Indian hunting grounds against settlers, but also to hold in subjugation the Indian nations and the new subjects in Canada, Louisiana, and Florida, all unfriendly to British control. The ministry decided to maintain a regular army of approximately 10,000 soldiers and officers in America, and after the Treaty of Paris in February, 1763, General Jeffrey Amherst, commander-in-chief of the British army in North America, reduced the military forces to a peace-time footing and drafted a plan for a new distribution. His plan designated Quebec, Montreal, Niagara, Detroit, Nova Scotia, South Carolina, Pensacola, lower Mississippi, and St. Augustine as locations for the troops. Small detachments were to be distributed within the districts. The Indian reservation set aside by the Proclamation came under the complete authority of the military department. No precedents guided in the administration of the region, and because of the great distances between the forts and the difficulties of communication throughout the West, it was necessary to give the military officials discretionary power in emergencies not covered by specific orders. This enhanced the power of the military establishment and made it the chief instrument of royal control in the new territory after 1763.

The first important challenge to British authority came from the Algonquin Indians living in Canada and in the Great Lakes and Ohio regions. The uprising was due to the persistent intrusions of settlers upon the Indian lands and to the wrongs which the Indians suffered at the hands of the colonial traders. The French had not taken Indian lands, and their traders pursued a policy more acceptable to the savages. Management of the Indians by the colonies had been inefficient because the governors, traders, and Indian agents had never agreed upon a system of coöperation. The seriousness of the Indian problem demanded a straightforward, centralized policy, but centralized control administered by the provincial governments was too intricate without a colonial federation which did not exist at that time. Indian affairs left to the control of the separate colonial governments were far from successful. The Indian agents had repeatedly urged

the Lords of Trade to draft plans for a unified system of Indian management. The Lords of Trade acted slowly, and before a British colonial policy for the West was announced, the Indians, under the leadership of the Ottawa chieftain, Pontiac, struck for revenge along the Ohio River and in the Great Lakes region.

The calamities which overwhelmed the borders of the middle colonies in May and June, 1763, were not felt to any great degree in the South. The state of Indian affairs in the South was largely a result of the meeting held at Augusta in 1763. One of John Stuart's first acts as Superintendent of Indian affairs in the southern department was to call a general Indian conference with the governors of the southern provinces. Its purpose was to apprise the Indians of the reasons for the transfer of the territory from France and Spain to England under the Treaty of Paris and to restore peace and confidence between the Indians and their new sovereign. This gathering, fortunately suggested by the British government and promptly carried out by Stuart and the governors, prevented the Indian uprising from extending to the South.

General Amherst, safely settled in distant New York, failed to consider the grave consequences of a general Indian uprising against the people of the defenseless frontier. He had expected to hold the vast western country under control with a few scattered garrisons and turned a deaf ear to those who warned him that, unless the Indians were given greater consideration, a war with all its horrors and sufferings would be inevitable. He failed to see that British security in the West depended upon the good will of the Indians. He underrated their power while Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian affairs in the northern department, saw in them the most formidable, uncivilized people in the world. Not until the news of death and destruction in May and June did Amherst awake to the full significance of the uprising. Once convinced of the nature of the insurrection, he acted with vigor. But with less than a thousand regular soldiers at his immediate command, he was handicapped in sending adequate military aid to the western country. Almost all colonial troops had been demobilized. In fact, Great Britain was ill prepared in 1763 to assume the new duties of territorial defense.

General Thomas Gage, who succeeded Amherst in 1763, accepted the military plans which the latter had drawn up for the spring of 1764. Two offensive campaigns had been planned against the Indians. Troops from New Jersey and New York, together with British Regu-



lars, were intended for the operations in the Great Lakes region. For punishment of the Delaware, Shawnee, and other enemy tribes in the Ohio Valley, General Amherst had planned to supplement the Regulars with troops from Pennsylvania and Virginia. Colonial troops were needed to increase the size of the armies and to supply men familiar with Indian methods of warfare. General Amherst had asked Pennsylvania for 1,000 men exclusive of commissioned officers, New York for 1,400, and New Jersey for 600. He also requested troops from Virginia. New York and New Jersey held that it was unreasonable to ask them to bear the whole burden and expense of reducing the red men to the northward and made assistance from New England a condition of their contribution. General Gage gave ear to the voice of these provinces and requested of Massachusetts 700 men, Connecticut 500, New Hampshire 200, and Rhode Island 200.

The jealousy among the colonies and their hesitancy in voting men and supplies for use beyond the borders of their own colonies made the execution of this plan a disagreeable task. British and colonial representatives had never agreed upon a system of defense in which concurrent duties and responsibilities were satisfactorily shared between England and the colonies. Would the provinces coöperate with the British forces in carrying out the plans for 1764? The provincials felt that, since they had already sacrificed beyond their abilities in the late conflict, Britain was not justified in asking them to bear an additional burden for the protection of a territory from which British fur merchants and land speculators would reap the greatest advantage. British officials held that it was a war for the protection of the colonies; therefore the colonists should share the expense of defending the new territory.

Finally New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Connecticut voted 2,963 troops for service in the West in 1764. Besides these, Governor James Murray of Canada sent 300 troops for the northern expedition. The purpose of this expedition, under Colonel John Bradstreet, was to secure the important communication at Niagara, to punish the Wyandot, Seneca, and Ottawa tribes, to relieve Major Henry Gladwin at Detroit, and to repair and regarrison the forts captured by the Indians in May and June of the previous year. After punishing the hostile tribes in the Great Lakes region, Colonel Bradstreet was to march to the country of the Delawares and the Shawnees and there coöperate with Colonel Henry Bouquet, who had been appointed to lead the other army from Fort Pitt. In addition to these two campaigns, Sir

William Johnson organized and directed parties of Indians in alliance with Great Britain against the enemy Indians. These offensive campaigns broke the resistance of the Indian confederacy. By 1765, after the ratification of a series of treaties in which the Indians promised allegiance to the English Crown, the country was restored to its former tranquility.

The outbreak of the Pontiac Conspiracy in May, 1763, emphasized the need of centralized control over Indian affairs. To meet this need the British government, by virtue of the Proclamation of 1763, placed Indian relations in the trans-Alleghany region under the control of the military department. Land transactions were placed under the supervision of royal officials. Settlements were not to be made west of the boundary line without special permission, and those already made in this region were to be abandoned. Trade was to be free to the colonists provided they obtained a license from the commander-in-chief or the provincial governors. Nothing was said, however, about regulating trade under colonial laws. In fact, the Proclamation failed to define clearly the principles to be followed in trade practices. No unified system for the management of Indian trade was provided until the next year.

Soon after the Proclamation had been issued, a comprehensive plan for the management of Indian affairs was drafted by the Lords of Trade. Commercial and political relations with all the Indian tribes were to be placed under the control of royal officials. The tribes were grouped into two districts over each of which was placed a superintendent. All laws in the several colonies for regulating Indian commerce were to be repealed. Trade was to be controlled by an Indian department in each district. In the southern district it was to be carried on at towns located in tribal territories; in the northern district at certain fortified posts. All traders were required to conform to the trade regulations prescribed by the Indian department. Military officers and governors were forbidden to hold general conferences with the Indians without the concurrence of the superintendents. On the other hand, the superintendents were to act with the governors on such matters as war, peace, and land purchases. The main purpose of these regulations was to secure protection for the Indians against traders, settlers, and land speculators.

This plan was never presented for parliamentary sanction because of the enormous cost of execution, estimated at £20,000 annually. To meet this expense it was planned to tax the fur trade. This would have



required an act of Parliament, and the ministry was not willing to risk the issue. Even though the plan was not legally adopted it was used by the superintendents as a guide in their dealings with the Indians until 1768. The governors had never whole-heartedly approved of this limitation of their power over the Indians and had refused to coöperate with the superintendents in carrying out the new regulations. Stuart met with greater opposition in the South than Johnson did in the North. Centralized control was too complex to be enforced in the great stretches of the West without coöperation between the provincial and British officials. General Gage, realizing that the army was powerless in upholding the new regulations in the Indian territory, recommended that the expensive plan be abolished. This was done in 1768, and the management of Indian trade was returned to the individual colonies.

Hopes of permanent peace along the frontier would be faint unless the British and provincial governments would be able to protect the Indians against the "lawless and licentious proceedings of the frontier inhabitants." Governor Francis Fauquier of Virginia admitted that his government felt constrained to pursue a policy of prudence rather than one of vigorous measures against the settlers for the simple reason that it had not strength to enforce obedience to law. Johnson was at a loss to know what to do about the conflict which continued along the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Virginia frontiers. The difficulty in bringing the lawless to punishment encouraged every excess. When brought to trial, the juries seldom convicted a white man for killing or ill-treating an Indian. General Gage suggested that trials be removed to the capitals of provinces where "the juries would be more civilized than those of the frontier." The "border banditti" and "lawless vagabonds" had become so bold that they even destroyed the King's goods destined for frontier forts. General Gage and the superintendents of Indian affairs acknowledged their inability to preserve peace in the back parts of the country, unless the home and provincial governments agreed upon some definite plan for enforcing obedience to their commands. The principal Indian chiefs desired peace, but they insisted that it was very difficult to restrain the war spirit of their young men against the many intrusions on their hunting grounds.

Officers attempted to bring the lawless pioneers to trial, but they were helpless against the conditions along hundreds of miles of frontier. The settler did not feel that he committed a wrong by occupying the uninhabited territory. He ousted no one from the land. He knew

perfectly well that the land belonged to no one. It was never visited except perhaps for a week or two each year by some Indian hunting party. In his estimation ownership was based upon the use made of the land, and he saw no justice in laws which restricted freedom of movement in the harsh but richly endowed wilderness. Of course, the Indian thought differently. The clash of the red men and the whites upon the American continent was inevitable. Thus the frontier was the line of contact between two irreconcilable races; real peace could not be attained until one or the other was vanquished beyond question.

During the interval of 1763-1770 several treaties between the British government and the Indians attempted to promote peace along the frontier. Room for expansion had been provided in Canada and in the Floridas by the Proclamation of 1763, but, in practically every subsequent conference with the Indians, additional grants of western land were made to the English. This the savages consented to, not always willingly, in the hope that they were at last to be permanently separated from the whites. The settlers continued their intrusions. Occasionally they were evicted by the army, but by 1766, General Gage feared a riot if the army attempted to expel the large number of settlers in the Ohio Valley without the order of a civil magistrate. He was careful not to involve the army in a quarrel with the provincial governments. Military force was used to restrain the westward movement of population only when requested by the civil governments. The colonial assemblies, hesitant in demanding obedience to royal proclamations, seldom advised the governors to use the regular army against their own frontier settlers. Many influential men, some of whom were colonial officials, were not at all sympathetic with the policy of restricting westward expansion. Governor Fauquier suggested that leaving settlers to the mercy of the Indians might be the only way of preventing settlements beyond the established boundary. Refusal of protection, however, was no more effective than "mere proclamation." It was evident that the British government had provided a western colonial plan which it could not enforce against the relentless movement of population across the mountains.

Conferences subsequent to 1765 between the Indian tribes and the superintendents of Indian affairs revealed that the only temporary relief from the dangerous situation along the frontier was to be gained by shifting the Indian boundary as established in 1763 farther westward. Settlers and land speculators from Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, and the Carolinas clamored for a new boundary line which



would open additional territory in the Ohio region for settlement. The Iroquois were willing to cede this land to the British Crown, and they awaited with great expectation the conference which would authorize this transfer. Johnson and George Croghan used their influence to secure action. They thought that order and justice along the frontier could never be secured unless the whites and Indians were separated by established boundary lines. The British government had been slow to negotiate with the Indians for additional territory because of the opposition of merchants interested in fur trade, of politicians still adhering to mercantile theories, and of treasury officials zealous for economy. The prospects of another general Indian war, however, convinced the Lords of Trade in December, 1767, that a new boundary must be established immediately. The course which the new line should follow was submitted to Johnson with orders to enter into an agreement with the Indians for the new cession.

Since the colonial governments were vitally interested in the Indian boundary, Johnson sent a summons for delegates to attend the important conference to be held at Fort Stanwix in October, 1768. Governor James Moore of New York thinking Johnson would take care of the interests of that colony did not send a representative. Virginia chose with care the men to represent her at Fort Stanwix, Thomas Walker and Colonel Andrew Lewis, prominent speculators in western lands. So important to Pennsylvania was the boundary that Governor John Penn and three delegates from the council attended the conference. Of far greater importance was the presence of Thomas and Samuel Wharton, merchants of Philadelphia. Both were land speculators and members of the company which had been formed to establish a colony in the Illinois country. The Whartons needed to make financial gains in order to recompense themselves and their associates for losses suffered in the Indian uprising in 1763. Land offered the solution, and, unwilling to leave such important business to chance, they used their influence with Johnson and the Six Nations to obtain the desired grant.

The conference was opened in October, and the deed to the new cession was signed on November 5. The Indians surrendered a small strip of land in central New York, a large area in southwestern Pennsylvania, and the region between the Ohio and Tennessee rivers. The right of the Iroquois to a large portion of this land was questionable. General Gage rightly feared that the extension of the boundary to the Tennessee River would be the occasion of numerous quarrels with the

southern Indians who claimed the ceded region. Johnson had been instructed by the Lords of Trade not to run the boundary line any farther down the Ohio than the mouth of the Great Kanawha River. The Indians insisted, however, that the line must extend to the Tennessee River and demanded that the traders, who had suffered at the hands of the Delawares and Shawnees in 1763, should be given a large tract of land as a compensation for their losses. This proposal was the result of private conferences held with the Indians by the Whartons and other interested individuals. There is evidence to show that Johnson lent his influence to gain the same ends even though he received no land for himself. He claimed that the region between the Ohio and Tennessee rivers would soon be occupied by settlers anyway; therefore he felt justified in accepting as large a grant as possible while the Indians were willing to part with it. Johnson asserted that in order to consummate the treaty it was necessary to depart from his instructions.

At Augusta in 1763, it had been agreed to run a boundary line back of the southern colonies, and by November, 1768, the line was completed with the exception of the portion back of Virginia. After Johnson had received such favorable terms at Fort Stanwix, Virginia, reluctant to surrender control of her western domain, refused to accept the boundary line as previously agreed upon with Stuart. Governor Norborne Botetourt appealed to the Lords of Trade for a more favorable boundary, and permission was granted to run the line back of Virginia so as to include additional territory. The Indian chiefs met Stuart at Lochaber in 1770 and confirmed the new cession. When the line was surveyed in 1771 considerably more territory was added to Virginia than had been agreed upon at Lochaber. This act, whether due to a mistake or to the influence of financial interests, was favorably received by Lord Dartmouth, the colonial secretary, an advocate of expansion in the Ohio region.

The boundary as completed by 1768, with its modification behind Virginia, was continuous from north to south. New land had been opened for settlement in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The fixing of the boundary at this time was of great importance in quieting the Indians. As a result the Indians in both the northern and southern departments were satisfied, and they accepted in good faith the promises of the English and colonial officials that there would be no more intrusions of settlers upon their lands.



In 1765, General Gage considered plans for the abandonment of some of the interior forts. The smaller interior forts were erected primarily to protect the interests of the fur merchants and to defend the frontier inhabitants against Indian raids. Forts had been of some value in promoting trade, but the number of them necessary to take in all of the trading area would have involved an expense far in excess of the advantages secured. Also, experience had proved that the forts gave very little protection to settlers along the hundreds of miles of frontier. In case of another Indian war in the trans-Alleghany country provincial troops would have been necessary to restore order. Under these circumstances General Gage could see no use of maintaining an expensive military establishment in the interior country. He favored the dismantling of the smaller western forts, the reduction of the garrisons in those left, and the concentration of the troops in eastern positions. The recent Stamp Act riots had convinced him that the regular army would be of more value as a check upon the older colonies than as a police force stationed in the West. On the other hand, Johnson feared that disrespect for British law would be greatly increased if the soldiers were withdrawn from the West.

The military establishment in America was costing the British government huge sums of money. To economize, the Lords of Trade, in 1768, decided to abandon all interior forts that were not needed to protect Indian commerce and to defeat French and Spanish intrigues among the Indians. Those not considered of sufficient value to justify their up-keep were to be abandoned and the troops stationed in large bodies in the provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and East Florida. Garrisons, however, were to be maintained at Detroit, Michielimackinac, Niagara, Fort Chartres, Fort Pitt, Crown Point, and Ticonderoga. Two of these armed vessels were to be kept on lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan, and Superior. This plan was favored by General Gage, and the withdrawal of troops from the West was begun immediately.

The new regulations for the military establishment had the appearance of finality; yet the Lords of Trade doubted the wisdom of maintaining forts in the Illinois and Ohio regions. Fully conscious of the commercial and military value of these regions, they realized that the expense of maintaining forts there would greatly exceed the advantages gained. Fort Chartres in the Illinois country was little better than a "mere mark of Possession." Its only use was to hold the French inhabitants in subjection. Without Fort Chartres, Fort Pitt was not needed. Both forts were abandoned in 1772. By 1773, almost all of

the British found the new wilderness from the western country and the west of the continent. France and Britain. However, small portions were left to the Indians of the Great Lakes, the Mississippi, the St. Lawrence, and the Gulf of Mexico. The Indians were not to be disturbed. The British and the French had been engaged in a long and bitter struggle against the French and the Indians of the western country.

The commercial relations of 1763 and the withdrawal of the army from the West meant that the new and more of the expedition could receive no encouragement from the British government. As a result of this action the war was not ended and a great Indian reservation. Settlements of white men were not to disturb the peace of the western country. The Great Indian was to remain to assume the responsibility of defending the west against French encroachments. This duty had been transferred to the colonial governments in the expectation that they would successfully control their own settlers and their settlements. After approximately ten years British control in the West had failed. Even then with the Indians had again been engaged in the war of the western tribes. The Indian superintendent and their relations however were retained as officers of the Crown in some disputes between the tribes, in securing for the sale or surrender of lands for public purposes not located within the limits of any particular colony, and in most business cases interviews with the Indians.

It became clear to follow the course of Indian management under British control a uniform rule of colonial regulation was necessary. For the and more independence there was needed a greater solidarity of feeling and a closer realization of the common needs that existed among the various colonies. Particularism developed by a diversity of interests and by mutual suspicion had prevented the growth of any general sentiment for a common cause. Unified regulation of trade by the colonies would have increased the cost of government, and they were unwilling to assume this additional expense. However, during the first half of 1776, New York, Quebec, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland took half-hearted steps to bring about concerted action in their commercial relations with the Indians. Delegates from these provinces were appointed to attend a general conference, but there was never a time when it was convenient for all to meet. Trade with the Indians continued to drift along under the control of the separate colonies until the western tribes were again seething with unrest.



The advance of settlers into the Indian country was the most fruitful source of conflict between the two races. The barriers to the Ohio Valley had been removed by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, and one of the phenomenal westward movements in American history followed. Almost all of the pioneers were home-seekers, not hunters. It was reported in 1773 that for a hundred and fifty miles below Pittsburgh the country was thickly settled, that a large acreage was in grain, and that grist mills were being erected. With this rapid westward movement after 1768, the old causes of conflict between the Indians and the settlers again came to the surface. From North to South the boundary had been disregarded. The frontier people were too numerous and too independent to be stopped. They entertained slight regard for treaties made with the Indians whom they considered little removed from the wild animals of the forest. The governors issued the most severe proclamations to restrain their people from crossing the boundary line, but they lacked the necessary power to enforce them. General Gage offered the regular army but it was not used. Colonial militias would not act with vigor against their fellow colonials; juries would not convict those brought to trial because they often had similar interests; and it was contrary to the settlers' conception of liberty to have trials removed to the capitals of the provinces.

The Indian superintendents, through conferences, by giving presents, and by persuasion succeeded in warding off open conflict between the two irreconcilable races until 1774 when the Ohio Indians struck for revenge against the Virginians. In the spring of that year the provincial soldiers who had been promised land under the terms of the Proclamation of 1763 began to locate their tracts in the region of Kentucky claimed by the Shawnees. This open disregard for the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, together with the already strained relations existing along the frontier, crystallized Indian rancor against the Virginians. They were determined that their hunting grounds should not pass from them. On the other hand, Governor Lord Dunmore, backed by public opinion in Virginia, made plans to reduce the Shawnees to submission. Hostilities on the frontier began as early as April and continued until Chief Cornstalk and his band were defeated in the battle of Point Pleasant on October 10, 1774. The spirit of the Indians was now broken and terms of peace, as submitted by Governor Dunmore, were accepted by Cornstalk and his council of war chiefs. The Indians surrendered all their prisoners and agreed never again to wage war against Virginia, to give up all of their land south and east of the Ohio River, and to

meet at Pittsburgh the following spring for a final ratification of the treaty. The Shawnees, Spartans of their race, had failed to stop the tide of western migration.

The conference at Pittsburgh continued from September 15 to October 19, 1775. The British commandant at Detroit objected to this meeting, but his objections were easily brushed aside. The Continental Congress, desiring to strengthen and confirm friendship with the Indians, was represented by James Wilson and Lewis Morris. Many influential chiefs were present. Every article of the preliminary treaty was ratified. Thus, the Indians of the western confederacy entered into a pledge of peace and friendship, not only with Virginia, but with the new American Confederacy as well. It was this agreement which kept the western Indians quiet during the first two years of the Revolutionary War. The victory at Point Pleasant and the peace which followed opened an ever lengthening pathway to western settlement. The gate to the West was now thrown open, and, by 1775, settlements extended far beyond the established boundary. British and colonial officials had failed to stop the westward march of the pioneers.

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This study has been based primarily on the correspondence of the military officials, Indian superintendents, and colonial governors in America, and on the letters and reports of the ministerial officials in England. The letters of General Thomas Gage are especially valuable for a study of frontier defense from 1763-1775. Photostats of these letters are in the Library of Congress. Valuable transcripts in the Library of Congress are the Colonial Office Papers, series 5 and 324, and the British Museum, *Additional Manuscripts*, series 21 and 29. In the Colonial Office Papers, series 5, volumes LVII-LXIII, 1760-1763, is found the correspondence of General Amherst with British and colonial officials in America. Volumes LXII and LXIII are valuable for information on the Pontiac Conspiracy. Series 5, volumes LXV-LXXVI, 1763-1775, contain the correspondence of John Stuart with the secretaries of state, the provincial governors in the South, and the officials in the southern Indian department. The military correspondence of General Gage with British and colonial officials in America and with the secretaries of state is found in series 5, volumes LXXXIII-XCII, 1763-1775. The Virginia correspondence in series 5, volumes 1330-1334, 1764-1781, and volumes 1345-1353, 1762-1771, contains excellent material on land companies, Indian trade, and boundary line controversies between Virginia and the western tribes. Other volumes



in series 5 and volumes XVII and XVIII in series 324 of the Colonial Office Papers contain miscellaneous information on Indian trade and boundary lines. Material on the administration of the military department is found in the *Additional Manuscripts*, series 21 and 29.

Important published sources are the *Pennsylvania Archives*, *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania*, *Documentary History of the State of New York*, and *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*. *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State*, edited by C. E. Carter, is one of the best published sources on frontier conditions in America. *The Journal of Jeffrey Amherst, Recording the Military Career of General Amherst in America from 1758-1763*, edited by J. Clarence Webster, gives information of the Pontiac Conspiracy. *Illinois Historical Collections*, X, XI, XVI, edited by C. E. Carter and C. W. Alvord, are excellent for a study of the West from 1763-1769. *Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791*, edited by Adam Shortt and A. G. Doughty, contain material on the British colonial policy after 1760. *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, edited by James Sullivan, are not of particular value for a study of frontier defense. *Documentary History of Dunmore's War*, edited by R. G. Thwaites and L. P. Kellogg and *American Archives*, edited by Peter Force, are good for conditions in the West in 1774-1775. Source material was found in *Collections of Massachusetts Historical Society*, 4th series, IX and X; *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections*, XIX and XXVII; *Collections of the New York Historical Society*, 1876-1877 and 1922-1923; *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, XXXI and XXXII; and in the *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, XI.

## JOSEPH GALLOWAY, POLITICIAN AND IMPERIAL STATESMAN\*

By RAYMOND CLARENCE WERNER

A study of the public career of Joseph Galloway throws new light on Pennsylvania party politics and on the relations of that colony and England during the years 1756 to 1776. This study, furthermore, reveals the views of an outstanding American politician and statesman who visualized, in their imperial aspects, the economic and political problems of the period following the French and Indian War. It also adds to our understanding of that colonial element which believed that while America had grievances, these might be adjusted satisfactorily, and future causes for complaint and misunderstanding might be avoided by the adoption of a written constitution for the empire. This inquiry deepens an appreciation of those colonials who believed that America's future lay within the British empire and that true patriotism demanded their best efforts in the suppression of the rebellion.

Joseph Galloway was, in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania's wealthiest man. Nor is it too much to say that, next to Benjamin Franklin, he was that colony's most distinguished citizen, politician, and statesman. He was possessed of a keen, orderly mind and his writings indicate a broad and intimate acquaintance with history and the classics as well as with the political philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Deeply interested in science and philosophy, he was a member of the American Philosophical Society from 1768 until his death, and its vice-president from 1769 to 1775. In 1769, Princeton conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Laws. Although one of the most critical and forceful pamphleteers of the Revolutionary period, and one of the few persons, in the years 1763-1775, with a grasp of the imperial problems and a clearly conceived plan of union for the empire, his fame has been dimmed by the rôle fate cast for him. Had he, like his intimate friend, Benjamin Franklin, thrown himself whole-heartedly into the revolutionary strug-

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Winfred T. Root.



gle on the American side his talents would have brought him to the forefront among the founders of the republic.

Born in 1731 (1732?) of a wealthy landed and trading family of West River, Anne Arundel County, Maryland, he removed as a young man to Philadelphia on the death of his father. Here he took up the study of law and was admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In 1753, Galloway married Grace, daughter of Lawrence Growden, an ex-Speaker of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, Justice of the Peace for Bucks County, Justice of the Supreme Court, and Provincial Councillor. The family controlled the famous iron furnaces at Durham and was accounted wealthy. Galloway's Quaker birth, his wealth, and his marriage gave him an enviable standing in the Quaker aristocracy.

Galloway quickly rose to eminence in his profession. One of the four leading lawyers of colonial Pennsylvania, he was considered the foremost pleader of his day. By 1775, although most of his time during the past ten years had been devoted to politics and provincial affairs, he was able to estimate the income from his legal practice at from £1800 to £2000 per annum. Much of his legal work, like that of other Pennsylvania lawyers of the day, was concerned chiefly with wills, land transfers, and litigation resulting from lack of system in the land office and carelessness in the filing of warrants.

The Quakers, though numbering only approximately a third of the population, were concentrated very largely in the three oldest counties, Philadelphia, Bucks, and Chester. With the assistance of the pietistic German elements, who held to many doctrines similar to those of the Friends, they effectively controlled the legislature through the simple expedient of refusing equitable representation to the newer western counties. To the question of legislative representation, upon which the colony was split politically, were added other issues such as military defense and war aids. The Penn family, vitally interested in frontier defense and aroused by the home government to secure the military participation of the province in the wars of the period, turned for support to the anti-Quaker party. Until the political power of the Friends was broken there could be no prospect of an adequate militia law or sufficient legislative appropriations for war purposes. The Friends, furthermore, differed with the proprietors on the question of Indian policy. Contending that the Penns secured the advantages of all Indian land cessions, the Quakers insisted that the greater portion of the cost

of negotiations and Indian presents should be borne by the proprietors. As these problems became more acute the rift between the parties widened.

The French and Indian War, of considerably greater magnitude than its predecessors, brought in its train greater problems. Deterred by conscience from making the necessary contributions of men and money for the prosecution of the war, the Quakers, in 1756, decided under pressure from their co-religionists in England, who feared that a catastrophe in America might react unfavorably on the society, to give up all public offices in the following year and allow the control of government to pass into the hands of others who might be unhampered by religious scruples. Following the withdrawal of the Friends from the Assembly, their political machine gave its support to Galloway and such others as were friendly to the Quakers. Accordingly, he was elected to a seat in the House where he remained until 1776 through annual reelections, with the single exception of the year 1764. From 1766 to 1775, he served continuously as Speaker of the House, with powers greater than those possessed by any previous presiding officer of that body. He played a leading part in shaping legislation, served on most of the principal committees, and when Franklin went to England as agent, succeeded him in the greater number of his chairmanships.

Galloway's rise to control in Pennsylvania politics was intimately connected with his leadership of a movement, shortly after entering the House, to secure a royal government to supplant the proprietors, in exchange for Pennsylvania's active participation in the war. At first the financial requirements of the conflict had been met in Pennsylvania by taxation and the emission of bills of credit redeemable over a period of years. As the demands of the war became heavy, Galloway joined with Franklin in an effort to tax the large holdings, hitherto exempt, of located but unimproved lands of the Penn family, in the desire to lift part of the burden from the shoulders of the province. In the sessions of 1755-1756, the issue had been avoided by an outright gift by the Penns of £5000 out of the arrears of quitrents. In the following session, however, Galloway, Franklin, and others joined in a demand for the taxation of the Penn estates as a matter of right, and, when this was refused, Franklin, in 1757, was despatched to England to lay the matter before Thomas Penn personally. The Penns, in order to secure the legislature's cooperation in the prosecution of the war, finally consented to the taxation of their located but un-



improved lands at a rate no higher than that paid by others on lands of poorest quality. Meanwhile, however, a new conflict had broken out between the Governor and the House when the latter attempted to raise funds by the emission of a paper currency redeemable out of the proceeds of duties levied on imports. These bills were promptly vetoed by the Governor on instructions from the proprietors.

Franklin now became convinced that no headway could be made against the proprietors and that the substitution of royal for proprietary government was necessary for greater freedom of action for the legislature. Not finding the British government receptive to the idea, he believed that it might be converted if convinced of the impotence of the Penn government. Accordingly, he induced Galloway to write him, recounting all possible charter violations and picturing the province, and especially the frontier, as being in a constant state of turmoil and restiveness. Upon Franklin's return to Pennsylvania the movement was pushed more earnestly than ever. The leading Quakers supported the movement and petitions praying the Crown to assume the government were circulated.

While the Crown might have been anxious to assume the government in the early years of the century, it no longer felt so inclined and the Penns had very little to fear from this movement. The efforts of Franklin and Galloway to secure a royal government for the province and their refusal to permit greater representation in the Assembly to the western counties cost them their seats in the hard-fought election of 1764. Nevertheless, they controlled the House just as effectively as before and secured the selection of Franklin as the colony's agent in London. With the departure of Franklin, Galloway dominated the politics of the province and headed the Quaker faction.

During the French and Indian War large sums had been expended by the French and English governments for the support of the armies in America, and many Pennsylvanians had sold to both combatants. The province had been prosperous, prices high, imports from Europe had been expanded enormously, and the standard of living had increased materially. With the cessation of hostilities disbursements for the armies practically ceased and the flow of specie to England to pay for purchases in Europe set it. Trade fell off, mercantile houses failed or were on the brink of disaster, prices declined, markets shrank, foreclosure sales did not return enough to cover debts, and unemployment increased alarmingly. Galloway suggested that, in order to stimulate trade, ports be opened in the West Indies to which the restrictions

of the Navigation Acts would not apply. He further hoped that Parliament might be persuaded to repeal the statute of 1764 prohibiting the issue of legal tender currency in the colonies in order to supply the deficiency within the province, and incessantly belabored Franklin, in London, to push the matter with the ministry. In the meantime, bills of credit were issued through the Loan Office against mortgages and thus the prohibition of 1764 was circumvented. This he hoped would inflate the currency sufficiently to raise prices and relieve the distress. It may be, as Chief Justice Allen contended in 1767, that the need for a paper currency was not so real as was the desire of the debtor portion of the province to have it, and that depreciation would certainly follow. Yet Galloway and Franklin felt that there was a real need on the part of business and that inflation might be controlled by emitting no more paper than was necessary. The colony eventually found its way out of the economic doldrums and newer and graver political problems soon occupied the attention of leaders and people alike.

The attempt of Parliament, at the close of the French and Indian War, to tighten up the machinery of imperial organization and raise a revenue in America sufficient to defray a part of the cost of the defense of the West, led Galloway and others to look beyond provincial interests and to envisage the colony in its imperial connections. His legalistic mind accepted Parliament as the supreme legislative and taxing power over the whole British empire. While he admitted the legality of the Stamp Act, he believed it impolitic. He deprecated the disturbances which followed its passage, and held that redress could be obtained by orderly petition to Crown and Parliament through the provincial legislatures. Hoping to quiet the public mind he published "a moderate piece" over the signature *Americanus*. This warned his fellow citizens of the possible consequences of their seditious conduct and admonished them to desist lest Parliament compel their submission. He professed to believe that it had a quieting effect on the inflamed state of opinion. As an outstanding representative of the propertied class he, furthermore, opposed the execution of legal instruments without the use of stamped paper unless the courts should agree to recognize the validity of such documents. His attitude on the Stamp Act earned for him the suspicion and resentment of the radical faction not only in Philadelphia but in New England also. Thoroughly alive to the situation, Galloway did his utmost as a member of the



Assembly's committee to correspond with the colonial agents in London to secure the repeal of the Stamp Act and to obtain the modification of the Navigation Acts as well.

Only a short time elapsed before the passage of the Townshend Acts brought new problems. While the duties imposed by the acts did not bear heavily on the Philadelphia merchants, since they were merely added to the cost of the goods and passed on to the consumer, the traders hoped to be able to use the popular discontent to secure the modification of the Navigation Acts. As was pointed out by the Philadelphia merchants, the repeal of the duties on paint, glass, and paper could do them little good. Such articles could easily be produced in Pennsylvania for local consumption if the duties became onerous and what was needed was the repeal of such restrictions as bore too heavily on colonial trade. Furthermore, it was felt that parliamentary taxation was aggravating the difficulties of the colonies by accentuating the flow of specie to England. Galloway sympathized deeply with the desires of the mercantile interests and from the very beginning used his position as Speaker to urge the agents in London to work for the repeal of the duties. Anxious as Galloway was to secure the repeal of the Townshend Acts, he became much alarmed at John Dickinson's *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, lest they arouse the unthinking and again lead to disorders. Ironically, they appeared in the *Pennsylvania Chronicle* of which Galloway was part owner. The radical party in Philadelphia was determined to bring the Philadelphia merchants into line with the New Englanders and New Yorkers in attempting to secure repeal through a non-importation agreement. Much of Philadelphia's trade was with the West Indies and parts of the empire outside England. The Pennsylvania merchant, furthermore, had but lately recovered from the post-war depression; nor did he have much faith in the New Englander's adherence to an association. The unwillingness of the merchants to agree led inevitably to the application of pressure through public opinion to compel them to do so and numerous letters appeared in the newspapers. These were answered by Galloway over the pseudonyms *Chester County Farmer* and *A. B.* defending the attitude of the merchants and inquiring whether all that was possible had been done through regular and orderly channels to secure the repeal of the acts. This he followed by a pamphlet over the signature *Pacificus*, which he hoped would act as a sedative to the growing distemper, attacking "factious" and "turbulent" Massachusetts and praising the people of

Pennsylvania for their good sense and tranquillity. The correctness of his views was shown when Philadelphians, finally pushed into accepting non-importation, suffered severely from loss of trade.

The repeal of the Townshend Acts cleared the atmosphere temporarily, but the undercurrent of radicalism and democracy and the revolt against the conservative leadership in America continued. The agitation was to all purposes a democratic demand for participation in government. In the election of October, 1770, the small tradesmen and mechanics openly flouted the conservative party. Several days before the election there appeared in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* a statement by a group of tradesmen and mechanics to the effect that it had become customary for certain groups "to nominate persons and *settle the ticket* for assemblymen, commissioners, assessors, etc., without even permitting the affirmative or negative voice of a mechanic to interfere, and, when they have concluded, to expect the Tradesmen to give a sanction thereto by passing the ticket; this we have tamely submitted to so long that those gentlemen make no scruple to say that the Mechanics (though by far the most numerous, especially in this county) have no right to be consulted. . . . We have as cautiously avoided putting the name of a Mechanic in our ticket for some years past as we could have been in putting in that of a Jew or a Turk." William Goddard, who had been associated with Galloway in the publishing venture, also attacked him venomously. Galloway's health at this time was not of the best and, thoroughly disheartened, he thought for a while of withdrawing from active political life, but was dissuaded therefrom only by the active solicitation of his friends, especially Benjamin Franklin.

For the radical elements in the colonies, Galloway had only the contempt of the man of property and political power. His cold, intellectual, vain, domineering nature inspired no love among the electorate, and he was maintained in office largely by the efficient functioning of the conservative political machine, whose hold on the province was becoming daily more precarious. The determination of the British government to assist the East India Company by permitting the shipment of tea directly to America without first paying the tax in England greatly increased the popularity of the radical movement. Franklin, in London, assuming that Galloway's views were the same as his own, wrote him advising that the colony assume a firm attitude toward Great Britain and reject the tea, but Galloway chose rather to ignore the whole question publicly, for insofar as he was concerned the act



was entirely justified. As the tension between the mother country and the colonists increased and the committees of correspondence became more active, Galloway had the committee of the Assembly for corresponding with the agents in London authorized to correspond with "other Committees appointed by the several assemblies." He hoped in this way to prevent the further spread of the contagion into Pennsylvania and to forestall the creation of unauthorized committees of correspondence by the rapidly growing radical group.

The impending storm between Great Britain and her colonies was not long in coming. While the rejection of the tea might have been overlooked, its destruction in Boston could not be tolerated. Galloway, seeing in the destruction of the tea only the destruction of private property by violence, felt that the punishment of Boston was entirely just but he was willing to join with the conservatives in advocating payment for the tea and thus avoid the issue. In popular circles, however, the punishment of Boston was regarded as much too rigorous and in the demand for the calling of a continental congress the question of the destruction of the tea was entirely avoided. Galloway and the conservatives expected to remain neutral and leave Massachusetts to her fate in the hope that radicalism might thus be definitely crushed in America. This hope was rendered futile by the powerful demand of the radicals that Pennsylvania should participate in the Congress. The fear that delegates would be sent by illegally elected bodies led the Assembly to participate in the Congress in the hope that it might be controlled by conservatives. Galloway, chosen as one of the delegates, refused to serve unless he should be permitted to write the instructions of the Pennsylvania delegation. This being agreeable to the House, he built the instructions to center upon the idea of an accommodation of all questions in dispute with Great Britain.

Galloway could see no distinction between direct taxation and taxation for the regulation of trade only. He had no sympathy whatsoever with independence, which he viewed as the logical outcome of the radical movement, and believed that America's future lay in the British empire. While he was willing to concede that America had grievances, he felt that the basic problem was one involving the nature of the empire and that it might be solved by a written constitution which would create a supreme governing body, or imperial legislature, wherein all parts of the empire would participate. He was, furthermore, thoroughly in accord with the idea of greater autonomy for the various imperial divisions.

With the assembling of the delegates to the Congress in Philadelphia, Galloway offered the use of the Assembly chamber as a meeting place. The patriotic group, however, declined the offer in favor of Carpenter's Hall and thus brought the movement closer to the people and gained rather considerable popular support for the members. In the Congress, Galloway played an important part in endeavoring to hold the conservatives together as well as in working on the various committees. With the adoption of the Suffolk Resolves and the "Association" for non-intercourse, the Congress fell more and more into the hands of the radicals, and Galloway, as a constructive measure, introduced a plan for a written constitution for the empire. The plan contemplated an American legislature which would function as the lower house, and the British Parliament as the upper house of an imperial legislature, with a governor-general for America. The individual colonies would continue the administration of their purely internal affairs while in all matters of inter-colonial and imperial nature the imperial legislature would be competent. From the very beginning the plan had the support of the conservatives but the radicals succeeded in having it referred for future consideration. When finally called up, it was defeated by the narrowest of margins and all references to it were ordered expunged from the journals of the Congress. With the adjournment of the Congress he devoted himself to the preparation of the *Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain and Her Colonies* which, while avowedly a dispassionate examination of the constitutional status of the colonies, was a severe arraignment of the Congress and the radical element, and earned for himself popular suspicion.

With the close of the Congress the conservatives in Pennsylvania under the leadership of Galloway endeavored, though without success, to have the legislature petition the Crown for a redress of grievances. Galloway's conduct in the House aroused considerable enmity against him in the popular party, which was rapidly intimidating the conservative elements and laying plans to set up a provincial congress to supersede the Assembly. Seeing the inevitable clash in the offing and, believing that he could remain neutral, despite the persuasions of Franklin that he join the patriotic cause, he retreated to his country-seat, Trevoise, in Bucks County, shortly after the opening of hostilities at Lexington. Even here Galloway feared for his safety and eventually fled to the British lines in New York with his daughter, Elizabeth, leaving Mrs. Galloway to look after the family property.



The British military authorities eventually recognized Galloway's value, and he was consulted by Howe while the Philadelphia campaign was being planned. Galloway strongly advised against attacking by way of the Chesapeake and his fears proved to be justified. Accompanying Howe's army to Philadelphia he was made Superintendent of Police and also acted in the capacity of civil administrator of the city. He believed that the loyalist sentiment in New Jersey and Pennsylvania predominated and that the loyalists would rally to the British standard. In this, however, he was largely disappointed, although he did succeed in enlisting a troop of horse, which did good service, and in building up a loyalist association. His knowledge of the geography and the people of Pennsylvania proved invaluable to Howe and his organization of the civil administration did much to relieve the distress incident to the war.

Galloway's active assistance to the British and his efforts in Philadelphia, though largely of a humanitarian nature, aroused so much resentment against him that his continued residence in Philadelphia after its evacuation by the British was impossible, and, with his daughter, he accompanied the army on its return march to New York. The withdrawal of the British from Pennsylvania meant the attainting of all loyalists and the confiscation of their properties. Galloway's estates were among the first to be confiscated and sold for the benefit of the state. Mrs. Galloway, who had remained behind in an endeavor to save what she could, found herself ejected from their home and reduced almost to penury.

In the autumn of 1778, Galloway, sadly and regretfully, sailed for England where he became one of the leading figures among the emigres loyalists. As one thoroughly familiar with the military situation in America, he was a witness before the parliamentary committee for the investigation of the conduct of the war and his testimony was very damaging to Howe, whom he felt responsible for the failure of British arms. Thwarted before the committee by Burke who was determined not to bring to light too many of Sir William's shortcomings, Galloway severely arraigned the latter's military conduct in a pamphlet entitled, *Letters to a nobleman on the conduct of the war in the Middle Colonies*. Convinced that the superior numbers and equipment of the British, if properly used, would bring eventual victory, Galloway insisted that the function of the British army in America was to seek out Washington and compel him to give battle. For this reason, Galloway offered strenuous objection to the long periods of inactivity on

the part of the British and to the attack on Philadelphia by way of the Chesapeake. The British attitude toward the loyalists he roundly condemned, for he felt that the latter might be organized and armed and be of great assistance to the royal forces by holding the country as rapidly as it could be conquered. These views he presented to the public in *An Account of the War in the Middle Colonies*. This was followed by *Historical and political reflections on the rise and progress of the American Rebellion* discussing the origins and tracing the political progress of the revolution in America. In contradiction to his later views, that the rupture had been brought on by the stupid methods employed by a bureaucracy to tax the colonies, he traced what he chose to regard as the growth of the spirit of independence, but which was in reality a spirit of nationalism, from the very founding of the New England colonies to the opening of hostilities; and suggested a written constitution for the empire. Subsequently appeared *Cool Thoughts on the Consequences to Great Britain of American Independence*, in which a determined attack was made on that small group of Englishmen who felt that the economic value of the North American colonies did not justify the expenditure of blood and treasure necessary to keep them in the empire. These men were, consequently, willing to let them go, believing that the trade of America would continue to come to England and that eventually the colonies would fall under the political leadership of Britain. Galloway took issue with this point of view and contended that the loss of the colonies meant the loss of three million subjects and one of the most valuable parts of the empire. He insisted that America would very quickly recover from the effects of the war and in a few years become a powerful nation, while England, through her loss of colonial trade and resources, would sink to the position of a second rate state.

Galloway believed to the very last that the colonies could be reclaimed and kept up a constant correspondence with the loyalists remaining in America. In this belief he was encouraged by the fact that many who had supported the American cause before 1778 became lukewarm as a consequence of the alliance with France. He was, furthermore, buoyed up by the continued activities of the loyalists in the middle and southern colonies. The surrender of Cornwallis and the opening of peace negotiations were staggering blows to the refugees in England. They had hoped to the last that the revolution in America would ultimately be crushed. Their chagrin and despair were eloquently proclaimed by Galloway. In his *The Claims of the American*



*Loyalists reviewed and maintained upon incontrovertible principles of Law and Justice and Observations on the fifth article of the treaty with America* he dwelt upon the sacrifices made and the losses suffered by the loyalists in consequence of their support of the British cause. He pleaded earnestly for their more generous treatment. To Galloway, the fifth article of the Treaty of Paris was a callous betrayal of loyal subjects. He had no hopes that the various states would, on the recommendation of Congress, enact suitable and equitable legislation to permit the loyalists to return to their homes and recover their estates. Under the various acts of Parliament Galloway, however, was reimbursed for his losses to the extent of about £10,000 and was granted a pension of £500, though his own estate had been valued at £40,000.

With the death of Mrs. Galloway in 1789, a surge of homesickness overcame him and he unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania to dismiss the bill of attainder against him. Galloway could not realize that he had played far too prominent and active a part in the events of his day—a lesser man might have been granted amnesty. Galloway was deeply disappointed. He had espoused the royal cause from the most sincere and patriotic motives, inspired by a passionate love for America and a belief that he was saving her by opposing the radicals and revolution. To the end he felt that all colonial grievances might have been adjusted by the adoption of a written constitution for the empire.

Galloway grew old rapidly after 1790 and turned his attention to religion, writing tracts such as *The Prophetic or Anticipated History of the Church of Rome, written and published six hundred years before the rise of that church; in which the prophetic Figures and Allegories are literally explained*, and preparing commentaries on the Scriptures such as *Brief commentaries upon such parts of Revelation and other Prophecies as immediately refer to the present time*. While he lived he was ever at the service of Americans. He prosecuted the claims of the loyalists with the Government and performed whatever offices he could for his less fortunate compatriots. He died on the 29th of August, 1803, and lies buried in the churchyard of Watford, Hertfordshire.

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To date but one biography of Joseph Galloway has appeared: Baldwin, E. H., "Joseph Galloway, Loyalist Politician," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History & Biography*, XXVI (July, October, December, 1902), 161-191, 289-321, 417-442.

With the exception of his pamphlets, Galloway has left few materials from his hand. A few letters are scattered in various places. His activities are portrayed best in the Penn Mss.—especially the *Penn Letter Books*, *Penn Official Correspondence*, and the *Penn Miscellaneous Manuscript Letters*—in the possession of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. A wealth of published material is to be found in *Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania*, *Pennsylvania Colonial Records*, *Pennsylvania Archives*, *Writings of Benjamin Franklin* (Smyth, A. H., ed. 1905–1907), contemporary Philadelphia newspapers, and in the pamphlet collection of the Library Company of Philadelphia, Ridgway Branch.

Galloway's own writings are an important source for the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods of his life, but other materials are to be found scattered through Force, Peter, *American Archives*, fourth series; *Journals of the Continental Congress* (Ford, W. C., ed. 1904–1922), I; papers of Governor William Franklin in the *New Jersey Archives*, X; New York Historical Society *Collections*, especially the Deane, Lee, Kemble, and Montross papers; and in the *Loyalist Papers* and *Emmett Mss.*, of the New York Public Library. Other materials are to be found in the "Diary of Grace Growden Galloway" (Werner, Raymond C., ed.), *Pennsylvania Magazine of History & Biography*, LV, LVIII; *Letters to Members of the Continental Congress* (Burnett, E. C., ed. 1921–1933); and Mason, W. S., in *American Antiquarian Society Proceedings*, October 15, 1924. A few pieces are to be found scattered in the *Historical Magazine*, first series, V, Keith, C. P., *Provincial Councillors of Pennsylvania* (1883) and Lincoln, C. H., *Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, 1760–1776* (1901) contain some materials. Brief references to Galloway also appear in the *Gentlemen's Magazine* for 1780 and 1803, and in the *London Monthly Review*, LXI and LXIII.



## PAMPHLET LITERATURE AT THE OUT- BREAK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION\*

By BOYD CARLISLE SHAFER

A flood of pamphlets inundated France in 1788 and 1789. Together with the *cahiers* they constitute the best sources in revealing the thinking of literate Frenchmen at the beginning of the Revolution. The purpose of this study is to analyze and interpret French public opinion as it manifested itself in these hitherto inadequately studied brochures. The problem is approached through a discussion of the nature of the pamphlets themselves, by interpretive analysis of their content on the nature and form of government, on noble and ecclesiastical privilege, on the place of the third estate and middle class, and on the development of nationalism. Throughout, an attempt is made to place the thinking of the pamphleteers in its proper historical perspective, as the popularization of the teaching of the *philosophes*, and as the ideological basis for the revolutionary reforms and changes. Very little was said in the pamphlets that had not been pointed out, at one time or another, by one of the *philosophes*. The pamphleteers, faithful adherents of Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Turgot, and Locke, took from these and other reformer-philosophers of the earlier eighteenth century, what appealed to them most; and with what seems to have been surprising agreement, molded a program of reconstruction for France. During the various stages of the Revolution proper their ideology and many of their concrete proposals were tried and tested in the crucible of revolutionary action. Scarcely one of their ideas did not cause reverberations from 1789 to 1815 or even later. Some of these ideas, representative government, for example, have proven useful. Others, ingenious schemes of taxation and the like, have long been forgotten.

The yeast concocted by the *philosophes* began to effervesce vigorously when Brienne was forced to convoke the States General and, on July 5, 1788, instigated by decree a nation-wide quest for informa-

\*From a dissertation directed by Professor George Gordon Andrews.

tion concerning the convocation, organization, and duties of that almost forgotten body. Hundreds of eager if not always learned Frenchmen answered his call with *avis*, *lettres*, *réflexions*, *observations*, *essais*, and *voeux*, pamphlets of every title and description. A letter in the *Gazette de Levee* observed in November, 1788, "There is not a day when three or four pamphlets concerning the States General do not appear." The Comte de Fersen wrote his father in December, 1788, that ten or twelve brochures appeared every day and that even the farmers were reading them. In June, 1789, Arthur Young wrote in his diary, "Thirteen [pamphlets] came out today, sixteen yesterday, ninety-two last week." Many of the writings like Sieyès' *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?* went through several editions and many printings.

Though many were eager to publish, few were willing to acknowledge their authorship except indirectly. The censorship which grew less stringent as the Revolution approached, was yet severe enough to force modern students, if they would ascertain who the authors were, to use constantly Barbiers' *Dictionnaire des Ouvrages anonymes*, and to search through contemporary gossip and opinion. Nevertheless, noble, ecclesiastic and commoner alike wrote and published. Many of those destined to become famous in revolutionary annals took up the pen. They zealously began to popularize those concepts of liberty, private property and patriotism which are commonplaces of the democratic state today. Gathered together in Paris for the most part they sold their leaflets at nominal prices, one *livre*, four *sols* often, or they passed them out gratuitously. They were as optimistic as they were bold. They thought they could evolve political and economic principles comparable to the laws of Newtonian physics to govern society and human institutions. As they developed their ideas they not only put the whole structure of the *ancien régime* on trial but by implication, innuendo and direct statement showed the type of social order they desired for France.

In theory, if not in practice, at the outbreak of the Revolution France was an absolute, divine-right monarchy. The sovereignty resided in the person of the king. He, as executive, legislator, and judge, was accountable to God alone in the exercise of his power, and an indissoluble bond held the people to him. Not all Frenchmen in 1789 took issue with these principles. A few pamphlets, for instance, Goudar's *L'autorité des rois de France est indépendante de tout corps politique: elle était établie avant que les parlemens fussent créés*, were published supporting them. But the trend of opinion was toward popular sover-



eignty. "All authority," wrote one anonymous author, "has its source in the will of the nation . . . The nation alone *has the right to establish, to direct*, and nothing can be done unless it so orders." The people, at least those possessing property, had a natural right to change, to modify, to maintain their government as they saw fit. As Abbé Raynal put it, "There is no form of government which has an immutable prerogative. No political authority which, though created yesterday or a thousand years ago may not be abrogated tomorrow or in ten years."

Four major justifications of popular sovereignty were advanced. The people, a term used synonymously with third estate, were sovereign, it was claimed, because of their great numerical superiority, because of the importance of their economic functions in society, because government originated in and was maintained by a social contract among them, and because they had a natural right to govern themselves. The privileged orders numbered but 500,000 to 600,000, the third estate about 24,000,000. Members of the third order tilled the land, built the cities, were the source of all wealth, "the glory and foundation of empires." Moreover, as opposed to the divine right of kings men had a natural right to choose freely their own government, and to make freely contracts among themselves to protect their rights as men. The "title of man was the first on earth," the "origin of all rights." The social contract did not deprive man of his rights but rather, to use the words of Condorcet, "Each [man] engages himself toward society to aid it with all his resources. Society engages itself towards each of its members to use the resources of association to defend them. . . . In reality when men contract freely they make nothing but exchanges." Kings, then, had only such power as had been conferred upon them by the people. No privileged order or individual had rights superior to society. The people, the mass of individuals comprising the third estate were sovereign. When the Convention voted to dethrone Louis XVI, it could very well have relied upon the political theories enunciated in 1788 and 1789.

The rule of the general will seemed better to the pamphleteers in theory than in practice, however. Few, like Babeuf, were willing to go all the way. For the most part opinion was not democratic, republican or agrarian. As the pamphleteers conceived it the state was a gigantic joint-stock enterprise in which those who held stock, or property, were to have an active influence on public affairs. All those who did "not contribute anything to the maintenance of the state" were

classed with women and children, were to be, as it were, non-voting stockholders, passive citizens. Elected representatives were merely to carry the proxies of the property holders and legislate for the nation's best interests, which fortunately coincided with the best interests of the propertied. The third estate was, perhaps, sovereign by natural right and human endeavour. It might constitute the nation. But those who were to have the real power were the well-to-do.

Faced with the actual possibility of achieving power the *petits philosophes* of 1789 were not much more republican than they were democratic. They did not wish to break violently with the past, to discard altogether as the Convention did the monarchical form of government. With Montesquieu most of them believed a constitutional monarchy best suited to a country of the extent and nature of France. Louis XVI was praised and lauded as was customary and politic. The royal ministers were at fault, the king deceived. Desmoulins' was but an isolated voice when he declared it "only necessary to open the annals of France, though they were written by monks and [royal] historiographers, to see that in spite of these panegyrists, no history presents a longer succession of bad kings." He loved Louis XVI, but to him "monarchy was no less odious." The absolutist conception of the state as advanced by Hobbes was almost gone, it is true. The king was now found to be subject to the will of the nation and bound by its law. Nevertheless he was to retain the executive and possibly some legislative power, the veto, for example. Brissot expressed prevailing sentiment when he said he favored that form of government which "conciliates all claims, which does not give too great a shock to the old form, which prepares, however, for a restitution of power to the people, that form which is most suitable to the state of affairs in which the French people find themselves, to the character of their monarch, and to the power of the States General of 1789, and this form is to divide for the present the power between the States General and the King." A number of writers seemed frightened by the possibility of a too vigorous popular government and with Mounier favored the principle of separation of powers so recently put into operation in the newly formed American nation. Even in their discussion of the form of the States General most pamphleteers were not so extreme as might have been expected from the nature of their expressed political philosophies. If they were theorists, they were also, many of them, practical men of affairs. They were willing to modify their seeming radical leanings and compromise with the old régime. They believed in gradual prog-



ress and change in the direction of their ideals. Often propertied and ambitious as well as idealistic they showed a strong distaste for extreme measures with the possible anarchy that might accompany them. To them, incurable optimists, progress was not an illusion, but a concrete, enheartening fact soon to be demonstrated before their eyes. Those violent cleavages of opinion, which in 1792 and 1793 appeared among the revolutionists and made them Jacobins and Girondins, and *citras* and *ultras*, were not apparent in 1789. Above all, the majority of pamphleteers ardently desired and believed obtainable, an automatically ordered, stable society which, controlled by the propertied class, would protect property, give individual economic and personal freedom and a greater degree of social equality.

History and legalism they distrusted as eighteenth century thinkers are supposed to, but this distrust vented itself against the laws and the orthodox interpretations of the past. Rabaut Saint Étienne, and many others of similar mind, believed they "must distrust the mania of proving what should be done must be what has been done. Because is is precisely what has been done of which we are complaining." Yet, as they were confronted with the dilemma of choosing between the new and untried based on the imagined natural reason and the old and tried based on custom and tradition, they could not tear themselves away entirely from the past or from an appeal to the high authority of law. Their words, their ideals were derived from the history of France. They mixed indiscriminately Montesquieu and Rousseau, their minds and their emotions. Writers like Target and d'Antraigues (then a vigorous champion of the third estate) found such history and such laws to their taste as could be fitted into their scheme of things. Few Frenchmen, after all, were not proud of the history of *la belle France*. When custom and tradition opposed their designs they appealed to natural law and the "nature of things," to a kind of higher legalism. The pamphleteers needed authority to combat authority. They consequently substituted natural rights for divine right, but they appealed to "law" and "rights" in any case. Probably they did not realise that the preconceived natural order lodged in their imagination had also to be conjured out of a dim, a very dim past.

Of all subjects on which they wrote the form of the States General interested them most. On this important issue every shade and variety of opinion found expression. Séguier and the advocates of the privileged orders urged the form followed in 1614 which they considered constitutional; deliberation and vote by order, each order having the

right of veto on all legislation and approximately the same number of representatives. The majority of writers though they might well have asked for real political equality of the unprivileged and privileged, demanded only a representation of the third estate equal to that of the other two orders combined, and vote by head. Sieyès among others went further and advised his readers that the third estate delegates should and could constitute the national assembly if the representatives of the first two orders refused to combine with them and vote by head. But Sieyès, Condorcet, Desmoulins, Le Tellier, nearly all the major writers (with the exception of Marat who seemed to go further than the majority), were willing to take less than real political equality even for the unprivileged propertied, at least until the new constitution should be made. If they made concessions to exigencies of the moment, they were still ardently devoted to their ideals. They evidently thought they could obtain reform and redress without revolution.

Opinion did not favor violent change. The ultimate goal of these changes was nevertheless a new society constructed on the twin concepts of liberty and property. Not only was the constituent assembly [*sic*] to organize the regular legislature, the Duc d'Orléans instructed his representatives through the pens of Sieyès and Laclos, but it was also to point out to that body its goal, to draft a declaration of rights which "*se réduit développer les points principaux qui sont dans ces deux mots: liberté et propriété*". The term liberty as it was used connoted not license but certain specific liberties prescribed and sanctioned by both natural and human law. Mounier defined the word as "the rights which man should enjoy in the social order . . . not the right of man to do as he wishes without restraint." In reality the concepts of property and liberty were closely connected, for the liberties demanded can be reduced in general terms to two, freedom in the exercise of personal faculties, and freedom in the acquisition and use of property. Citizens were to be protected by the nation-state in their freedom, so long as they did not harm others, to come and go, to assemble, to think, to speak, and to write. And their various religious views were at least to be tolerated. The right to property and to economic freedom was considered a necessary extension of the right to live and to enjoy personal liberty. In addition, as the physiocrats had held, freedom in the use and acquisition of property was believed socially desirable. The general interests of society were those, it was maintained, which best agreed with individual interests and, conse-



quently, society ought to guarantee complete individual freedom to acquire all the satisfactions possible from property. The property, then, of each individual was to be a sacred trust of the state. Every man was to have the opportunity to make whatever use of his goods he could, to buy, to sell, to produce freely. All careers were to be open to all men according to merit. Business and commerce were to be freed from all remaining paternalistic and feudal restrictions such as internal tariffs and the *jurandes* and *maîtrises*.

As the often recurring phrase "no harm to others" indicates, the exercise of economic freedom was to be somewhat limited. It was imagined, too, that the operation of natural laws would automatically check and adjust extreme inequalities. The real incompatibility of personal and economic freedom was not yet perceived. Theoretically, all were to have common rights, but they were to obtain them, paradoxically, amidst inequalities of power and fortune.

The abolition of inequalities except those of wealth would effect the eventual elimination of the privileged orders as such. Indeed the ideological argument for liberties and a partial equality often grew out of the resentment against the *privilégiés*. The Marquis de Condorcet, whose views were as representative of prevailing opinion as any writer's, felt no sympathy for his fellow nobles. "Any nation," he asserted, "in which a legally established genealogist exists cannot be free." Economic and social privileges based on class were much less charitably received than were similarly founded political privileges. To the dominant, idealistic rationalism of the day all privileges were contrary to natural law, anti-social, anti-national, and were equally odious, but the economic and social immunities and precedences, being ever present and concrete, came in for most hostile criticism. The attitude of most of the pamphleteers was well indicated by the irony of an anonymous commoner, "I believe in the privileges of the nobility, that is to say, in the right it has to march at the head of armies when it is worthy of doing so, to obtain rewards when it has merited them, and to share with the third estate the honor of serving the country in person and by proportional contributions of its wealth." Since the nobility no longer performed any peculiar social function, the privileges they enjoyed possessed no validity. The vestiges of feudalism such as the *capitaineries* and *corvées* were to be swept away. Financial exemptions in taxation, nearly all writers, conservative and radical alike agreed, should be abolished. The privileged classes enjoying with the people the protection and advantages of organized

society were to contribute to its support on an equal basis with the people.

The clergy fared no better than the nobility. With one or two exceptions the pamphleteers did not question religion. They did vigorously attack the institution and class entrusted with its care and propagation. That peculiar anti-clericalism evinced so often in French history manifested itself clearly in the days before the Revolution. Voltaire's "*écrasez l'infâme*" was bearing fruit. While the lower clergy, the curés and vicaires, were universally acclaimed, the regular and upper secular clergy were spared nothing. They were declared to be corrupt, greedy, indolent, debauched, socially useless. The lawyer Le Tellier and others launched burning indictments of their personal character that would have brought execution to critics under Louis XIV. More and more the view (an expression of a historical tendency of five centuries) was gaining ground that the church should be completely subordinate to the state. The clergy were no longer to constitute a state within a state. The wealth of the church and clergy did not belong to either the institution or the class but to the nation. At least that wealth partook of the same nature as all other wealth and should be taxable. Quite jealously the Gallican liberties were reiterated. Publicists, irritated by the huge sums sent to Rome and by the papal influence in France, sometimes argued that both should be drastically reduced.

Little matter if the privileged orders did not agree with these strictures. To paraphrase the words of Cérutti, the first and second estates had only "ancient titles," the third estate had "eternal rights." Its members were to obtain not only equality with the *privilégiés*. They were to be favored by the government as well. Roads and harbors were to be built and improved, uniform standards of weights, measures, and money established, schools created, and interest payments legalized. The benefits of French trade were to be confined to Frenchmen. Economy in government was to be practiced, and the debt of the state consolidated and made a national obligation. In reality the government was to become an instrument of *la classe moyenne*, that class in which were to be found "enlightenment as well as the virtues, knowledge as well as honesty, the sentiment as well as the actions of true patriotism."

Patriotism was indeed needed if all these reforms were to be enacted. Grouvelle clearly saw that "*Il faut une nation pour si grand ouvrage, et la Nation est à naître.*" The nation in the modern sense of the term was in fact being born. Many of the pamphleteers per-



ceived that the old conception of the state as king and subjects no longer sufficed, that a nation of citizens who would regard the "oppression of one as the cause of all" was needed. Based on the common cultural heritage and the common political, economic and social aspirations of the propertied class, a sentiment of unity was welding France into a nation and Frenchmen into patriotic nationalists. Each propertied individual was now considered part of a collective, cohesive entity. Pierre La Cretalle's definition of nation makes the new conception clear. "By a nation," he wrote, "can only be understood the generality of citizens who inhabit its territory, who are connected there by permanent residence, by landed property, or through an industry which makes them necessary to those who cultivate the land, who have adopted its laws, who support its charges, who serve it and obey it each in the manner proper to him. As everything is possessed by them, everything belongs to them, because nature knows no other domination than possession. As their concurrence constitutes the total force of society, they are the sole arbiters of its use. Nothing exists, then, in this collective group only by them, neither law, nor taxes, nor institutions, nor governments."

The very titles of some of the pamphlets indicate the growth of nationalism—for example, the *Catéchisme patriotique à l'usage des mères de famille*, and the *Questions d'un bon patriote*. More and more the word *la patrie* was used instead of *le pays*, the word *la nation* instead of *l'état*, the words *le citoyen* and *le concitoyen* instead of *le sujet*. From the pens of zealous patriots came appeals for national unity. Target, a serious lawyer and good business man solemnly declared, "We have acquired enlightenment, but it is patriotism, disinterestedness and virtue that are needed to seek and defend the interest of a great people. It is necessary that each one forget himself, see himself only as a part of the whole . . . , that he detach himself from his individual existence, renounce all sects and parties, abjure all *esprit de corps*, belong only to the great society and be a child of the fatherland." Ingenious schemes to foster patriotism were formulated. One Rupe de Baptestein de Moulières thought to engender love of country and fill the national treasury at the same time by appealing to personal honor for contributions to the government in return for lofty titles of patriotism. Frenchmen, especially unprivileged property owners, were realizing they each had an investment in the mutual enterprise, the state, that to insure the future of that investment they had to become interested in one another, take an increased interest and obtain greater

power in national affairs. Patriotism, the pamphleteers seemed to realize, would not only be a fine sentiment, but pay dividends in liberty and property as well. It was becoming patriotic, reasonable, natural in 1789 to believe in liberty, property and representative government—all best to be realized through patriotism.

When the property of the bourgeoisie became the sacred trust of the nation-state, and its safety the chief end of legislation, when the economic activities of the bourgeoisie were freed from all restraints yet given assistance by the nation-state, when the social status of the bourgeoisie was accepted as equal to that of the old privileged classes, and all careers were opened to them, when their personal liberties were guaranteed to them by the nation-state, when, in short, the bourgeoisie became the state and controlled it through representatives largely to please themselves, then the ideology and concrete proposals of the majority of pamphlets would be achieved. King, priest, noble were being discarded, the nation exalted, and the leading thinkers declared the third estate, or rather its propertied portion, the nation. In the symbol and actuality of nationalism were found the unity and power essential to the revolutionary changes involved in the transition from the old régime to the new. Through the nation-state, once it was established, the middle class could act for what it considered the best interest of France, its own. The nation, it is true, would still be divided as Abbé Gourcy pointed out, not into the feudal privileged and unprivileged, but into the rich and poor.

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About four hundred pamphlets published in 1787, 1788 and 1789 were actually used in the preparation of this dissertation, though there was access to many more. They are found in the libraries of The State University of Iowa and of Cornell University. Only a few of the important pamphlets were not available in this country. Varying in length, in content, and in equality of thought and observation the pamphlets are of very uneven value for studies of public opinion at the outbreak of the Revolution. In the space allotted it would be impossible to note more than a very few of those found to be most valuable. Among these are: Rabaut Saint Etienne, *Considérations très-importantes*. . . ; La Cretalle, *De la convocation . . . des États généraux*. . . ; Target, *Les États-généraux convoqués par Louis XVI*; Condorcet, *Essai sur la constitution . . . des assemblées provinciales*; Le Tellier, *Jugement du Champ de Mars*. . . ; Cérutti, *Mémoire pour le peuple français*; d'Antraigues, *Mémoire sur les États généraux*. . . ; Dela-



croix, *Mémoire sur la prochaine tenue des États-généraux* . . . ; Morellet, *Projet de réponse à . . . Mémoire des Princes*; Mirabeau, *Réponse aux alarmes des bons citoyens*; Metherie, *A nosseigneurs des États-généraux* . . . ; Raynal, *L'abbé Raynal aux États-généraux*; Mounier, *Considérations sur les gouvernemens* . . . ; Grouvelle, *De l'autorité de Montesquieu* . . . ; Desmoulins, *La France libre*; Bergasse, *Plan de conduite pour les députés* . . . ; Carra, *L'orateur des États-généraux* . . . ; Seguiet, *Façon de voir d'une bonne vieille* . . . ; d'Orléans (Sieyès and Laclos), *Instructions données . . . a ses représentans* . . . ; Marat, *Offrande a la patrie* . . . ; Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?*; and his *Essai sur les privilèges*. Among those whose authors are not yet known might be mentioned the *Note essential à l'usage de MM. les notables*; the *Cahier du tiers-état* . . . ; the *Le plus fort des pamphlets*. *L'ordre des paysans aux États-généraux*; the *Les quarante voeux principaux*; and *réveil du tiers-état*. . .

Most utilized of other primary sources were the *Archives Parlementaires*, 1st series, 1787-1799, 82 vols. tome I, which contains excerpts of many pamphlets as well as other official and significant documents; Brette, *Recueil de documents relatifs à la convocation des États généraux de 1789*; the newspaper *La Gazette de Leyde* (1773-1811), which often mentioned the pamphlets and is invaluable as a background for a study of public opinion; the newspaper, *Journal générale de l'Europe*, which carried summaries of events as well as philosophic discussions; and the *Correspondence littéraire . . . par Grimm, Diderot, Raynal, Meister* . . . , especially tome 15, which is almost an intellectual newspaper of the time. Several diaries and memoirs supplied essential information concerning events, opinion and individuals, for instance, those of Sallier, comte de Fersen, Arthur Young, Brissot, Mallet du pan, Morellet, and Gouverneur Morris. The memoirs, for the most part, were written long after 1789 and suffer from the lapses of memory and from the prejudices acquired at a later date. Though the secondary material available on the period as a whole is voluminous, little has been done on the pamphlets. The articles of Mitchell B. Garrett in the *Howard College Bulletin* pertain only to the pamphlets published between July 5, and December 27, 1788, on the convocation and composition of the States General. Together with his critical bibliography on the pamphlet literature between July 5 and December 27, they suggested many clues for this study and supplied some otherwise unavailable information. Without the researches of the bibliophile Barbier who published his findings in the monumental *Diction-*

*naire des ouvrages anonymes* little would have been known concerning the authors of the pamphlets. In Carré *La noblesse de France et l'opinion publique aux XVIIIe siècle*, many of the pamphlets referring to the nobility are discussed, as those bearing on socialism are treated in Lichtenberger, *Le socialisme au XVIIIe siècle*. Material was also drawn from the works of Droz, Chérest, Gomel, Aulard, Mathiez, Avenal, Hatin, Gallois, Boiteaux, Chassin, Champion, Sée, and Tourneux among others.



## PLANTATION AND PARISH LIBRARIES IN THE OLD SOUTH\*

By WILLIAM DALE HOULETTE

The plantation system dominated in the colonies (later states) of Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, during most of the colonial and the early national periods. Servile labor freed many of the planters from the burden of manual toil, leaving ample time for recreation and self-improvement. Many planters and members of the clergy possessed books, and some recorded the extent of their reading. The Anglican clergy contributed much to the spread of reading habits in the South through the establishment of parochial libraries and the circulation of books and pamphlets. Clerical encouragement of reading also was expressed through literary and educational activities. The purpose of this study is to indicate the extent and character of the books in the plantation and parish libraries of these four colonies of the Old South.

Books were in evidence from the beginning of the English settlement in North America. Sir Humphrey Gilbert carried books to the ill-fated colony established on New Foundland in 1583. Thomas Hariot, who accompanied the colonizing expedition sent to the coast of the Carolinas by Sir Walter Raleigh three years later, recorded that the natives were much astounded at the sight of some of the white men's possessions such as compasses, guns, and books. The clergy in early Virginia owned libraries. The Reverend Robert Hunt, the first Anglican divine in Jamestown, lost his book collection in a fire which devastated a part of that settlement in 1607. The Reverend Thomas Bargrave, who was in Virginia a decade later, devised his books to the projected College of Henrico. Donations for this first proposed institution of higher learning in the English colonies of North America also were made to the Virginia Company of London. The Indian outbreak of 1622 frustrated the plans for the college.

The non-clerical leaders of early Virginia brought their reading habits to the New World. Edward Maria Wingfield, first President of

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor H. J. Thornton.

the Virginia Council lamented the seizure of his books during the civil disturbance at Jamestown in 1607. John Pory, Secretary of the colony in 1613, assuaged the loneliness of the Virginia wilderness by literary pursuits. He wrote to a friend that the best means of employing his time was "Next after my penne, to have some good books alwaies at hand." George Sandys, who succeeded him, was a writer of importance. His translation of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, completed at Jamestown, was later highly commended by King Charles I.

The first record concerning the exact type of books brought to Virginia was made in 1605. This was an itemized list of the library of the Reverend John Goodborne, who died on shipboard before arriving in America. The works were mostly on religion, although there were a few treatises on medicine and mathematics. The limited information available regarding other book collections in the South prior to 1605 indicates that religious titles dominated, with works on medicine and law coming next in importance.

More information can be found concerning the books of the last half of the seventeenth century. Medical treatises were frequently devised to friends and relatives. Richard Russell, a Virginia Quaker, in 1607 bequeathed books to numerous friends. He provided, too, for the free schooling of poor children that they might be taught to read. Four years later an inventory of the estate of Captain William Moseley included a collection of French, Dutch, Latin, and English books considered to be worth, according to the general manner of valuation then prevailing, 5,000 pounds of tobacco. The inventory of the estate of Mrs. Sarah Willoughby of Virginia, in 1674, listed a variety of titles including "the turkish history, the life of Lewes the 13th . . . Riders dictionary . . . directions for planting mulberry trees . . . [and] Aesops fables." Colonel Southey Littleton, said to have been a nephew of the famous English jurist, Edward Littleton, died in Accomac County, Virginia, in 1680. The inventory of his estate revealed that he had possessed a number of books, among which were Aesop's *Fables* in Latin and several works on law and history.

One of the most interesting provisions for the use of a family library was found in the will of Francis Pigott of Virginia. Upon his death in 1684 his books were devised to his three sons. The library was to remain in the possession of the eldest son, however, until all had reached their majority. The two younger brothers were granted the privilege of borrowing books from the library during their minority.



In the last decade of the seventeenth century greater diversity of interest was manifest in the book collections of the South. Colonel John Carter of Lancaster County, Virginia, possessed Plutarch's *Lives*, Bacon's *Natural History*, Homer's *Iliad*, Barret's *Military Discipline*, and many other works. The inventory of the estate of Captain Joseph Wickes of Maryland, who died in 1693, included a *General History of the Netherlands*, *The Complete Attorney*, and books on religion, law, history, and medicine. In North Carolina, the same year, John Hunt considered books to be of sufficient importance to warrant court action for their recovery. He petitioned that Mrs. Ann Durant be compelled to "deliver all Books proper and writings belonging to the estate of Mr Wm Terrell Deceased." When a Spanish expedition from St. Augustine ravaged his estate in 1686, Paul Grimball, of Colleton County, South Carolina, listed among his destroyed possessions books and maps to the value of nearly £15.

Colonel William Fitzhugh, a prominent Virginia planter, referred to books frequently in his letters written during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. In 1679 he wrote to Richard Lee offering to pay for a borrowed volume which had been lost. References to legal works in French and Latin were made in a communication sent to Robert Beverley a short time later. Governor Francis Nicholson of Maryland and Virginia also possessed an important library. Governor Nicholson was much interested in education and, during the closing decade of the seventeenth century, he helped pave the way for increasing the reading material in the colonies of the South. He greatly encouraged and assisted the Reverend Thomas Bray in the movement for establishing parochial and provincial libraries in America.

The Reverend Mr. Bray was appointed Commissary of Maryland in 1695 to assist in promoting there the interests of the Anglican Church. As a means to this end, he proposed that parochial libraries be established in the colonies for the use of both laymen and clergy. For the divines there were to be works on history, geography, travel and theology. The libraries for the laity were to consist mostly of books and pamphlets on religion. These libraries were to be housed in a room of the parsonage under the care of the rector. The books for the minister were to remain in the library, but those for the laymen were to be allowed to circulate.

The plan met with encouragement in England and in the colonies. Books were donated by many loyal Anglicans. Governor Nicholson even proposed that part of the fiscal levy, appropriated for arms in

Maryland, should be diverted for the purchase of books. Thirty parochial libraries were established in Maryland within a few years after the time of Bray's appointment. These ranged in size from the two volumes at St. Paul's, Talbot County, to the collection of 1,095 books in the provincial library at Annapolis. There were over three hundred volumes at St. Mary's, while Herring Creek, South River, King, and Queen Parish, and St. Paul's, Calvert County, each possessed over one hundred books. Over 2,500 volumes were in the thirty parish libraries in Maryland within a short time after their founding. Books also were distributed through the Carolinas by Anglican missionaries sent out by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.

The outstanding result of the Maryland Commissary's activities was the establishment of provincial libraries in Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina. For the former colony, Anne, Princess of Denmark, as a mark of her approval of Dr. Bray's plan, donated £400 toward the library at Annapolis. It was named the "Annapolitan Library" in her honor and at one time contained 1,095 volumes. The collection was kept in a room of the state house where the books were accessible to the people. Some retained borrowed volumes too long and it became necessary for the sheriffs to post notices demanding their return. The foundation of the provincial library at Bath, North Carolina, was laid in 1700 when Dr. Bray sent one hundred and sixty-six volumes there. This shipment was supplemented by eight hundred and seventy books and pamphlets for a layman's library. A feature of interest concerning the use of this collection was the limit of one to four months allowed to borrowers. The provincial library at Charleston, South Carolina, was intended for public use. It was established in 1700 in a room of the rectory of St. Philip's Parish and remained under the care of the minister. The same lending regulations were in force there as at Bath. This literary stimulus induced the establishment of the Charleston Library Society about the middle of the eighteenth century.

The influence of Dr. Thomas Bray continued long after his death in 1726. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, for whose establishment he had labored, sent Anglican missionaries to the southern colonies and provided for the circulation of books there until the American Revolution severed Anglican church connections between England and her former colonies. The Maryland Commissary, through his missionary efforts, provided for the teaching of reading to Negroes and poor white children. Because of his activities, several thousand



books were procured for the parochial and provincial libraries of the South. These libraries greatly increased the quantity of reading material accessible to the planters and to the general public.

One of the most notable collections of books in the colonial South belonged to the Byrd family. William Byrd I, it is true, was principally concerned with augmenting his fortune but he found time for reading and writing. He laid the foundation of his library during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. His literary tastes were utilitarian as most of the books ordered from England dealt with natural history. Treatises upon minerals and plants were requested from English friends upon different occasions. Some time before 1675 Byrd purchased *The Proceedings of the Virginia Company in England* from the estate of the Earl of Southampton for sixty guineas and brought this notable manuscript to Virginia.

Under the influence of the next of the line, the library at Westover reached its highest development. William Byrd II was a man versatile and very proficient in cultural pursuits. His interest extended to reading, book-collecting, and writing. Letters from Byrd to fellow-members of the Royal Society frequently alluded to historical works. Critical comments upon the literature of that time indicated that Colonel Byrd's reading was not superficial. Requests for books sometimes accompanied these letters to England.

The Byrd library contained over 3,000 volumes some time before its disposal in 1777. The care of the books was in the hands of a librarian during the latter part of the life of Colonel Byrd II. This is the only record of a librarian having custody of a private book collection in the American colonies. Colonel Byrd made his library available to other scholars for research. The Reverend William Stith used the Westover collection while writing his *History of Virginia*. The evidence also indicates that Byrd's brother-in-law, Robert Beverley, did historical research at Westover for his work, *The History and Present State of Virginia*.

Some indication of the extent of Colonel Byrd's reading is revealed in his three works: *The History of the Dividing Line*, *A Journey to Eden*, and *A Progress to the Mines*. Allusions are made to the writings of Homer, Herodotus, and Mohammed. Frequent mention of curious incidents in many parts of the world indicate Byrd's wide reading of natural history and books of travel.

Although other planters and readers of his day did not manifest the extensive literary habits that characterized William Byrd II, there

a considerable evidence of book-collecting in the South during the eighteenth century. Agnes Jones, a member of the faculty of William and Mary College, mentions "the loss of my books. It seems it shoves under as full as could hold," mentioned in a letter to Williamsburg in 1777. Another year followed the same practice as his fellow Virginian, William Byrd, in making his library available to his friends. At the time of his death in 1779 the inventory shows that many of the borrowed volumes had not been returned.

Both the ministers, William Smith and Robert Beverley, possessed comprehensive book collections. Dr. Charles Bowen, of Williamsburg, mentioned in Mr. Smith in 1778 over six hundred volumes on natural philosophy and music. The Beverley collection contained nearly three hundred books. The library of Luther Cole, mentioned in 1755, is of great interest. Cole, a Williamsburg musician of some note, left the largest collection of music described in eighteenth century colonial Virginia. The musical works included "21 Books Hamburg songs, 6 Sonatas, Capriccios, 21 English songs by Frederick [King], 3 Concertos Arioso and Songs by Handel."

Planters frequently sent their sons abroad for education whose letters reveal extensive book purchases in Europe. Dr. Charles Carroll of Annapolis requested that his son "bring a Good Collection of necessary books" when he was sent to study in America in 1754. Another student of the Catholic family lived in Carrollton, Charles Carroll of that place attended school in France for several years. He wrote to his father in 1756, requesting the difficulty of securing the works of Locke and Newton in Paris. In response to his father's request, young Carroll diligently searched for an impartial history of Ireland. Warner's Irish History was sent to America after a quest of two years. Peter Manigault of Charleston attended school in London. He purchased *The Oeconomy of Human Life* for his father in 1750 and four volumes of *Amelia* two years later. Thus friends and relatives aided in searching European bookmarkets for the planters' collections.

Journals and diaries record actual reading interests. The diary of Colonel James Gordon, a wealthy merchant and planter of Lancaster County, Virginia, noted on August 23, 1759: "Gave several books among the negroes." The following year he wrote of giving books to his friends and of reading Harvey's *Dialogues*. Philip Fithian, tutor to the children of Robert Carter at Nomini Hall, noted, in 1773, that Mr. and Mrs. Carter read philosophy together. In South Carolina the writings of Eliza Pinckney indicate that some women read extensively.



This lady spent at least two hours each day in the library, and part of each morning she devoted to teaching some Negro girls to read.

Several prominent Virginians owned important book collections in the closing years of the eighteenth century. Colonel William Fleming, a prominent physician, possessed over three hundred books including numerous works on history, medicine, and surgery. The inventory of Patrick Henry's estate in 1799 revealed a library of over two hundred books. History and legal works predominated. There was little material dealing with oratory or debate. John Randolph, of Roanoke, kept his books in tightly closed cases to preserve their binding. Part of these were placed near his sleeping room. A contemporary of Randolph observed that his library included the best collection of literature then existing in Virginia.

Some of the best evidence of literary interest in the Old South is in the voluminous writings and the book collections of the four Virginians who early became Presidents of the United States and who read extensively. Many books in George Washington's collection came from that of Daniel Parke Custis, first husband of Martha Custis Washington. Others were purchased or were sent to Mount Vernon as gifts. Washington's reading covered principally history and military science. His devotion to the life of a planter is indicated by the number of treatises upon agriculture in the Mount Vernon library. At the time of his death, Washington possessed many hundreds of volumes. Some books, too, belonged to Mrs. Washington and these were devised to her grandchildren. Washington's part passed into the possession of his nephew, Bushrod Washington, a Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

Thomas Jefferson displayed the greatest interest and energy in book collecting. During his lifetime he possessed three libraries of importance. The first, valued at £200, was lost when his mother's house burned in 1770. His second, collected in America and Europe in the forty-five years following, contained nearly 7,000 volumes and was purchased by the government in 1815 as a foundation for the new Library of Congress. The third, gathered during his declining years, contained nearly 1,000 volumes and was offered for sale at Monticello after Jefferson's death in 1826.

The classification devised by Jefferson for the volumes at Monticello was adopted by the Library of Congress after 1815. The great diversity of Jefferson's interests was reflected in his library and in his writings. Historians and scientists frequently sought his advice. Benjamin Ban-

nekar, a Maryland Negro mathematician, sent his almanac and pamphlets to Monticello. Jefferson corresponded with learned men in England and on the continent. Jean Fabbioni, an Italian writer, sent him tracts on agriculture. From Joseph Priestley, the much persecuted English scientist, Jefferson received religious and scientific treatises. Volumes of history, both ancient and modern, were present in large numbers in the library at Monticello. The knowledge of the philosophers, Plato, Kant, Locke, Spinoza, and Voltaire, was available to Jefferson and his friends through his book collections. Numerous works on architecture reflected the interest of the owner and designer of Monticello. Jefferson made his books available to his friends so that this greatest private library in the United States before 1830 could be used by the learned public to a certain extent. James Madison was one of the close friends of Jefferson who made frequent use of the library at Monticello.

James Madison read widely and possessed many books. Many of these volumes were procured for him by Jefferson and Monroe during their sojourn in Europe. Madison once declined an invitation to visit Jefferson in Europe rather than interrupt a prescribed course of reading. No catalogue listing the books in Madison's collection has survived. A contemporary observed that books filled all available space on the shelves and tables of the library at Montpelier. Madison's books, devised to the University of Virginia, were relinquished somewhat unwillingly by his heirs.

James Monroe was financially handicapped during most of his life but that did not prevent his collecting books. Some of these books were purchased while residing in Europe. Monroe made his library available to young students, a practice not uncommon among book owners in the Old Dominion. This practice was extremely helpful to poor young men, especially those engaging in the study of law. No catalogue has survived to indicate the size and character of Monroe's book collection.

Nearly all reading material for the South came from Europe during the seventeenth century. Books were frequently mentioned in the inventories of merchandise received by the planters. The total weight of printed material shipped into the Chesapeake colonies in 1699 amounted to over 11,000 pounds, an index of the demand for reading matter in the South during the first century of settlement. American printers and booksellers were more prevalent in the eighteenth century. William Parks, printer of Annapolis and Williamsburg, sold many



books in the South. Dixon and Hunter were active in Williamsburg during the Revolutionary period and offered for sale a large assortment of reading material. One of the most active booksellers in the South was Mason Locke Weems, biographer extraordinary of George Washington, and traveling vender of reading material. For nearly thirty years after 1797 he carried books to the buyers on the plantations. In one year he ordered 2,000 Bibles and 1,000 spelling books from Matthew Carey, a Philadelphia publisher.

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The sources for this study consist chiefly of colonial records, wills and inventories, and the letters and other writings of the Southern planters and clergy. Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, vol. VIII (1925) gives some information concerning the books brought over by the English in their two unsuccessful colonizing attempts during the sixteenth century. Details concerning books and literary pursuits in Virginia during the seventeenth century are found in William Stith's *The History of the Discovery and Settlement of Virginia* (1753); Edward D. Neill's *Virginia Vetusta* (1885) and *Virginia Carolorum* (1886); Susan M. Kingsbury, editor, *The Records of the Virginia Company of London; William and Mary College Quarterly*, series I, vols. II, VII, and VIII; and *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, vols. I and II.

Much information concerning books in Maryland, and the work of the Reverend Thomas Bray in establishing libraries there, can be found in Edward D. Neill's *The Founders of Maryland* (1876); *The Maryland Historical Magazine*, vols. I, XI, XII, and XXV; *Archives of Maryland*, vols. I, IV, XIII, XIX, and XXX; and the writings of the Reverend Thomas Bray, edited by Bernard C. Steiner, and published by the Maryland Historical Society as Fund Publication No. 37. Some of the material on the Byrd library is found in "Letters of the Byrd family," in *The Virginia Historical Register and Literary Advertiser*, (1848), and in several issues of *The Virginia Magazine of History*. The catalogue of this library is appended to *The Writings of Colonel William Byrd*, John Spencer Bassett, editor, (1901). *The Virginia Magazine of History*, and *William and Mary College Quarterly*, series I, proved to be the most fruitful sources of information concerning the eighteenth century plantation libraries in Virginia while *The Maryland Historical Magazine* served the same purpose for Maryland. *The Colonial Records of North Carolina*, vols. II, X, and XXII, and *The South*

*Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* reveal many facts about the type of books found in the Carolinas during the eighteenth century. Specific details concerning the libraries of the Virginia dynasty were difficult to obtain. The writings of Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe reveal the kind of books read but indicate little concerning the manner in which they were obtained. John C. Fitzpatrick, editor, *The Writings of George Washington*, (1931); Paul L. Ford, editor, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, (1894); Gaillard Hunt, editor, *The Writings of James Madison*, (1900); and S. M. Hamilton, editor, *The Writings of James Monroe*, contain the most numerous references to the books and the reading habits of the first four presidents from Virginia. The list of books sold by Thomas Jefferson to the Library of Congress in 1815 was found in *A Catalogue of the Library of the United States*, (1815). A copy of this is located in the John Crerar Library at Chicago. The titles of the books belonging to Washington are listed in the *Inventory of the Contents of Mount Vernon*, Worthington C. Ford, editor, (1909). The information concerning the sources of books for the South was widely scattered. *The Virginia Magazine of History, William and Mary College Quarterly, The Maryland Historical Magazine*, the *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, and Emily E. F. Skeel, editor, *Mason Locke Weems, His Works and Ways, Letters (1784-1825)*, reveal many interesting facts. The Appendices, forming the second volume of this study, contain catalogues of a number of plantation and clerical libraries. Lists of books offered for sale and laws governing the provincial libraries are also included in Volume II.



## ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF UKRAINIAN ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES\*

By WASYL HALICH

Ukrainians first came to the United States about the time of the American Civil War, and, in little more than a decade constituted one of the currents in the main stream of immigration. According to careful calculation there were in 1933 about 700,000 people of Ukrainian blood in this country, whose contributions to American industrial, agricultural, and professional life have been important. They provided labor for the mines and mills of most of the industrial states. They have had part in the development of agriculture from the coast of New England to the Rocky Mountains, more particularly in North Dakota. Professionally they became active in teaching and in the church, in law, engineering, and medicine.

The Ukraine lost its dependence at the close of the Middle Ages because of continued attacks by Turkey, Poland and Russia. The Ukrainians had to endure much hardship under foreign rule, but succeeded in preserving and enriching their culture through each succeeding generation. Numerous insurrections resulting from foreign exploitation culminated in the Cossack movement in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. The Cossack period produced such noted military leaders as Bohdan Khmelnitzky and Ivan Mazepa. The former delivered the Ukraine from Polish rule in 1648. The latter, with the help of Charles XII and a Swedish alliance in 1709, attempted to liberate the Ukraine from Russian dominance, but the Ukrainian-Swedish forces suffered defeat at the battle of Poltava. Until late in the eighteenth century the country was a battleground for the rivalry of Russia, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. The two latter were eliminated by the former, and as the century closed Russia controlled about three-fourths of the Ukraine, while Austria-Hungary held the provinces of Galicia, Bukovina and Ruthenia. This remained the situation until the outbreak of the World War.

\*From a dissertation directed by Professor H. J. Thornton.

The effect of these events upon Ukrainian basic economy, agriculture, was most serious. While foreign nobles held vast estates, the farms of the peasants became smaller in each succeeding generation because of the practice of division and subdivision of the land among grown sons and daughters. The economic problem was aggravated by the steady growth of the native population, the weight of governmental taxation, the high interest rates of Jewish money lenders, and the absence of industries. Although the country was rich in mineral resources, and possessed an abundance of cheap labor, despotic government hindered its industrial development.

These economic hardships, together with long periods of compulsory military service, and political and religious persecution—especially during the reign of the Czar Alexander III—made the life of the Ukrainian people unbearable. Many looked to distant countries for an escape. It was during those years of distress that the masses of the Ukraine learned of America. It was represented to them as a country of high wages, cheap food, and personal freedom, with an abundance of good land at a low price. Following a few casual and scattered settlers dating from the time of the Civil War, mass migration began in the year 1877. It was then that an agent of the Pennsylvania anthracite coal mining company, whose workers were then on strike, appeared in parts of the Ukraine and caused great interest by promising steady work and high wages to those who would go to America. Intense excitement attended the departure of those who accepted the invitation. After a little while, money with an astonishingly high exchange value, began to flow from American industrial sections to Ukrainian villages. Then in a few months came letters from the immigrants describing actual working and social conditions.

In a short time the emigration movement assumed such proportion, especially in the provinces ruled by Austria-Hungary, that the landlords feared it would cause a shortage of labor and consequently compel the payment of high wages. The governments of both Russia and Austria also disapproved of emigration, at least until the closing years of the nineteenth century. At first the Austrian government used mild measures of restraint, such as publishing pamphlets, and requesting the clergy to discourage the movement by telling the people that much hardship awaited them in America, and that they would have to work hard and, even then, face starvation. But the letters and dollars from America prevailed over the pronouncements of repressive governments. Even the refusal of the government to issue passports,



and the posting of guards at the frontiers to prevent escapes, failed to stop the exodus. On the contrary in due time the movement had to be open and regulated.

A majority of the Ukrainian immigrants were farmers and common laborers. Nearly fifty per cent were illiterate. Not many had any technical skill or profession. Finding themselves in a strange country, frequently among unsympathetic people, they had to endure abuses during the first few years in their new homes. Mining became the first field of their economic concentration in America. Some went to work in the coal mines of Pennsylvania and in the iron mines of Minnesota and Michigan. Following a period of hard work and thrifty living, better economic and social adjustments were possible. In Pennsylvania alone there were in 1933 one hundred and ninety communities where Ukrainians lived in numbers sufficiently large to maintain churches and other organizations.

Although a larger number of Ukrainian immigrants lived in Pennsylvania than in any other state, in process of years they penetrated all other industrial states, with the exception of Alabama. Neither are they confined to any one type of industrial work. They may also be found on the railroads, in packing plants, textile work, lumber camps, restaurants, in hotels, and every type of industrial labor that requires strength and endurance. Big and strong men of the Ukraine frequently work at the side of those of Sweden and Germany in American factories.

About 26,000 Ukrainian Americans became farmers. Some of them spent the first few years working in the factories or mines, and, upon accumulating a little capital took up farming. Others went to the farms directly. Whether scattered among the American farmers, as in New England, Ohio, and Indiana, or in compact communities, as in New York and North Dakota, they shared in the development of American agriculture. When they came to America the best land had already been taken and occupied, therefore they faced the following possibilities: to buy modern farms or to work the abandoned farms of New England, the hilly mining land of Pennsylvania, and the poorer land in northern Wisconsin. There were also open to them the homesteads of Montana, Wyoming and the Dakotas. Since a majority of them had but little capital they were unable to buy the modern farms; they became, therefore, for the most part, new pioneers in the West. The largest number of Ukrainian farmers may be found in North Dakota where they are erroneously known as "Russians." They oc-

cupy several counties in the central and western part of the state, and have penetrated even to the regions of the Bad Lands. Being accustomed to hardship, and the struggle for existence on small Old World farms, they made good pioneers. Although the period of pioneering was coming to an end many of these settlers in the West heard of the Indian wars, and actually suffered abuses from lawless cowboys. Many lived in sod-houses; a few of such houses still remained in 1933. About two hundred Ukrainian families who intended to go to Canada were sent by an unscrupulous German steamship agent to Texas. Most of them settled on old plantation lands as tenants, paying their rent in kind. More than a hundred families settled on the farms of Oklahoma: these are mostly land owners. The settlement of these Ukrainians in Texas and Oklahoma is an interesting circumstance in that it carried the "new" immigration into the traditionally Anglo-Saxon South.

In addition to the miner, the industrial worker, and the farmer, Ukrainian business and professional men were added to American society. Starting with the operation of such common types of business, chiefly in the service of their fellow countrymen, as rooming and boarding houses, saloons, and grocery stores, they slowly expanded into many other fields. The business establishments most frequently operated by them are butcher shops, candy stores, bakeries, restaurants, creameries, dry goods stores, barber shops, beauty parlors, and funeral homes. Although a majority of them are small business men, a few successful individuals are expanding their establishments to such an extent that they are in transition toward big business enterprises. Foremost among the latter is Ihor I. Sikorsky, designer and builder of airplanes. Nearly all of them own their own business establishments, but in recent years partnerships have developed. Sometimes these are with men of other nationalities. Also, young men with American education hold offices as local managers for large American concerns.

The largest number of professional men and women are in the churches and the schools. They are clergymen and teachers working exclusively among Ukrainians. There are also lawyers, journalists, doctors, and dentists, contractors, artists, singers, and actors. Among the artists and intellectuals a few of great importance are Alexander Archipenko, sculptor, Alexander A. Granovsky, biologist, Volodimir Timoshenko, economist, and John Barabash, musician. The number of Ukrainian Americans to engage in the professions is insignificant when compared with the entire number of immigrants, but many more



are now in colleges and universities, preparing for the professions. A considerable number of the Ukrainian immigrants are willing to deny themselves in order to give their children the best education.

The first comers had to adopt a low standard of living, lower than the American level. Their rented houses were small and in poor sections of urban communities. Their houses were often so crowded with children, roomers, boarders, that any degree of comfort was impossible. But hard work, together with thrifty living, frequently brought prosperity, especially when the men entered business. With prosperity came social betterment. People bought or built modern houses in suburbs or better parts of the cities. Home building was promoted by building and loan associations. Such associations are commonly organized by the enterprising members of churches in the larger cities. The groups of Newark, New Jersey, and Chicago are the most prominent. The financial enterprises of the former involved more than \$1,000,000 in 1930. Some church members invest their money with building and loan associations, others borrow it for the purpose of building or buying homes. There are cities where all the Ukrainian families own their houses. Family life still remains a strong unit of society among these immigrants. Yet less success than in the Ukraine attends the efforts of parents to instill the old Ukrainian virtues into the minds of their children, namely, thrifty living, respect for elders, for the law, and for the authority and sanctity of the church.

As soon as the immigrants were sufficiently increased in number to have churches of their own they erected them, and brought ministers from Europe. The first churches were organized in 1884, in Shenandoah, Olyphant, and Shamokin, Pennsylvania, by a noted missionary, the Reverend John Volansky. From then on hundreds of churches were erected throughout the northeast. But because of religious differences, tactlessness, and bad faith, various religious factions were created, including two Greek Catholic groups, two Ukrainian Orthodox branches, and several Protestant denominations. At the same time it is to be noted that about eighty per cent of the Russian Orthodox churches in America are really Ukrainian. Consequently people erected more buildings than were needed or than they could afford. Not infrequently, especially since the World War, factions of dividing congregations contested for the church building and the parish house. Such incidents led to expensive lawsuits and left much hard feeling in the end, as one or the other group was given a judgment for the church property. According to several estimates over \$20,000,000 were spent

in erecting churches. Maintenance, of course, costs many times that amount. As a result, some of the smaller churches were closed during the years of economic depression. Besides supporting the priests and church teachers (in the Orthodox Church the minister, as a rule, is doing the work of both), the members are also urged to support the church press, which consists of newspapers and periodicals. Although the church institution is a financial burden on the Ukrainian Americans, it is the center of their spiritual, social, and political activities. It is in the church hall that they have nearly all of their concerts, plays, and educational meetings. The support of the church entails great expense, yet it is the institution without which the immigrant could not get along.

Of all the organizations of sound economic value that the Ukrainian Americans have established, the most important are the self-aid, or mutual-aid associations. The Ukrainian National Association has its headquarters in Jersey City. Five other important organizations have their head office in Pennsylvania. They are: The Concord Association, Olyphant; The Providence Catholic Association, Philadelphia; The Sojedenenija, Homestead; The Ukrainian National Aid Association, Pittsburgh, and The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association, Scranton. In addition to these there are several Russian fraternal associations, a majority of whose members are Ukrainians. The branch offices or lodges, extend throughout the country, wherever the Ukrainian people live. Some of the organizations also have branches in Canada. Although the mutual aid associations are in the nature of benevolent organizations, they are operated under state laws as much as American insurance companies. These institutions have insured over 200,000 men, women and children, and represent an investment of many millions of dollars. The two most outstanding from the point of view of membership are the Ukrainian National Association and the Sojedenenija (Union). For a nominal monthly payment members receive moral and material help in time of distress, and in case of death the beneficiaries receive benefits according to the insurance policy, the face value of which is on an average about one thousand dollars.

As a further demonstration of the value of these organizations, the Ukrainian National Aid Association, one of the smallest of the societies, lent on easy terms, to its members during the hard years 1932 and 1933 a sum of \$56,487.34. At the last convention of the Ukrainian National Association, held in Detroit in May 1933, the delegates voted \$2,800 for philanthropic purposes. The service of such organizations



is not confined to their membership, for they maintain a national fund from which to provide scholarships to Ukrainian students in American colleges, to give aid to needy authors in America and Europe, and to certain Ukrainian institutions and groups in Europe under Polish rule, notably private schools, libraries, and invalids of the World War. Contributions are also made to civic projects of importance in America.

The vigor of these mutual aid associations has been demonstrated during the recent years of industrial depression. These organizations subsidized many of their members, preventing them from becoming a burden to their communities when out of work and deprived of their savings either temporarily or permanently. Although a large percentage of the members were out of employment, with a consequent loss in membership, the organizations all survived, and by 1934 were again gaining new members, especially the Ukrainian National Association.

Of the minor organizations, the following are also important: The United Ukrainian Organization (The '*Obyednania*'), the Sich Athletic Association, the Avramenko Ballet School, and the Ukrainian Women's League. Each of these organizations is national in character rather than local, and in most cases has a wide scope of activities among the Ukrainians in America and in Europe.

The *Obyednania* serves more or less as a clearing house for many financial and civic problems. Although it is not exactly what its name indicates, nevertheless it is a useful immigrant institution. According to its monthly reports in *The Svoboda* daily newspaper, it receives thousands of dollars, representing voluntary gifts of Ukrainians in numerous communities in America. During the eleven years of its existence the organization sent to various parts of the Ukraine \$216,288.15. Most of such funds go immediately to East Galicia to aid the sufferers under Polish rule. A comparatively small sum is used for the publication of pamphlets, books, the support of lecturers, and for civic education in America.

The Sich organization is the athletic society for young people, resembling that of the Slovak "Sokols." Before the World War this society had a widespread activity; its influence extended to seven states, and its numerous lodges had thousands of members. Since the war, however, Old World politicians coming to America have almost ruined this organization. Through the periodical *Sich* they have advocated monarchistic ideas, backing General Paul Skoropadsky, one-time figurehead ruler of the Ukraine. American born youth of Ukrainian connection has no interest in such policies and refuses to endorse

them financially. Consequently, the organization is declining in vitality and importance.

The Ukrainian Women's League is comparatively a recent creation, but is growing and very active. In 1934 it had fifty-two lodges in some nine states, and several thousands of members. The membership of this group consists of intelligent women who wish to extend a civic education to immigrant women and make voters of them. At the same time each member promises to bring up her children to be good American citizens, and to contribute to American life some of the best accomplishments of Ukrainian civilization, especially folk-lore, art, and handicraft. The members manifest their unselfish spirit on occasions by contributing to good civic projects even when least able to afford it. Very frequently various clubs give concerts or plays, and from the proceeds help the Red Cross or some other cause. The organization began in 1933 to publish at Pittsburgh a monthly journal, *Zinochy Svit*, which seeks to express literary values. One-half of it is in Ukrainian, the other in English.

The value of such immigrant organizations cannot be overestimated. They include a majority of the Ukrainian Americans, many of whom would not have joined any other social or vocational group. The cost of belonging to them is a matter of consequence, but it is considered to be money well spent. When compared with the immigrants of other nationalities, the Ukrainians are as well organized as most of them. Although numerous individuals are joining purely American societies, the probabilities are that the Ukrainian institutions will continue to exist for a good many years.

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The most important primary sources dealing with the Ukrainian Americans as well as other immigrants are the *Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration* and *Reports of the Immigration Commission* as recorded in the *Senate Documents* of the Sixty-first Congress, second and third sessions, 1910-1911, especially Volumes IX, XX, and LXIX, which deal with the distribution of immigrants in America. Volumes IX and XII contain good accounts of the background and the causes of emigration from Europe. Volume XVIII is a thorough case study of immigration and crime. *Immigrant in Industries* is an extensive scientific study of the number of immigrants in various industries. This monumental research is recorded in Volumes LXVIII, LXXI, LXXII, LXXVIII, and LXXIX. *Immigrants in Manufacturing and Mining, Iron and Steel Manufacturing*, is a collection



of many case studies recorded in Volumes VII, LXX, LXXI, and LXXXII. These numerous volumes deal with the historical background of the Ukrainian immigrants, the causes of emigration, distribution of the immigrants in America, their occupations, and home life. An unpublished manuscript of value in English is *In Ruth's Way*, a story by Mrs. Anna Bychinsky (Ann Arbor) which ably describes the life of the first comers.

The largest amount of material on this subject is in Ukrainian. Such sources include: The Rev. Alex Prystay's *Memoirs*, one volume of which has been printed (New York, 1934). The others are still in manuscript. They contain numerous unpublished letters, case studies, church records, copies of telegrams, and newspaper clippings. *The Memoirs of Agapius Honcharenko* (Kolomea, 1894) contains an account of the first prominent educated Ukrainian immigrant who came to America during the Civil War, and lived until the World War. A collection of letters in the possession of the author constitutes valuable material gathered on this subject. The letters in English, Ukrainian, and a few in Russian, are from prominent individuals, many of whom were pioneers themselves.

The files of old Ukrainian newspapers have much to offer, although an intelligent search is necessary. The articles of one of the early ministers, the Reverend Nestor Dmytriv, are important. They appeared in *The Svoboda* in February, 1899, May, 1904, and in the *Calendar of the Providence Association* in 1924. A keen student of immigration movements, the Reverend Nestor Dmytriv recorded many important facts. Other writers dealing with this subject are the Reverend John Volansky, and Dr. Volodimir Simenovich. Both saw the immigration movement in its beginnings. They themselves were the leaders who laid foundations for many religious and social institutions. Numerous articles based on the researches of the author, dealing with economic and social aspects of Ukrainian immigration, appeared in *The Svoboda* (Jersey City), September, 1932, and August, 1933, and *The Narodne Slovo* (Pittsburgh), December, 1933. In addition to the Ukrainian newspapers, some valuable material may be found in the Calendars of benevolent Ukrainian Associations. The secondary works, books and magazine articles on immigration, are of importance to the extent that they contain some facts on Ukrainian activities in America. A great deal of the author's information has been gathered by personal study and sojourn in Ukrainian American communities. He is himself a first generation American of Ukrainian ancestry.

## LORD JOHN RUSSELL AND CANADIAN SELF- GOVERNMENT, 1835-1841\*

By OSCAR ARVLE KINCHEN

The most outstanding problem in British colonial administration has been that of reconciling colonial self-government with membership in the larger empire. Early in the second quarter of the nineteenth century this problem of imperial order was pressed upon the attention of statesmen of the motherland by a series of developments in the North American provinces. A conflict then ensued between advocates of colonial self-government under the Crown, and British statesmen of the motherland, engrossed in their own busy arena of insular politics, and blind to the larger vision of empire of leaders like Robert Baldwin and Joseph Howe. There were British statesmen of this period whose work was dedicated to the extension of the frontier of freedom and whose names are numbered among the great liberal reformers of the century. Yet they were unable to comprehend the nature of this unrest in Canada and its neighboring provinces.

The Melbourne Government, in power from 1835 to 1841, had as its spokesman in the House of Commons the great constitutional reformer, Lord John Russell. But it was this champion of liberal reform in the United Kingdom who is so widely known in colonial history for his denunciation of the principles advocated by the proponents of self-government for a colonial dependency. This study is an attempt to clarify the position that Russell assumed toward the struggle for self-government in the Canadas and to show, in its true perspective, his place in the development of British imperial policy.

A study of Russell's political education and public career prior to his entrance into the Melbourne Cabinet in 1835, reveals the presence of well-developed principles and a point of view that have an important bearing upon the position he later assumed toward the struggle for self-government in a dependency. Born in Westminster in 1792, the third son of the sixth Duke of Bedford, Russell had spent his formative years in the midst of a circle of benevolent re-

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor W. Ross Livingston.



formers who bore the name of Foxite Whigs. Their favorite theme had been humanitarianism, "domestic happiness," and the principles of civil and religious liberty. Advocates of free speech, a free press, and freedom from arbitrary imprisonment, it is of capital importance to observe that they had been thinking mainly of civil liberties for individuals and of oppressed minorities. Since they were but a minority fearful in the presence of a powerful Tory government, they had been loud in their denunciation of a tyrannical majority. It is but natural that they should conceive of the preservation of their cherished rights as being bound up with the preservation of the Constitution itself. But it was the "Ancient Constitution" which was the particular object of their devotion, and by this expression they meant the basic principles upon which their political institutions had developed during the happy decades of Whig leadership in the previous century. It is, therefore, not surprising to find Russell, in his earliest political essay in 1821, charging the Tory Government with endangering the very existence of the Constitution by the introduction of "innovations" contrary to its "ancient spirit" by such acts as the suspension of habeas corpus, tyranny of the majority over a helpless minority, and of restraint of freedom of speech and press. While he poured his wrath upon the Tory Government for its neglect of parliamentary reform, he was thinking only of rectifying the old system of class representation in accord with the principles upon which it had developed during its "ancient period." In pursuit of "gradual and timely reform," he would adopt a course of cautious moderation, steering clear of the violent Philosophical Radical on the one hand and the reactionary Tory party on the other. "Now it is a maxim of Newton," he wrote in 1821, "and succeeding philosophers, not to admit more causes than are sufficient to explain the phenomenon, so also, it ought to be the maxim of statesmen, not to propose more innovations than are sufficient to cure the evil."

In the spring of 1835, Russell entered the Melbourne Government as Home Secretary and leader of the majority in the House of Commons. The situation which he faced was, however, such as would encourage him along the line of his earlier political education. Here was a new ministry with a slender and undependable majority sandwiched between a strong, compact, reactionary Tory party on the one hand and a small but influential group of Philosophical Radicals on the other. Even the continuance of the Government's slender majority was contingent upon its successful manipulation of a rather unwieldy

ground of Irish Nationalists had not been won over, for the time, against the previous Lieutenant-Governor. Indeed, whatever course the Government might choose, a highly cautious policy was indicated, and would seem as wise between the proverbial Charybdis and Scylla. Russell was now in a position to learn by experience how important it was to continue in his course of "cautious moderation." It was to the new Government, and Russell in particular, to judge of the seasons and opportunities for grafting the new on to the old; and to make a study of "fundamental institutions," to determine how much reform was possible as well as desirable in any given occasion.

When the fourth-time Government came to power in 1835, unrest in the Canadas was already assuming serious dimensions. There had grown up in the two Canadian provinces, under the act of 1791, a privileged class in the Legislature and Executive Councils, commonly known as the "Family Compact." In the upper province, the Church of England took a similar position entirely out of harmony with the new frontier conditions. A privileged social class, a privileged officialdom, and a privileged church had entrenched themselves behind this "transmission of the English Constitution." While the same type of irresponsible government prevailed in the lower province, the disaffected elements represented in the main, a rising French nationality within the shell of British subjects. The Assembly, overwhelmingly French, had summarized its demands upon the imperial government in the much-noted "Nineteen Resolutions" in which they specified an elective legislative council, and an executive council responsible to the representative assembly. Their immediate problem was that of getting rid of an irresponsible clique that had been superimposed upon them, and which stood in the way of the attainment of their national aspirations. To attain these ends, they were ready, if need be, to sail the uncharted seas of political adventure. Their first step was to refuse to vote the supplies until the imperial government granted their demands.

What attitude would the Melbourne Government take, and particularly its spokesman in the House of Commons, Lord John Russell? After nearly two years of delay during which time the Colonial Secretary, Lord Glenelg, had endeavored to reconcile the Canadian advocates of responsible government to measures which fell far short of their demands, Russell, on March 6th, 1837, introduced a set of resolutions in the House of Commons, denouncing the principle of a responsible colonial ministry as being destructive of the foundation upon which the British empire had hitherto rested. His speech in defence of these



resolutions is significant, reflecting not only his usual attitude of "cautious moderation," but also his reverence for "fundamental institutions" as he had come to understand them. It had hitherto been his mission to defend the English Constitution against the attacks of radical reformers and of "innovators" of whatever type. With these resolutions before him, he now felt it his duty to defend, first of all, the ancient and time-honored relationship that had hitherto existed between the metropolitan state and a subordinate colonial government. To concede a colonial executive responsible to the representative assembly would be to abandon the necessary relationship between a colony and the mother state, and thereby to demolish the ancient framework of empire. He affirmed that,

"To make the Executive Council to resemble the Ministry in Great Britain would be entirely incompatible with the relation between the mother country and a colony. These relations require that His Majesty should be represented not by a person responsible to the House of Assembly, but by a governor sent out by the King and responsible to the Parliament of Great Britain. This is the necessary constitution of a colony, and if you have not these relations existing between a mother country and a colony, you will soon have an end to these relations altogether."

In defence of the unitary theory of empire he resorted to the argument so forcefully expounded by John Louis De Lolme in his famous treatise on the English Constitution, a work that had long been popular among the Foxite Whigs. Since the fullness of sovereignty resided in the Crown, acting through its ministers who were responsible to Parliament, there could be but one, and only one, set of advisers to the Crown. To have other sets of advisers in other parts of the empire would not only deprive the British Parliament of its exclusive right of voting supplies to the Crown, thus sacrificing the "capital principle" upon which the Constitution was based, but would deprive the United Kingdom of its priority over other parts of the empire. As soon as two or more sets of such advisers offered conflicting advice, there would be as many independent powers within the empire, and the Constitution, itself, would be dissolved. It, therefore, behooved Parliament to guard jealously its exclusive right of voting supplies to His Majesty. Again he declared:

"That part of the Constitution which requires that ministers of the Crown shall be responsible to Parliament . . . is a condition in any imperial legislature, and in an imperial legislature only. It is a condition that can only exist in one place, namely, at the seat of empire. Otherwise we should have separate, independent powers existing, not only in Great Britain, but in every separate colony. . . . Each colony would, in effect, be an independent state, with this singular anomaly, that the executive

chief nominated by the King of England and the troops and forces of the King of England might be employed to carry the orders of the House of Assembly into effect."

It is significant that Russell saw in the proposed colonial ministry not only the abandonment of the "ancient constitution," but the sacred rights of British minorities endangered as a consequence. A champion of the civil and religious liberties of the individual since early youth, and especially on the look out for the rights of oppressed minorities, he saw in this instance the rights of a small British group in Lower Canada threatened by a rampant French majority. A responsible colonial ministry would therefore leave this Anglo-Saxon minority at the mercy of the stronger party, and the metropolitan government would be unable to afford protection. Absolute independence for Canada, he thought, would be more desirable than a responsible colonial ministry. For if Canada were independent, then England could, as in the case of other foreign powers, intervene to see that wrongs against British subjects are relieved.

While the minister was still in bewilderment over the problem of Lower Canada, news arrived on the 22nd of the following December that not only had open rebellion broken out in the lower province, but even Upper Canada was showing signs of serious disaffection. Even Nova Scotia, from whence had issued a new demand for "responsible government," was considered by the Colonial Secretary as a province that "could not entirely be relied upon." Meanwhile the Melbourne government was facing dissolution. A majority was in favor of suspending the Lower Canadian constitution, or repealing the act of 1831 which had surrendered the disposition of a large part of the Crown revenues to the Assembly on condition that the latter would vote an adequate civil-list. Lord Howick, who held the portfolio of Secretary-at-War was the leader of a faction bitterly opposed to either of these coercive measures unless combined with a larger policy "directed toward the removal of the causes of Canadian unrest." In two lengthy communications to Russell, Howick outlined a plan for a colonial convention in British North America, for the purpose of working out the details of a federal system that Sir James Stephen had envisaged for these distant provinces.

At this juncture Russell, determined to prevent the break-up of his government, came forward with a program of compromise and conciliation. He won Howick's consent to a temporary suspension of the Lower Canadian constitution, apparently on condition that his brother-in-law and intimate friend, Lord Durham, should be appointed as



Governor-General of the North American Provinces, with a commission to investigate the causes of the prevailing unrest and to arrive at a plan for the future government of these provinces. Howick's beloved project for a colonial convention was to give way, for the time at least, to Russell's "Committee of Advice" for ascertaining the "wishes and opinions" of the two provinces. It is strongly probable, however, that Howick expected to convert his brother-in-law to his favorite scheme before the latter should make his final recommendations for the future government of the provinces. While Durham would be a despot in Lower Canada, Russell and Howick agreed, in order to placate the Radicals in Parliament, to make it clear in the preamble of the suspension bill as well as in an early issue of Durham's instructions, that constitutional suspension under Durham would be a benevolent régime. He would make it a temporary expediency toward a more liberal government than these provinces had yet known. These liberal intentions were further emphasized in Russell's speeches in the House of Commons while the suspension bill was before Parliament in the winter of 1838.

The Canadian mission of Lord Durham, during the summer and autumn of 1838, became a storm center of British politics. "Durham's Despotism" was the object of bitter attack, not only from the Tory and Radical opposition, but even from members of the Government's own party in Parliament. Finally the Prime Minister, himself, consented to the passage of an indemnity bill absolving certain Canadian leaders, who had taken part in the recent rebellion, from penalties meted out by Lord Durham. Since Russell had been the leading sponsor of the Durham Mission, he now felt strongly his obligation "to stand by Durham," during these trying hours — both for Durham and for the Government who sent him. In the language of Speaker Abercromby, Russell did "more than was thought possible" in saving the face of the Melbourne Government while at the same time defending Lord Durham.

Disgusted by the conduct of the Melbourne Government, Durham abdicated his North American mission with a determination to vindicate his administration on the floor of Parliament. Instead of returning home as a "defeated man" as both Government and opposition leaders had expected, he was greeted by a wave of popular enthusiasm. While radical politicians and journalists were "rallying around Durham," claiming for him "not mere acquittal but praise and honor," while the *Spectator* and *Colonial Gazette* pointed to him as the logical

leader of a new opposition party; the Melbourne Government looked on in despair. The "Durham Scare" was intensified when the ex-Governor-General persistently refused to have any relations with the cabinet. He refused even to make an official call upon the Colonial Secretary, Lord Glenelg. Since Durham was "very grateful" to Russell "alone of them all" for defending his administration in Canada, the latter was in the best position to save a tottering ministry by coming to an understanding with him. Realizing, finally, that he could hardly trust his Canadian program to either the Tories or Radicals and that something might be gained by coming to terms with the Government, a reconciliation was effected in the following January. But it is strongly probable that Durham had exacted something in return, for on the last day of the month both Howick and Russell were loudly demanding the dismissal of Glenelg from the Colonial Office. On the 8th of the following month Glenelg announced his resignation. Howick and Russell were now stronger than ever before in the all important matter of Canadian policy, but they differed widely on this subject.

On the 9th of February, 1839, Durham's famous report on the colonial problem in British North America was distributed among members of Parliament. His most important recommendations for the Canadas were to swallow up the French with their alien institutions, and insure a British ascendancy by extensive schemes to further immigration from the mother country. Reunion and British ascendancy being accomplished, Durham would then recommend the introduction of the practice of "responsible government" in provincial matters.

Russell, who was already strongly inclined toward wiping out "Pitt's mistake" of 1791, received Durham's recommendation for a legislative union with enthusiasm. Howick, the leading proponent of federation for the North American provinces, the details of which were to be worked out by a colonial convention, was deeply disappointed with the plan recommended. On March 2nd, Howick and Russell fought for their respective views before the cabinet. In this controversy, Russell denounced the whole idea of federation within the empire, as being utterly unwarranted by precedent. On the contrary, he cited the legislative union of Scotland with England, in which commissioners had worked out the details of the settlement, as a suitable example to follow in British North America. Russell also attacked colonial federation as a source of confusion and of collision between the imperial government at London and the new federal government in North America, and between that government and the individual provinces. He



contended that the federal government would eventually usurp all the real powers that had been assigned to the provinces, and he cited the United States as a glaring example of such a tendency. In the third place, he argued that the colonial-federation project had no support from the Canadians, or even from Lord Durham; and that it had nothing to commend it but "mere theory" fabricated by persons residing in London.

In this contest, Russell's ascendancy over Howick and the proponents of a federal union was made easy by a flurry then being stirred up against Sir James Stephen, permanent undersecretary at the Colonial Office and originator of the idea of a North American federation. Stephen, who was accused of seeking to introduce "republican institutions" into the British empire, "was powerless to defend himself without revealing secrets which it was his official duty not to disclose." By the 5th of the following April, the Durham-Russell scheme for a legislative union had won the day, and the outline of the Government's "Canada Bill" had been agreed upon.

The following June, Russell introduced in the House of Commons his bill for a reunion of the two provinces. In a speech he showed himself even more insistent than Durham on "insuring a thorough British character to the province" by advocating an arbitrary system of representation which would give to the British the whip-hand as soon as the united legislature should meet. Early in the autumn, he went so far as to adopt a highly artificial scheme that had been worked out by Sir John Colborne, Lord Durham's successor in Canada. This plan was designed to give the British element in the united province an ascendancy over the French in the legislature at a ratio of five to three.

But Russell parted with Durham on the question of "responsible government." In his speech of June the third, he made it clear to the House of Commons that he would not recede one inch from his theory of the imperial relationship. He observed that,

"Lord Durham has stated that an analogy exists between the representative of the Crown in the colony and the constitutional responsibility of ministers in this country. He states that as soon as ministers of the Crown have lost the confidence of the House of Commons in this country, they ceased to be ministers, and they could not go on with the Government in a constant minority. He adds that it is certainly a most unusual case for a ministry to go on for several months in the minority. And he then attempts to apply this principle to the local government in Canada."

He then reverted to the well-worn argument he had advanced in the spring of 1837, that of an undivided responsibility to the Crown. How

could a colonial government act under a similar responsibility, one to the metropolitan state and the other to a colonial assembly? How could he be expected to give instructions from the home government and instructions from a colonial assembly at the same time? Nor did he think it possible that a line could be drawn, fencing off matters of empire from matters from those touching the interests of the empire at large. But in fact of such a line was there none as Lord Cairns and the colonial advocates of "responsible government" would insist upon dividing the subject of colonial self-government from that of imperial authority. Russell would maintain the two communities that of "localization and individuality."

"But conceive Sir and I think it would be the part of wisdom and justice to say that there are matters affecting the imperial affairs of these provinces that are matters in which neither the imperial parliament nor the several governments were interested and in which they should be most anxious to consult the feelings of the colonies. I know of no reason why the Legislative Assembly whether it ever separates or of such provinces united should not be treated in with deference. But I am not prepared to say that it is a principle for the home government of these provinces that we ought to subject the executive there to the same restrictions as prevail in this country."

At the conclusion of Russell's speech, Charles Buller, who had gone to Canada as one of Cairns's secretaries and had contributed extensively to the *Fredericton Times* and elsewhere, he fully approved of the policy of carrying on the government in Canada with the support of only a minority of the representative assembly. This searching question brought from Russell a statement which is of particular significance, since it explains the theory of the system which he, through Lord Sydenham, later inaugurated in Canada.

"What he really said was that the executive should be carried on in such a way that their measures would be acceptable and agreeable to the representatives of the people, and that he saw no reason why the government should not agree to adopt the measures approved by a majority of the colonists."

At the close of the session in August 1839, Russell made preparations for taking over the work of the Colonial Office, a position held by the Marquis of Normanby since the retirement of Lord Glenelg in the preceding February. Russell wrote to Melbourne on the 16th: "If you could manage it, giving Normanby the Home Office . . . and me the Colonial would improve the ministry." On the fifth of the following month Russell and Normanby exchanged offices. Along with this arrangement, he had wrung from Melbourne the appointment of



his intimate friend and colleague, Charles Poulett Thompson, as Governor-General of the North American Provinces.

If Russell had definitely disowned the principle of "responsible government" for a colonial dependency but had declared his unwillingness to carry on the government with the support of only a minority in the colony, then what would be the nature of the régime that he would seek to establish in the reunited province of Canada?

In his instructions to Thompson of September 7th, Russell warned him that he would likely be pressed by the Canadian leaders for some statement relative to "a question respecting which the bill to which I have alluded is necessarily silent.

"I allude to the nature and extent of control which the popular branch of the Legislature will be admitted to exercise over the conduct of the Executive Government, and the continuance in office of its principal executive officers. . . .

The importance of maintaining the utmost possible harmony between the policy of the Legislature and the Executive Government admits of no question; and it will, of course, be your anxious endeavor to call to your councils and employ in the public service those persons who by their position and character have obtained the general confidence and esteem of the inhabitants of the province."

This statement, in conjunction with his previous assertion in the House of Commons, indicated that he would have the colonial governor strive for a working harmony between the legislative and executive branches of his government, by maintaining in its principal executive offices persons who were "acceptable and agreeable to the representatives of the people." Although not willing to go so far as to concede the type of responsibility which ministers in England owed to Parliament, it was apparently his desire that the legislative branch should exercise a measure of control over these executive officers.

To accomplish such a result, it would be necessary to reform the old Executive Council so as to render it a pliable instrument in the hands of the representative of the Crown in the colony. But certain obstructions had to be removed before the Council could be brought to the requirements of the new régime. A colonial officialdom enjoying virtually a life tenure lay across the path marked out for the Governor. It was an irresponsible, privileged group, responsible neither to the Governor on the one hand nor to the Assembly on the other. How then could the Governor make the needful adjustments in the personnel of his council unless the practice of life tenure be dispensed with? It remained to find some device which, when placed

in the hands of the Governor, would enable him to blaze a trail through this wilderness of irresponsible officials who stood between him and the representatives of the people.

On September 9th, two days after Russell issued his instructions to the new Governor-General, Sir James Stephen, at the Colonial Office, made a draft of a circular dispatch on the tenure of civil officials:

"You will understand, and will cause it to be made generally known, that hereafter the tenure of colonial offices held during Her Majesty's pleasure will not be regarded as equivalent to a tenure during good behavior; but that not only will such officers be called upon to retire from the public service as often as any sufficient motives of public policy suggest the expediency of that measure, but that a change in the person of the governor will be considered as a sufficient reason for any alterations which his successor may deem expedient to make in the list of public functionaries, subject of course to further confirmation by the Sovereign."

While it is true that the question of change in the tenure of colonial officers had been raised some days before by a report from South Australia, asking that the Governor be empowered to dismiss members of his council for disloyalty to the administration, this draft dispatch of September 9th was apparently made, not only to cover the simple problem encountered in the Antipodes, but also the special requirements of the Canadian program as well. This document really sanctioned two remarkable changes in the colonial system which the South-Australian problem had not demanded. Instead of applying the principle of "tenure during pleasure" to civil officers generally, it definitely limited the scope of this reform to those public functionaries who performed "duties in the right discharge of which the character and policy of the government is directly involved," and specified that this principle was to apply particularly to the heads of executive departments in the provincial government. In the second place, instead of confining the tenure of these officers to the official life of the governor who appointed them, this draft dispatch went far beyond this simple limitation by providing, in addition, that "such officers shall be called upon to retire from the public service as often as any sufficient motives of public policy may suggest the expediency of that measure."

It is easy to see that the comprehensive adjustments in the machinery of provincial administration provided for in Stephen's draft of the circular dispatch were such as would fill every requirement which the introduction of Russell's system in Canada would seem to demand. That is, in order that the executive "be carried on in such a way that their measures should be acceptable and agreeable to the representatives of the people" and thereby insure "the utmost possible harmony



between the policy of the legislature and the Executive Government," a condition conspicuously absent in the North American provinces.

That Stephen and Russell were thinking of the draft dispatch in relation to North American policy is indicated by an exchange of notes on September 10th. Stephen wrote to Russell: "These are the circulars respecting the tenure of public offices. I send them to Your Lordship, not being quite sure whether you would wish that as far as respects British North America Mr. Poulett Thompson should not be the bearer of them." In reply to Stephen's note, Russell informed his undersecretary that he thought it best "to reserve these circulars for a month or two"; they were not to be sent to all the colonies, and "some further deliberation would be required."

Russell's conduct in this instance is not without explanation. The time was hardly ripe in British North America for this circular dispatch. He was sorely worried about disturbing reports he had just received about the "responsible government cry" in Upper Canada. His attention had just been drawn to a number of letters that had lately arrived from Sir George Arthur, the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, "on matters of the highest importance." Arthur contended that "responsible government" agitators could not be trusted. "Reform is on their lips, but rebellion is in their hearts." He was deeply grieved because a representative of the imperial government had given a new impetus to the movement which he had been doing everything in his power to discourage. "These people," he wrote, "having made 'responsible government' their watchword, are now extremely elated, because the Earl of Durham has recommended that measure." After receiving these letters, Russell wrote to Arthur on the same day that the draft for the circular dispatch had been written, advising him that "Gov'n'r Thompson" was on the point of his departure for Canada, and that he would come "fully possessed of the views of the Cabinet." Arthur was urged to arrange speedily for an interview with the new Governor-General in order that he might gain a sympathetic understanding of the new program for Canada. Indeed, to release the circular dispatch in the midst of the prevailing excitement over responsible government might well insure its being interpreted by colonial agitators as a virtual concession of the principle Russell had repeatedly disowned. Until it could be seen in the light of the higher goal toward which he was striving, Russell would withhold from them this change in official tenure "for further deliberation."

One month after Thompson's departure for Canada, the new Colonial Secretary informed Stephen that he thought it an appropriate time for sending to the North American colonies "the circular dispatch prepared by you as to continuance in office under a new governor." It is significant that this decision came at the very time when Russell was adding the finishing touches to his famous dispatch against "responsible government," reiterating his old unitary theory of imperial order, endeavoring at the same time not only to disclose the spirit and purpose that lay beneath his own program, but also to differentiate it from that advanced by Lord Durham. Thompson was admonished to discourage any further discussion of "responsible government," and especially "since its vagueness is a source of delusion, and if at all encouraged would prove the cause of embarrassment and danger." At the same time, the colonial reformers were assured that "the Queen's Government has no desire to thwart the representatives of British North America in their measures of reform and improvement. . . . Her Majesty has no desire to maintain any system of policy among her North American subjects which opinion condemns." Having recited his objections to a responsible colonial ministry, he probably was now convinced that, when placed alongside this explanatory dispatch and interpreted against the background that Thompson would have already set up in Canada, the purport of Stephen's circular dispatch could hardly be misunderstood. Let the two dispatches go out together.

Now the representative of the Crown in the province might proceed with his task of counteracting the movement for "responsible government" by "maintaining the harmony between the policy of the Legislature and the Executive Government," by adjusting the personnel of his executive council "as often as motives of public policy may suggest the expediency of that measure." While it seems clear that the Governor would be expected to carry on the government through his heads of departments who would also be executive councillors as well as persons "acceptable and agreeable to the representatives of the people," the relationship of these department-heads with reference to membership in the Legislature was by no means clear. But when Russell reintroduced the Canadian reunion bill in the House of Commons on the 23d of the following March, he stated that he intended to lay down "a rule of administration" which he had already applied to the government of Nova Scotia and which he intended also to extend to Canada as soon as a reunion of the provinces could be achieved.

"I would not, by any means, lay down an inflexible rule upon the subject, but I maintain that a general system should be established by which the



leaders among the majority of the Assembly should be included in the executive government. . . .

I think at the same time it will be necessary . . . that the Assembly shall exercise a due control over the officers appointed or kept in office by the Governor, and over the distribution and expenditure of public funds.

But I am not of the opinion, as I have often declared, that the official servants of the Governor should be subject to exactly the same responsibility as the ministers in this country, because the Governor's orders issue directly from the Crown, and it is unjust that the representatives in the Assembly should visit with responsibility those who are not the authors of the acts they condemn."

Admitting the right of the Assembly to exercise a "due control" over the principal executive officers, it is still certain that the Governor, himself, should be expected to determine, in any instance, just what the extent of this control should be. It is also clear that Russell was thinking of the Governor as being the only unifying force within the executive, that there would be no such thing as a cabinet of the English type, and that it would be the individual officeholder over which the Assembly would be permitted to exercise the "due control" of which he spoke. He did not intend to select his executive councillors exclusively from the majority party in the Assembly. He intended that the minority interest, also, should have representation in the executive government.

Finally on the day of the passage of his reunion bill, Russell drew up a dispatch to Thompson which affords still more conclusive proof that he wished each department head to stand or fall according to its own individual record. He laid down some general rules that were to govern the several executive departments, so that the work of each might be rendered subject to careful scrutiny and censorship by the Legislature, and particularly by the Assembly.

"Every office should be so constituted that all proceedings carried on in it should be a matter of daily record, & where no superior measure of state intervenes, such proceedings should, when requested, be laid before the Assembly.

The functions of the Colonial Secretary, the Receiver-General, the Commissioners of Public Lands, and the Board of Works should be clearly explained to these several officers. The Attorney, and Solicitor General should be consulted in all matters of law affecting the Administration & all these officers of the Government shall be *responsible to you* for the performance of their duties & for the harmonious conduct of the public business entrusted to their care."

Each department would live in its own glass house. There would be neither cabinet nor "collective responsibility," but something closely

resembling the old system that had existed in the time of William III. Each department head, while directly responsible to the Governor, would also owe, in practice, a kind of indirect responsibility to the representative assembly. But it was for the representative of the Crown to hold the key to the "new constitution" while making all needful adjustments in its subordinate details.

On February 10th, 1841, a proclamation issued by Thompson, now Lord Sydenham, declared the two provinces officially united and the new constitution in force. On the 15th another proclamation called upon the electoral districts to return representatives to the united assembly. Three days later, Sydenham appointed eight executive councillors, and on March 17th a ninth member was added. Five were of the reform party in Upper, and Lower Canada, and the remaining four were considered as conservative. In apparent anticipation of an assembly in which the moderate reformers would predominate, Sydenham had given to this element the initial ascendancy in the Executive Council.

But other and more difficult principles of the system remained to be applied: the achievement of unified action on the part of this council, which would necessarily include members representing both the majority and minority interests as reflected by the Legislature; a clear-cut departmental organization with a representation of each department in one or the other of the houses; the identification of these departmental heads with membership in the Executive Council; and, most important of all, the making of such timely adjustments in the membership of this body as to enable the executive government to maintain a working coöperation with the representative assembly. Most of these problems could not be solved until the new legislature convened, its political complexion ascertained, and its temper cautiously tested. Moreover, time must necessarily elapse for the Governor to exert his influence toward winning a safe majority to habitual coöperation with the policies of the Government and for cultivating in the Legislature a state of mind favorable to the new system. What if the Legislature should refuse? What special resources could be provided to elicit its coöperation and to wean its members away from a discussion of abstract theories?

A lengthy private letter which Sydenham wrote to Russell, shortly after the inauguration of the new government, explained the use that might be made of a projected loan of £1,500,000 which Russell had previously authorized Thompson to use, if need be, in order to win



the consent of the Upper Canadian legislature to a reunion of the provinces. This loan, Sydenham wrote, should be "for the full amount, and the proceeds should be applied, first of all, toward paying off the debt of the United Province, and secondly, toward the completion of public works that have been undertaken." He then showed how effectively such a loan might be used as a means of eliciting the good will of the Legislature. This was the logical time, he believed, to let these people know that the imperial government really intended to do something for the province, and he showed why the home government could afford to extend such a loan. It was "good business for England"; for it would not only hasten economic revival, but would enable the Canadians to buy more manufactured products from the mother country. They would be drawn into closer relations with England, and an imperial sentiment revived. Such a loan, he argued, would be to Britain's advantage, "even though it be as a gift," for "England would get the business."

On the third of the following May, 1841, Russell sent out a dispatch to Sydenham, not only assenting to the loan, but also promising assistance in an extensive scheme for British immigration, and to provide a fund for assisting newcomers to places where their labor would be most needed. There was also the promise of a grant for military defense, and especially for the erection of fortifications along the American frontier. There were expressions of England's love and "provident care" for her colonies and her determination to "maintain at all hazards" the imperial connection.

With this trump card in his hand, Sydenham met the Legislature on the 15th of the following June, offering for its consideration a crowded program of public improvements, proposals for the completion of the public works that had been abandoned for want of funds, and the "improvement of navigation from the shores of Lake Huron to the ocean." Then he announced the glad tidings:

"I have authority from Her Majesty's Government to state that they are prepared to propose to Parliament . . . a guarantee of the imperial treasury for a loan to the extent of not less than a million and a half pounds sterling, to aid the province for the double purpose of diminishing the pressure of the interest on the public debt, and of enabling it to proceed with the great public undertakings whose progress . . . has been arrested by financial difficulties."

Then he told the Legislature that "with a view to further aid immigration, I am authorized to declare to you that a vote of money for that purpose will be proposed to the imperial parliament," and that there

would soon be forthcoming "large sums for military defense of the frontier."

Then Sydenham let it be known that the coöperation of the new Legislature would be expected in return:

"I rely upon your co-operation in the financial measures which it will be my duty to propose to you, for taking advantage of the assistance which Her Majesty's Government propose to afford and for carrying into effect the public improvements which are deemed so desirable."

Then he pointed out the greater reward that coöperation with the Government would ultimately bring:

"The eyes of England are anxiously fixed upon the result of this great experiment. Should it succeed, the aid of Parliament to your undertakings, the confidence of British capitalists in the credit you may require of them, the security which British people will feel in seeking your shores . . . may carry improvements to unexampled height. . . .

May no dissensions mar the flattering prospect which is open before us."

How would the Assembly react toward the Russell-Sydenham system and its bounteous program? No sooner had this body begun its deliberations when Robert Baldwin, whose resignation from the Executive Council had been accepted "without the least regret," fulfilled an anticipation of the Governor-General by pitting against his program of "good works" the issue of a responsible ministry as an essential part of the new provincial constitution. The long days which were monopolized by Baldwin and his adherents, who sought to drive the Government's party in the Assembly to subscribe to their "principles" need not be narrated here. But as time grew heavy upon their hands, a prominent leader was heard to remark, that it seemed "evident that both Tories and Republicans would glory in getting us into difficulties . . . but I think our earthly salvation depends upon agreeing with His Excellency." Sydenham must have rejoiced when, some days later, Francis Hincks, to the disgust of the "responsible government" coalition which he had helped to build during the preceding two years, was found voting on the side of the Government; because, as he said, "The formation of a new ministry on the declared principle of acting in concert with the United Reform Party having failed, all parties were compelled to look to the measures of the Administration."

On the 26th of the month the victorious Governor-General could write to his chief at the Colonial Office:

"I, therefore, entertain no doubt that the problem, which I felt in common with Your Lordship so anxious to work out, will be practically solved. The Assembly acting in perfect harmony with the Executives will, I confidently expect, occupy itself seriously and steadily upon the



measures which will be submitted to it by me . . . and the session will proceed usefully, peacefully, and afford just grounds to the imperial parliament for rendering that assistance to the province which Her Majesty's Government had pledged itself to propose."

The large volume of legislation achieved during the following two months attested the initial triumph of the tactics employed toward a realization of the goal marked out by Russell. But it did not follow that the Canadian leaders were truly reconciled to the system of government the success of which was believed to be bound up with the ameliorative program which Sydenham would be able to achieve through his extraordinary talents as a leader of men.

Meantime, Sydenham had been taking steps toward a fuller application of the principles that Russell had laid down during the two preceding years. A dispatch to Russell of July 18th, 1841, gave an account of the departmental organization which Sydenham had effected. He had retained the old departments as they had existed in the two Canadas, but had endeavored to realize such a division of functions as would bring them more closely into conformity with the principles upon which the departments of the home government had been built. He had created new departments, such for example as "the important office of Inspector-General of Public Accounts" whose function would be similar to that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the United Kingdom, who would necessarily be a member of the elective branch, "and also capable of proposing the principal financial arrangements . . . and of explaining and vindicating those arrangements in the House of Assembly."

The Executive Council, he observed, had been allowed to drift far out of its rightful sphere of authority. Instead of its being a body capable of rendering competent advice for the Governor's consideration, it had degenerated into a mere committee for passing on claims, land grants, and for the inspection of the accounts of public officers. He had, therefore, thoroughly overhauled this institution, both with respect to its functions and its necessary personnel.

"I have appointed to the Executive Council no one but the principal officers of the Government, who are responsible both to the Governor and to the public for their acts. . . .

For the satisfactory conduct of public affairs, it has appeared to me absolutely necessary that on the one hand the Governor should be able to rely upon the zeal and attention of the Heads of Departments, not merely to act under his immediate directions upon every minute point, but also to feel themselves really responsible for the conduct of their different offices. And on the other hand, their being members of one or the other house of parliament, the public would possess a wholesome

control over their acts, and the security would be obtained for the general administration of affairs being in accordance with the wishes of the Legislature."

It is reasonably clear, then, that the Russell-Sydenham system was one involving the individual responsibility of each department to the Assembly, for the successful performance of its functions. In order to make these functions definite, a clear-cut departmental organization was thought to be necessary. But each department would be responsible to the Assembly only to the extent to which the Governor wished to subject it to control by that body. It was he who would be the supreme interpreter of the wishes of the people as reflected through their representatives, and it was his function to make the adjustments deemed necessary in order to render these heads of departments "acceptable and agreeable to the representatives of the people." But in doing so, he would exercise his own discretion, and be free to exact other qualifications for individual office-holders than the mere condition of their possessing the confidence of the representative assembly.

In the same dispatch, Sydenham reported upon the status of the heads of departments with respect to their membership in the Legislature.

"At present all the Heads of Departments are members of the Assembly, with the exception of the President of the Committee of the Council. . . . The four Law Officers, the two Secretaries, the Receiver-General, the President of the Board of Works, and the Inspector-General, whom I propose, shortly to appoint, will be of that body.

For the future I should not consider it absolutely necessary that all these offices should be thus held, but at the present time, it will in my opinion be desirable that a considerable portion be thus filled, and if the gentlemen who hold them cannot obtain seats, they must give place to those who can."

Receiving this report, Sir James Stephen forwarded it to Russell, observing that these reforms that Sydenham had effected amounted "to nothing less than a change of the whole administrative system in Canada," and that he "could not venture to suggest the course to be taken on topics so onerous & momentous." But Russell, pleased with the adjustments that had been made in the new provincial government, ruled on the following day that "This arrangement should be approved, on the ground of Lord Sydenham's acquaintance with the details, as well as the principles of administration in Canada."

Such were the administrative arrangements through which Russell's ameliorative policy for Canada was being carried into effect, when the Melbourne Ministry retired from office in August, 1841. His system



was almost purely remedial in purpose, designed to counteract the movement for "responsible government," by swallowing up factional and racial differences in a reunited province, by substituting harmony for antagonism in the conduct of the provincial government, by teaching the discontented elements what good and efficient government really was, and sweetening the whole program with flattering promises of financial aid from the imperial treasury. While he strove to direct the activities of colonial reformers along such constitutional lines as were compatible with the old imperial relation, he apparently could not foresee the consequences of the details which he, through Lord Sydenham, had arranged for the purpose of carrying the adopted program into successful operation. In bestowing this benevolent system upon the colony, he had reached the constitutional limits of the time-honored régime which he had held "in superstitious reverence" since early youth. With his fervent attachment to the unitary theory of imperial order, it was left for him to think only in terms of expanding an insular constitution into a constitution for an empire.

It was, however, during Russell's ministry, 1846 to 1852, that the colonial interpretation of empire began to prevail, first in Nova Scotia and then in Canada. Looking at the Russel-Sydenham system in the light of the conditions that surrounded the final achievement of responsible government in Canada in the spring of 1848, when Lord Elgin entrusted the conduct of the provincial government exclusively to the leaders of the majority party that Baldwin and La Fontaine had perfected, it will be seen that the delicate arrangements that Russell, through Sydenham, had devised for the purpose of carrying their own program into effect, proved to be the ideal foundation for the final realization of the colonial ideal of self-government within the empire. It remained for the leaders of this majority party in the Legislature only to lay their hands upon the Russell-Sydenham mechanism and cause it to move in conformity with their own principles. It is, therefore, mainly to this skillfully arranged mechanism, rather than to his constitutional theories, that one may look for Russell's outstanding contribution toward the final achievement of Canadian self-government under the Crown.

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This study is based largely upon manuscript sources deposited at the Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, London; and at the Canadian Archives, Ottawa, Canada. The *Russell Papers* at the Gifts and Deposits Division of the Public Record Office is one of the principal

sources used. While many of Russell's own letters and cabinet memoranda are to be found here, the greater part of this collection consists of letters and inclosures from his political friends and colleagues in the Melbourne cabinet. A very limited portion of this collection has been published by his son, Rollo Russell, under the title: *Earlier Correspondence of Lord John Russell* (2 vols., London, 1913). The *Colonial Office Records* for this period are available at the Round Room of the Public Record Office. For this study, the original correspondence between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the governors of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, and the United Province of Canada have been used. *The Durham Papers* at the Canadian Archives embrace letters, papers, and documents relating to Lord Durham's administration in Canada. Sections 1 and 6 contain materials that throw light upon Russell's relations with the Durham Mission. A calendar of these papers is printed in the *Report of the Canadian Archives for 1923*.

Among the principal published government records that have been used are *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, First, Second, and Third Series; *British Parliamentary Papers*, relating to Canada; and the *Journals of the Legislative Assembly* for the Province of Canada. Other printed sources include the *Greville Memoirs*, First and Second Parts (London, 1885), *Recollections of a Long Life*, by the Hon. John Cam Hobhouse (6 vols., London, 1911), who was President of the Board of Affairs, and a member of the Melbourne cabinet. The *Melbourne Papers* have been edited by Lloyd C. Sanders (London, 1889). Lord Melbourne was the prime minister under whom Russell served, first as Home Secretary 1835 to September 1839, and as Colonial Secretary from the latter date to the fall of the Melbourne Ministry in August, 1841. The *Durham Report* has been edited by C. P. Lucas (3 vols., Oxford, 1912). A diary kept by the Queen, during this period, throws considerable light upon Russell's relations with Canadian affairs. Most of her information, however, was obtained through the Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne. This work is published under the title: *The Girlhood of Queen Victoria, A Selection from Her Majesty's Diary between the years 1832 and 1840*, edited by Viscount Esher (2 vols., London, 1912). Material relating to the inauguration of the Russell-Sydenham system in Canada appears in *A Memoir of the Life of the Right Hon. Charles Lord Sydenham*, by his brother Charles Poulett Scrope (London, 1843). The section devoted to Sydenham's administration in Canada was written by the Governor-



General's private secretary, Clinton Murdoch. W. P. M. Kennedy is the compiler of a very comprehensive source book, *Documents of Canadian Constitutional History* (New Ed., Oxford, 1830). Among the works published by Russell, himself, are: *Selections from Speeches and Dispatches of Earl Russell* (2 vols., London, 1870), and the *Recollections and Suggestions of Earl Russell*, (London, 1875). The latter is Russell's own account of his public career, but it was written during the closing years of his life when he admitted that he was "sadly conscious" of a failing memory. For the most extensive biography of Russell, see Spencer Walpole, *Life of Lord John Russell*, (2 vols., London, 1889).

## THE HISTORY OF FORT KEARNEY\*

By LYLE EDWIN MANTON

Migration westward during the eighteen forties made necessary the establishment of military posts along the Oregon Trail to afford protection to emigrants passing over the trail and to strengthen the claim of the United States to the Oregon region. The chief purposes of this study are to trace its history during the twenty-five years of its existence and to present an account of the significance of this post as a factor in the development of the West. Fort Kearney was located at the eastern fringe of the Indian country and was called upon to protect emigrants, passengers and freighters, until the opening of the Pacific railroad made such protection unnecessary.

Difficulty was experienced in the selection of the first site for the new post. It was finally located at the mouth of Table Creek, on the Missouri River in 1846. The outbreak of the Mexican War, at the time the fort was to be garrisoned, left no regular troops available for this duty. Volunteers from the State of Missouri were pressed into service and formed the first garrison. The War Department soon realized that the Missouri River site was not properly chosen with regard to the route taken by western emigration. The Missouri River was not crossed so far north, but the larger part of the emigrants crossed at Westport, Leavenworth, or St. Joseph. Removal of the fort to the travelled highway was necessary. An exploring party sent out in the fall of 1847 selected a more suitable site for the fort. After a thorough reconnaissance the engineer officer in charge recommended a place at the southernmost point of the Platte River, where the Oregon Trail touched that stream. The fort was moved to the new location in the spring of 1848. The land upon which the post was located originally belonged to the Pawnee Indians, and had been partially ceded to the United States in 1833. Steps were immediately taken by the Government to enter into a treaty to extinguish the Pawnee Indian title. The Missouri Mounted Volunteers, moved from the Missouri to the Platte, were used in the work of constructing the buildings for the

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Louis Pelzer.



new post. The little timber available proved to be of poor quality for lumber. It was necessary to build some of the buildings from sod and adobe bricks, which were cut and dried by the soldiers. Unaccustomed to such work, they did not do well, and not much was accomplished. The close of the Mexican War, for which the volunteers had been enlisted, caused them to be withdrawn from Fort Kearney for discharge. They were relieved by a detachment of Mounted Rifles, upon whom fell the task of completing the buildings begun during the summer.

Nearly 50,000 emigrants passed over the Oregon Trail during the gold rush of 1849. There was little Indian danger until Fort Kearney was reached, but westward Indians were apt to be encountered at any time. Most of the gold seekers were inexperienced travellers and found it necessary to reorganize their trains at the fort. Often, from wagons too heavily laden, they discarded every possible item of equipment, and sometimes even food, to lighten loads for the long journey ahead. The stop to rest the animals, to repair outfits, and to reorganize trains, made the fort a very busy place during the travel season.

Emigration begun in the forties continued through the fifties. A major portion of the overland travel to California and Oregon passed over the Oregon Trail. Fort Kearney became a fixed and established point on that trail, its garrison affording protection in time of Indian danger and its storehouses providing food and supplies to stranded or impecunious travellers far from home. The commanding officer at the fort was authorized by a law to issue or sell supplies from the government warehouse, upon requisition, to such persons as he deemed worthy of aid. The officers were very careful about approving such requests but despite this many applications were accepted. Large numbers of persons were inexperienced in plains travel, and because of unwise selection of goods, found themselves in need when Fort Kearney was reached. Accident, or robbery deprived others of food. The fort rendered necessary aid in these cases and an important service to those in distress.

Unrest among the Sioux Indians west of Fort Kearney became noticeable during the summer of 1854. Guards were furnished for emigrant trains and depredations by the savages were reduced to a minimum. The following year a large force was sent to subdue the Sioux. Fort Kearney, with Forts Laramie and Pierre, were used as bases of operation in this campaign.

Conditions in Utah caused President Pierce to send an army, under Brigadier General W. S. Harney, to that territory in 1857. While no troops were ordered upon this campaign from the garrison at Fort Kearney, the fort became the scene of great activity during the operations. The western posts were not sufficiently manned to furnish the needed troops. The regiments were assembled at Fort Leavenworth, and from there ordered west. Forts Kearney and Laramie were used as concentration points for men and supplies.

Increasing population on the plains and in the mountain regions created a need for better communication. Mail service was slow and the western military posts were unable to communicate rapidly with their department commanders. During the fifties contracts were let for more rapid mail service, but even with this improvement nearly a month was required for orders to reach Fort Kearney from headquarters at St. Louis. Post returns required five weeks to go from the fort to the Adjutant General's office in Washington.

With the inauguration, in the spring of 1860, of the Pony Express, Fort Kearney was brought into much closer touch with high command. Connecting as it did with the telegraph at St. Joseph, the express brought important communications from that point to the fort in less than two days. The Pony Express station at Fort Kearney was the point of departure into the Indian country, and many of the riders, including William Campbell, William F. Cody and others, had narrow escapes from the Cheyennes and Sioux.

By November, 1860, the Missouri and Western Telegraph Company had built its line westward as far as Fort Kearney. Here the express riders took the communications coming in over the wire and rushed them westward. The telegraph brought the fort into instantaneous communication with its headquarters and greatly increased the effectiveness of the post. The next spring saw work of construction on the telegraph line pushed westward. From November, 1860, until August, 1861, Fort Kearney was the western terminus of the telegraph.

The outbreak of the Civil War had an immediate effect upon Fort Kearney. All regular army troops were withdrawn for service in putting down the rebellion, and volunteer regiments, largely from the State of Iowa and the Territory of Nebraska, replaced this garrison. Ordnance was likewise ordered transferred to Fort Leavenworth leaving that post without cannon. Located near the dividing line between free and slave territory, Fort Kearney was the scene of many an impassioned argument between northern and southern sympathizers. The



commanding officer of the fort at the outbreak of the war was a native of Virginia and an ardent southern man. He soon left the service of the United States and later served as a colonel in the Confederate army.

Desertions from the volunteer regiments stationed at the fort were numerous during the war. Many of the men had enlisted with service at the battle front in mind, and were disappointed at being assigned to duty away from the theater of war. Homesickness also prompted many desertions from the post.

Withdrawal of regular army regiments and their experienced officers from Fort Kearney and the western posts, was an open invitation to the Indians to resume warlike activities. During the summer of 1864 a number of outbreaks occurred both east and west of Fort Kearney, in which great property loss was suffered, and a number of settlers lost their lives. In the outbreaks along the Little Blue River, south-east of the fort, as many as twenty-five settlers were slain and several women and children carried off captives by the Indians. Troops were sent there from the post, and they, with several regiments from Kansas, drove the Indians away. At Plum Creek, west of Fort Kearney, a wagon train was burned and several men killed. Troops were sent from the fort upon receipt of telegraphic notice of the attack.

The Indian outbreaks made necessary the establishment of several outposts which were garrisoned and supplied from Fort Kearney. Detachments were sent from the fort and from these outposts to protect the settlers and to drive off the Indians. During these outbreaks it was not possible for the stage coaches to operate and for several weeks no travel was possible. With the resumption of travel it was necessary to send armed escorts from Fort Kearney to protect the passengers and mail from Indian attack.

Toward the close of the Civil War a company of Pawnee Indians was recruited by the army for scout duty. The Pawnees were willing to enlist for service against their enemies, the Sioux. These troopers were a picturesque military outfit but were efficient soldiers. They were stationed at Fort Kearney and were used in the operations along the overland trail.

Several companies, enlistments of former Confederates, were stationed at Fort Kearney in 1865. These men had been taken prisoners of war and had been confined in the prison pens of Chicago and Rock Island. They had had enough of fighting in the Confederate army and did not wish to be exchanged. Desirous of getting out of prison,

they were willing to enlist in the United States army provided they were not required to fight against their brethren. They were sent west for duty against the Indians, and in this capacity rendered faithful service.

Fort Kearney had, by the early sixties, become an important station on the stage and freighting routes. The roads from the Missouri River towns joined there and all of the vast traffic of the plains by way of the Platte Valley route concentrated at that point. From Fort Kearney westward the route of the carrying trade followed the great military road along the south bank of the river. In 1860 more than 20,000,000 pounds of freight passed the fort, requiring 40,000 oxen, 4,000 wagons, and more than 4,500 men to handle it. As many as 500 heavily loaded wagons passed Fort Kearney in a day. Had it not been for the protection afforded by the fort, this vast movement of freight would not have been possible.

Passenger travel past Fort Kearney was very heavy. Here the stage line from Omaha, which followed the route along the north bank of the Platte River, joined with the line from Atchison, which followed the Oregon Trail up to the fort. Often passengers from Omaha found it necessary to wait several days at the fort for a westbound stage with room for them. The stage company had, besides its station, a huge storehouse, barns, and shops. Here also was located one of its largest and best stations for the serving of meals to passengers.

After the Civil War the volunteer regiments were withdrawn from Fort Kearney to be mustered out and regular army regiments sent to garrison the post. During the process of moving the volunteer troops eastward as high as 1,400 men were stationed at the fort. With the arrival of the regular troops efforts were made to put down the Indian uprisings which had begun during the latter part of the war. Numerous details, sent from the fort, reconnoitered the country and sought hostile Indians. Stages and freighters were given guard escort and small garrisons continued at the sub-stations established at the beginning of the Indian outbreak.

There being no direct route to the newly discovered gold fields in the southwestern part of the Territory of Montana, the Government resolved to open a road by way of the Powder River Valley. To carry this plan into execution, Colonel Henry B. Carrington of the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry was selected and Fort Kearney was made the base of operations. The Eighteenth Infantry was recruited to strength and



sent to the fort during the winter and spring and the expedition left Fort Kearney in May, 1867.

At that time Major General John Pope was commander of the District of the Missouri, which included the Department of the Platte, in which Fort Kearney was located. He believed that the population of the west had outgrown transportation by wagons and that the government should render material aid in the building of railroads. The plains could not be settled and the military posts there would have to be maintained as long as there were Indians in the region. Fort Kearney would be needed for a long time to come. He designated the fort as the point of rendezvous for all trains destined for Denver City or Fort Laramie, by way of the Platte River route. Westbound wagon trains were not permitted to go beyond Fort Kearney unless sufficiently strong to withstand Indian attack. The provost-marshal of the fort was held responsible for the concentration of the smaller trains into greater strength before permitting them to proceed into the Indian country.

Completion of the Union Pacific Railroad past Fort Kearney in the late sixties made passenger travel more comfortable by train and safe from Indian attack. Fares, at ten cents per mile, were about half that of the stage. Freight rates by wagon from the Missouri River to Denver were much higher than by rail, but despite this fact some freighting was done by wagon, to points not directly on the railroad, for several years after the railroad was built. The building of the Pacific railroad, and the consequent abandonment of the overland route as an artery of travel, made military protection no longer necessary. The garrison at the fort was greatly reduced.

While the railroad was being built the fort furnished guard details to protect the construction workers. Even after the road was finished past the one hundredth meridian, occasional Indian danger made the continuance of such protection necessary. The garrison at Fort Kearney always stood in readiness to meet all demands made upon it for guards.

Military posts established on the public domain were placed upon reservations ten miles square. The reservation at Fort Kearney included slightly more than the one hundred square miles. Scarcity of timber for lumber and fuel made it necessary to reserve the heavily wooded inlands in the Platte River for a distance of sixteen miles, rather than ten, to insure an adequate supply for use at the fort. Since most of the troops stationed at the post were mounted, forage for the

horses was a serious problem. Except for the first few years, when the garrison was small, no persons were permitted to camp on the reservation, where all grass was required for the mounts of the troops.

In appearance Fort Kearney was not unlike other western frontier posts. The site of the fort proper was located about a half mile south of the Platte River, midway north and south within the reservation boundaries, two miles from the western edge and eight miles from the eastern. The buildings, constructed of native lumber and adobe, were situated around a rectangular parade ground four acres in extent. The flagstaff stood in the center of the parade ground.

The Indian outbreak of 1864 caused the district commander to erect, adjacent to the fort, earthworks surmounted by a wooden stockade. This enclosure comprised an acre and was sufficient to protect the entire garrison in case of Indian attack. While Fort Kearney was never attacked by the Indians, a sentinel was fired upon in August, 1864.

In addition to the military buildings at the fort, the Overland Stage Line had been permitted to erect such buildings as were necessary for its business. The post sutler also had a building near the parade ground as did the postmaster, Moses Sydenham, who also operated a book and stationery store. The telegraph office shared the quarters of his bookstore and was one of the most active places about the post.

Merchants were not permitted to establish themselves upon the military reservation but the post sutler had the exclusive privilege of selling to the troops. Two villages grew up at the eastern and western edge of the military reservation, beyond the jurisdiction of military authority. The one to the west, Kearney City or Dobytown, was nearer to the fort and was the more important. It derived its name from the adobe material with which the buildings were constructed.

Dobytown consisted of twelve or fifteen buildings, the majority of which were disreputable places. Whiskey was the principal article of commerce. There were several large outfitting stores including those of Brown and Lydell, and Anson Michel, which catered to the needs of the emigrants and freighters passing through. These establishments did a considerable business until the railroad made freighting a thing of the past. For a time Dobytown was the principal outfitting point west of the Missouri River.

Soldiers from the fort, and those enroute to posts west, formed a large percentage of the customers of Dobytown stores. Whiskey could not be purchased from the post sutler, except under stringent regula-



tion, if at all. But many customers in Dobytown saloons wore the uniform of the United States. Other goods not sold by the sutler were also purchased from the nearby merchants. With the passing of the fort, Dobytown was also abandoned.

The life of the soldiers at Fort Kearney was similar to that of troops at other western posts. The early years appear to have been spent in almost as great isolation as that of a ship at sea. Mails were slow and irregular and communication between the soldiers and relatives and friends back home was difficult. Movement on the plains almost ceased during the winter months. Through the cold weather the post was even more isolated than during the travel season.

Drill and ordinary garrison duty made up the daily routine of the soldier. The men, when used for duty not strictly military, such as cutting wood, putting up hay, or doing construction work, received, after 1866, extra pay. Escort and scouting duty also occupied much of their time. One of the most hated of all assignments was that of escort to the slow moving ox trains. Protecting the less monotonous stages was less objectionable.

Discipline immediately after the war was very lax. Desertions were surprisingly frequent from the volunteer organizations, as many as eleven men deserting in one day during the summer of 1865. Even the commissioned personnel of the post was not entirely free from deserters. With the coming of regular army regiments, most of which had enviable records of service during the war, discipline was again restored.

The introduction of the breech loading rifle after the war caused Fort Kearney, in common with other posts, to be used as a proving ground for the several models then being considered for adoption by the army. At the same time the relative merits of ammunition manufactured by the Ordnance Department, and that by private firms, was tested.

By 1870 it was realized that the need for Fort Kearney as a military post had passed. A few years previously General William T. Sherman had visited the fort and had considered strongly ordering its abandonment at that time. During the last years of maintenance the post was garrisoned by but fifty men. Early the following year the War Department ordered Fort Kearney abandoned as a military post, and the removal of its garrison to Omaha Barracks.

Squatters settled on the military reservation and the site of the old fort was put to agricultural uses. One of the squatters on the fort

land was a former sergeant who had been stationed at the post. In 1873 William O. Dungan, also a former soldier, but never stationed at Fort Kearney, bought the squatter rights to the land upon which the fort had been located. He removed his family there from Illinois and built his house on the old parade ground.

Numerous attempts were made to secure Congressional assent to the disposition of the 65,000-acre reservation as a whole. Some attempts were made to have it ceded to the State of Nebraska for use as a state institution, but these were unsuccessful. It was even proposed by Moses Sydenham and others to remove the national capital to the reservation and to name the new city thus created New Washington. This plan was not favored in the East, and never received serious consideration by Congress.

In 1876 an act was approved transferring the reservation to the Department of the Interior for settlement under the homestead law. The land was surveyed and opened to entry the following year. Mr. Dungan filed on the quarter upon which the fort had been located. By applying time spent in the army during the war he was able to prove up his entry in less than the usual five-year period and to receive a patent from the government conveying title to the site of the old fort.

The tract remained in Mr. Dungan's possession until his death in 1922. A short time prior to this historically minded persons undertook to secure the site of old Fort Kearney as a state park. Mr. Dungan's demise threw his estate into litigation. Further efforts were held in abeyance until legal matters could be adjusted. When it was apparent that the land would be sold at a referee's sale interest was again aroused and steps taken to purchase the site for park purposes.

With the organization of the Fort Kearney Memorial Association in 1928, the prospect of creating a state memorial park became more real. Efforts were at once begun to procure the necessary funds for carrying out this purpose. The money was subscribed largely by the citizens living in the vicinity of the old fort, and the forty acres upon which the building of the post stood, was purchased.

Title to the tract for use as a state park was tendered to the State of Nebraska by the Association. On March 26, 1929, an act was approved by the State Legislature accepting the tender and creating therefrom a "State Historical and Scenic Park and Bird Reserve." The



following December, Governor Arthur J. Weaver personally visited the park and accepted officially the deed to the site of the old Fort Kearney.

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This study is based largely upon the Fort Kearney Post Returns, on file in the office of the Adjutant General of the Army. The commanding officer of each military post filed a monthly report, or return, with the Adjutant General. The file of these returns for Fort Kerney is very complete. Letters and maps, filed in the office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington, were also consulted. About fifty letters and ten maps pertain to Fort Kearney.

Three unpublished diaries were also used. Manuscripts of the diaries of E. A. Benson, and F. A. J. Gray, who crossed the plains in 1849 and 1850, respectively, yielded much valuable material. The diary of L. D. Randall, in the original manuscript, was loaned by his grandson, Everett Randall, of Kearney, Nebraska, and proved helpful. Numerous published diaries were consulted for material about, or descriptions of, Fort Kearney. These are most numerous for 1849 and the years immediately following.

Two unpublished ledgers of the Michel store at Dobytown were valuable. These ledgers contain the day to day entries of business transacted, and give the nature and quantity of goods dealt in, as well as the prices involved. One, extending from 1864 to 1868, was loaned by John Lowe, a banker of Kearney, Nebraska. The other, extending from 1866 to 1872, was loaned by Associate Professor Jennie M. Conrad, of the State Teachers College, Kearney, Nebraska.

Several published works, more or less autobiographical, written by persons at Fort Kearney, were also consulted. Chief among these were, Root and Connelley, *The Overland Stage to California*; Eugene F. Ware, *The Indian War of 1864*; and William F. Cody, *Autobiography*. Frank Root was conductor on the overland stage and relates his experiences in that work. Captain Ware was an officer stationed at Fort Kearney during the Civil War, and took an active part in the Indian wars of 1864 and 1865. Colonel Cody was a pony express rider and stage driver at the fort, and was later stationed there as an officer in command of scouts.

Public documents were a valuable source of material. The reports of the Secretary of War were particularly helpful. Many of these contain reports of the officers commanding the military department in which Fort Kearney was located. Reports of the Secretary of the Interior, also in the documents, were valuable for information con-

cerning land laws and policy. *The Congressional Globe* was helpful for its recorded speeches of senators and representatives on bills pertaining to the military policy.

The *St. Louis Republican*, in the Missouri State Historical Society, contains a number of letters written from Fort Kearney in 1849. The *Nebraska State Journal*, in the Nebraska State Historical Society, contains several articles, reminiscent in nature, written by persons who had been at the fort. Local histories, state and county, were searched for pertinent material. Chief among these was Morton and Watkins, *History of Nebraska*, in three volumes.

The unpublished minutes of the Fort Kearney Memorial Association were used as a basis for material on the organization and work of that Association. This material was loaned by the secretary of the Association. In addition Federal and state Statutes were consulted for laws and resolutions affecting Fort Kearney or military policy.



## THE PLANTER IN THE LOWER SOUTH, 1865-1880\*

By CHARLTON WATSON TEBEAU

The history of social, economic, and political life in the ante bellum South is to a large extent the history of the southern planter and his plantation. The planter class was not large, and not all planters were forceful leaders. A few thousand families, held together by bonds of marriage, buttressed by wealth, land-holding, and education, were able to dominate the social and political life of the Old South.

The student of the social life of the southern states is embarrassed by much romantic and picturesque material, not all of it historically true. It is, for example, a popular assumption that the Civil War marked the end of an era: the disappearance of a whole economic and social system, and that upon its ruins a "New South" was built. Again, the "Old" as well as the "New" is made to appear either wholly good or wholly bad.

The Civil War did indeed achieve revolutionary change in the social and economic circumstances of the planter class, especially in the Lower South. But it is a denial of the historical process to regard this change as being as sudden or complete as is commonly made to appear. The planter and the plantation system were too deeply rooted in the whole life of the Lower South to be swiftly overthrown. The Civil War liberated forces, and freed movements and personalities that had long been struggling for recognition. And, almost all the elements of the old order are present in the new.

The planters contributed their full share to the sacrifice that the South made of its man power to the cause of the Confederacy. Those who returned to their homes faced heavy material losses. Perhaps the most serious was emancipation, for slaves had represented the bulk of their personal property. Their land, now that the free Negro labor was uncertain, became a drug on the market, the decline in price in one state being as high as seventy per cent. The banking and credit

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor H. J. Thornton.

system of the South had been involved in the economic collapse so that even if material were impossible any early restoration of material well-being.

The actual destruction wrought on the plantations in the invaded districts during the war was disastrous in the extreme. The cotton planters lost their gins and presses. Livestock was killed or driven off. Farm implements and machinery suffered from wear and neglect as well as actual destruction. An English visitor in 1870 described their plight: "Many of the planters were left without a cow or an ox, with scarce a hog or even a chicken, and since the war they have had to buy, breed and recover every useful animal on their land. It is forgetfulness of this fact that has led to an exaggerated estimate in Europe of the fortunes made in cotton planting from the high prices realized since the close of the war. The planters had to resume operations with their farms in ruins, with fences to rebuild, with labor scarce, scattered and disorganized, with everything to buy at prices three times higher than before the war; it is certain that but for the high price of cotton, two-thirds of the plantations could not have continued in cultivation after the first attempt in 1866."

It must be noted, however, that it was the rice and sugar cane growers who suffered the greatest losses at the hands of the enemy. These staples had led to the highest development of the plantation system, and had involved the largest units and the heaviest investments. Costly machinery, especially for sugar-making, and expensive works for drainage and flood control, made these plantations profitable only when operated on a large scale. By reason of their location on the "rice coast" and in the central river districts they fell into the hands of Federal troops as early as 1862. When, after three years of abandonment, the owners returned, many found their homes in ashes, and such homes as remained were stripped of everything valuable; much of the machinery was ruined by neglect or destroyed; and so much of the work of reclamation was undone that half the original cost of the preparation for cultivation would be required to restore it.

But a remarkable measure of recovery in commercial circles came right after the war in spite of the bitterly adverse economic conditions. High prices of cotton created a mania for investment in southern planting and commerce. Many northern men and a few foreigners, who could supply the necessary capital, embarked upon planting careers. But the crops of 1866 and 1867 were poor in yield and quality and the price was declining. Failures in planting and in the commercial



pursuits dependent upon agriculture, were numerous. These losses discouraged further investment and the Lower South was deprived of that valuable aid to recovery. Stagnation in business and lack of recuperative power held economic life in an iron grip. But the climax of discouragement was the inauguration and progress of congressional reconstruction with its high taxes, wasteful and corrupt administration, political disturbance, violence, and intimidation. The economic and social life of the South was so convulsed that capital indispensable to recuperation fled precipitately as the governments began to function.

The best interests of the planters counseled rapid adjustment to the results of the war. The wisdom of this was apparent, but performance was very hard. Some were willing to accept the inevitable and make the best of it, but others refused to do this. To a small number the thought of remaining in the South after the fall of the Confederacy was intolerable. During the war persons who wished to escape participation had withdrawn to Mexico or more distant countries. Immediately after the surrender of the Confederacy, others, looking about frantically for an avenue of escape from possible punishment, went abroad, usually to Mexico, until they could discover which way the winds would blow at home. In Mexico, Brazil, and British Honduras, a small number attempted to reestablish their planting interests, and a few were able to engage themselves as managers of foreign sugar and coffee plantations. It appeared for a time that the exodus of southerners might reach large proportions. Much concern was felt over such a possibility by those who recognized the need of the South for its man power. Southern leaders publicly urged those disposed to flee to remain.

Other influences checked further emigration. Those who had first gone away to attempt to rebuild in new places returned with discouraging reports of failure. Furthermore, improving conditions in the Lower South, and the realization that the victorious North would not prove to be a vindictive conqueror led some who had sought a temporary exile abroad to return. At the end of reconstruction, though a few had permanently settled abroad, most of the expatriates had returned to their native communities. Within the United States there was likewise a noteworthy movement of people into the Southwest, of which a small portion were planters. There the frontier of the cotton belt still offered new land and the opportunity for rehabilitating wrecked fortunes.

The confusion of the late sixties and early seventies should not be allowed to obscure the fact that a steady process of healing and recovery was going on all the while. Social adjustment was more continuous and sure during reconstruction than was political readjustment. Through many of the planters never lost the notion that the day of all good things had passed away. The great majority of them, unlike the few extremists and the irreconcilables, accepted the inevitable. Victims and winners might not be allowed to forget how grand might have been their manner of living had there been no war, but necessity forced them to the task of earning their daily bread. For a generation southern economic life languished and planters were relatively poor, but it is a point seldom made in the description of those convulsive times that the great mass of planters soon regained a reasonable measure of comfort and security. Here and there one finds instances of the old style of living. Fortune was kind to some individuals. The old slaves remained to serve some masters in the capacity of hired servants. Good management made planting a success for some favored persons in spite of the difficulties of the transition. A few irreconcilables continued to fret and fume about the old issues. But these were largely unheard by those elements in society that were chiefly concerned with the restoration of the order and security necessary for economic life to resume a natural course.

The diminishing returns from planting, the breaking up of some of the estates and the necessity for finding a means of making a living slowly broke down certain aspects of social prejudice and forced planters into other activities. To be sure, some clung to the tradition of their past with a strength that was pathetic. But, though there remained certain limits beyond which the late aristocrat did not go in his resort to labor, other vocations than planting, politics and the more genteel professions were becoming respectable. Commercial and clerical pursuits together with increased attention to the professions and politics claimed the attention of planters who looked beyond their own estates for gainful occupation. To a much less degree embryonic industrial enterprises drew leaders from the ranks of the landed gentry. By 1880, when a new generation of men and women was coming to take its place in the world of men and affairs, the sons and daughters of the country gentlemen of the old régime no longer looked upon planting as the only vocation through which they might reach high social position.



For the dispossessed and impoverished planters the process of adjustment was sometimes painful. With touching tenacity some held on to the ancient forms, but their efforts to be sociable and hospitable were often more like the last splendid banquet of one on the verge of ruin than rational liberality. But the hard facts would not be denied. "One by one the domestics were dismissed; dinner parties grew rare; stately coaches lost their paint and became rickety. Carriage and saddle horses were worn out at the plow and replaced by mules; at last the master learned to open his own gate and the mistress to do her own cooking." Others rapidly adjusted themselves to the changed circumstances. They remodelled their domestic economy, accommodating it to their smaller incomes and to the uncertainty of household help. They discarded the outside kitchen and brought the domestic operations as much as possible under one roof so that they might be more easily dispatched by the members of the family. As for the southern cultural tradition, though enormously shocked by the war and its aftermath, it was, happily, not destroyed. The home of the slave owner was something unique in American history. There the planter was surrounded by his slaves and almost everything that was necessary to make the small community self-sufficient. Generations of social training had developed a strong sense of power and responsibility. There was a certain spaciousness in the old southern scheme of things that was destroyed by the Civil War and its aftermath. But the planters continued to give a distinct tone to southern life. Not the relatively few specimens of the "broken down aristocracy" who clung to the shreds of a departed glory were the best exemplars of the shaken order, but rather those who preserved the charm of the old in their adjustment to the new.

One of the most significant results of the readjustment was the changed status of woman in southern society. She had lived a sheltered life. Marriage had been the only career open to her. But in spite of the protected position she had enjoyed, the planter's wife had shouldered large responsibilities when she undertook the management of the plantation home. And in the task of rebuilding her home after the war she demonstrated her ability to meet the stern realities of a strangely altered and impoverished existence. The loss of fathers, brothers, and husbands, and the declining family fortunes, forced thousands of women to do their own work, and, what is more important, broke down the tradition that had kept them from working for self support. Numerous widows and orphaned girls were driven to main-

tain their families. The oversight of some plantations fell upon feminine shoulders. Planters' daughters became school teachers. The education of the planters' children underwent a change. Public and private schools replaced tutors and governesses. Education became more practical and girls went to school with the definite purpose of preparing themselves for self-support. There were those who looked askance at such changes and at what seemed to them the degraded position of the southern woman. There was perhaps less time for the purely cultural and leisurely pursuits of the ante bellum period, but the new life was on the whole welcomed by southern women eager to take their places in a busy world and to be free of absolute dependence upon their families.

When the plantation system was disrupted by emancipation, and planting ceased to be the only important interest of the southern gentry, many moved into the growing country towns, to give to the social life of these small communities something of the distinction that had once belonged to the country places or the few towns and cities to which they had been accustomed to make seasonal migrations. Handsome country places, once famous, often stood tenantless and uncared for, a monument to a way of life that had largely ceased to exist.

The changed relations between whites and blacks consequent upon emancipation were felt in every phase of life. All people in the former slave states were compelled to accustom themselves to the idea that the Negroes were free. The Negroes on their part were unfitted for freedom. Ignorant and childlike, the habit of obedience was strong in them. Docile and easy-going by nature, they had been robbed by years of servitude of any initiative or sense of responsibility which they might have possessed. They had tilled the soil for generations, but had not been the owners of property. Planters were greatly handicapped, if, indeed, not disqualified from treating Negroes as a free people. They believed that the African race was inherently inferior. That the condition of the blacks was a result of the system of slavery rather than any racial characteristic did not seem to occur to them. They were convinced without a trial that the freedmen would not work unless compelled to do so.

Planters did not hate the Negroes. Almost all of the records of the reconstruction period agree that planters and men of property and assured social position were inclined to treat the freedmen more fairly than persons who had never been slave-holders. Slavery left a residuum of mutual affection that both were long in outgrowing. More-



over, in spite of an earlier urge to test freedom by movement, the freedmen tended to settle down in their old homes and work for their old masters wherever conditions had been reasonably satisfactory under the slave régime. Even the difficulties of congressional reconstruction and Negro enfranchisement seldom affected the general attitude of tolerance on the part of the planters toward the freedmen. True, planters wished to suppress the political activities of the Negroes, but the land-holders wished them to work, and it was necessary that they be satisfied with conditions where they were employed. Planters did not consider them responsible for the existing state of affairs. They recognized that the ignorant freedmen were usually the dupes of demagogues of both colors who exploited their votes to enrich themselves, but with little benefit to the voters. The effect of the Ku Klux Klan activities and other coercive measures of the whites on the relations of planters and freedmen, like the disturbing effects of political agitation on the Negroes, has often been over estimated. Planters were adept in the management of Negroes and both whites and blacks came to recognize mutual dependence and common interests in an economic sense. There were numerous cases of local violence, but such extremes were seldom resorted to and were frowned upon by the more conservative elements in the Lower South.

By 1880 a tenant and share-cropping system had almost completely replaced the old highly centralized slave labor organization on the cotton plantations. The quarters that had housed the slaves were usually broken up and moved on to the individual tracts that were given to each family to cultivate. Cotton culture was reduced to a routine with which the blacks were familiar, and little attention was paid to supervision. The results of absenteeism were generally unsatisfactory. The tenant failed to care for the planter's property and the soil was robbed of its fertility by careless cultivators who had no direct interest in its conservation.

As a result of this breakdown of the old patriarchal plantation system the planter no longer felt the moral obligation to care for his laborers. He had lost intimate contact with the life of the Negroes, and their physical well-being was no longer one of his chief concerns. Though he remained almost the only resource of the freedmen in time of trouble or difficulty, the planter was far more completely emancipated from the bonds of slavery than was the former slave.

In the case of the rice and sugar plantations decentralization was much less pronounced than in the cotton belt. The necessity of main-

taining the machinery of drainage and flood control precluded the division into individual units. On the sugar lands the labor organization was little changed. The workers continued to live in the quarters, usually near the sugar houses. The development of portable mills and cheaper apparatus for the reduction of the cane to sugar as well as coöperative milling favored production on a small scale. But the keen competition with foreign sugar made the large scale operations of the corporations much more efficient and profitable, and planters as individuals tended to give less attention to sugar cane growing. On the "rice coast" where rice production steadily declined a modified rental and tenant system was developed and planters lost almost all contact with rice planting. In the Southwest, in Louisiana and Texas, where the expense of drainage and flood control was largely eliminated, rice could be cultivated and harvested by machinery and that competition soon destroyed rice growing on the eastern seaboard.

The burden of financing the production of the staple crops was transferred from the factor in the city to the merchant and banker in the country towns. Planters who had land found credit easy to secure, and when their real estate was insufficient they pledged their growing or even unplanted crops to secure advances. The introduction of the crop lien system made this latter form of credit available to tenants and renters as well as landholders. It appeared for a time that the merchants might not only gain control of the supply business of the unfortunate planter who had not sufficient capital, but that the control of the tenants might also be taken away from the planters by means of that trade. Some planters found a solution for the problem by becoming merchants and supplying other tenants as well as their own.

The credit system enabled planters and tenants to carry on planting operations when no other means of financing them was available. It enabled a few laborers to achieve independence. But its operation usually proved vicious. The first result was a tremendous increase in the cost of supplies. The helpless tenant, or planter, had no other source of credit. Tenants suffered greater disadvantages from the practice than did unfortunate planters who were forced to seek it. No matter what they did they seldom more than broke even at the end of the year. Interest and carrying charges, overcharges and manipulation of accounts were easily made to absorb all the profits. Neither was there any free play of competition, for the purchaser of the crop was determined before it was planted. It enforced upon the South a one crop system, a fact that carried a double advantage to the person



doling out the supplies: it was the greatest assurance that the debt would be paid, and at the same time it increased the amount of supplies that the tenant must purchase. Lastly, it was a hindrance to the introduction of new techniques and improved methods in agriculture. From these latter developments the remaining resident planters and the small independent farmers reaped the greatest benefit.

It is easy to assume from this disintegration and decentralization of the plantation system, and the rising importance of the small farmer, that cotton planting on the large scale of ante bellum days disappeared. But such is not the case. There was a decided decrease in the average size of farms from 1860 to 1880, an increase in the number of farms, and a decreased total acreage of improved farm land. But there was another tendency noticeable by 1880: the gradual purchase of many small units or even whole plantations by merchants and business men who operated them with tenant laborers. The plantation had not disappeared but it had become "a continuous tract of land of considerable area under the general supervision of a single individual or firm, all or a part of such tract being divided into at least five smaller tracts and leased to tenants." And this type of agricultural unit was becoming more firmly fixed in the richer portions of the cotton belt.

The weakened economic position of the planters carried with it certain social implications that were clearly discernible by 1880. The leadership of the planter oligarchy had not gone entirely unchallenged in the ante bellum South, and the results of the Civil War and reconstruction gave new strength to elements in the population that were demanding recognition. Planters and their conservative allies controlled the state governments that were set up under the brief period of presidential reconstruction. But their control was rather precarious, for even then some new leaders brought forward by the war were threatening that control. Congressional reconstruction put an end to the differences of opinion among the whites. In due time, however, the experienced planter leadership organized the white voters to "recapture" the state governments, and common white men did not forget this exercise of political strength. But the political experience of the planters and the ever-present fear that a division among the whites might result in the return of the Negro to power were sufficient, for a while, to keep the white masses loyal.

The political group that came into power after the reconstruction was called by its opponents the "Bourbon Democracy," implying that the ante bellum slaveholding oligarchy was determined to restore the

old régime. But "Bourbon Democracy" did not mean planter control except in the sense that it was conservative. Nor did it mean a solid South. Changes had taken place in southern life which spelled doom to the "Bourbons" if they failed to take note of new social and economic problems. As it was, their overthrow was to be achieved by the rise of a self-conscious middle class, and the coming of the New South which was industrial rather than agricultural. It was the Populist uprising in 1890 that swept the common man into power, but even then the result was a compromise, for the ever-present Negro could be used by astute politicians to prevent serious white division. Nevertheless, after the Populist revolt the planter was a factor of diminishing importance in southern politics.

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The sources for this study are numerous but scattered. Little unpublished material is used. Few planters appear to have kept diaries during the period of reconstruction and little work has been done in collecting such as do exist. A few plantation records and journals in the Louisiana State University Library at Baton Rouge and in the library of the South Carolina Historical Society at Charleston have been examined. Correspondence with descendants of planter families, and interviews with others in and about Charleston and New Orleans, threw much light on the subject and provided some case studies.

Of the published material, the annual reports of the United States Department of Agriculture and the voluminous reports of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands are quite valuable. Much of the evidence in the latter is questionable, but the agents of the Bureau came into direct contact with planters, a fact that makes the reports of peculiar value. The period of political reconstruction was productive of numerous investigations by the United States government, the reports of which often contain references to planters and plantations.

A great mass of printed material exists in the form of reminiscences, letters and collected documents which are of varied importance. Some of them record the experience of northern men engaged in planting and other activities in the South, and the works of philanthropic and missionary organizations among the Negroes which necessarily brought them into contact with planters. Travelers, both foreign and American, visited the South in unusual numbers between 1865 and 1880 and recorded their observations. Many of these were newspaper men trained to observe the social order, a fact that gives added value to their



writings. Others came with preconceived notions, and the reliability of their views is correspondingly diminished. Contemporary periodicals and newspapers, both national and local in their circulation, supplied valuable data. Prominent among those covering the entire period from 1865 to 1880 are: *The Charleston Daily Courier*, *The New Orleans Daily Picayune*, *The New Orleans Price Current*, *The New York Daily Tribune*, *The Nation* (New York), *The Rural Carolinian* (Charleston and Cokesbury, S. C.), *The Southern Cultivator* (Athens, Ga.), and *Debow's Commercial Review* (New Series, 1866-1870).

Numerous books and monographs, usually dealing with political aspects of state history during reconstruction, are a very important part of the material used in drawing together the many scattered threads that make up the pattern of planter and plantation life in the years under review.

## LINCOLN'S ATTORNEY GENERAL: EDWARD BATES\*

By FLOYD AVERY MCNEIL

Edward Bates possessed a dogmatic devotion to constitutional principles as the one sound mode of political conduct, that was equalled only by his unequivocal acceptance of the omnipotence of God. Hamiltonian in his belief in federal supremacy, but Jeffersonian in his concept of political democracy limited by intellectual leadership, he remained to the end an "excellent Whig of the old school." Living in an age of aggressive Jacksonianism, yet, with no compromise and by merit only, he rose high in State and Nation. Hardly a great politician or a great statesman, he was, without qualification, a great citizen. This study reveals these facts.

A considerable emphasis has been placed upon the public rather than the private life of Edward Bates. Detailed historical treatment has been centered upon the incidents and events of which he was an inseparable part. This involves with major significance the Lincoln Administration, the weaknesses of the Executive, the discord in the Cabinet, and the strength and loyalty of the Attorney General. Lincoln's was a great Administration. However, a considerable portion of its integrity must be attributed to the mild but implacable law officer of the Government. With honesty, candor, and devotion to constitutional principles, he showed the way to an often timid and much harassed President. He rendered opinions regarding the powers of the President, the status of the Negro, and other important war questions that no Civil War historian can afford to neglect; he curbed in many instances the tendency toward military abuse of civil rights. However, his greatest work was in persuading a reluctant administration to place flotillas of gunboats upon the Mississippi.

The first American ancestor of Edward Bates was John I. Bates, recorded as dwelling in Virginia in 1624. Tradition has it that he was of Scotch-Irish descent. The father of Edward Bates was a great-great-grandson of John I. Bates. Born in York County in 1741, he

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor Louis Pelzer.



remained a Virginian throughout his life. Himself of Quaker parentage, he was married in the Quaker meeting, in 1771, to a twenty-year-old Quaker daughter of Virginia, Caroline Matilda Woodson. They reared a family of twelve children, of whom the fourth and the last were destined to become illustrious Missourians. Thus it happened that Edward Bates grew to manhood in Virginia amid the heat and turmoil of the conflicting political views of Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans.

In 1807 an older brother became Secretary of Louisiana Territory. His influence determined Edward, upon attaining maturity, to cast his fortunes with those of the West. Consequently, on the twenty-ninth day of April, 1814, the youngest of the Bates family, "then a ruddy youth of twenty," faced the great Mississippi River. Before him was the village of St. Louis, wherein was to be built his long legal career. He crossed the river.

In those days the surest way to fame for young attorneys lay in the pathway to politics. So it was not surprising that in the fall of 1818 Edward Bates secured an appointment from Governor William Clark as District Attorney for the Northern Circuit of Missouri. This office he held until the formation of the State of Missouri.

On the twelfth of June, 1820, there assembled in the dining room of a St. Louis hotel, the newly elected Missouri State Convention. Thirty-eight days later, having constitutionally transformed Missouri from a territory into a state, the members returned to their homes. While all had officially participated, the framing of the constitution may be attributed to six remarkable delegates, who so ably directed the "machine" as to accomplish nearly everything desired by the lawyers and business men of Missouri. The guiding spirits of this small group were David Barton and Edward Bates. Barton was destined to become Missouri's first United States Senator. The younger man became the first Attorney General for the State.

In 1822, Bates campaigned successfully for a seat in the Missouri House of Representatives. However, the course of circumstances during the ensuing year brought to him the appointment of United States District Attorney for Missouri. In this office the main problem for several years was the satisfactory adjustment in court of Spanish land grant claims. In April, 1827, he resigned the office of District Attorney and became a successful candidate for election to the lower house of Congress. But with the adjournment of Congress in 1829, he returned home to be engulfed by the rising torrent of Jacksonianism in Missouri.

Bates now resumed the quiet practice of his profession, but not for long. By 1830 the nameless Adams organization in Missouri was recognized in the newspapers as an integral part of the National Republican party. And in Missouri, where Jacksonianism became synonymous with Bentonism, "Whiggery" was destined for a long existence. The Hamiltonianism in Bates made him a natural Whig. Always opposed to foreigners, disliking the "vulgarians," a strong "constitutionalist," not a violent factionist, he threw a strong support to the new movement. Becoming one of the chief Whig organizers in Missouri, he led the party in State politics for the next decade. During the greater part of this period he was a potential figure in the state legislature.

Throughout the next two decades he was famous as Missouri's leading trial lawyer. Never ceasing, however, to maintain an interest in politics he continued to be regarded as the leader of the Whig party in his State. In 1851 he was instrumental in bringing to a close the boasted "six Roman lustrums" of Senator Thomas H. Benton. In 1856 he presided at Baltimore over the last national Whig convention. This gained him immediate prominence, but injured seriously his future career. A solemn assemblage of earnest men, moved wholly by fear for the Union, Bates and his associates sought to select for the Presidency a man unpledged and owing allegiance to no section. They believed firmly that such a man was Fillmore. He was already the nominee of the American party, but many members of the Whig convention were active supporters of the American organization. "United as allies with entire unanimity and some zeal," wrote Bates later, the two parties supported the American nominee. He added, "We made a miserable failure, carrying no State but gallant little Maryland!" Northern Whigs had become Black Republicans. Southern Whigs had joined the Democratic ranks. The party of "Whiggery" was dead.

Nine years earlier, Bates had acquired considerable fame as chairman of a great River and Harbor Convention which met at Chicago. Soon offered a seat in Fillmore's cabinet, he declined to reënter public life. But the churning of events in the years that followed drew him from his seclusion. A former slave holder but opposed to the extension of slavery, he was endorsed for the presidency in 1860 by those who thought a compromise candidate might avert a civil war.

As the time set for the Republican Convention at Chicago approached, Bates' campaign increasingly looked promising. He was endorsed by the Connecticut delegation. Maryland, Virginia, and New



Jersey seemed favorable. The Ohio prospect was cheering. Oregon was instructed for him. T. J. Coffey, a Pennsylvania delegate to the convention, wrote him in March that nearly half the members of that delegation favored him for the first ballot and that he was the second choice of all. In the important Indiana delegation, at least twenty of the twenty-six members were for him.

Everything turned at the convention on the question of Seward. However, the *Philadelphia Press* could inform its readers on the first day of the assembly, that "there is a strong outside pressure against Seward today. . . . Lincoln stock is on the rise but his chances are regarded as very poor. . . . The fight is generally regarded as between Seward and Bates." On the second day the *Public Ledger* of Philadelphia asserted that New England was deserting Seward. Then it added, "Judge Bates of Missouri is the strongest opponent that Seward has." But the expectation of a Seward success proved to be a myth.

The night of the second day of the convention offered little sleep to the leaders of the delegates from Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. The Bates forces worked hard to win the support of Pennsylvania and Indiana. Hearing of this the Illinois leaders delivered an attack on Bates' nativistic tendencies and declared that never would a German Republican outside of his own State vote for him. Following the advice of Governor Henry Smith Lane, the entire Indiana delegation turned to the choice of Illinois. The Pennsylvania delegation was disposed to go for Bates on the second ballot. But Governor Curtin was acting in concert with Lane. Ultimately, the Pennsylvanians were persuaded that with Indiana for Lincoln, the cause of Bates was the weaker choice. The third morning of the convention was an exciting occasion as the delegates filled the Wigwam, ready to choose the nation's standard bearer. He was already chosen.

At Lincoln's request, Bates conferred in Springfield with the President-elect on the fifteenth of December. In the course of this meeting Lincoln asked the Missourian to become his Attorney General. Not desiring the office, Bates was impressed with the approach of civil war. No longer feeling at liberty to consult his own interests he entered without hesitation the new Cabinet.

Many and varied were the opinions rendered by Attorney General Bates. However, he was meticulous in giving opinions only to the President and the heads of departments, and only in specific cases presented for their action and decision. For example, with the specie reserves in the banks in Washington including the sub-Treasury ex-

hausted in 1862, Bates advised Chase that while the treasury notes issued under various acts of Congress prior to February 25 of that year were not legal tender, under the condition of war the Constitution permitted an issue of legal tender notes. On the strength of this opinion, such a bill was enacted.

Frequent opinions were required by the President. Citing with exactness his authorities for each point, the Attorney General declared against the power of President Lincoln to create a militia bureau in the War Department. Again, he informed the Executive that it was beyond his power to annul or revoke a court martial sentence of a soldier which occurred under President Buchanan. On another occasion he restrained President Lincoln from assuming a power which he defined as belonging to the United States circuit courts. In the same vein was the President advised when he was urged by the New York Chamber of Commerce to appoint and sustain provost courts wherever the army had become established in rebellious territory. "You must not assume powers properly belonging to the civil courts," declared Bates.

It was inevitable that opinions would be called for in connection with the Negro. In September, 1862, Chase wished to know the legal status of a Negro master of a vessel in the coasting trade. Thereupon Bates rendered what has been regarded as his most important opinion. On the twenty-ninth of November, he wrote to Chase that "free men of color, if born in the United States, are citizens of the United States, and if otherwise qualified, are competent, according to the Acts of Congress, to be masters of vessels engaged in the coasting trade." He then defined American citizenship as "the accident of birth" in the United States, the "*natural-born* right" as given in the Constitution.

Two years later, the President asked him what pay, bounty, and clothing were allowed by law to Negroes in the United States military service who were free on the nineteenth of April, 1861. An appropriation act for the army called for an opinion on the issues of supplies to colored troops already in service. Shortly thereafter, came the Attorney General's opinion. The case involved was that of a Negro chaplain in a volunteer regiment of his own race. Bates declared that the colored soldiers by law were entitled to the same pay and allowances as the other soldiers in similar forces of the army. A copy of the opinion was transmitted without delay by the President to the Senate.



Scarcely had Fort Sumter fallen, when the Attorney General wrote to the most successful wrecker on the Mississippi for advice on the possibility of using steam gunboats on the inland rivers. This was James B. Eads, destined to become famous as a boat and bridge builder and as an inventor. Soon, as a result of Bates' earnest solicitation, Eads was called to Washington to give to the Cabinet his views on the practicability of altering river steamboats into gunboats. Secretary Cameron showed no interest in what he termed as "Bates' hobby." However, Bates persuaded Secretary Welles that naval jurisdiction extended to the navigable rivers as well as the outside waters. Eads agreed with Bates that Cairo should be made a base of operations on the Mississippi, with shore and floating batteries to control the Ohio River as well. Plans for such a control and a blockade of Confederate commerce were drawn and presented to Welles. They were approved by the Navy Department, but at this point Cameron asserted jurisdiction, entailing an irritating delay. However, the Attorney General rode his "hobby" so energetically that the Secretary of War began at last to coöperate. Rather significantly, the order for the construction of the first three gunboats for use on western rivers was written by the hand of Bates.

In the course of a few weeks the whole program which was to set into motion the cleavage of the Confederacy in the West was under way. Eads became the builder of the ironclads which were to be famous within two years as the Mississippi Squadron, under Foote, Farragut, and Porter. The permanent occupation of the South was rendered possible by the appearance of this navy of little gunboats. Of these, the eight which first were built by Eads "formed the backbone of the river fleet throughout the war."

As the first year of civil war drew to a close, the Cabinet became engrossed in long discussions over England's response to the seizure by Captain Wilkes of Mason and Slidell. En route to England, the British mail steamer *Trent* had been stopped by the U. S. *San Jacinto*. The ensuing arrest and removal of the two Confederate envoys to Great Britain and France became an international complication.

Feeling that grave issues of the nation hinged upon their solution of the problem, the members of the Cabinet criticised with frankness and candor Seward's drafted answer to Lord Lyons. As the nation's lawyer, Bates waived the question of legal right "upon which all Europe is against us, and also many of our own best jurists." He supported unhesitatingly Seward's acknowledgment of the technical

correctness of the British position and his consent to the release of Mason and Slidell. Pointing out to his colleagues that a war with England would give success to the rebellion, while British naval superiority would obliterate the blockade, ruin the trade of the North, and bankrupt the federal treasury, he exclaimed in concluding, "*We must not have war with England!*" Although the truth of his argument was obvious, some of the Cabinet, and the President also, yielded with exceeding reluctance to an endorsement of the letter.

By December, 1861, Bates thought the "evident lack of system and concentrated intelligence" in the handling of the army should have been corrected. Consequently, he began to press upon Lincoln the need of his asserting his powers as Commander in Chief under the law. With McClellan ill and absent from duty, it was developing that the plans of the General in Chief were not known either to the President or the Secretary of War. This state of things in the face of the war alarmed Bates greatly. He felt that the Administration should know how much of a ready army was on hand and what the generals in high command (the President's "lieutenants") were doing about it.

On the last day of the year, the situation was presented "in sorrowful plainness" by Chase in the Cabinet council, "and then, as usual," wrote Bates afterward, "we had a bald disjointed chat about it, coming to no conclusion." When several proposed a council of war, made up of major generals, in order that some one besides McClellan would be in a position to take the supreme command in the event of his continued absence, Bates objected. Informing the President that he was Commander in Chief, the Attorney General declared that he should exercise his power to order things to his liking, and avoid an injurious deference to his subordinates. Through the secretaries of War and Navy, he ought to be able to learn all that was necessary about the field organizations. However, Bates feared that he spoke in vain. To his brother-in-law, Governor H. R. Gamble of Missouri, he wrote that Lincoln was in great distress over the situation, but filled with a belief that he could not rectify it.

By the middle of March, Stanton was complaining to the Cabinet that all reports went to McClellan and none from McClellan to the Secretary of War. He and Bates seemed to agree that the General in Chief was "fumbling and plunging in confusion and darkness." Again the Attorney General urged the President "to take his constitutional position and command the commander." The upshot was that with McClellan out in the field in command of the Army of the Potomac,



all generals in charge of armies were ordered to report directly to Stanton.

A discordant factor in the organization of the Cabinet as a working unit was the tendency of Seward to let the duties of his office overlap those of his colleagues. On the sixteenth of December, 1862, there gathered a caucus of Republican senators who believed the war was not being prosecuted with sufficient vigor. A demand arose for the head of Seward. On the following day, Seward resigned. For hours that night the subject was discussed by a senatorial committee and the Cabinet. Ultimately the attack from the Senate was turned and Seward was retained by the President. Interesting and unwitting assistance to this end came from one source of the whole trouble—Chase.

Parallel with this problem ran that of emancipation. After much Cabinet discussion the Proclamation was issued on the first of January, 1863. However, in the minds of the Cabinet, the problem of emancipation soon gave way to that of West Virginia. Of the secretaries recently assailed by the "extreme Senators," Bates wrote in December that "they keep their places, but come up manfully to the *extreme* measures of their assailants. The chief one is the bill for the formation and admission of *West Virginia*." He had in thought, not only Seward but Stanton. Then he added, "I think they (including also Chase) have bought their peace with the *extremists* by supporting that monstrous bill. . . ."

Disregarding all arguments on unconstitutionality or for the "restored government" of Virginia, the friends of the new State pushed through Congress a bill for its admission into the Union. Under the power of Congress granted by the "laws of war," they asserted, West Virginia could be admitted. The matter was discussed in the Cabinet. At the instance of the Attorney General, the President asked each to prepare an opinion in writing, on the constitutionality and the expediency of the act. Meeting again on December thirtieth, the opinions were read aloud and presented to the President. He also contributed a paper on the subject. A thorough discussion followed. Seward, Chase, and Stanton favored the admission of the State. Welles, Blair, and Bates were opposed. Smith was not present, having resigned. In his opinion the Attorney General went far beyond the others in an analysis of the whole problem. With the Cabinet evenly divided on the question, Lincoln decided in favor of signing the bill.

The Merryman case of 1861 led to an official opinion from Bates at the request of the President on the subject of executive suspension

of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*. In bold fashion did the Attorney General depart from existing views that executive suspension was a lawful exercise of military power, or an incident of martial law in time of military need. He classified the President's power as *civil*, and as exercised in the civil duties of his office. Said he, "The President is a *civil magistrate* and not a *military chief*." Hence, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* was not a violation of the courts. It was a civil action to prevent sedition and insurrection from using the writ "as part of their enginery to overthrow the Government." This he wrote to a friend.

Bates had endorsed the right of the nation's chief magistrate to set aside the civil rights of the people and save the State. But the "hot haste" of radical "patriots" to have everything "done by military power" was most repugnant to him. "If these men have their way a little longer, there will be nothing left of law," he declared in February, 1864.

On the twenty-fifth of May he addressed a significant letter to General Lewis Wallace, Commander of the Middle Department, with headquarters at Baltimore. "Complaint has been made to me . . . of an order of yours. . . . That order . . . assumes a very large power over persons, contracts, and property, purely *civil* and over which the military has no lawful authority. . . ." Bates then emphasized his approval of the exercise of extraordinary powers as a "military necessity." He added, "Yet, few men will consent, as a matter of convenience or expediency . . . that the military shall dispose of civil rights without law." Then he called the attention of General Wallace to the fact that the confiscation acts of Congress required such "proceedings to be *judicial* and in the courts." He concluded with ominous brevity. "The President has, long ago, by special orders, charged the Attorney General with the superintendence and direction of all such proceedings. . . . This letter is written . . . after conversation with the President, and with his knowledge and permission. . . ."

General Wallace replied that his order would stand as published. Accordingly, Bates presented the situation to Lincoln, pointing out the utter illegality of the procedure adopted by the Department Commander. With quiet emphasis he spoke to the President: "I must and will protect my office and myself, and to that end, if General Wallace's proceeding be not stopped, I will leave of record in the office, my solemn protest against the military usurpation." At this point, the President issued directions to the Secretary of War to revoke the



action of General Wallace. With ill grace Stanton performed the task. But the order issued at Baltimore was never withdrawn by public statement, although it no longer was exercised.

Hardly was this victory achieved when the Attorney General was plunged into a bitter struggle with General Benjamin F. Butler over the despotic interference of that commander with civil government in Norfolk. At this time he recorded: "I have heretofore forbore too much, to avoid a conflict of jurisdictions, but it only makes the military usurpers more bold and insolent. Hereafter, in open, gross cases, I will press the matter *to issue*."

Having secured all available information, the Attorney General wrote a long letter of protest to the President regarding Butler's arbitrary action. This was on the eleventh of July. By the sixteenth he was becoming discouraged over not receiving an answer from Lincoln. But on the nineteenth the matter was presented to the Cabinet. Stanton and Fessenden supported Bates. Seward thought it was a question of military necessity. Welles seemed to sympathize with the friends of civil administration in Norfolk who had refrained from voting against the military. All were agreed that the Alexandria government was fully recognized by the Government of the United States. Bates wrote afterward: "I think the President can't get over revoking the orders, but I fear reluctantly and ungracefully."

A few days afterward, the Attorney General and President Lincoln discussed at length the Norfolk situation. Lincoln admitted that his continued inactivity in the matter was due to the fear that if he revoked the troublesome orders, Butler would "raise a hubbub about it." Thereupon, Bates reminded him that the nature of the affair was such that to ignore it indicated an approval and sanction of it. Inside of a month a request from General Grant led to the prompt removal of Butler. One of the reasons offered by the commanding general was to the effect that Butler's administration of the affairs of his department was objectionable.

Upon the reelection of Lincoln, Bates, faced with a recurring illness, prepared to resign. He felt that the President now would be "a freer and bolder man." As for himself, the elevation of Chase to the Supreme Court as Chief Justice had closed the door to the only office which held forth any attraction to him in his advancing age. Offered by President Lincoln a vacant judgeship in Missouri, he refused it. On the thirtieth of November he retired for the last time from public office at the interesting age of seventy-two.

He returned to Missouri to find his State embroiled in the turmoil of reconstruction. Too ill to resist actively the hated Radicals, he fought their excesses in long newspaper letters to the people. A new oath for voting which disqualified all who had taken part in or sympathized with the rebellion in any of its phases, he boldly classified as unconstitutional. He urged all who had not borne arms against the Union to "swear and vote." During the heat of the struggle he passed away.

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The bulk of the source material utilized in making this study was found in the unpublished separate collections of the private papers, correspondence, and occasional diaries of some thirty prominent Missourians of the period, 1800-1870. These manuscripts are assembled in the Jefferson Memorial archives of the Missouri Historical Society in St. Louis. Of inestimable value were the extensive papers of Edward Bates and of his brother-in-law and law partner and provisional Civil War Governor of Missouri, Hamilton Rowan Gamble. Hardly less helpful for specific periods were the collections of Frederic Bates, David Barton, James O. Broadhead, and James B. Eades. The contemporary issues of the *Missouri Democrat* and the *Missouri Republican* contributed at times much political material.

Especially valuable was the Edward Bates Journal of the period (1859-1866), owned by Miss Helen Nicolay and deposited in the Library of Congress at Washington. Among many federal and state documents consulted, most useful were the Attorney General's papers of the Civil War period, in the Department of Justice at Washington, and the *Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States*, X, XI, edited by J. Hubley Ashton. From a variety of other printed primary materials used, the papers, memoirs, and diaries of congressmen and cabinet members were notably helpful, especially the diaries of Orville H. Browning, Gideon Welles, and Salmon P. Chase. Finally, reliable secondary works were used frequently in filling in the picture of the long career of Edward Bates.



## THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN NEW ZEALAND\*

By JOHN ALDEN GREENLEE

Students of the constitutional history of the British Empire have held that responsible government was either the gracious gift of the Home Government or the fruit of a victory over a tyrannical Mother-country. Applied to New Zealand, both interpretations are valid. Less attention has been given to the evolution of this form of self-government in the Antipodes than in other parts of the Empire. In New Zealand, one of the last of the British colonies in which complete responsible government was realized, nineteenth-century imperial devolution can be studied to a considerable advantage.

Although in 1769 New Zealand had been claimed for the British Crown by Captain James Cook, it was not formally annexed until 1840. During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the archipelago was frequented by whalers who established bases for their activities. Traders soon located in the islands to supply the needs of whalers and to barter with the natives. The native Maoris were hardy descendants of earlier Polynesian invaders. Far superior in intelligence to the American Indians, they were formidable in battle. Missionaries learned of the region with interest, for they believed that among a superior native race in such an isolated location, could be built the utopia of their dreams. These earnest souls hoped to carry out a social program among the Maoris which would redeem Christianity from the charge that it proselyted only to enslave its converts. Roman Catholic priests came to the Antipodes and were suspected of being the emissaries of the French Government, which had renewed the interest manifest by Napoleon in this region. Anglican and Wesleyan missionaries came out from the British Isles well financed by those who sympathized with the Evangelical movement at Home.

In 1833 the British Government sent James Busby to be Resident Magistrate in the Bay of Islands, near the present site of Auckland. The appointment of such a magistrate in savage lands constituted a

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor W. Ross Livingston.

denial of British sovereignty over such regions according to international law. Busby was instructed to maintain a semblance of order among the British traders frequenting New Zealand. But with no armed force to make his decisions effective, he was popularly known as the "ship-of-war without guns." The Colonial Office under Charles Grant, Lord Glenelg, and Constantine Henry Phipps, first Marquis of Normanby, in obedience to the wishes of the missionaries interested in New Zealand, refused to permit any colonizing companies to make settlements in the archipelago. In May, 1839, the New Zealand Company under the "Governorship" of John George Lambton, Earl of Durham, determined to force the hand of the Government. They sent a shipload of colonists to the islands contrary to the specific orders of the Colonial Office.

The British Government immediately dispatched Captain William Hobson, R. N., with instructions to establish the sovereignty of the Crown over New Zealand. This he accomplished by assembling many important Maori chiefs at the Bay of Islands and by persuading them to cede their sovereign rights to the British Crown in return for its protection. The Protestant missionaries had primed their native converts so that they acceded to the plan with little hesitation by signing the Treaty of Waitangi on February 6, 1840. This treaty, the basis of British control in New Zealand, proclaimed in clear language that the Maoris submitted to the Queen's authority in return for a guarantee of their property rights in the land. And, that if at any time they desired to sell land, the Crown should have the first right of purchase at a fair price.

On November 16, 1840, Personal Government was established in New Zealand by Letters-Patent under the authority of an Act of Parliament (3/4 Victoria, cap. 62) which formally erected the Islands of New Zealand into a separate dependency and provided for its government in the second lowest grade of Crown Colony. For over a decade the Government consisted only of the Governor and his Legislative Council. He was appointed by the Crown as were his advisers whom he nominated. The Legislative Council included the three executive officers—The Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, and the Colonial Treasurer—and the three senior Justices of the Peace. No business could be considered by this unicameral legislature until it had been introduced by the Governor who was its presiding officer. Under the Circular Despatch issued by the Colonial Office on October 16, 1839, all members of the Legislative Council were subject to sus-



pension at the discretion of the Governor and to dismissal at the concurrence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Thus the will of the Governor, as tempered by the advice of these officials, became the law of the land within the limits prescribed by Instructions from Home.

New Zealand proved to be a troublesome colony because of the land hunger of the settlers and the complicated process of purchasing land. Governor Robert Fitzroy catered to the demands of the settlers and alienated Native land without fair examination of titles, with the result that the Maoris were soon in active revolt. Governor George Grey restored order by vigorous campaigns, but won the affection and trust of the Maoris by his just dealings in land questions. Hardly had he quelled the rebellion when a despatch from William Ewart Gladstone, Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Peel Ministry, informed him that the Home Government intended that the New Zealanders "... should undertake, as early and with as little exception as may be, the administration of their own affairs."

Before Governor Grey could formulate and send Home his reactions to this surprising proposal, the Russell Administration had drafted a measure enabling Earl Henry George Grey, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to draw up a constitution for New Zealand. This enabling Act, (9/10, Victoria, cap. 103) was rushed through Parliament in a fortnight without critical comment or alteration from either Opposition or Government benches, and received the Royal Assent on August 28, 1846. In planning the government under authorization of Parliament, Earl Grey recognized the distinctive features of the New Zealand environment. Because of the great distances separating the scattered European settlements, he favored the establishment of two legislative bodies, one at Auckland and the other at Wellington. To mitigate the inconveniences which might arise from two parliaments working along unrelated lines, he planned to delegate members from each to a central legislature where a permanent policy for the whole colony could be worked out under the guidance of a governor-in-chief. The varied character of the settlers, who had come from all strata of English society, led Earl Grey to return to the usage of the old colonial system in outlining the proposed New Zealand government. Instead of allowing the nominees of the Crown and the representatives of the people to meet together in a single chamber, he decided to set up a nominee council and an elective assembly after the precedent of Barbados, Jamaica, and the earlier North American colonies. In isolated settlements the voters were to elect the mayor and council to carry

on the local government. The provincial assemblies were to be chosen by the borough councils on the basis of proportional representation. These houses were to choose from their own membership delegates to the central assembly. The governor-in-chief was to appoint in each province the governor as well as the nominee council from which he should select the members of the central council. Thus in an indirect form, the English institutions of Crown, Lords, Commons, and Boroughs were to be extended to New Zealand.

When Governor Grey received the Charter of 1846, he was concluding a skirmish with the Maoris in Wanganui. "Amidst the flashing of muskets," he read the despatch which was to strip him of his personal powers. Finding that the entire control of Native Affairs was to be placed in the hands of the central legislature, he determined to suspend the Constitution until ordered by the Home Government to bring it into force. On May 13, 1847, he wrote Earl Grey advocating the suspension of the Charter of 1846 for five years. He asserted his principal objection to representative government was that it would place at the disposal of a minority of the population the revenue and rights of the vast majority of their fellow subjects. Earl Grey magnanimously accepted the Governor's decision and requested suggestions for a second and better constitution. On March 7, 1848, the Royal sanction was given to an Act of Parliament suspending the New Zealand Constitution for five years.

When he sent out the Suspending Act, Earl Grey set forth the basic condition to be fulfilled by any colony before representative institutions would be conferred. The dependency must be able to defray completely the expenses of its own government. As long as the Home Government was contributing sums towards such expenditures, it would continue to control the administration. At the same time, he urged Governor Grey to indicate the form of government he deemed best adapted to the needs of New Zealand.

Governor Grey complied with this request by drawing up several draft constitutions. The legal basis for the New Zealand Constitution was enacted by his Legislative Council, the Provincial Councils Ordinance of 1851. In August, 1851, he sent his final plan to Earl Grey. He proposed to maintain the municipal institutions, but to consolidate their influence in provincial governments to be presided over by elected officials. He designed the constitution so that the colonists would bestow their greatest energies on local government. Thus the central legislature was to be a popular body, but its liberal bent was



compromised by an upper house indirectly elected by the local legislatures, and by the regulation that it should assemble at infrequent intervals. Although Governor Grey later became an ardent advocate of federalism, he based his constitution on municipal governments with purely local powers.

Governor Grey had been careful to reserve to the chief executive of the colony, the post which he expected to fill, all the real power of government. Not only was the Governor-in-Chief to appropriate most of the colonial revenue, but as the representative of the Crown, he was also to have charge of Native Affairs and of the sale of waste-lands. While the Governor seemed to defer to popular influences, in reality he planned to maintain not only his own power but also that of the Colonial Office.

In February, 1852, Earl Grey drew up a counter-draft of the proposed constitution and formulated instructions which illustrated the general principles upon which his colonial policy was founded. He adhered to the same organization he had planned in 1846, insisting on provincial and central governments with bicameral legislatures in which the upper houses were to be nominated by the Governor-in-Chief. He rejected Governor Grey's plan for elective provincial executives by stating that no precedent for an elective executive existed anywhere in the British Constitution. He stated that all executive authority excepting merely municipal powers, ". . . must emanate from the Crown." In the matter of control over finance, sale of lands, and Native Affairs, he agreed with Governor Grey that the Home authorities should deal with them exclusively. Thus Earl Grey believed that it was practicable to endow the colonies with representative institutions and then to stop without giving responsible government. He proposed to get the consent of an elective assembly for money bills, but to deny them the right of administering the expenditure of such funds. He was convinced that his proposals embodied the most advanced interpretation of the principles of British self-government. He failed to see that they resembled more the deadlocked constitution under the early Stuarts which had produced so much anarchy and civil strife.

During this period there was a strong movement substantially represented in the House of Commons favoring self-government for the colonies as a prelude to eventual independence. With the abandonment of the economic policy of protection and the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Navigation Laws in the forties, the old mercantilist system was destroyed, and men in public life began to take stock of their

attitudes toward dependencies. Although under the old Empire, colonies had been considered the chattels of English industry and commerce, there had been a fairly clearcut recognition of the mutual duties and obligations of each part of the system. The free trade theory fostered by Adam Smith carried with it the abandonment of protectionism which freed England of the necessity of maintaining the older mercantilist Empire. It obliged her to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest markets, regardless of location, and *ipso facto* did away with the older justification of colonies as valuable because their trade was beneficial to the Mother-country. Richard Cobden and John Bright, the founders and leaders of the Manchester School of industrialists which stood for the new free trade conception of commerce could no longer justify the continuance of the political connection between the colonies and England when it had ceased to be profitable. It was but a short step, soon taken by the Cobdenites, to the contention that colonies were encumbrances and should be cast off as rapidly as possible, still retaining the good will which would ensure a profitable trade relationship.

Another group interested in the question of colonial reform was composed of disciples of the tradition founded by Lord Durham, the Earl of Elgin, Charles Buller, and Gibbon Wakefield. They believed in the value of the imperial connection and did not share the opinion that colonies were encumbrances destined ultimately to separate themselves from the Mother-country.

Between the two groups—the champions of free trade and the Colonial Reformers—there was considerable common ground. It was agreed that government of the colonies from Downing Street was expensive, inefficient, and despotic; expensive, for the colonies made no direct return commensurate with the large expenditures on their behalf by the British Treasury; inefficient, because the government of forty dependencies of varying needs, customs, and situations, was left to a single understaffed department; and despotic, for it was a bureaucracy in which contemporaries believed despotism to be inherent and unavoidable. There was no general agreement, however, on the question whether or not the colonies were eventually to separate from England. It was agreed that responsible government was the best solution for colonial problems, although whether the best way to hold the colonies or the way to let them go in peace, was not certain. But on one point there was almost universal agreement in and out of Parliament: England could no longer be expected to bear unaided



the expenses of local defense in the colonies. Sir William Molesworth, Charles Bowyer Adderley, William Ewart Gladstone, Sir Robert Peel, Sir James Robert George Graham, and Richard Cobden continually preached that in proportion as colonies were self-governed they were governed economically.

In spite of a fundamental difference in viewpoint regarding the future of the Empire, the Free-Traders and the Colonial Reformers coöperated even more closely than in the informal workings of parliamentary committees. In December, 1849, the Colonial Reform Society was organized in London. In its first public statement, the Society announced that the British North American colonies, the South African colonies, the Australian colonies, Van Dieman's Land, and New Zealand were entitled to self-government in the management of their own affairs. As the strategy best designed to effect its ends, the Society adopted a fourfold program, which included getting in touch with the colonies, inviting the appointment of an agent in London by each colony, weekly meetings during the sessions of Parliament, and the passage or blocking of colonial Bills agreed on during the weekly meetings.

With the first of the "Canterbury Pilgrims," the Colonial Reformers sent John Robert Godley to New Zealand as their representative. He assisted the colonists interested in the New Zealand Company to organize the Wellington Settlers' Constitutional Society. This Society held its first public meeting in December, 1848, and immediately began to organize similar groups in each of the European settlements. After the formation of the Colonial Reform Society in London, the Settlers' Constitutional Societies of New Zealand appointed Adderley and Molesworth their agents and sent them copies of all their proceedings. These groups met regularly to consider the future governance of the colony, and informed one another of their deliberations by means of Committees of Correspondence. It was not uncommon for as many as five hundred adults to assemble for twelve hours to discuss and adopt resolutions bearing on the administration of Governor Grey and the new constitution which he was drafting. The colonists besieged the Colonial Office with a continual stream of resolutions. They sent William Fox as their personal representative to discuss with Earl Grey their future governance. He was never given the courtesy of an interview, although he was permitted to send a long memorandum setting forth his views. Fox was welcomed by members of Parliament and by the Colonial Reform Society so that in the end his mission was successful.

From December, 1850, to February, 1851, the Settlers' Constitutional Societies adopted draft constitutions and forwarded them to the Colonial Office. On all main points they were in close agreement. They desired a strong central executive responsible to a popularly elected legislature. They advocated founding local government on municipal institutions and abandoning the provincial council system proposed by the Governor. In the colonial parliament, both houses were to be elected by manhood suffrage from which Maoris were to be excluded. Nomineeism was to be abolished. The Societies agreed that the government should be carried on by means of a ministry responsible to parliament. All money bills were to originate in the lower house, and parliament was to have power to legislate regarding wastelands, organization of local government, and to be absolute on all matters except the Crown's Prerogative and imperial interests. The Crown was to have control only over foreign policy, coinage, and military and naval affairs. The settlers maintained that they were asking primarily for an extension to New Zealand of the rights and privileges enjoyed by their fellow subjects in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.

The problem of granting self-government to New Zealand was, therefore, complicated by four interested parties: the colonists, who insisted on securing complete control over all their internal affairs; the Governor and Colonial Office, who were equally determined to guard their personal powers; the Colonial Reformers at Home, who were anxious to preserve the imperial tie; and the Free-Traders, who were concerned with expanding trade and reducing the costs of government to the English tax-payer. At the time the New Zealand Bill of 1852 came to the attention of Parliament, it is no exaggeration to describe the situation as one in which utilitarian motives ranked high. The realization by all parties that the drain on the English tax-payer's purse could be lightened materially by making the colonies responsible for their own internal expenses, made the passage of the Constitution Act much simpler.

The Bill drawn up by the Russell Ministry was taken over by the Derby Administration and enacted with few major changes. The colony was divided into six Provinces, each of which was to be governed by a Superintendent and Council elected by the direct vote of all adult European and Maori men who possessed freeholds or leaseholds worth ten pounds sterling annually. These bodies were to make all regula-



tions necessary for local self-government and in time, it was believed, would become purely municipal institutions.

The central government was to consist of a General Assembly composed of the three ancient estates: a Governor-in-Chief, a nominated Legislative Council, and an elected House of Representatives. The Legislative Council was to be nominated by the Crown for life. The House of Representatives was to be elected by voters on the same franchise as the Provincial Councils, except that the Maoris were to be excluded from voting. The General Assembly was to manage the Crown and wastelands of the colony from the sale of which they were obligated to pay the debts of the New Zealand Company. The Acts of the General Assembly were to take precedence over those of the Provincial Councils even when contradictory in provisions. A Civil List of 12,000 pounds annually was to be reserved from the New Zealand revenues, from which were to be paid the salaries of the Governor-in-Chief and the Judges, and the other expenses of the administrative establishment. To the Crown in the person of the Governor was to be reserved full control and discretion over Native Affairs. For this purpose the sum of 7,000 pounds annually was to be reserved to be expended by the Governor-in-Chief at his discretion. Because the Colonial Office regarded this Constitution as "experimental," it was provided that the New Zealand Parliament with the sanction of the Crown could alter it in any manner desired, provided the British Parliament agreed.

After spirited debates in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the "Act for the better governing of the Colony of New Zealand" received the Royal Assent on June 30, 1852. It was one of the most liberal expositions of colonial policy enunciated by the British Government up to this time. For the first time, colonists were given control of their own wastelands, and incidentally the power of altering their Constitution with the consent of the Crown and Parliament. So general was the praise of the Constitution as the means of recapturing the older Eighteenth Century plan of colonial governance, that it was overlooked that the colonists lacked complete control of all their internal affairs and of all their internal revenues. Contemporaries believed that it was not only a workable and rational plan of government, but in addition was the expression of the most advanced ideas of colonial administration.

The new form of government was placed in operation in New Zealand on January 17, 1853. Governor Grey provided for the establish-

ment of the Provincial Governments, convened them, and left the colony for a furlough which was prolonged to a permanent appointment as Governor of Cape Colony. The Officer Administering the Government of New Zealand, Colonel Robert H. Wynward, called the first session of Parliament on May 24, 1854. After the first meetings, it was realized that the Constitution of 1852 was defective in that it provided no means of communication between the Governor and the General Assembly. The administration of the colony was in the hands of nominees of the Governor who formed the "Executive Council" and served as his constitutional advisers. These officials occupied the same position in relation to the Governor as the Ministers responsible to Parliament occupied in relation to the Queen at Home. Thus, while the New Zealand House had some power in appropriating money, it was unable to obtain any statistics on which to base its calculations except the Supply Bills forwarded by the Governor. The members of the House of Representatives compared their position to that of the House of Commons before the Puritan Revolution, and under William and Mary in 1688.

On June 2, 1854, Gibbon Wakefield presented to the House a motion for the establishment of responsible government. The motion declared that the General Government could best control the Provinces and keep the confidence of the people by " . . . the establishment of Ministerial responsibility in the conduct of the legislative and executive proceedings by the Governor." The motion was thoroughly debated and finally adopted by a two-thirds majority on June 5, 1854. It was soon presented to the Acting-Governor in an Address, to which he returned a cordial agreement. He indicated his intention of establishing as an expediency, a provisional form of Ministerial responsibility and the General Assembly adjourned for a week to facilitate the inauguration of the changes in the Administration.

During his speech supporting this motion, Gibbon Wakefield had suggested a form of Ministerial responsibility which he believed would be practicable for the time being. The House would pass a Pension Bill, giving life allowances to the Crown officials holding the administrative posts of the colony. After the passage of the Bill, the nominee officials would resign, and the Acting-Governor would be free to call members possessing the confidence of the House to his Executive Council. These members would then take up the customary administrative and legislative duties of Ministers. But Wakefield knew that this process would be delayed for a year because the Pension Bill and



the resignations would have to be submitted to the Home Government for allowance. As a temporary measure, to meet the needs of the moment, he proposed that the Executive Council be enlarged by the addition of as many members of the General Assembly as there were nominee Advisers.

Wakefield's plan was known to Acting-Governor Wynyard who submitted it to the Attorney-General for his opinion, which was favorable. The Acting-Governor and his Advisers realized that the General Assembly would refuse to do business unless its demands were met at least half-way. Knowing that a failure to pass the fiscal Bill would increase the already over-balanced powers given to the Provincial Governments, they determined to adopt the provisional form of Ministerial responsibility while waiting for Instructions from Home. It was therefore agreed between Colonel Wynyard and the House that he would add to his Executive Council four members of the General Assembly. This would give the legislature a majority in the Executive Council, and the Governor ordinarily would be bound to follow their advice. The House agreed to accept the provisional form, allowing the nominee officials to retain their administrative posts, thereby leaving no executive duties to the responsible majority in the Executive Council. Meanwhile the members from the House were to carry on the business of the Government in the General Assembly and to see that a Pension Bill was passed. When such legislation had been sanctioned by the Home Government, responsible government would be placed in operation.

On June fifteenth, in the House, James Edward FitzGerald, Henry Sewell, and Frederick A. Weld made their appearance as "Ministers" by delivering Ministerial statements. On the spur of the moment, Gibbon Wakefield taunted these men because they had no executive duties, and said, that although suggested by him, the provisional system was not responsible government. But he announced his support of the program. Wakefield was correct, the system was not responsible government, but it was characteristic of the man that within a month he had reversed his stand and publicly proclaimed the experiment as one in which responsible government was fully operating. Bills were presented by the "Ministers" and passed through the various preliminary stages, and the Pension Bill was also introduced. The agreement seemed to be accepted by all factions, and legislation was progressing satisfactorily, when on the first of August, the legislative

Advisers of the Governor demanded the immediate completion of a responsible ministry.

The "Ministers" insisted that the Governor had bound himself to introduce the complete form of self-government ". . . *When the public service should require it.*" They believed they could not leave the powers of administration in the hands of the nominee officials during the recess of the Assembly. The Acting-Governor insisted that he had not promised to introduce any more than the provisional form of responsible government until he had heard from Home which would take at least a year. Because Colonel Wynyard refused to accept the advice of the responsible majority of his Advisers, they resigned, even though supported by the House.

Acting-Governor Wynyard and the irresponsible nominee Advisers called to their counsel Gibbon Wakefield, the leader of the minority in the House. He advised trying to gather together a new "Ministry" and as a last resort, proroguing the Assembly should it refuse to do business. After disorderly scenes, the House refused to accept the plan, and the Acting-Governor was forced to prorogue the General Assembly for a fortnight. But not before the House had expressed its abhorrence of Gibbon Wakefield's unconstitutional conduct during the controversy.

When the General Assembly reconvened on the last day of August, 1854, it was met by a promiscuous "Ministry" gotten together by Gibbon Wakefield and the Acting-Governor. This "Ministry" was constructed on the theory that each Province should be represented. The House immediately expressed its complete lack of confidence in such an executive, which resigned after holding office for only three days. The General Assembly then directed the Acting-Governor to submit the legislation necessary for the country. He "reluctantly" complied with these demands, and during the next fortnight, many beneficial laws were passed.

At Home, the Colonial Office had been converted to the view that the Empire was disintegrating, which would relieve the Mother-country of the burden of taxation assumed in behalf of the colonies. In ridding themselves of this burden, the British Parliament was determined to proceed so as to retain the advantages of colonial trade. When the request of the New Zealand Parliament was brought to the attention of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he had no hesitation in directing Acting-Governor Wynyard on December 8, 1854, to estab-



lish immediate responsible government in New Zealand. The nominee executive officers were to be pensioned and then replaced by Ministers selected from the General Assembly.

The third Session of the First Parliament in August, 1855, passed the Appropriation Act for that year, and provided for the election of a Legislature to inaugurate responsible government. The second New Zealand Parliament fulfilled the final requirement of the Home authorities by passing the Pension Bill on April 15, 1856. A lack of party division caused the formation of three Ministries in the short space of three months before a stable government was finally placed in power. Although many writers have asserted that New Zealand enjoyed complete responsible government after the creation of the first Ministry in 1856, they have mistaken the form for the substance. In 1856, by the practice of Ministerial responsibility, the General Assembly controlled the Executive in all of the internal affairs of the colony with the all-important exception of Native Affairs. The machinery of responsible government was established in 1856, but it was not complete for it did not involve direction of all internal affairs by the General Assembly, including the control of troops needed to enforce authority among the Maoris.

Following 1856, there was no clearly defined line to indicate the place where the Governor's responsibility ended and where that of the Ministers began. The Governor might claim absolute control over Native Affairs in the name of the Crown, but he was completely dependent on the Legislature for money to carry out his program. Thus, it came about naturally that the Governor consulted his Ministers and rarely took any course of action toward the Maoris contrary to their advice. In 1860, a Maori War lasting over a decade was begun by the Governor, Sir Thomas Gore Browne. Upon the advice of the Ministry, he determined to enforce a decision to purchase a block of land in the disaffected area of Waitara. Although the Home Government quickly replaced him as Governor by the appointment of Sir George Grey, the local authorities never tried to dodge responsibility for the war.

Governor Grey suggested a peaceful program toward the Natives, and for a time was successful in arranging a truce with the hostile groups. He proposed the formal coöperation of the Governor and the Ministry in handling Native Affairs. A responsible Minister was placed in complete control of the Native Department, and it was agreed that the Home Government should pay its costs. Although the arrange-

ment with the House was provisional, it was immediately endorsed by the Home Government on May 26, 1862. This despatch from Henry Pelham Fiennes Pelham Clinton, fifth Duke of Newcastle-under-Lyme, hinted that for the sake of economy the Imperial forces would soon be withdrawn from the colony. This intimation caused the General Assembly to view with alarm its responsibilities. On August 19, 1862, the House of Representatives passed resolutions refusing to accept complete responsibility for Native Affairs. When this decision was communicated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he replied on February 26, 1863, with a scathing despatch declaring that the arrangement had been sanctioned by the Home Government and, therefore, was not open to reconsideration. On November 6, 1863, the House passed resolutions stating that it " . . . cheerfully accepts the responsibility thus placed upon the colonists."

Following November, 1863, political chaos prevailed in New Zealand. Although the General Assembly had agreed to accept the responsibility for controlling Native Affairs, the Imperial Government furnished the troops and carried on the war which had broken out in Waikato. A devastating quibble over the right to direct field operations had developed between the Governor and the General-in-Command. As a result, a handful of Maoris had kept at bay a force three or four times their size. Since it was paying for the desultory war, the General Assembly determined to expedite matters by taking complete control. Therefore, the Home Government was requested by the Weld Ministry to withdraw the Imperial troops.

On November 30, 1864, the House adopted Resolutions enunciating the "Weld Self-Reliant Policy" which demanded the recall of Imperial troops and the completion of the Maori War with colonial forces at local expense. Early in 1865, the Home Government received the intelligence of these proceedings with enthusiasm. Many members of Parliament as well as other public men believed that the New Zealanders had been taking advantage of British resources for their sordid schemes of gaining more land. The Colonial Office had planned as early as 1860 to withdraw the troops, because they believed that when the settlers were faced with the consequences of their own actions, the trouble in New Zealand would be settled quickly. On September 23, 1865, the Home Government ordered the immediate withdrawal of the five regiments in the colony. Two months later the order was modified to permit one regiment to remain until the transfer of supplies had been completed.



Again the House of Representatives was in an uproar. It hesitated to take full responsibility for restoring order, and the Weld Ministry fell in an attempt to support its policy. But colonial forces were successful in the field, the war again ceased temporarily, and in 1867, the House seemed willing to accept its task. However, in 1868 the fanatic Hau-haus escaped from their prison isle and the war broke out again. The House petitioned London frantically to permit the last regiment to remain a short time longer, but the Colonial and War Offices had already made arrangements to withdraw it. By the first of August, 1869, the last of the Imperial troops had left New Zealand. Although protesting loudly, the Assembly shouldered the obligations and privileges of complete responsible government.

With the departure of the troops, New Zealand had attained by means of Ministerial responsibility full control of the executive government in all internal affairs, and responsible government came into full operation. The feeling of bitter disappointment aroused by the British Parliament's granting and enforcing the "Weld Self-Reliant Policy" soon declined. Soon afterward the New Zealanders began a campaign to establish an imperial unity which has finally culminated in a commonwealth relationship among the several self-governing British nations.

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This study has been based primarily upon official documents. The *Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand* for each of the years from 1854 to 1888 has been utilized carefully in this constitutional study. This collection includes the despatches with their multitudinous enclosures between the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and the several Governors of New Zealand. Papers A-3 and A-3A in the first volume for 1883 include the pertinent documents regarding the establishment of representative institutions. The *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* from 1854 to 1870 are useful particularly for the study of the growth of responsible government from the colonial viewpoint. The *British Parliamentary Papers* for the period 1840 to 1870 contain material bearing not only on the early history of the colony, but on the development of both representative institutions and responsible government. There are many duplications in the *British Papers* and the *New Zealand Appendices* as well as many individual memoranda. The *British Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), Third Series, were used freely to gain the colonial views of members of Parliament during this period. The issuance of various govern-

mental rulings and papers was substantiated by consulting *The London Gazette*, the official publication of the British Government.

Particular attention was paid to accounts of events written by individuals who participated. Earl Grey's apologia, *The Colonial Policy of Lord J. Russell's Administration*, and C. B. Adderley's *Review of it*, furnished abundant material bearing on two different views of colonial policy during this period. William Gisborne's impartial account of his contemporaries, *New Zealand Rulers and Statesmen from 1840 to 1897*, was especially valuable. Likewise, Sir George Grey's memoirs dictated to his secretary, J. Milne, *Romance of a Pro-consul*, was important. Of considerable value also were the pamphlets written in 1869 and 1870 and published in London by Henry Sewell, *The Case of New Zealand*, and Frederick A. Weld, *Notes on New Zealand Affairs*. The anonymous articles by British and Colonial statesmen published during the period in the *London Times*, *Spectator*, *Edinburgh Review*, and the *Quarterly Review* were also found useful.

The principal modern accounts of British colonial policy during the nineteenth century were used in the study of this topic. Of these, the works of three New Zealanders, J. C. Beaglehole, *Captain Hobson and the New Zealand Company*, J. S. Marais, *The Colonisation of New Zealand*, and A. J. Harrop, *England and New Zealand*, were most valuable for background and orientation.



## THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW AMERICAN COLONIAL POLICY, 1898-1902\*

By EVERETT WHITFIELD THORNTON

The territorial expansion of the United States to the middle of the nineteenth century rested on the principle that new territory should be held in trust for the inhabitants until they should form a state and enter the Union on equality with other states. It was expected that new lands would be occupied by American pioneers, who would introduce the social and political institutions of the older states. According to the theory the inhabitants were not to be treated as subject peoples nor were the territories to be considered as dependent possessions. But with the purchase of Alaska in 1867 the first divergence from this principle occurred, as shown by the treaty of annexation. All previous treaties annexing territory had provided for ultimate incorporation into the Union and American citizenship for the inhabitants; the Alaskan treaty omitted reference to incorporation but it did grant American citizenship to the people of the territory. The annexation of Hawaii was made without any statement regarding the future status of either land or people, during the war with Spain in 1898. The close of the war saw the future addition of over-seas territory, Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands, with over 10,000,000 inhabitants foreign to the United States in race, language and customs. It was impossible, therefore, to consider these new acquisitions as territories in the traditional sense and it was proposed that they be held as dependent possessions. This meant the transformation of the republic into an empire. The colonial policy which resulted was not that of modern European imperialism, but an entirely new policy of empire, distinctly American in principle. It developed out of the clash of opinion between the advocates of strict imperialism and those who adhered to the belief that under the Constitution there was no room for dependent possessions.

The United States, actuated by the same influences then operating in Europe, had been moving in the direction of imperialism for a decade

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor W. Ross Livingston.

before the war. The economic development after 1865, together with the disappearance of a growing West, had made the United States an exporting nation in search of markets abroad. American foreign policy after the middle eighties yielded to the needs of business and commercial interests in the regions of the Pacific. But American imperialism was restrained by the influence of traditions, by the policy of isolation, and by the belief that there was no place in the American system for subject peoples.

The war with Spain ignited some of these traditions and released a somewhat latent imperialism into vigorous action. The spring and summer of 1898 saw the movement at its peak, as part of a wave of patriotic sentiment which swept over the country. The rise of the United States as a world power kindled the national imagination. An enthusiastic press declared that Providence had placed the Philippines in the path of American destiny and that the United States must take its place among the great nations of the world. There was talk about new responsibilities, the end of isolation, and national duty. New needs of American commerce and business were suddenly recognized; it was discovered in particular that the Philippine Islands occupied a strategic position in relation to the trade with China. The lines of Bishop Berkeley, "Westward the Course of Empire takes its way," were recalled, and were re-interpreted as a new revelation of the Divine will in the affairs of men. The few voices raised at this time against the dangers of an imperial program were drowned in the universal clamor for expansion.

During this period the first decisions were made which led ultimately to the annexation of the Philippine Islands. The effect of Dewey's victory in Manila Bay was to hasten the execution of plans already made to send a military expedition to the islands. Three days after the engagement McKinley gave the order to assemble an army at San Francisco. The first troops arrived in the islands on June 29, and the city of Manila was taken by General Wesley A. Merritt on August 13. Meanwhile the peace protocol had been signed at Washington on August 12, by which McKinley secured for the American government the legal right to occupy Manila pending the treaty of peace and the final disposition of the islands.

Broken cable connections, however, prevented news of the signing of the protocol from reaching General Merritt until August 16. The effect of this delay was to raise a question of signal importance: Did the Americans hold Manila by virtue of the protocol, signed in Wash-



ington on August 12, or by virtue of the capitulation, signed in Manila on the following day? The former status would give to Spain important advantages, including the release of the Spanish army from Manila and the liberty to reestablish her authority in the islands outside the city. But General Merritt took the position that the protocol did not go into effect until the notice of it had been received. He, therefore, continued to hold Manila under the terms of the military surrender. The United States government adopted a similar view, although international law was on the side of Spain and did not permit her to send an army for the purpose of policing the Philippine interior. Thus the McKinley administration decided that the Philippines should be kept "available" in case they should be desired later in the peace conference. Had the United States yielded to the contentions of Spain, it would have meant the virtual surrender of the archipelago, and would have made it almost impossible to acquire the Philippines by treaty.

By the 16th of September, when President McKinley issued his instructions to the peace commissioners, he had decided to demand only the cession of the island of Luzon. But before the end of October he had demanded the annexation of the entire archipelago. It has been generally believed that the western tour by the President about the middle of October caused him to make the new demands. While that is true in part, other considerations had an earlier and more important part in his decision. Perhaps the most important was the realization that it would have been a serious mistake to divide the archipelago by taking only the island of Luzon. President McKinley became convinced of this after a conference early in October with General F. V. Greene, who had recently returned from the Philippines. He was likewise influenced by testimony taken at the peace conference and cabled to Washington. The President was made to see that the foreign trade of Manila (located on Luzon) depended largely on the reshipment of sugar and hemp from the other islands. If Spain held those islands she would have it in her power to destroy the export trade of Manila, either by refusing to ship through that city or by levying export duties on goods so shipped. And, because the principal source of revenue for the government had always been the export duties on hemp and other products, that too would disappear with the loss of trade. It would also be necessary to provide by treaty against the possible transfer of Spain's part of the islands to a stronger power which might be unfriendly to the United States. At best it would mean another Spanish

frontier, with prospects of continued unhappy relations, such as the United States had experienced with respect to Louisiana, Florida, and Cuba. These considerations, presented by General Greene and others, greatly impressed President McKinley. Therefore, in his cable to the peace commission he said: "The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must, therefore, be required."

The United States was also influenced by the international situation in the Far East. Other powers did not hesitate to show their interest in the future disposition of the Philippines. The attitude of the German naval authorities in Manila Bay aroused the suspicion that they would seize the first opportunity to secure a foothold there. The British attitude, on the other hand, was one of extreme solicitude for American welfare, but it was plain that Great Britain was prompted by motives other than those of friendship toward the United States. A well known authority, John H. Latané, gives credence to a report that Lord Salisbury sent a communication to President McKinley warning him that Germany was preparing to take over the Philippines in case of American withdrawal, which he said would probably precipitate a world war. Among the many intrigues afoot during the negotiations at Paris was one for the transfer of the Philippine Islands to Belgium. It is evident that President McKinley saw the necessity of keeping the islands in order to preserve the balance of power in the Far East.

President McKinley, like many Americans, had a humanitarian spirit which led him to feel that the United States should not hand the islands back to the Spanish government and to the administrative tyranny against which the Philippine people had rebelled. It was widely believed, instead, that the American people had assumed the responsibility of carrying to those islands the gospel of political liberty and Christian civilization. President McKinley himself is reported to have said that since we could not honorably give them back to Spain, turn them over to other powers, or leave them to themselves, "there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace to do the best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died."

It cannot be said of the United States, however, as it has been said of England, that she adopted an imperial program "in a fit of absent-mindedness." American leaders were aware that the nation had reached a parting of the ways, as shown by the Senate debate on the treaty



in December 1898, and January 1899. Here the issue was clearly defined, and the new imperialism was examined in the light of previous constitutional development. Those who opposed it appealed to the principles that had guided American expansion prior to the economic revolution and the closing of the western frontier. They invoked the doctrine that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and reviewed the principle of the Northwest Ordinance that territories should ultimately come into the Union on an equal footing with the original states. The expansionist group in the Senate endeavored to show that it was possible under the Constitution to hold colonies as possessions. They advanced the doctrine that the right to govern territories was an inherent, sovereign right, with no constitutional limitations, and that the Constitution did not extend to newly acquired territory until Congress should so provide. In explaining their position, they anticipated some of the arguments by which the Supreme Court later justified imperialism under republican institutions.

The Senate also discussed the question from the standpoint of policy. The supporters of the treaty put forward all the stock arguments for imperialism, such as the trust for civilization and the promise of benevolent government. They appealed to national pride and pointed to the economic advantages for the United States. The opposition replied that humanitarianism and imperialism were essentially inconsistent, and that the true humanitarian procedure would be to deal with the Philippines as we had promised to deal with Cuba. The commercial advantages, they said, were merely apparent rather than real. Besides, Philippine products would compete with American goods. The proposed step would mean a great increase in military and naval expenditures, and would endanger the very existence of republican institutions. They also declared that the United States was being made a pawn in the hands of British interests in the Far East.

But all these arguments could not prevail against the fact that the Philippine problem was tied up with the treaty of peace. Many Senators who might have voted against the annexation of the Philippine Islands, had the question been presented by itself, felt that the treaty should be ratified in order to establish peace with Spain. Rather than defeat the treaty, therefore, they were willing to accept the administration program of imperialism. The annexation of the Islands, therefore, would not have received a two-thirds vote of the Senate on its own merits, although it might have commanded a majority. The final

influence that moved the scales in favor of ratification was the outbreak of the Philippine insurrection two days before the date set for the vote of the treaty. Even then ratification was accomplished by the narrow margin of one vote more than the necessary two-thirds, and some of these votes were rounded up in the last hours through a clever and not too scrupulous bargain by administration leaders.

The anti-imperialists throughout the country refused to accept the ratification of the treaty as the final decision on the question of imperialism. They carried the issue to the country through the press, and developed the Anti-Imperialist League, which had the support of numerous public leaders, such as Grover Cleveland, John Sherman, Samuel Gompers, Andrew Carnegie, and Carl Schurz. During the years 1898 and 1899 the country became deeply aroused over the Philippine insurrection, which also became a vexing problem for the Republican party and political capital for their opponents. On this issue the party of Bryan, which had been divided by the question of silver, could present a united front in the campaign of 1900. In the Democratic national convention a platform was adopted that "the burning issue of imperialism growing out of the Spanish war involves the very existence of the Republic and the destruction of our free institutions. We regard it as the paramount issue of the campaign." Thus the whole Philippine question was forced into the forefront of the campaign, and, although Republican leaders endeavored with some success to shift attention to other issues, the question of imperialism was effectively presented to the country. The fact that the people refused to turn the Republican party out of office after its Philippine policy had been thus given such a full airing showed that the country at least passively accepted imperialism.

It still remained for the new program to receive the sanction of the Supreme Court before its acceptance could be considered final. This was given in the Insular Cases of 1901. In deciding the validity of tariff duties on products from Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands the court was obliged to define the status of the new territories in their relation to the United States, and thus give an opinion on the constitutionality of holding colonial possessions. Did the terms "foreign" and "domestic" express the only categories for annexed territory, or were there other relations between those two extremes? Could there be territories which were neither foreign countries nor states of the Union, nor yet territories in the process of becoming states? In answering these questions the court held that the new territory was



neither foreign nor domestic, but was "appurtenant" to the United States, "as a possession." But it was held further that Congress might determine how long and to what extent the status of dependent possessions should apply to any territory. In other words, the Constitution followed the flag only as far as Congress permitted it to do so. Thus the Supreme Court approved the practice already begun by the government of not permitting the Constitution to follow the flag, but made it clear that the Government must be guided in the future by what Congress might decide.

Meanwhile, the new imperial policy had been inaugurated in the Philippines by the President. Furthermore, much against the intentions and desires of the administration, it had been necessary to introduce it by means of armed force. But before the outbreak of the insurrection, a series of peace conferences by the military leaders served to define the issue as a contest between government by consent and government by force. In these meetings the Filipino representatives protested against the American occupation of the islands and the assumption of sovereignty without consulting the Philippine people. The Americans replied that the Filipinos were subject people who could be transferred from one sovereignty to another without their consent. Thus, the American Republic was led by circumstances to proceed contrary to the principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The Government did not deliberately choose to repudiate this principle, but, having acquired the archipelago by an imperial transaction, it became necessary to defend its sovereignty in the islands by force. The program called benevolent imperialism at home quickly became military imperialism abroad. Even before the treaty of cession had been ratified, the humanitarian policy which Senators thought they were adopting had led to the necessity of a war of conquest.

The insurrection was an indirect but nevertheless an important factor in shaping American colonial policy. In the efforts to conciliate the insurgents the principles of that policy were revealed. President McKinley, by a proclamation on December 21, 1899, promised a benevolent rule for the colony, in which personal rights would be protected and a small degree of home rule granted. This promise was reënnunciated many times in subsequent statements to Filipinos by both military and civil authorities. Another principle found expression through the proclamations of General Otis, the Military Governor, and President Schurman, of the First Philippine Commission, in their efforts to win the insurgents over to the acceptance of American sov-

ereignty. They promised self-government in an ever increasing measure as the Filipinos should become fitted for it. But the United States was to be the judge of their capacity for self-government. The first definite proposal of a form of government in a dispatch of May 5, 1899, was to aid the Schurman commission in a peace parley with the insurgents. Known as the "Hay autonomy plan," it provided for a governor and a cabinet responsible to the sovereign power, and an advisory council, (the nucleus of a legislative assembly) to be elected by the people of the colony. But Schurman was unable to win the insurgents with this program, and the insurrection continued beyond the time of his stay in the islands.

The educated leaders in the Philippines were keenly interested in the constitutional questions involved in colonial government. Most of them eventually separated themselves from the insurgent organization, but they were, nevertheless, concerned about the future relations of their country with the United States, and worked persistently to ward off the status of a colonial dependency. Schurman endeavored to ascertain the viewpoint of these men. To that end he examined several constitutions that had been prepared by Filipino leaders during the period of insurrection. But in his eagerness to show that Philippine aspirations for home rule agreed with the American view, he allowed his wishes to overrule his judgment. As a result, in his report to the President on that subject, he completely misinterpreted the Philippine constitutional theory. The Philippine ideal, as clearly indicated in the several constitutions which he examined, was colonial self-government administered by a cabinet responsible to the legislature, according to the British practice. But Schurman was not willing to recognize this view, and sought evidence in the documents to sustain his own interpretation of the Philippine theory. He dismissed the responsible ministry idea as a mere scheme to circumvent the possibility of an oppressive governor as known under Spanish rule. Then, after searching the several constitutions, he found in one of them an enumeration of the powers of the legislative and executive branches, which he seized upon as evidence that they were trying to follow the American principle of "separation of powers." All of this he interpreted as an indication that the Filipinos desired no more autonomy than the United States was prepared to offer. Therefore, he proceeded to recommend a plan similar to that suggested by the Hay dispatch of May 5, although it was in some respects more liberal. There was to be a gov-



ernor and cabinet responsible to the authorities at Washington, and a legislature whose lower house should be elected by the people.

Thus the Schurman plan differed but little from the British type of colonial government to which he had referred in a previous section of his report, and which he had described as something of an anomaly, because it "furnishes occasions for conflicts" between the governor and the assembly. But he believed that such conflicts could be prevented in the Philippines by the separation of the powers to be exercised by the executive and legislative branches. It is difficult to see how such results could be achieved when the governor and cabinet were to be responsible to the sovereign power, while the popular assembly would be sure to act in accord with local interests.

The Second Philippine Commission, or Taft Commission, was sent out to establish civil government. The guarantee of personal liberty and a large degree of home rule in local affairs formed the core of the policy for the immediate future. But while the commission proceeded to form a government with autonomy only in local affairs, it was established along lines designed to lead to complete self-government and ultimately to independence, should the Filipinos so desire. Self-rule was to be extended as rapidly as the people became fitted for it.

This program of training for self-government formed the distinguishing feature of the new American imperial policy. It meant that Filipino officials must work side by side with American officials in what Elihu Root called "clinical instruction" in government. It brought about the establishment of a system of public education for the purpose of preparing an intelligent electorate. English was made the medium of instruction in the schools in order "to give them a common language," and to enable them to "breathe in the spirit of Anglo-Saxon individualism," as expressed by Governor Taft. It was sought, by that and other means, to develop a Filipino nationalism which should finally unite the several tribal groups.

While the local provincial administrations were thus organized along liberal lines, the central government remained for the time being under American control. On September 1, 1901, the so-called Commission Government was completed by the addition of three Filipino members to the five Americans already appointed. The executive offices were given to the five American members, while the entire commission functioned as the legislative branch. The arrangement closely resembled the government of a British crown colony. While designed to be only temporary, it lasted until 1907.

Still another feature of the new policy called for the material development of the islands by American capital. Governor Taft believed that every legitimate opportunity should be provided for the investment of capital, and favored granting liberal terms in franchises to corporations for the construction of railroads and the development of the natural resources of the country. This part of the program became the object of severe criticism by Democratic Congressmen, who accused the Republican party of seeking to exploit the Philippines for the benefit of American trusts. Taft, however, followed the Roosevelt doctrine of government control. While recommending legislation to encourage the investment of capital in the islands he also advocated restrictions to prevent selfish exploitation. He declared that the material development of the country was necessary to the program of uplifting and civilizing the people. He was interested in the improvement of the sugar lands, the development of mining, timber wealth, and other resources, because, as he said, such improvements would result in general enlightenment of the people and would aid in the realization of the ultimate purpose, the training for self-government. At the same time it was recognized that America might profit by the enterprise. There was, indeed, a frank union of altruistic and profit-seeking motives in the Philippine policy.

The Taft commission, in its report of 1901, made recommendations for a permanent form of government. The proposal was similar, in its general features, to the Hay program and the Schurman recommendation. It provided for a governor and a council, who should be appointed, and an assembly, to be elected. The plan was to go into operation in 1904, thus giving the commission two years longer in which to complete the groundwork. Mindful that colonial assemblies in times past had been thorns in the flesh of the home government, the commission proposed to deprive the Philippine assembly of its chief weapon of combat. If the assembly should fail to vote supplies for the government, the right to do so was to be vested in the executive council. A further prevention of the development of radical tendencies by the assembly was made in the provision for a limited electorate. At the same time the educational qualifications for the suffrage, together with a system of public education, were expected to result in a gradually increased body of voters. But the popular assembly was thought of for the time being mainly as a training ground for the Filipinos in the art of self-government. It was assumed that, as they became qualified, they would exercise an increasing share in



the central government. There was never any question in the minds of the commissioners that the American formula of education and democracy would work successfully; the Americans administered the formula and waited confidently for results.

Such a plan was liberal chiefly in its promises. As an immediate policy it was disappointing to the Filipinos. They were especially concerned because it left the country for the time being as a colonial dependency. Regardless of future autonomy, the country was subject to Congressional despotism for an indefinite period. For the purpose of escaping the status of a colonial possession, a Federal party was organized in December 1900, by the moderate Filipino leaders who, while accepting American sovereignty, desired under it self-government. In the platform and in a memorial to Congress (1901), they presented their proposal, which was nothing less than territorial status in the traditional American sense, with the privilege of becoming eventually a state in the Union. This was an attempt to adjust Filipino aspirations for autonomy to the American system. The essential idea of self-government which they had advocated earlier was retained, but the plan of a responsible ministry was abandoned in favor of the American idea of separation of powers. With it, however, they asked for other American constitutional features, including the right of the legislature to override the executive veto, the control of finance by the lower house, and the privilege of becoming a state in the Union.

Hence, the Federal party, representing the educated leadership of the country at that time, accepted the Root-Taft policy of postponed autonomy and the educational program leading to it; but they strenuously opposed the plan to hold the islands as a colonial possession during this period of tutelage. They requested that the United States Government should outline the future permanent relations between the two countries. But it was the view of Governor Taft that to define the policy in terms of permanent status would destroy its central feature. It would nullify the tutelage plan to the extent of taking away the teacher's right to pass on the fitness of the pupil for advancement. Taft refrained from making any promise concerning independence, and advised that legislation be enacted only to care for the immediate needs of the colony.

Therefore, it was not to be expected that the Republican Congress of 1902 would attempt to carry the colonial policy farther than it had been already developed. Rather, it could be expected that the forthcoming "government act" would contain only such constitutional pro-

visions as were necessary for carrying out the program as planned. Such was the case, and, except for the provision for a popular assembly to be convened some time in the future, the Act of 1902 contained little to justify its being called an organic law. The failure to make a declaration of purpose regarding permanent relations with the United States left the islands as a colonial dependency with no legal assurance of any change in status. In addition, Congress passed in that session a tariff act which practically excluded Philippine products from American markets. Hence, the new colonial policy, if judged only by the constitutional provisions of 1902, would appear arbitrary. But the true principles were not to be found in the legislative enactments. They were being worked out in the administration of local government under American tutelage, in the rapidly growing public school system under Filipino-American direction, in the acts of the Philippine Commission, and in the development of a Filipino nationalism, encouraged and fostered by the American authorities.

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This study is based almost entirely on published government documents. *The United States War Department Annual Reports* furnished a great deal of the material. The reports of General Otis and General MacArthur in particular deal with matters of civil administration and events of constitutional significance. The *Reports of the Philippine Commissions* including those of the Schurman Commission for 1899 and 1900, and of the Taft Commission for 1900 to 1902 inclusive, provided much material for the study, containing as they do the discussions and recommendations regarding colonial policy. *Senate Documents* and *House Documents* yielded a miscellany of valuable data, varying from treaty negotiations to Senate hearings on Philippine Affairs. *Foreign Relations* supplied the treaty correspondence, while the *Congressional Record* revealed the conflict over imperialism and the final approval of the colonial policy of Congress. The *United States Reports* were used in the study of the Insular Cases. These documents are all obtainable from the Government Printing Office at Washington, D. C.

A number of weekly and monthly periodicals were consulted in the effort to trace that elusive thing called public opinion. The most useful were the *Outlook*, Volumes LIX to LXV, (1898-1900), the *Independent*, Volumes L to LII, (1898-1900), the *Review of Reviews*, Volumes XVII and XXII, (1898 and 1900), *The Nation*, Volumes LXVI



and LXVII (1898), and *Harper's Weekly*, Volume XLII, (1898). The periodicals also provided the campaign documents of 1900.

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## AMERICAN MILITARY DEFENSE AND OPINION SINCE THE WORLD WAR

By EDWIN HINES CATES

This study was prompted by the absence of any study which would compare dispassionately the arguments of the preparedness groups in the United States. The great material appearing since the World War on the question of defense is controversial and partisan. It may not balance the two points of view. This dissertation attempts to do so from a neutral vantage the pacifist and defense cases. It surveys the literature and publications of the respective groups. The arguments have been presented in the phraseology of the spokesmen themselves. Both pacifist and preparedness spokesmen have been quoted at length from pamphlets and articles to capture popular support. The reader can compare the propaganda of both.

The question of armaments and defense has agitated the mind in the United States more since 1918 than in any other war period. The participation of America in the World War clarified the issues between pacifist and preparedness groups. It has resulted a bitter fight for the control of public opinion. Each group has conducted an intensive campaign to convince the public of the rightfulness of its case.

This controversy has stirred such feeling and interest in recent years that a large increase has occurred in the number of groups and societies on both sides. Membership rolls have increased since 1920 and each side has presented its case against its opponents in an increasing intensity of spirit. The new members and additional support prior to the war have been supplemented by new techniques involving the use of the daily press, and vast quantities of printed leaflets. Even house to house canvasses have been used to secure support either for or against the pacifist crusade.

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\*From a dissertation directed by Professor H. J. Thornton.



The provincialism of nineteenth century America, partially broken by the acquisition of a colonial empire after the war with Spain in 1898, was ended by the entrance of the United States into the World War. A new era began with the signing of the Versailles treaty. Affairs and problems of international import crowded aside the local issues which long had occupied the attention of the American people.

Prominent among these new questions was that of national defense. In 1919 the United States possessed the largest army and navy in its history and through its financial and military achievements held a position in the forefront of world attention. What policy concerning armaments and world peace should the United States adopt? Two considerations were presented: one was to withdraw from international coöperation and follow a course of ultra-nationalism involving large armaments and an isolationist policy. The other involved taking a bold stand for the reduction of national defenses, supporting the movement for world peace, and terminating the traditional American policy of aloofness from European commitments. The turmoil in the public mind incident to making a choice between these two courses gave both pacifist and preparedness protagonists a splendid opportunity to advance their propaganda.

A study of American military defense and the arguments of the groups that attack and defend it falls into three parts. The first is an account of America's military policy prior to the World War and a description of the present military establishment as operative under the National Defense Act of 1916 and as amended in 1920. The second is an analysis of the crusade against armaments and war conducted by pacifists. The third is a study of the case for preparedness as outlined by defense advocates.

A view of the past reveals that the United States had never pursued a definite military policy, as that term is understood among European nations, until the approval of the National Defense Act of 1916. Upon the outbreak of the European war in August of 1914, President Wilson proclaimed the neutrality of the United States. But as the months of the war dragged by, and American lives and property were attacked on the seas, the certainty of America's participation in the war increased. The possibility of war focused the attention of the American people upon the issue of preparedness, and after months of deliberation by Congress, on June 3, 1916, the National Defense Act was approved. This act was the most comprehensive piece of military legislation in the history of the United States up to that time. The army of

the United States thereafter was to consist of the regular army, an officers' reserve corps, an enlisted reserve corps, and the national guard when in the service of the United States.

From the standpoint of military policy, the foresight shown by Congress in passing the National Defense Act of 1916 was a strategic move in preparing the United States for its entrance into the World War on April 6, 1917. For the first time in conducting a war Congress was in a position to place the entire resources and man power of the nation at the disposal of the President and the military authorities.

The major cause of a lack of a permanent American military policy prior to 1916 was a belief in the security of the isolated position of the United States. With immense oceans on the east and west, and with no neighboring power strong enough to threaten their security, the American people have felt safe from foreign aggression. But in spite of geographical position, the United States has not escaped military conflict.

From the beginning of the War of the Revolution until 1916 the policy of the American government in regard to national defense was to maintain a small regular army in time of peace and improvise the force needed to wage war after the outbreak of hostilities. The peace time military establishment was never large enough to conduct a war against a foreign power, or even to crush a major rebellion at home. To supplement this regular army there existed a force of militia organized under the direction and authority of the various states. Until after the war with Spain in 1898, the state militia was a force of low military efficiency. Its officers were often elected by local companies, and professional standards of training were not generally enforced. Regiments in different parts of the country differed in proficiency. But the weakest feature of the militia as a part of the nation's defense program was that, until the approval of the Dick bill in 1903, it belonged to the states, and its use in the service of the Federal government beyond the borders of the state was at the discretion of the state governor.

The War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War were each conducted for the United States by armies composed chiefly of volunteer troops enlisted for the prosecution of that particular conflict. At the conclusion of each struggle, the war time military establishment was immediately disbanded and only a few regiments kept intact to form the peace time regular army. The major part was stationed beyond the Mississippi River as a protection against the menace of Indian attack, and the balance scattered in small detachments through-



out the nation. The meagerness of the regular establishment is shown by the fact that during the secession movement in 1860, the standing army of the United States numbered less than 12,000 officers and men, and all but three of the regiments in this army were stationed west of the Mississippi River.

At the conclusion of the World War the important question of determining the future military policy of the United States faced Congress. The committee on military affairs in both the Senate and the House of Representatives studied carefully and at great length the past military policies of the United States and possible future emergencies. They formulated an act concerning the American military establishment which passed both houses and was finally approved on June 4, 1920.

The principal provisions of the act are as follows: the maximum enlisted strength of the regular army is fixed at 280,000 men and 17,000 officers, with provision for expansion in time of war. The maximum strength of the national guard is fixed at 428,000 officers and men. The national guard was henceforth to be under closer supervision of the War Department. A reserve of partially trained officers and men was established. The personnel for this reserve component of the army is today supplied by the reserve officers' training corps and the citizens' military training camps.

From the standpoint of improving the military establishment the most important contribution of the National Defense Act of 1920 is the consolidation of all the armed forces into one organization. For this reason the act is sometimes known as the "one army plan." The various forces—the regular army, national guard when in the service of the United States, and the organized reserves—are welded into one force composed of the three components that are different only in their source, and in the amount of time devoted to military matters.

Another significant development in American military policy which was begun by the National Defense Act of 1920 is the entrusting to the Assistant Secretary of War the task of organizing American industry for its part in any future war. In this plan an elaborate structure of proposed war industries has been created by this official. A careful estimate has been made of the type and quantity of articles needed by the army and navy in the event of a major war, and each item has been contracted for at a price fair to the producer but which will at the same time eliminate the system of war profiteering that existed during the World War.

Though hatred of war and agitation against it have long been active among men, the period since 1918 has been one of particular activity on the part of individuals and organizations in the United States opposed to armed conflict. The supporters of the pacifist viewpoint in the United States have entered vigorously into activities seeking to reduce armaments and to secure the adherence of the United States to every proposal to end international war. The number of peace organizations has increased practically four-fold since the signing of the armistice with Germany in November, 1918, and methods have changed from mild requests to a wide concerted drive upon the public mind.

Anti-war advocates rest their indictment of an appeal to arms upon a variety of contentions. The following list may be considered as summary of the pacifist arguments against war as found in numerous peace publications of peace organizations: (1) modern warfare, as exemplified by the World War, has become entirely too expensive a method by which to settle disputes between nations; (2) war lowers morality by giving a free rein to the baser passions of men, and thus retards the development of the finer aspects of civilization; (3) there is no victor in modern warfare, since military armaments are so destructive that the struggle on the battlefield is not conclusive; (4) war is not inevitable; (5) armed conflict can be eradicated from society without changing human nature.

The pacifists have evolved a definite crusade against their opponents. The first objective of the pacifist attack is the group of army and navy officers. The second is the army and navy service organizations. The third consists of the reserve officers' association, a national organization composed of men who hold reserve commissions in the army of the United States. The fourth is the military intelligence association. The fifth is the military training camps association. And the sixth is the various veterans' organizations such as the American Legion, Military Order of the World War, and the Military Order of the Loyal Legion.

The pacifist opposition to a program of military preparedness is based on the following points: (1) armaments do not give any nation security against aggression; (2) armaments in themselves are provocative of war; (3) the use of armaments for the defense of nationals abroad is inadvisable; (4) armaments are entirely unnecessary; and (5) great accumulations of war materials mean rich and powerful manufacturing firms whose influence is exerted against peace and for war.



The military units maintained in various high schools and colleges of the United States have been the object of much pacifist denunciation. These units, authorized by the National Defense Act, are established in more than two hundred educational institutions throughout the nation. One of the largest and most active of the pacifist organizations, The Committee on Militarism in Education, has as its sole mission the combating of this phase of the War Department's activities.

Likewise, pacifists have roundly denounced the maintenance of summer training camps for boys of high school age at more than thirty army posts throughout the United States annually since 1920. When sufficient money was appropriated by Congress more than 30,000 young men of less than twenty-one years of age attended these camps. Pacifist indignation was stirred by the type of advertising carried on by the War Department to induce young men to attend. Placards and pamphlets emphasize the pleasures of thirty days' camping in the open at government expense, an athletic program supervised by competent coaches, and training in citizenship. The Committee on Militarism, which led the attack on these summer camps as well as against educational military units, charges that this type of advertising is "sugar-coating" the true purpose of these camps, which is the promotion of the spirit of militarism and love of military exercises.

The attacks of the pacifist groups in the United States since 1918 have not been directed solely against the work of the War Department and the activities of their preparedness opponents. They have disagreed strongly with the attitude of the Christian church during the past in openly sanctioning the institution of war. Pacifist literature has recently urged the church to take an open and bold stand for all time against the practice of war, and to announce that henceforth it will never approve another appeal to arms, regardless of the cause.

Advocates of military and naval preparedness describe the objectives of the pacifists as emotional and visionary. They declare that the pacifist program is not feasible because if it were possible to abolish war and institute an era of universal peace, conflict would have disappeared from human society centuries ago. Defense advocates argue that there are many definite examples of the failure of idealism to achieve peace. At the conclusion of each major war of modern times diplomats gathered to fashion some type of international device which would prevent another great war. Concerts, alliances, pacts, and leagues were created in turn, but each time these efforts to enforce peace by legislation and agreement failed. Wars not only continued to occur

during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but they grew in extent until the cataclysm of the World War imperiled the existence of civilization.

The defense advocates readily assert that they desire peace as much as do the pacifists, but they do not believe that it can be secured by the pacifist method. This sentiment was voiced by Senator Lawrence D. Tyson of Tennessee: "I am for peace—the American people are for peace, but every sensible man and woman must realize that we do not want peace at any price. We must ever be ready to do right by all of the nations in the world, but we must at all times be ready and willing to fight for the just rights of our citizens in every part of the world whenever necessary, in order to maintain our dignity and honor as a nation. In order to do so we must be prepared by land and sea to maintain and preserve the great place we have attained in the world." The preparedness group opposes a drastic reduction in armaments, as urged by the pacifists, without the creation of what they term other reliable means for national security. They can not bring themselves to accept the word of other nations as a sufficient guarantee for the protection of the United States. Joseph T. Cashman of New York City, the author of many pamphlets of the National Security League, expresses the opinion of many preparedness supporters: "We are all for peace. We deplore war. But in this world of human greed, human selfishness, human frailties, and human viciousness, we must be prepared to maintain always our rights, protect our families, and our property, and meet force with force. . . . So long as the people of this world refuse to conform to the principles enunciated in the Decalogue and elaborated in the Sermon on the Mount, just so long will it be necessary for mankind to defend himself and his possessions from murder, rapine, and chaos."

Some defenders of the present military policies of the United States charge that the pacifist group in order to secure support for its program deliberately misrepresents facts about the relative cost of the present American defense establishment. The National Council for the Prevention of War in many of its bulletins and pamphlets makes the statement that seventy-two per cent of the Federal budget goes for war purposes. The preparedness supporters charge that this computation does not give a fair presentation of the military budget because the estimate that seventy-two per cent of every tax dollar goes for past and future wars is compiled by adding the interest on the public debt and the cost of military pensions to the annual appropriations for the army



and navy. When considered singly, the total military and naval budget voted annually by Congress averages only about eighteen per cent of the Federal budget.

The amount spent for national defense by the United States can not be considered correctly, argue defense advocates, unless it is made clear that this nation is a Federal republic, and that provision for the national defense is one of the few expensive duties assumed by the national government to the exclusion of the various states. If the total budgets of the nation, of all of the separate states, and of the units of local government such as the cities and counties are grouped together, and the annual army and navy appropriations compared with that figure, only about five per cent of the total tax dollar is spent on national defense. To prove this point the statistical branch of the general staff of the United States army published the following list showing the per capita cost to the public of these items during the fiscal year 1929-1930: city government, \$73.32; state government, \$13.94; Federal government, \$31.67; the military establishment of the nation, \$2.25; and the total per capital cost of national defense, including the naval appropriations for 1929-1930, \$4.91.

The defense advocate firmly believes that national armaments are necessary to assure national security. Upon examining the record he finds that from the earliest beginnings until now men have employed physical force and offensive weapons to achieve objectives and to defend possessions. Major General Douglas MacArthur, chief of staff of the United States army, stated this argument: "On looking back through the history of the English-speaking peoples, it will be found in every instance that the most sacred principles of free government have been acquired, protected, and perpetuated through the embodied armed strength of the people concerned. From Magna Carta to the present time there is little in our institutions worth having or perpetuating that has not been achieved for us by armed men." In spite of the earnest efforts that have been made through the years to change this grim situation, the defender of preparedness declares that he is unable to find in the order of the modern world any compelling justification for the surrender of a measurable state of preparedness. It is not that the men of military convictions look only to the operations of the jungle law in primitive times. They have regard for the realism of contemporary life.

It is clear to them that all modern political states have employed armaments for aggressive ends. The great world powers of the present

day in various periods of their development engaged in war for the purpose of enlarging their territory, increasing the sources of their raw materials, and expanding their markets. In fact, there is not a single contemporary government that has not repeatedly engaged in war for the purpose of enlargement at the cost of other peoples.

Confronted by such a world order, defense advocates assert that the present military establishment of the United States is necessary to assure the American people an adequate defense in the event of war. Lawrence D. Tyson of Tennessee in a debate in the Senate thus explained this sentiment: "The army and navy are the two most expensive departments which we have in our Federal government. They will remain so as long as we are properly prepared. It is a financial burden, however great, which we must carry. It is an insurance policy for the future security and safety of the nation, and while we should be careful to see that we do not pay a higher price for our insurance than we need to, we should ever be willing to pay as much as is necessary."

To the pacifist charges that the military units in American high schools and colleges tend to foster a spirit of militarism, defense periodicals cite portions of the reports of various committees of the Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, and of a survey directed by the United States Commissioner of Education. A committee of the Association in its report published in 1926 under the title, *Survey of Land Grant Colleges and Universities*, declared that it found no spirit of militarism among the student cadets in the reserve officers' training corps units in the schools which it investigated. Numerous educational leaders have spoken highly of the military departments of their schools. President-Emeritus William O. Thompson, of the Ohio State University, in an address at the University of Minnesota stated: "I venture to affirm that there is no more militarism to be found in the student bodies of these Land-Grant colleges or among their alumni than will be found in a similar body of students in other types of colleges or among our citizens who have never attended college. The truth in this objection is academic in theory. It does not arise out of a state of facts."

\* \* \* \*

The most valuable materials for preparing the first part of this dissertation are official publications of the War Department. The data for several of the charts in the general bibliography were secured from figures on file at the War Department offices. The Congressional enactments which originally established the United States Army and subse-



quently enlarged it are included in the *United States Statutes at Large*. The first few volumes of the *American State Papers* give the reports of various Congressional committees to investigate military affairs early in our national history. Discussion of later military problems is contained in the annual *Report of the Secretary of War*, and the annual *Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army*. A description of the activities of the War Department is presented in publications by the G-2 branch of the War Department General Staff. *The Work of the War Department* (Washington, 1924), and *Our Military System* (Washington, 1930), stress the civilian character of much of the War Department's duties.

The National Defense Act is explained in detail in a publication by the office of the adjutant-general of Kansas, entitled, *The National Defense Act* (Topeka, 1931).

A study of American military policy prior to 1916 is presented in Emory Upton's *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1904). This traces the gradual growth of the military establishment as a result of the participation of the nation in the major American wars. Another general account, though partisan toward a strong national defense, is Frederic L. Huidekoper's *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States* (New York, 1925). This includes tables and data of interest to the student of military history.

To the student seeking technical data about the army, F. B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army* (Washington, 1903) is a guide.

The literature of pacifism is very abundant. General accounts of the pacifist crusade are given in the following: Florence Brewer Boeckel's *Between Peace and War* (New York, 1928), and *Efforts of the Founders of the United States and Its Leaders to Abolish War* (Washington, 1930); Devere Allen, *The Fight for Peace* (New York, 1930). A sketch of the history of the peace movement is in Arthur Derrin Call, *Three Facts of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1921). Statistics regarding the cost of the World War are cited in Arthur Derrin Call, *The Will to End War* (New York, 1924).

The pacifist case is stressed in numerous editorials and articles in the *New Republic*, *The Nation*, and *The World Tomorrow*; also in William Floyd, *War Resistance* (New York, 1928), and John Nevin Sayre, *Pacifism and National Security* (New York, 1929). Arguments against the maintenance of military units in educational institutions are given in various publications of the Committee on Militarism in

Education. The following publications of this organization are significant: Roswell P. Barnes, *Militarizing Our Youth* (New York, 1927), and *Origins and Aims* (New York, 1924); Winthrop D. Lane's *Military Training in the Schools and Colleges of the United States* (New York, 1926), and *Brass Buttons and Education* (New York, 1929).

For a detailed study of pacifist attitudes the voluminous publications of the following are invaluable: The American Peace Society, The Committee on Militarism in Education, Catholic Association for International Peace, Church Peace Union, Fellowship of Reconciliation, National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, Pacifist Action Society, Peace Patriots, War Registers' League, Womens' International League for Peace and Freedom, Women's Peace Society, and the World Peace Foundation.

The preparedness case is presented in books and pamphlets published by defense organizations. Joseph T. Cashman, *Defense is Always Justifiable* (New York, 1927), argues for a large national defense establishment. Disarmament is scorned by Professor Thomas H. Healy's "Disarmament and National Defense" in *The Reserve Officer*, April, 1932. The stand of the professional soldier is given by Major General Fox Connor in *The National Defense* (New York, 1928), a publication of the National Security League. The editorial columns of *The Infantry Journal*, *The Coast Artillery Journal*, *The Reserve Officer*, and *The American Legion Monthly* contain much material attacking the pacifists and defending the large army and navy enthusiasts.

The preparedness and defense contentions are elaborated *in extenso* in the literature of the following groups: American Defense Society, National Security League, National Civic Foundation, Military Order of the World War, American Citizenship Foundation, Better America Federation, Allied Patriotic Societies, United States Patriotic Society, Daughters of the American Revolution, The American Foundation, and Military Training Camps Association.



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
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## FOREWORD

Since the publication of the last volume of *Abstracts in History* the Department of History in the State University of Iowa has made it a regular requirement that each doctoral candidate shall submit an abstract of his dissertation together with the dissertation itself. In this way the series of *Abstracts* will become more than a summary of certain selected dissertations. It will also become an index to the doctoral work in history done in the Department. Even if certain theses are printed elsewhere, either in whole or in part, they will still be included in the *Abstracts*. The writer of each *Abstract* is alone responsible for the facts and interpretations given.

A complete set of the original dissertations which have been accepted for the doctoral degree is filed in the Library of the State University of Iowa. Scholars who may wish to consult any of these dissertations are free to borrow copies from the Library.

The Department of History is indebted to Professor C. W. de Kiewiet for preparing these manuscripts for the press.

November, 1937  
Iowa City, Iowa

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY  
STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

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The first of the series of lectures on the history of the English language was given by Mr. J. H. Green, of the University of Cambridge, on the 10th of January, 1881. The lecture was attended by a large number of students, and was most interesting. Mr. Green dealt with the history of the English language from the earliest times to the present day, and showed how the language has changed and developed. He dealt with the various dialects of the English language, and showed how they have merged into the standard language. He also dealt with the influence of foreign languages on the English language, and showed how many words have been borrowed from other languages. The lecture was most interesting, and was well received by the students.

THE SECOND LECTURE  
ON THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE



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## QUAKER PACIFISM AND THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1756

GUY FRANKLIN HERSHBERGER

The Christian's relation to the state presents a number of difficult problems, especially if the strict ethical principles of the New Testament are to be taken seriously. The essence of statehood is generally considered to be its coercive authority. But the New Testament ethic requires a kindly dealing with one's fellow men, in the spirit of love. Here there is no occasion for the use of force as exercised by the state. For this reason, generations of Christians have asked the question: What shall be my relation to the state? The problem is a real one. And the effort to arrive at a satisfactory solution has produced a variety of views on the relation of private to public morality.

In the early Christian era there was a sharp distinction between the church and the state. But in the mediaeval age there was an interpenetration of the church and the general social order, resulting in numerous compromises, so that this distinction was largely removed. And the result was a virtual identity of private and public morals. Lutheranism, on the other hand, recognized standards of personal morality which made for a theoretical difference between the ethics of Christianity and those of the state. In actual practice, however, the contradiction was ignored. And by a kind of double standard of morals the individual Lutheran was free to serve either the church or the state as occasion might demand.

The Calvinist system, however, did not admit of any such compromise. It assumed a God of majesty who demands a strict holiness on the part of man. Hence the Calvinist was driven into the world, charged with the responsibility of making it a holy society, ordered to the glory of God, under the control of the church. In its political aspect this meant a state church in which the righteous ruled the ungodly. And the moral emphasis was on those principles which derived from the Old Testament rather than the New. Hence there was no distinction between the morals of the state and those required of the individual by the church. Public and private morals were integrated into one organic whole, and the system swept everything clean before it.

The peaceful Anabaptists, on the other hand, adhered to a strict New Testament ethic, without any compromises. And inasmuch as they considered the coercive authority to be the essence of statehood, they separated themselves rather sharply from all affairs of the state.

Sixteenth century Christianity, then, offered at least four solutions for the social problem arising from an evil world. Each of these four schemes was designed for a particular ethical position. The Calvinists suppressed the distinction between individual and corporate morality and emphasized an Old Testament ethic adapted to a vigorous corporate life. The Anabaptists regarded corporate morality as necessarily on a low level and emphasized a New Testament ethic of love adapted to individuals and small, intimate groups. The Lutherans and Catholics took an ethical position between these two extremes. The sixteenth century, therefore, seemed to show that a given moral view required a particular attitude toward the social order to meet its peculiar needs.

Then in the seventeenth century the Society of Friends challenged this idea by combining the ethical position of the Anabaptists with the Calvinist attitude toward the social order. The Quakers had a definite political heritage, and their doctrine of the inner light made for an optimistic belief in the imminent Christianization of society. So they identified themselves with the civil government, hoping to administer the affairs of state on the principles of love, brotherly kindness, and goodwill. The result of this was to be a warless society in which a peaceful Christian might act as governor or magistrate with perfect ease of mind.

Here is the point where the Quakers and the peaceful Anabaptists differed. The latter rejected every kind of force. They were absolute non-resistants. The Quakers were non-resistant in their personal relation with their fellow men. And they rejected the military as unchristian and even unnecessary: for a Quaker state would be so governed as not to invite an invader. And, of course, there would be no aggression. But the Quakers regarded the use of force by the *civil* government different in principle from that of the military. Because of their faith in the goodness of man they hoped to reduce even this to a minimum. But the lawfulness of the police force in the hands of Christians who reject the military was seldom questioned. The Quakers, therefore, cannot be classed as absolute non-resistants.

This attempt to combine an uncompromising pacifism with an active political life was the distinctive feature of Quakerism in government.



They believed that the New Testament ethic of love which had hitherto been applied in individual relationships, and within small, intimate groups could be applied with equal success in the larger corporate life as well. But almost before they began they drew a distinction between the use of force by the military and its use by the civil government. While rejecting the former as unchristian, they chose to consider the latter wholly consistent with the New Testament doctrine of brotherly love and peace.

This meant, of course, that William Penn and his co-religionists must carry out their political program in Pennsylvania without submitting to the spirit of ordinary "worldly politics." And to do so was Penn's fond hope. But the best evidence reveals a wide hiatus between this hope and the actual performance of the government. The Quakers were unable to maintain their anti-military principles successfully. And even their very efforts to do so often developed a spirit of controversy and of "worldly politics" which weakened the spiritual foundation upon which the holy experiment itself was laid.

Failure to maintain pacific principles was due in part to outside forces. The holy experiment was hindered from the beginning by military obligations written into the very charter itself. And then, William Penn himself was able to spend less than four years in Pennsylvania, making it necessary to govern the province with a deputy governor most of the time. Quaker deputies, however, found it difficult to deal with all the exigencies of government. Thus as early as 1688 Penn adopted the policy of appointing non-Quaker governors, sometimes even army officers, who could be "stiff with neighbors upon occasion."

In 1692 the government of Pennsylvania was temporarily taken away from Penn, allegedly due to "great neglects and miscarriages" in government, to "disorder and confusion," and to lack of provision for the defense of the province. When the government was restored two years later, it was with the understanding that the proprietor do everything within his power to "provide for the safety and security thereof." Penn accepted the conditions and explained to his friends that "we must creep where we cannot go, and it is as necessary for us, in the things of this life, to be wise as to be innocent." In 1697 he even offered the Lords of Trade a plan of union for the common military defense of the colonies. In practical politics Penn found it impossible to be an inflexible idealist. And in order to save his holy experiment he compromised his principles and started down the slippery path of

dual morality which must eventually lead to a renunciation of the ethical position of Quakerism, or a withdrawal from public life.

Other forces also militated against the success of Penn's experiment. The anti-pacifist forces within the province, Penn's unwise selection of officials, and his unfortunate financial difficulties were additional factors which eventually led to negotiations for the surrender of the government to the Crown. An agreement to this end was actually reached in 1712, but it was never executed. So the province remained in proprietary hands until the time of the American Revolution.

But the severest test of the holy experiment came in the internal politics of the province. The Quakers in the assembly were generally possessed of lesser qualities than William Penn. This was especially true of the second and third generation. Many of them were birth-right Friends who accepted the Quaker way of life because of tradition and custom instead of a conviction which grew out of an inner experience. Years of continued prosperity also developed a spirit of "worldliness" which affected the entire Quaker society and reduced its spiritual vitality. So, when the militaristic forces on the outside became too strong, the political Quakers found it difficult to resist the pressure. The result was numerous compromises and a situation which grew increasingly serious until the Quaker society was finally forced to a decision between worldly politics and Christian ethics.

Even without considering the military complications, the strain of political life itself was a major incentive to this compromise of principle. The practical demands of statecraft required methods out of harmony with the Quaker faith. Ethical standards insisted upon in private life were found unsuited to public morality. And the politicians in the assembly, much more than Penn, were compelled to renounce that "high attainment" upon which he relied for the making of his mild and almost uncoercive state. This high attainment finds its basis in the Christian principle of love. It willingly suffers at the hand of the enemy rather than retaliate. In private life the Quakers were able to maintain this principle with reasonable success. But in political life there was another principle running counter to it. This was the principle of political freedom. And herein lay a cause for their failure.

Ideals of social justice can seldom be fully achieved without the exercise of political power. Hence the determined pursuit of freedom eventually means a struggle for power. And the struggle for power can hardly escape the use of methods out of harmony with the New



Testament ethic. In this the Quakers in the provincial government of Pennsylvania did not prove an exception to the rule. They early developed certain ideals of justice and liberty which they pursued relentlessly. Obstacles were removed by seizure of power and vigorous attack. This often led to acrid controversy, bitter feeling, and a selfish spirit. The Christian principle of love was sacrificed to the search for political power. And when this was done the foundation of the holy experiment was seriously weakened.

As early as 1683 the assembly began to increase its power at the expense of the governor. Under Penn's first frame of government all legislation originated with the governor and the council, or upper house. But the struggle for power continued until in 1701 the right of initiative resided in the assembly alone. And the council became an appointive body, a mere cabinet of advisers, without any legislative powers. Out of this struggle grew two political factions, the proprietary and the popular parties. An enormous amount of jealousy and personal animosity existed between them. Important issues seldom arose without some one feeling that his power was being challenged or his official prerogative encroached upon.

William Penn was grieved by these developments. He pleaded for peace and harmony. In an earnest letter to Friends in the government, he said: "Cannot you bear a little for the good of the whole? . . . Can you not for my sake and your own forgive one another? . . . Strive not, read the fifth of Matthew, the twelfth of Romans. . . You will see what becomes Christianity even in government." This was the heart of the issue. Could the ethic of Matthew five and Romans twelve be maintained, "even in government?" This was the faith on which Pennsylvania was founded. And this was the issue on which the holy experiment would stand or fall.

The Quaker politicians themselves saw the issue, but they made a bold attempt to rationalize their actions. When they imprisoned George Keith and William Bradford for publishing a printed attack upon the authorities they said the arrest was related only to those portions of the pamphlet which criticized them as magistrates, and in no way to those affecting them as individuals or as members of the Quaker society. This meant that the Quaker in public office could not tolerate criticism which he might endure as an individual. The Friend in the meeting might love his enemies and do good to them that hate him, but not so the Friend in government. The religious Quaker might be "transformed by the renewing of his mind," but the political Quaker must be

"conformed to this world." This was a direct denial of Penn's own belief, and a positive violation of his advice to the council when he cited the fifth of Matthew and the twelfth of Romans as teaching what is becoming to Christianity "even in government." These magistrates were renouncing the original Quaker position on public and private morality as the most convenient escape from their dilemma.

Numerous instances of this kind occurred from time to time until in 1701 the yearly meeting warned that some members "have been too factious and troublesome in the government under which they ought peaceably to live; and have by their seditious words, insinuations, and practices, disquieted the minds of others to the making of parties and disturbances; and some under the fair colours of law and privileges have promoted their sinister ends, when indeed it was but to take vengeance against those whom they had taken disgust against: and this we cannot but declare our just abhorrence of; that any should sacrifice the peace of the province to private revenge."

This warning was in order, but it was not well heeded. The administration of Governor John Evans which came a few years later was a period of storm and stress, beginning with a dispute over the power of adjournment, and ending in 1709 with an attempt to impeach James Logan, the proprietor's secretary. Logan was charged with tyranny and with working against the interests of the people, depriving them of their rights, their privileges, and their liberties. And in the end it was only by executive interference that he was saved from imprisonment by his brethren in the assembly.

The assembly's doings had now reached a point where the sober-minded people of the province could tolerate them no longer. Two weeks before the election in 1710 the Philadelphia yearly meeting dealt with the political activities of its members in a large and comprehensive way. The official epistle decried "some things of a hurtful tendency . . . whose reformation we greatly desire." Especially in "matters of temporal government" had some things taken place "not to the honor of our holy profession." Friends were advised to vote for men "fearing and loving God . . . that all self-seekers . . . may be disrobed and prevented of any power." And litigation among Friends was condemned in a vigorous fashion. These efforts had their effect and a new assembly was chosen which labored "in good humour and well."

By this time, however, many began to question the fitness of the Quakers for political life. Even Isaac Norris, a political Quaker, said that in order to be active in politics, Friends must choose among three



alternatives: first, to "be independent and entirely by ourselves;" second, "if mixed, partial to our own opinion, and not allow the liberty to others;" third, to be "dissenters in our own country." James Logan found it impossible to accept the Quaker distinction between the police and military force. And he was certain the demands of worldly government were in conflict with the Quaker profession which denied the spirit of the world.

This point of view was upheld in vigorous fashion by an anonymous Quaker writer who declared in 1715 that Christians "have no more to do in Caesar's court than in his camp." He regarded the political experiment in Pennsylvania as "an innovation, and as great an abuse to our profession, as any that ever yet was introduced into the church from the apostles to Constantine's time."

Up to 1710 the course of William Penn's holy experiment was not very satisfactory. His hope that the Christian principle of love could be applied in political life as well as in private life had not been realized. But a number of factors helped to improve the situation from this point on. As a result, the Quaker government of Pennsylvania entered a period of tranquility, awaiting its final test in the period beginning with 1739.

In that year, however, at the beginning of the Anglo-Spanish War, Governor Thomas asked the assembly to put the province into a state of readiness at once. It was a long time since the assembly had received such a request. So its first reaction was to say in true Quaker fashion that laws for military defense would conflict with peaceful consciences. In a short time, however, the assembly began to weaken under continuous pressure from the governor. Religious arguments were abandoned and others used instead. Evasion and delay were resorted to as long as possible. And in the end the assembly compromised by voting a sum of money for the "King's use."

This policy was so unsatisfactory to James Logan that in 1741 he challenged the Quakers of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting to abandon political life. He argued that defensive war was essentially the same as the exercise of the police force. Because he differed with the majority of the Friends on this point he had tried to be consistent by remaining inactive in the official meetings of the society. So he argued that those of the society who opposed defensive war should also be consistent and withdraw from all offices of the civil government.

Logan's argument was cogent enough. But the yearly meeting did not take it seriously at this time. Some of its more spiritually-minded

leaders saw the seriousness of the situation, however, and began to lead the society away from politics. Soon after Logan sent his famous letter to the official meeting, John Woolman, then in his early twenties, wrote some lines in his journal, resolving "so to pass my time, as to things outward, that nothing might hinder me from the most steady attention to the voice of the True Shepherd." It was the genius of Woolman to bring into Quakerism a revival of spiritual strength. His resolution against outward things was made with special reference to business affairs. But in Woolman's mind it applied to politics as well. And he was one of a group of vigorous young leaders who quietly, but resolutely, led the Quaker society out of the troublesome political arena into a new era of mystical quietism.

Some time was needed, of course, for this development to take place. After 1745, however, the yearly meeting placed an increasing emphasis on the example of Christ "who hath commanded us to love our enemies, and to do good even to them that hate us." And Friends were urged "to be faithful to that ancient testimony against bearing of arms and fighting." The epistle of 1746 was practically non-resistant in tone. All desire for worldly power was repudiated. High standards of moral attainment were demanded. It is evident that the Society of Friends was gaining new strength in its inner life, for which the leadership of Woolman was in part responsible.

But while the yearly meeting was coming back to the true anti-war position, the assembly moved farther away from it. The political Quakers had become so habituated to voting money for the "King's use," that they no longer claimed to champion the principle of pacifism. And in 1748 they definitely told the council so. Then later, when Braddock came to drive the French out of Pennsylvania, the assembly again began working on a bill to raise money for the King's use. But it soon reached a deadlock with the governor on the method of raising the money. When bills of credit were proposed, they failed to agree on the length of time for sinking the bills. And when a general property tax was proposed the governor objected to the taxation of proprietary estates. In the end, the attempt to raise the money did not succeed until the proprietors consented to a voluntary contribution.

The most impressive feature of this controversy is the complete absence of pacifism in the assembly's approach. The issue was political and economic power. The assembly had no scruples about contributing military supplies. Instead, when military appropriations were delayed because of disagreement over the method of raising the money,



it complained of being rendered "odious . . . to the army that is come to protect us." And the high point in anti-pacifist argument was reached when the assembly complained of inability to defend its own estates without protecting those of the proprietors gratis! This referred to the proprietors' insistence that their estates be exempt from taxation. Obviously the time had arrived when the Pennsylvania Friends must lose their "ancient testimony" for peace, or experience some kind of awakening to restore the pristine fervor of the faith.

The yearly meeting saw this point and struggled hard for a satisfactory solution. In 1755 it demanded conduct strictly in harmony with pacifist doctrine. The struggle for rights and privileges was completely repudiated. Friends were urged to submit to the authorities over them in so far as they could. And if anything was required contrary to conscience they were advised to suffer patiently, "not believing it to be allowed to the followers of Christ, by force and violence to oppose the ordinances of magistrates . . ." This note is entirely out of harmony with the actual performance of the political Quakers, and approaches the non-resistant position more nearly than anything found in Pennsylvania Quakerism for a long time. The yearly meeting could no longer condone the conduct of the Friends in the assembly.

In line with this advice, when a new war tax bill was introduced shortly afterwards, a group of the more conscientious Quakers petitioned the assembly not to pass it. And about the same time Samuel Fothergill of England, a Quaker minister who ranks with Woolman in his spiritual qualities, came to the province to assist the Friends in this trying hour. Like the prophets of Israel, Fothergill prayed and pleaded with his backsliding people until a few members in the assembly began to vote against military measures. Then in April, 1756, when the governor and council declared war against the Delawares and Shawnees, old Indian Friends of the province, the breaking point was reached. Fothergill declared that the Quaker government was a salt which had lost its savor. And early in June six of the more conscientious Quaker assemblymen resigned their seats, explaining that office holding was now equivalent to military service, "which from a conviction of judgement, after mature deliberation, we cannot comply with." So for the "peace of our minds, and the reputation, of our religious profession," they asked to be excused from further service.

The Pennsylvania assembly as a whole, despite its general departure from Quaker principles, had failed, nevertheless, to enact military measures with the speed which the British government desired. For

this reason, Parliament in 1756 was about to pass a bill requiring an oath and test which would have forced the Quakers out of the Pennsylvania government altogether. But influential Friends in England feared this might mean a complete political disablement of all Quakers within the realm. So they persuaded the leaders of Parliament to delay the proposed action while efforts would be made to effect a voluntary withdrawal of Friends from the Pennsylvania assembly. To this end the London meeting advised against standing for reelection, and delegated John Hunt and Christopher Wilson to go to Pennsylvania to take up the matter with the Friends personally. Many Quakers now refused to accept nomination, resulting in the election of seventeen new members in a total of thirty-six. The average annual turnover was about four, so the significance of this election is obvious. Four additional members were induced to resign their seats at the opening of the October session, 1756. The legislature normally had a few non-Quaker members. So in the new assembly the Quaker element was reduced to less than one-fourth the total membership.

It is true, this withdrawal from the government was undertaken to prevent the complete political disablement of the Quakers. But the ablest spiritual leaders, such as Samuel Fothergill and John Woolman, believed this step necessary to preserve the spiritual life of Quakerism as well. In 1755 Woolman wrote the epistle for the yearly meeting, advising separation from the spirit of this world. And then in 1758 he sat on a special committee recommending a declaration against all office holding which invited a violation of the Quaker conscience.

In line with this advice the yearly meeting passed a drastic minute demanding separation of all members from the provincial government, under pain of disownment. The minute says: "And if any professing with us should after the advice and loving admonitions of their brethren persist in a conduct so repugnant to that sincerity, uprightness, and self-denial incumbent on us, it is the sense and judgment of this meeting that such persons should not be allowed to sit in our meetings for discipline nor be employed in the affairs of truth until they are brought to a sense and acknowledgement of their error."

The year 1758 is a definite turning point in Quaker history. By this notable minute, the society, for the first time, forbade its members to hold office. With many it was an act of expediency because of practical difficulties in time of war. But Woolman's own convictions lay deeper than this. He believed that political life was in part responsible for the spirit of "worldliness" which afflicted the Quakerism of his day.



In his *Journal* for 1759, he asks whether civil affairs, "narrowness, party interest, respect to outward dignities, names or distinctions among men, do not stain the beauty of those assemblies, and render the case doubtful in point of duty, whether a disciple of Christ ought to attend as a member united to the body or not."


In political life Woolman found a force gnawing at the vitals of Christian experience. So he turned his face to other interests, and with him the Society of Friends entered an era of quietism. There was now a renewed emphasis on inward religion, and the social message of Quakerism found expression in the gentler work of philanthropy and social reform. The Quakerism of this new era had a lively and virile social interest. But it held aloof from those activities inviting a compromise of the Quaker ethic.

The special problem of this study has been to determine the outcome of that unique experiment which proposed to maintain a strict New Testament ethic on war and peace, in the management of a political state. The Quakers had challenged the moral and social views of their time. They carried into public life principles hitherto accepted by none save individuals and small, intimate groups, detached from the world. They challenged the distinction between private and public morals, proposing to lift the latter to the level of the former. This was the heart of the holy experiment and this was where it failed. The ethics of the Pennsylvania government proved to be no different in essence from that of the other colonies. The practical demands of statecraft required methods out of line with true Quaker morals, so that the standards of love and kindness insisted upon in private life were not maintained in government.

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This study is based principally on manuscript sources, government documents, and the printed journals and writings of Quaker leaders. Indispensable manuscript sources are the *Minutes of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting*, beginning in 1682, and the minutes of the subsidiary quarterly and monthly meetings. The *Minutes of the Meeting for Sufferings for Pennsylvania*, beginning in 1756, were also of value. Most of these Quaker meeting minutes are housed at 304 Arch Street, Philadelphia. Among the important manuscript collections at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania are the following: the *Pemberton Papers*, the *Logan Papers*, the *Penn Papers*, the *Norris Papers*, and others. The government documents used were: the *Minutes of the*

*Provincial Council of Pennsylvania*, commonly called the *Colonial Records*; the *Pennsylvania Archives*; the *Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania*; the *Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York*; and the *New Jersey Archives*. Among numerous Quaker writings used were those of George Fox, Robert Barclay, Isaac Pennington, William Penn, James Logan, Samuel Fothergill, John Woolman, and others. Of particular importance are the two volumes of the *Penn-Logan Correspondence*, the *Journal* of John Woolman, and the *Memoirs of Samuel Fothergill*. A number of printed broadsides and pamphlets were found helpful. The *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* contains much helpful material.





## THE INDIAN POLICY OF SIR WILLIAM JOHNSON

WILLARD ORAL MISHOFF

The strategic location of the Iroquois confederacy during the period of Anglo-French rivalry in North America made its allegiance important in peace and war. This confederacy, at one time known as the Five Nations, included the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas, who occupied the western area of the province of New York. With the advent of the Tuscaroras, the confederacy was subsequently referred to as the Six Nations, although its jurisdiction extended over the neighboring Delawares and Shawnees in Pennsylvania, whose hunting grounds comprised the upper Ohio Valley. Thus these tribesmen found themselves between the French on the west and the English on the east. During peace time their sentiments depended upon the proximity of French or English posts, the opportunities afforded for trade, and the treatment they received. In war time, however, the confederacy was exposed to attack by either neighbor and its favor inclined toward the contestant exhibiting the greater military prowess and purchasing power. From 1744 to 1760, the French authorities made strenuous efforts to detach the Six Nations from their traditional alliance with the English. That they failed to do this was due largely to the influence of Sir William Johnson, Indian agent for the province of New York and superintendent of Indian affairs under the British command. It is the purpose of this study to present an account of Johnson's dealings with the Indians from the outbreak of King George's War to the reduction of Canada.

The alienation of the Iroquois by the French in the seventeenth century, and their proximity to the English, resulted in a covenant of alliance and friendship between the Six Nations and the province of New York, while British suzerainty over the confederacy was recognized by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). To compete more effectively with the French at Fort Niagara, the province of New York erected a trading post at Oswego (1727), which was frequented not only by the Iroquois, but also by hunters from the Mississippi Valley. Meanwhile, wealthy patentees secured grants of land from the Mohawks and the growing population soon encroached upon the ancient hunting

grounds. To protect the Iroquois against unscrupulous traders and settlers, the provincial government created a board of Indian commissioners to provide adequate regulations and to redress grievances. This board periodically renewed the covenant with the Six Nations and distributed substantial presents as an inducement to its observance. Unfortunately, the board was dominated by a number of Albany merchants whose location enabled them to trade more profitably with the French. Unwilling to pursue an official policy at variance with their private interests, the commissioners ceased to function, and by 1744, the Iroquois suffered from loss of trade, unredressed land grievances, and the neglect of their covenant.

The French took advantage of English negligence by sending agents among the Six Nations to promote trade and to inflame them against the English. While the confederacy prevented the erection of a French fort at its council seat, Onondaga, it permitted the emigration to Canada of a number of tribesmen, who were henceforth known as *Cananawagas* and became valuable intermediaries in peace and war. Governor George Clinton watched with alarm this intrigue among the Iroquois as a result of their neglect by the board of Indian commissioners. Upon the outbreak of King George's War (1744), the northern border was terrorized by raids of French and Indians whose boldness increased until they attacked and destroyed the outpost of Saratoga late in the year 1745. The commissioners promptly sought the aid of the Six Nations in defense, but the latter refused. Thereupon the governor determined to win their support through personal overtures and sent out Cadwallader Colden, who for many years had favored a close alliance with the Iroquois for trade and defense. This angered the commissioners, who refused further co-operation despite the emergency. Clinton thereupon took matters into his own hands and sought the assistance of William Johnson, a rising young merchant and landowner of the Mohawk Valley, well regarded by the Six Nations.

Johnson had come to the Mohawk Valley in 1738 to manage the extensive estate of his uncle, Peter Warren, a prominent naval officer who had married into the influential De Lancey family of New York. Within a few years he acquired land of his own near Fort Hunter, cleared a considerable acreage, founded a thriving settlement, and established a general store, patronized by neighboring whites and Indians. His headquarters at Mount (or Fort) Johnson were strategically located on the highway between Albany and Oswego, frequented by traders. A short distance west was the Mohawk village of Cana-



joharie, the eastern castle of the Iroquois, and gateway to the Susquehanna Valley. Pushing into the Indian country, Johnson developed a profitable fur trade and won a distinctive place for himself through honest dealings and personal adaptability. He was soon adopted by the Mohawks and married into the family of the leading sachem. Admitted to the deliberations of the confederacy and to the confidence of its leaders, Johnson occupied a unique position among his adopted brethren. By 1745, he had become a prominent merchant, a prosperous trader, and a wealthy landlord, whose rapid rise was envied by his Dutch competitors and whose family connections were respected in the province.

The provincial assembly recognized the possibilities in Johnson's situation and, in 1746, authorized him to provision the garrison at Oswego. Meanwhile, the Governor instructed him to secure military intelligence through the Mohawks, to assure them of adequate defense against the French, and to recruit warriors for service with the militia. Johnson's immediate success won him a commission as colonel of the Six Nations and commissary in the militia with headquarters at Fort Johnson. Here the colonel organized and equipped war parties while he carried on his business under military protection. Since his chief task was to retain the Six Nations in the English interest, Johnson devoted much time in conference with leading sachems and warriors, whom he cultivated with the aid of presents and bounties. No longer needed, the board of Indian commissioners ceased to function for the duration of the war, but the members resented their displacement and lent their influence to the provincial assembly in its struggle with the governor over prerogatives. Consequently Johnson encountered both personal and political obstacles, for the influential merchants resented his competition under official patronage, and the anti-administration faction distrusted him as a favorite of the governor. The resulting delays in transportation, supplies, and funds caused Johnson continual embarrassment.

Johnson found the attitude of the warriors less favorable than that of the sachems. In general, the English interest among the Six Nations decreased as the distance increased from Fort Johnson. While the Mohawks in the eastern part of the Iroquois country were friendly to the English, the Oneidas, Tuscaroras, and Onondagas showed successively less fervor, and the Cayugas and Senecas showed dangerous leanings toward the French. By maintaining the good will of the more distant sachems, the colonel secured their influence over the warriors.

Furthermore, many Iroquois declined to go on the war path as it would involve attacking their kinsmen, the Caughnawagas, who were French allies. Then, too, many warriors had been induced to take up the hatchet by the promise of an expedition to Crown Point, and were profoundly disappointed when it failed to materialize. Finally, at Johnson's very headquarters designing whites exploited the Indians, and by plying them with liquor despoiled them of their equipment, clothing, and bounty money. But the hostile raids of the Caughnawagas soon provoked the Iroquois to retaliate, and Johnson personally led a hasty expedition of impatient warriors toward Lake St. Sacrement more as a gesture of British zeal than as a threat to the French. The exploitation of the savages continued, however, despite prohibitory military regulations and provincial legislation.

Johnson early adopted a policy of personally welcoming every Indian who came to his headquarters for the first time, and he extended bountiful hospitality to visiting delegations. To many tribesmen loyalty to the English thus became a personal obligation. In this way, Johnson offset the perpetual aim of the French to arouse the Iroquois against tribes friendly toward the English. By the summer of 1747, the colonel was convinced that the Six Nations would remain loyal to their covenant, and that they were discouraging their western brethren from actively assisting the French. Indeed, certain tribes even favored the destruction of Fort Niagara because it hindered trade at Oswego. As hostilities centered upon the sea coast, border warfare consisted of raids and counter-raids in which many prisoners were captured by Indian war parties. As a result, the French Governor, Comte de la Galissonnière, sought to treat directly with the Six Nations for the exchange of captives. This the English authorities determined to prevent lest it exalt the enemy in the estimation of the confederacy and undermine the covenant. Accordingly, Johnson labored incessantly and by cajolery and bribery prevented negotiations. His success as Indian agent won him the commendation not only of Governor Clinton, but also of Governor William Shirley, of Massachusetts, who brought his services to the attention of the Crown.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) suspended hostilities, pending a final struggle for the mastery of North America. Realizing that any attempt to possess the Ohio Valley must receive the consent of neighboring tribesmen, the French began a systematic campaign to detach the Iroquois and their dependents (the Delawares and Shawnees) from their English alliance. They spread rumors of British attack, taunted



the Six Nations with cowardice, encouraged them to war against their southern enemies, the Cherokees, who were friendly to the English, and prophesied the gradual extermination of the confederacy through encroachments upon their hunting grounds. To offset this propaganda, Johnson stationed at the various castles agents who dispelled rumors and promoted confidence in British friendship. Profitable trade, however, was the chief factor in preserving the alliance, and the French were obliged to send traders among the Six Nations with instructions to meet competition at any cost. Johnson in vain sought the exclusion of these foreign agents. Thus the French prepared the way for the expedition of Céloron de Bienville (1749-1750), which not only laid visible claim to the Ohio region but also secured the good will of the Delawares and Shawnees. Johnson, however, pointed to one of the leaden plates buried by the expedition as a proof of French designs against the best hunting grounds of the confederacy.

Johnson had a skillful and zealous rival at Fort Niagara in Joncaire, the well-known trader, to whose influence among the Senecas, Delawares, and Shawnees their French leanings were due. Yet he found a greater obstacle in the indifference of the provincial authorities to these intrigues. Through Governor Clinton, the colonel appealed to Governor James Hamilton, of Pennsylvania, to conciliate the Delawares and Shawnees and to fortify the Ohio frontier. Hamilton, however, doubted the existence of a menace and did not act. Likewise, in New York, the provincial assembly withheld funds for the erection of defenses in the Iroquois country, and failed to reimburse Johnson for emergency outlays in the Indian service. Under these circumstances, Johnson declined to assume further responsibility at the expense of his personal interests, and resigned in 1750, over the protests of Clinton and the Mohawk sachems. The board of Indian commissioners was restored and the Six Nations were again neglected. In the spring of 1753, the French erected Fort Le Boeuf, on French Creek, and seized the English trading post of Venango. Overawed by the invaders, the neighboring tribesmen refused resistance, but the confederacy resented this invasion and, through Hendrick, the Mohawk sachem, threatened to abandon the covenant if the English did not provide protection.

The reports of Clinton, Shirley, and Johnson to the ministry stressed the intercolonial aspects of Indian affairs and their bearing upon the problem of defense. In 1753, therefore, the provincial governors were urged to resist French encroachments and were directed to unite in securing either the active assistance of the Six Nations or their promise

of neutrality. To this end, commissioners from seven provinces met at Albany in 1754 and summoned thither delegates from Johnson, now a member of the provincial council, to prepare the addresses to the sachems. The Indian policy in the erection of the French forts, and the alliance with the English, provided that the commissioners would neglect their needs and that the province would protect them against invasion. Complaining bitterly by both contestants, Hendrick, the Mohawk sachem, for the reinstatement of Johnson as superintendent by the customary promises. Under the influence of the congress drew up representations to the Crown analyzing the Indian problem and recommending the appointment of an agent to regulate Indian relations, redress land grievances, and provide adequate defenses. While Johnson did not place unlimited declarations of the Iroquois, he thought their interests best served by fair dealing and systematic propaganda, and the congress pointed the way to a centralized administration.

The Albany Congress afforded Johnson a platform to present his views upon the Indian problem and to propose measures designed to offset the ascendancy of the French and the weakening of the Iroquois alliance to hostile purposes in the absence of concerted resistance. This left the Six Nations to British aims and the influence of the Iroquois was among the western tribesmen. Johnson therefore advocated the establishment of frontier posts as centers of defense and propaganda. In his opinion, the confederacy did not wish to occupy the Ohio country, but rather it desired English aid in driving the invaders from these hunting grounds. In settling the Ohio question Johnson put forward the argument that the Iroquois had granted to the English the right of preemption. If the French could be driven off, he thought the Indians would consent to British occupation. So important was Ohio to the English and trade, that Johnson strongly advocated its co-operation with the several provinces to preserve the allegiance of the Indians. The Congress passed a resolution thanking Johnson for his services and transmitted his recommendations to the governors and legislatures.

The erection of Fort Duquesne and the failure of the expedition of 1754 convinced many Ohio tribesmen that



unable to resist the invaders, and they either transferred their support to the French or declared their neutrality. Johnson again warned the authorities in London that a general defection of the Six Nations could be halted only by the expulsion of the French from this region, by the establishment of outposts along the frontier, and by the removal of land grievances. Early in 1755, General Edward Braddock arrived in command of the British forces and promptly summoned a council of governors, to which Johnson was invited. A plan of campaign was adopted, and Johnson was assigned the twofold task of managing the Six Nations and commanding an expedition to Crown Point, with the rank of major-general. After preliminary conferences with leading sachems, the superintendent held a congress at Fort Johnson in the summer of 1755, attended by over eleven hundred Indians. In a series of carefully prepared speeches, he reviewed the encroachments of the French and convinced the tribesmen that the British would expel the invaders. To this end he sought their aid and declared that their refusal would indicate either cowardice or enmity. Inspired by news of the forthcoming expedition and encouraged by a substantial present, the Six Nations affirmed their loyalty to the British cause and their intention to give active aid.

The results of the great Indian congress were immediately threatened by the failure of Braddock's expedition to dislodge the French. Johnson minimized the debacle as much as possible and dispelled the warriors' doubts as to the military capacity of the British. While the Iroquois sachems assured him that the confederacy would not renounce its covenant, the Delawares and Shawnees were easily incited to border forays, and Johnson was convinced that an early expedition to Crown Point was necessary to sustain the English interest among the warriors. However, a misunderstanding with Shirley, lack of co-operation from the provinces, and military inexperience delayed the expedition until late in the summer of 1755. Under Johnson's command, a motley force of New England militia, New York troops, and Iroquois warriors moved toward Lake St. Sacrement (renamed by Johnson, Lake George). Ably assisted by Major-General Phineas Lyman and wisely counselled by Hendrick, the Mohawk leader, Johnson's forces repulsed an attack by the French under Baron Dieskau, who was captured. Hendrick was killed, and Johnson was wounded. The Indians, minus their leader, and now at odds with the Caughnawagas, who had assisted the French, departed forthwith. Abandoned by the Indians, and faced with disaffection among the troops, Johnson refused to press forward, content

to establish Fort William Henry at the south end of Lake George. Toward the close of the year, Johnson resigned his commission, received a baronetcy from the King, and a generous reward from Parliament.

From Braddock's defeat (1755) to the capture of Fort Frontenac (1758), the Six Nations were obviously divided in their sympathies. While the confederacy, under the stimulus of Johnson's gifts, repeatedly declared its loyalty to the ancient covenant and disavowed the hostile conduct of individual warriors, the proximity of the enemy encouraged a policy of apathy, if not duplicity. The aggressions of the French overawed the Iroquois and made the English to appear dilatory and supine. The authorities in Canada, therefore, encouraged delegations of the Six Nations to come to Fort Niagara and Montreal, where hospitality and presents awaited them as tokens of friendship. Meanwhile, systematic propaganda sought to establish the French as the true protectors of Indian lands and trade. The confederacy made clear to Johnson its confusion over the fact that both the French and English disclaimed any intention to dispossess the Indians, yet both contested for the possession of the great interior. Johnson did not place undue confidence in the steadfastness of the Six Nations. The complicity of the French in the border raids of the Delawares, Shawnees, and Senecas was well known, and the erection of English forts in the Iroquois country was opposed by tribesmen who viewed them as a hindrance to subversive negotiations with the French for ammunition and supplies. The persistent refusal of the confederacy to give wholehearted support to the British cause and its tolerance of French overtures rendered Johnson's policy extravagant and ineffective in the opinion of the British command.

Early in 1756, two departments were created by royal edict for the management of Indian affairs, pursuant to the recommendations of the Albany Congress and prominent colonial officials. Johnson received a commission as colonel and sole superintendent of the Six Nations, while Edmund Atkin accepted a corresponding appointment over the southern tribes. Sir William was now assisted by a deputy, George Croghan, a prominent Pennsylvania trader, and by a staff of commissaries, smiths, and interpreters, who supplied the Indians with munitions, clothing, and provisions, kept their arms and tools in repair, secured military intelligence, and dispensed propaganda. In a daily routine of conferences, the colonel attempted to convince visiting tribesmen at Fort Johnson that the French sought to destroy the confederacy, while the English not only provided more advantageous trade, but would



help the Iroquois to regain their former prestige among the western nations. Forts were built for the protection of the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, although the more distant Nations refused this protection in fear of French retaliation. The Six Nations, however, permitted the free passage of British troops through their country to Oswego. Yet public and private conferences convinced Johnson that these tribesmen, notwithstanding their avowals of loyalty, were equally receptive to French advances, and had adopted a policy of watchful waiting for signs of ultimate victory.

The Six Nations did not regard the battle of Lake George as a convincing indication of British prowess, and they were disgusted with Shirley's failure to proceed against Fort Niagara. Scouts brought to Johnson news of the French designs against Oswego, early in 1756, and the Iroquois were amazed at the English delay in reinforcing this post. In the meantime, the French Governor, Marquis de Vaudreuil, despairing of success in detaching the confederacy, warned the warriors to stay away from Oswego, and summoned them to Fort Niagara to insure their inactivity at the critical moment. In midsummer, 1756, Montcalm, the French commander, descended upon Oswego with a superior force and compelled its surrender. Having destroyed the fort, he returned to Canada, leaving the Iroquois country and the Mohawk Valley exposed to attack. The destruction of the lake post nullified Johnson's plans to engage the confederacy against the French, for Vaudreuil threatened reprisal if any of the Iroquois assisted the English. In the autumn, Sir William, assisted by Croghan, held a general congress of the Six Nations to ascertain their official sentiments. Censuring them as mercenary and vacillating, Johnson did his best to convince them of the ultimate success of British arms. While the sachems assured him that the confederacy would not renounce its covenant, the warriors declared that they must defend their own castles, and declined to render further assistance.

The neutrality of the Iroquois after the fall of Oswego placed the English at a disadvantage and increased the likelihood of attack by hostile tribesmen. Johnson, at the behest of Loudoun, commander-in-chief, turned for aid to his southern colleague, Edmund Atkin, who had maintained the support of the Cherokees and Catawbias despite the intrigues of the French in Louisiana. Weakened by the defection of their western allies and the alienation of their dependents, the Iroquois welcomed Johnson's suggestion of an alliance with the southern nations, notwithstanding the enmity between the Senecas and Cherokees.

Accordingly, Atkin addressed a congress of sachems at Fort Johnson in the autumn of 1756, and invited the confederacy to join the Cherokees and their allies in expelling the French from their hunting grounds. The sachems readily acceded to an alliance, but the superintendents agreed that a covenant of peace was an essential preliminary, since the French had incited the Senecas to attack the Cherokees. To this end they labored until the summer of 1757, when delegates from the Six Nations and Cherokees signed a treaty of peace at Fort Johnson and agreed upon an alliance in which the southern Indians would seek further allies and continue hostilities against the French. This cleared the way for the active support of the Cherokees in winning over the Ohio tribesmen, thus facilitating the recovery of Fort Duquesne in 1758.

The consent of the Delawares and Shawnees greatly aided the French occupation of the Ohio region, and it was therefore necessary for the English to detach these Iroquois dependents from their hostile interest before attempting any possession of their territory. After Braddock's defeat these tribesmen periodically raided the Pennsylvania frontier, notwithstanding the injunctions of the confederacy, although their sachems usually disavowed such conduct in formal council. It was the task of George Croghan, deputy superintendent, to ascertain the cause of their dissatisfaction and to render them less susceptible to French influence. Their chief grievance at this time was the unauthorized sale of their Susquehanna hunting grounds to the proprietors of Pennsylvania in 1754. A portion of the land remained unsettled and unpaid for, and the Indians sought to repossess this area. The French pointed to this transaction as an example of English encroachment and encouraged the Delawares in their violent resistance. Johnson felt that compliance with the Indians' demands was vital at this critical time, and so advised the Lords of Trade. A series of conferences held by Croghan revealed the interplay of provincial politics and proprietary interests and culminated in a congress at Easton in 1758, attended by Iroquois, Delawares, Shawnees, Mingoes, and Miamis, led by Teedyuscung. The Penns renounced their claim to the land in question, and the Indians signed a treaty of peace in time to insure the success of Brigadier John Forbes' expedition to Fort Duquesne.

The year 1757 marked the lowest point in the affairs of the Six Nations, who witnessed the surrender of Fort William Henry and a devastating raid upon the German Flats, in the Mohawk Valley, but an upward turn of events was imminent. In the midsummer of 1758,



Lieutenant-Colonel John Bradstreet, ably assisted by Oneida scouts, captured Fort Frontenac, on Lake Ontario, thereby severing the French line of communication with the Ohio posts. By this time the French interest among the Delawares and Shawnees had been weakened, and Fort Niagara faced isolation. At the behest of Amherst, in command of the British forces, Johnson began a drive for warriors early in 1759, and found the Iroquois once more co-operative, now that the French menace had been reduced. A conference in the spring revealed that the reduction of French trade was rapidly inclining the western tribesmen toward the English. The Senecas and Cayugas, no longer courted by the enemy, joined their Iroquois brethren in renewing the covenant, while the Caughnawagas in Canada promised their neutrality. In the summer of 1759, Johnson assembled more than nine hundred warriors to assist Brigadier John Prideaux in an expedition against Fort Niagara. Upon the death of Prideaux, the command devolved upon Johnson, who used his Indian auxiliaries to cut off French reinforcements from Detroit, and compelled the surrender of the stronghold.

The capture of Quebec, in the summer of 1759, was followed by preparations for an expedition to Montreal. In the early autumn, Johnson relinquished his command at Fort Niagara to Brigadier-General Gage, and went to Oswego, where he received the submission of numerous tribes from Canada and the west. After preliminary arrangements for trade with these Indians, Johnson returned to his home until spring. Throughout the winter the tribesmen along the Ohio River and Lake Erie remained peaceful. Meanwhile, former Indian allies of the French made peace with the Six Nations, induced by the scarcity of provisions, the promise of trade, and the outlook for victory. The warriors were now impatient for action. In July, 1760, Johnson mustered more than seven hundred tribesmen to assist Amherst, but many deserted when they were enjoined from pillage after the reduction of Fort La Galette. The remaining forces descended the river, unhindered by neighboring tribes, and joined the siege of Montreal. Deserted by his allies, Vaudreuil surrendered early in September, although fearful of a massacre. Once more Johnson dissuaded the warriors from harming the citizenry, while Amherst rewarded them for good conduct before discharging them and complimented the superintendent upon his management of the Indians.

The problem of Iroquois allegiance was continuous from 1744 to 1760. During King George's War, Johnson's activity was confined to the province of New York, but broadened in scope during the final

struggle. Throughout this period, his services were both military and diplomatic. As colonel of the Six Nations he recruited, equipped, and led war parties with more success than he commanded major expeditions. His routine tasks as superintendent of Indian affairs, while less spectacular, were far more significant. By diligent attention to the correction of trade abuses, the redress of land grievances, provision for the needy, and the cultivation of personal good will, Johnson maintained the English interest among the Six Nations. His blandishments and lavish gifts did not offset the neutralizing effect of British reverses and French proximity. However, Johnson's personal prestige among the sachems and his political tactics of cajolery and bribery were important factors in preventing the defection of the confederacy. His contacts at home and abroad enabled him to override opposition from immediate superiors, and his recommendations largely determined the Indian policy of the Crown.

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There are three basic sources for the study of Anglo-Iroquois relations during the superintendency of Sir William Johnson. Of prime importance are *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, edited by Sullivan and Flick, aiming to reprint, calendar, or index every known manuscript pertinent to Johnson's labors. This collection is supplemented by the *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, edited by O'Callaghan and Fernow, including reprints of official documents in the archives of London and Paris. The *Documentary History of the State of New York*, edited by O'Callaghan, includes supplementary papers relative to Indian affairs under Johnson, with some duplication of the preceding work. The *Calendar of Sir William Johnson Manuscripts*, compiled by Day, provides a chronological approach to these sources and to the contents of manuscripts no longer extant.

Other collections of primary sources include pertinent material. *The Colonial Records of Pennsylvania* and the *Pennsylvania Archives* cover Indian affairs in the Ohio region. Peter Wraaxall's *Abridgment of the Indian Affairs . . . in the Colony of New York*, edited by McIlwain, provides the background for Johnson's labors, but essential data are contained in the ecclesiastical records, colonial laws, and calendars of land papers and council minutes of the province. While the publications of several state historical societies show Johnson's relation to various colonial authorities, *The Collections of the New York Histori-*



*cal Society, Publication Fund Series*, are most useful. Finally, the correspondence of Shirley, Pitt, and Gage throws light on the broader aspects of Indian affairs and gives a critical view of Johnson's department.

Among the secondary works, biographies proved useful, and of the five so far devoted to Johnson, William Leete Stone's *Life and Times of Sir William Johnson, Bart.*, has not been superseded. It lacks documentation, but it includes some important source material not elsewhere available. Arthur Pound's *Johnson of the Mohawks*, while colorful, is valuable primarily because of the collaboration of Richard E. Day, the Johnson scholar. The activity of Johnson's deputy is fully portrayed in Albert T. Volwiler's *George Croghan and the Westward Movement*. The co-operative *History of the State of New York*, edited by Flick, shows the effect of provincial politics on Indian affairs, while Frank H. Severance's *An Old Frontier of France* reveals the French efforts to undermine Johnson's influence over the Six Nations. Finally, the historical setting is adequately provided by the works of Parkman and Thwaites.





## THE MISSOURI RIVER TOWNS IN THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT

WALKER D. WYMAN

Any general text on the westward movement in the United States has chapters on the gold rushes, the settling of Kansas and Nebraska, and the erection of the Mormon empire. Mention is often made of the fact that the pilgrims to California came up the Missouri River to Independence, Missouri, and from there departed to the West. Maps also show the rise of a string of towns along the river between Independence and Sioux City, Iowa. It is also common knowledge that ox-team freighting to government forts, to Denver, and to Santa Fé, assumed considerable proportions before the extension of the railroads to the Rockies. But no study has ever examined the position of these river towns in the westward movement of people and goods. Of what importance were they to the emigrant and freighter? Did geography dictate the selection of the point of departure? What artificial methods of directing the forces of expansion were used? Why did towns seek such patronage? And why were some successful, and others failures? These questions have never before been answered. It has been necessary to qualify, if indeed not disqualify, some viewpoints commonly held by historians and cartographers.

### EMIGRATION

American emigration up to 1840 had proceeded in a fairly straight line across the continent. But when the Missouri River was reached, it jumped across the Great Plains to the Rockies and the Pacific, later filling in that area which it had once scorned. The first stream of this emigration was composed of farmers going to California and Oregon; the second, of prospective miners to California; the third was again agricultural; the fourth, gold-seekers; and thereafter the component parts of the overland traffic were indiscriminately intermingled in one great wave.

In the movement to the Pacific before the gold rush, outfitting for the trip was of no great consequence, for most of those going were from the farms of the Mississippi Valley. They had wagons, oxen, and

foodstuffs to take along, and hence no business of selling such goods arose at the three crossings—Independence, St. Joseph, Missouri, and the “Bluffs” area in the vicinity of the present Council Bluffs, Iowa.

But with the gold rush in 1849 a new set of circumstances appeared. All classes of American life, many ignorant of the demands of frontier travel and of mining life, made ready to go. It was these travelers who caused a development of outfitting towns on the east banks of the river. The Missouri was the frontier. To the east were settlements, to the west lay a region practically uninhabited by the white man. The emigrant from the East could take a steamer via Cape Horn or could cross at Panama. But great numbers who resided between the Alleghenies and the border were best located to go overland by ox-team and wagon, handcart, or horseback. Three roads led west from the “Great Muddy”: the Santa Fé Trail leading southwest from western Missouri to Santa Fé, New Mexico, from where two California trails used by the Spanish could be taken to the coast; the Oregon Trail running northwest from the same terminus, and from which one could branch southwest beyond the Continental Divide into the land of promise; and the Mormon Trail starting in western Iowa and following the north bank of the Platte River. The first path had been broken by frontier freighters and fur traders, the second by trappers and Oregon emigrants, and the third by the Saints going to their Zion at Salt Lake. The Oregon and Mormon trails offered the advantage of being more direct, and were the most popular paths of empire used by “argonauts” through the following years.

Before committing himself to the prairies the emigrant had to have a vehicle, oxen or mules, subsistence, and the utensils, bedding, and tents necessary for convenience and comfort if possible. The farmer emigrant could easily provide himself with the oxen, wagons, and some of the foodstuffs such as bacon; and if he lived on the frontier he could even afford to haul most of his provisions from home. But the clerk from Chicago or the young lawyer from Ann Arbor had to purchase the whole outfit. It would have been foolhardy, under normal conditions, to buy it in the home town; rather he took a stage or steamboat to St. Louis and then ascended the Missouri in a boat to a settlement offering for sale the needed articles. It was this type of emigrant who gave the greatest impetus to the rise of outfitting depots during the rush to California.

The question confronting the pilgrim, whether he was a “dirt” farmer or a “white collar man,” was that of selecting the point of departure.



If there had been but one town on the Missouri River, that problem would not have presented itself. But there were several: Independence, Westport, and Kansas City in Missouri at the bend of the river; Weston and St. Joseph farther up the river on the Missouri side; and a few posts up near Kaneshville, Iowa, on both sides of the river. This made the selection more difficult, especially to the pilgrim from the East. Steamboat and stage connections, the availability of outfits at reasonable prices, the existence of a ferry, and the conditions of the trail west as well as the comparative distance to the Pacific, these were to be considered. Because of these factors, towns competed for the prize of selling goods. Albert Richardson once wrote that man "can no more choose to focus the emigration's converging rays, than he can by taking thought add one cubit to his stature." If that be the case, the owners of the various town-sites did not believe it to be true. There is no doubt that geography was the dominant factor in directing the western-bound. Surely no Wisconsin farmer would drag his wagons south past the "Council Bluffs area" and St. Joseph to Independence just to buy a few goods or to take the Santa Fé Trail. Instead, he would take the most northern town on the river that was patronized by others, and that would be in the region of the "Bluffs." No steamboat emigrant, who did not possess an outfit, would disembark at a settlement without repute as a favorable frontier depot.

The thread running through all the towns and through their history was the Missouri. As far as that geographic force was concerned, they were largely equal. Differences in steamboat rates from St. Louis did give the nearest towns an advantage not enjoyed by Omaha and Council Bluffs. The forces other than the river and the general geographic location were helped or hindered by artificial stimuli from the individual towns. In the California pilgrimage the business of advertising was in its infancy. Local papers were almost the only avenue used to propagandize and they pointed largely to the availability of products or to the prestige of tradition. Thus Kaneshville spoke of the wisdom of the Mormons in having selected that place for a point of departure in former years, and guaranteed an abundance of products even when such did not exist; Independence "pointed with pride" to her Santa Fé freighting and Oregon outfitting business which assured the pilgrim of adequate advice and outfits; while St. Joseph spoke of the patronage of the Oregonians after 1843. Each town pitied the plight of the emigrant who purchased stores of its rivals. Tradition was the keynote, and the advantages resulting from past patronage, made up the

substance of the speeches. These newspapers, circulating among friends and relatives "back East," no doubt gave help to many in selecting a frontier town. Independence seems to have been the only town which resorted to the printing of handbills and of distributing these statements of "fact" to the unsuspecting emigrant in St. Louis. Emigrant guides gave some outfitting information and pointed out the possible points of departure.

A decade later the choice of the emigrant was much more difficult to make. Instead of three or four points of departure there were many. Along the Kansas and Nebraska boundary, after those territories had been opened to settlement in 1854, a host of aspiring towns had come into existence. Most of them nursed the idea that pilgrims could be had for the asking, and that had to be done by advertising. Hence a development of new techniques which eclipsed those of former years. The first point to prove was that of being closer to the Pike's Peak mines than any other competitor. Elaborate maps with an accompanying "Table of Distances" were published by practically every town from Omaha to Kansas City. Each showed beyond doubt that its map was genuinely based on government surveys, an emigrant guide, or other reliable sources. The table of distances showed that the route ran through a country possessing an abundance of water, wood, forage, and even ranches and stage stations at which hay and corn were available. Pamphlets, including the map, were sent to eastern hotels, and distributed on railroads and steamboats by paid "runners." Special editions of some of the newspapers were also financed by local business men. Agents were employed by most of the towns to stand vigil on roads leading through Iowa and Missouri to inform the travelers of the high prices charged or the existence of an epidemic in the town to which they were going. At least two towns advertised the existence of a new route west with a daily stage, before even the first surveys had been made and the stage company organized. Those innocents who took the route learned too late of the extravagance of such advertising.

The emigration in 1859 and 1860 was shared by Council Bluffs, Omaha, and Nebraska City, Nebraska, St. Joseph and Kansas City, Missouri, and Atchison and Leavenworth, Kansas. Taken collectively, many crossed the river at minor towns, just as many crossed at minor points ten years before. But apparently Council Bluffs, Atchison, and Leavenworth were those most favored in this great pilgrimage.

Emigrants filtered through many of the towns *en route* to the prairies



of Kansas and Nebraska, but they afforded few outstanding opportunities. When the rush began to Montana in 1864, the northern towns, particularly Omaha, by right of geography, provisioned the overland traffic. Most of the miners who left from the "States" seem to have gone by steamboat. Feeble attempts were made by most of the river depots to get at least some of the trade, but the efforts were not nearly so intense as they had been five years or even fifteen years before.

The business of outfitting was not in existence in the beginning years of the Oregon emigration. In 1849 it was still in an elementary stage of development, there being but few merchants who specialized in any one type of service. Oxen were sold by farmers on the streets. Grain and butter were distributed by the producers as well as the general stores. No town as yet had become a processing point with pork plants and flour mills to care for their surplus. But when the Missouri Valley became fairly well settled in the fifties, these plants developed. By 1860, the demands of the emigrant could largely be met by the products of the hinterland; however, the new demands for oxen by freighters made necessary the extension of the producing area a great distance from the river. Independent dealers and forwarding houses then sold this stock to the pilgrims. As the overland emigration continued in the sixties and seventies, demands for oxen, wagons, and subsistence declined, even though the numbers of western-bound emigrants were greater than ever before. These emigrants, principally farmers, were adequately provisioned before leaving.

When the "white collar" emigrant disembarked from the steamboat in 1849, he was forced to go immediately into camp. The hotel accommodations were few even if he were fortunate enough to get his name on the register. The boarding houses, although more numerous, were offensive to many. Camp life, perhaps enjoyed at first, served to educate the novice in the culinary arts. The lack of adequate ferry facilities at any place on the river caused delay and articulate impatience. In this period of idleness caused by the ferries, waiting for friends to arrive or grass to come up, the buying was done, acquaintances were made, and often savings were squandered at the faro table. The social life was largely limited to gambling and visiting, the "gala girls" not yet having arrived in great numbers. Besides these men were still thinking of home. Here they penned and received their last letters for many weeks. The towns on some days were bargain places, homesickness causing a few of the sentimental to sell out and turn back. The average gold-seeker, however, enjoyed his sojourn there.

He may have grumbled at the absence of better liquors, for only straight whiskey was for sale. He may have been sold unbroken mules or oxen and have faced the consequences before an appreciative audience. Or again he may have been robbed by others than the storekeepers. The constant intermingling with the other "argonauts" intensified his desire for riches; and he began to look at the lowly oxen with a less critical eye. Optimism lasted through the purchasing, loafing, and organizing periods. After the selection of a captain, secretary, and other officers, and the drawing up of a constitution, resolutions, and by-laws, the start for the great beyond was made. Then some began to "see the elephant," and back-trailed to the frontier town to catch a boat home.

The pilgrim *en route* to Colorado found a different environment in the Missouri towns. He might come by the railroad as far as St. Joseph, and then board a steamboat for points above or below. Roads through Iowa and Missouri were then more than obscure trails. The first three years of the Kansas-Nebraska emigration had been a great boon to river ports, the panic of 1857 had struck most of them hard, but in 1859 a sort of noisy expansion was again taking place. The mercantile establishments were becoming specialized. Hotels were numerous, and the "runners" were little short of being a menace. Saloons were far more in evidence than churches, and bawdy houses and their inmates lent a distinct tone to the night life of the cities. Hacks and drays thronged the streets. Steam ferries plied at most points, and delays were few. The arrival of boats no longer caused the whole populace, resident and floating, to rush to the levee. The emigrant purchased his groceries at one store, his oxen from a forwarding house or professional stock dealer, his wagon from a "manufactory" or wagon "yard," and his tools at a hardware store. Organization into companies with semi-military government was no longer a common practice. The growth of settlements along the trails at which grain and food stuffs could be purchased made possible earlier departures in the spring of the year. Civilization had come, like paralysis, upon the frontier depots and upon the emigration itself. With the exception of 1859 there was no time after the first year of the California gold rush when pilgrims went forth in a helter-skelter manner. Those days were over. The great emigration of the eighteen sixties, like that between 1849 and 1859, was well equipped, apparently moderately prosperous, and of no great value to the outfitting merchants. The great days were over but more than the memory lingered on.



The conclusion is not warranted that these towns were created as outfitting posts, existed solely for that purpose, and were "made" or "broken" by emigrant patronage. The establishment of Independence, Westport, and Kansas City was stimulated by Santa Fé and mountain freighting. Weston was located as a distributing point for an agricultural community. St. Joseph was originally a fur post, but became a Missouri port for a settlement of farmers. Council Bluffs was brought into existence by the Mormons as they waited for the final trek. Omaha was a speculative enterprise, engineered by Council Bluffs business men who, hoping to locate the Pacific Railroad there, made it the capital and sponsored it as an outfitting point. Nebraska City was located at a crossing used by California emigrants several years before. Atchison was founded as a potential depot, and Leavenworth, located near the government post, expected to profit from the business of catering to the military.

All of the towns on the west side of the river, founded about 1854, were born in speculative sin. Those on the eastern side did not get the "new vision" until the emigration began in the forties. The outfitting demands of the western-bound did not cause any of these towns to succeed. In fact, they were "made" or "broken" by diverse forces of the westward movement in general. The lucrative business of outfitting was but a segment in their complete economic life and aspirations. To serve as a depot for overland freighters was considered the greatest honor of all. Being the terminal of a stage route was of only slightly less distinction. To be the upper port of a packet line was earnestly coveted. The major interest of any town was to concentrate there the forces of western expansion, and to do that at the expense of neighboring towns. The obvious purpose of such monopolization was to impress Congress so that when it should build a Pacific railroad this particular town would become the eastern terminus. Perhaps these dreams were caused by an abundance of town lots possessed by the alien founders, who hoped they might establish fortunes on the unearned increment.

However, the concentration at any one town did much to turn the trick. It put that fortunate town on the map, and made available a ready market for surplus farm produce. This encouraged the rapid settlement of a prosperous hinterland, and brought into the towns a tribe of merchants, millers, and blacksmiths—all eager to serve the hopeful going west. And with them came others—lawyers, physicians, land speculators, carpenters, and draymen to round out an expanding community. Hence, it can easily be seen why emigrant patronage was

eagerly sought. The question confronting any "Board of Trade" was how to get the pilgrims there before devising the best manner to fleece them.

Nurtured, if not born, in speculation, these towns held out open arms to the emigration that geography directed there, and did missionary work to get more. Certainly some of them were successful at distorting the forces of a natural expansion. Council Bluffs and Omaha, though slow in improving the roads west, received their just dues. Nebraska City was worthy of more than came through it. St. Joseph fared well at first, but apparently fell to a second or third depot in the late fifties. But the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad was adequate compensation. Atchison seems never to have had all that geography might have given it, but that unethical rival downstream, Leavenworth, drew much of the emigration which should have outfitted in St. Joseph, Kansas City, or Atchison. The only patronage Kansas City was entitled to was that to the hinterland and a share of that to Pike's Peak. Apparently the latter slighted the town for those less deserving. The only major distortion of the great lines of emigration was by Leavenworth, but competition caused much misrepresentation. If many of the thirty or more river towns laid out in the fifties had become outfitting depots, there would have been great cause for taking issue with Richardson's statement that man cannot focus "emigration's converging rays."

#### OVERLAND FREIGHTING

Transportation has been one of the basic problems of every border area, especially until a state of comparative self-sufficiency has been attained. The fur trade, military, and settlement frontiers of the Trans-Missouri West would not have given rise to such a great business of ox-team freighting if the processes of that expansion had been orthodox. When population jumped the Great Plains, going to the Indian posts, to Utah, to the mines of the Rockies, and to the Southwest, contact with the States was necessary, for it was dependent upon that part of the nation for most of the necessities and all the comforts of life. Located as were these patches of civilization, often in the midst of unfriendly Indian nations, they relied upon Washington for protection. This necessitated the establishment of isolated posts on a far-flung frontier, which were dependent upon the old economic order. To feed and clothe the empire builders—Mormons, miners, soldiers, and farmers—there developed a business of hauling goods to them; and as they produced raw materials in the form of furs, metals, mules, or



wool, the processes of exchange took place, enriching both the new and the old frontiers. Originally the fur trader went to the Indian tribes primarily for the purpose of getting raw products, the trinkets given in exchange being incidental. As the Indians became wards of the government, and as the fur business declined with the encroachment of white men, the nature of the freighting became reversed, and exports from the Missouri then exceeded imports. In that respect, the Indian trade was unique.

The greatest events giving rise to overland freighting were the Mexican War, the settling of Utah by the Mormons, and the gold rush to Colorado. These three frontiers were the destination of the greatest amount of goods shipped west, while those of the Indian traders and miners other than the Denver regions, were of secondary importance. The relative unimportance of freighting to the mining areas except Colorado may be attributed to the use of the steamboat in supplying the expanding Montana frontier and to the fact that the mineral empire was largely established after the coming of the transcontinental railroad.

The Indian trade was the oldest of the Trans-Missouri West. Ft. William, later known as Bent's Fort, built on the upper Arkansas in 1814, became a trading point for most of the wandering tribes between the Platte and Arkansas. Ft. Benton on the upper Missouri and Ft. St. Vrain on the South Platte, were also famous Indian posts. Others were established on the rivers between north Texas and the Canadian line and did business exclusively with St. Louis until the rise of the Missouri River towns in the fifties. In the early period mackinaw boats brought the furs down the Missouri River to the upper terminal of the steamboat lines, and pack horses and wagons brought them overland. Later steamboats and wagons alone penetrated the wilderness. The American Fur Company, the organization chiefly interested in western pelts, shipped in thousands of robes and skins each year for the greater part of a half century.

By the time of the Civil War, some 100,000 furs, peltries, and hides constituted the annual business valued at one-half million dollars. Yet it was on the decrease. Buffalo dominated the trade, and three-fourths of this portion came from the upper Missouri regions by steamboat. That shipped overland came largely to Kansas City. Commission men there took charge of the furs while New York buyers made the purchases and prepared them for eastern shipment.

Both stationary and wandering traders found guns, powder, lead,

tobacco, sugar, coffee, beads, calicoes, blankets, saddles, bridles, and ribbons in demand everywhere among the tribes. Agricultural groups also brought flour and bacon. Most of those permanently located were supplied with farming equipment, provisions, blankets, and clothing by the government. Contracts were let to merchants in St. Louis or in the Missouri River towns for the goods. From these ports, but chiefly Kansas City, freighters contracted to transport the goods at a stipulated price per pound per mile.

However, the Indian trade made up but a minor part of the total overland freighting, even if it antedated all of it. The most extensive was that to New Mexico, Arizona, and the northern Mexico area. Commercial intercourse began with that Mexican frontier in the eighteen twenties largely because of the relative proximity of Missouri as compared to the distance south to Vera Cruz. Traders at first took goods directly from St. Louis, later shipping from the headwaters of navigation until this private trade finally was concentrated at the bend of the Missouri. Before the influx of Americans into that region, largely after the Mexican War, the variety of the imports was not great. Flashy, colored calico, groceries, and leather goods were exchanged for specie, hides, and mules. Coffee and sugar were unknown. As the decade of the fifties waned, almost every article found in the stores of border state merchants was also available in New Mexico. The demand remained "uncommonly large" for diminutive white hosiery, calicoes, and bleached domestics, and as Spanish customs crumbled American-made clothing constituted a great proportion of the total traffic. The Rio Grande Valley produced sufficient wheat to make the flour needed, but the appetites of Americans in that region were not whetted by this native product. Hence flour was freighted overland from Missouri. Mining machinery also became of importance as an export.

After the American invasion, mules, furs, and specie declined as articles of exchange. Mule breeding in Missouri made importation unnecessary; the fur supply diminished as the whites advanced; and specie was largely drained out of the country. After 1857, when the first load of wool was brought over the Santa Fé Trail, that article along with goat and sheep skins became one of the greatest native products brought to the Missouri frontier.

The New Mexican trade was first in the hands of relatively few freighters, both Mexican and Yankee. A considerable proportion of the merchants were freighters themselves, several of them being originally from Missouri. By 1860, however, 270 or more Americans alone



were engaged in the overland traffic, many doing a small business as compared with the large merchants and forwarding houses. However, very few border merchants had established branch stores in the many hamlets scattered over the desert from California to Texas and from Colorado to Chihuahua. The business of freighting was lucrative, 40 per cent profit not being considered too great in the fifties.

The other aspect of the southwestern traffic was that of supplying government troops stationed in the interior. The army took the responsibility of freighting its own subsistence stores during the Mexican War. But after northern Mexico became a part of the United States, and seven posts were established, garrisoned by 1,000 troops, the contract system, or the employment of private freighters to transport the goods became the accepted means of furnishing Navajo Land with food. Ten years later the uncompromising nature of the Apache Indians had caused the number of posts to increase to sixteen, and troops to over 2,000. Santa Fé was the army depot until 1851 and after that Ft. Union became the headquarters. Freighters transported goods there or directly to the scattered posts.

In the earlier years the troops depended upon the Missouri border for all supplies for themselves and horses. Later the policy of buying forage, fuel, and a few other items from their own localities was adopted. But such articles as bread and bacon apparently were shipped overland during the whole period of ox-team freighting.

The number of contractors engaged in this aspect of the Santa Fé traffic was quite small. During the first few years an average of three firms received the government contracts. William Russell or Alexander Majors or both were recipients of a part of the contracts from the inception of the system in 1849. Even before Russell, Majors, and Waddell organized their great firm in 1858, they had succeeded as individuals in monopolizing the whole business. The only competitor of this firm in the sixties seems to have been Irving, Jackman, and Company, but that firm never excelled the former.

The supplies for the Army of the West during the Mexican War were dispatched from Ft. Leavenworth, the only government fort on the Missouri River frontier. As the town of Leavenworth grew up about the fort and as other towns appeared on the river bank in the fifties, competition was keen for the honor of being the depot. Leavenworth's monopoly was broken in 1858 when goods for posts on the Arkansas and in the Southwest were dispatched from Kansas City. But the Civil War effected the transfer back to Leavenworth in 1861 where it

remained until the end of the war, and incidentally to the twilight of overland freighting. As the Kansas Pacific nosed westward, Ft. Riley, Kansas, became the depot for the troops of the Southwest.

The army freighting to the Southwest, the greatness of which has been much exaggerated, was of minor importance compared with the private traffic. From 278 wagons in 1850 it grew to 862 in 1860, or perhaps an average of one-fourth of the total commerce of the Santa Fé Trail. But it was as significant as any other, for when a bushel of corn purchased in Missouri and delivered at Ft. Union cost the government \$9.44, and when the total transportation costs were close to \$1,500,000 annually, the necessity of less expensive freighting, of making the troops dependent upon New Mexico for all supplies, or of giving the whole southwestern frontier back to Mexico became clear. This explains much of the railroad fever that raged in Congress, and it certainly gave irrefutable arguments to the proponents of such legislation.

Another phase of overland freighting, that to Utah, dating from 1847, was of no small consequence. The small number and the poverty of the residents gave but little encouragement to those St. Louis firms, which had sold to them for years, to establish branch stores in the Valley. But after the evacuation of the Iowa settlement in 1852, and the annual arrival of an increasingly greater number of European converts, the demands grew for machinery, hardware, cheap dry-goods, and boots and shoes. With a few exceptions adequate food supplies were grown after the first few years. By 1860, the Saints were exporting flour to the mines in the Rockies, and furs, skins, and some wool to the Missouri River. Both Gentile and Mormon interests were engaged in freighting, and even the Church sent annually teams (given for use in tithing) to the States to get the newly-arrived converts and those articles or implements needed. The Church purchased in the East, and billed the goods to Florence or Omaha, Nebraska, for further shipment. The private traders loaded at towns lower on the river, Atchison perhaps being the most important depot. This business, while lucrative, especially in the fifties, declined after the grand orgy at the end of that decade which overstocked the markets. Considered as a whole, it never was as great as the Santa Fé trade because the people were poor and their wants were simple. Moreover the settlement continually became more self-supporting by use of irrigation for agriculture and through the establishment of small plants for the manufacturing of flour, clothing, and other items.

The Saints in their settlements beyond the Wasatch Range gave rise



to one of the briefest but greatest periods in government freighting. Because of difficulties involving the sovereignty of the federal government, an army was dispatched there in 1857. Dependent upon the settlers and freighters for all supplies except mules, horses, and fuel, the 2,500 troops necessitated the employment of about 3,000 wagons with public stores and a considerable number for the sutlers who dispensed the "extras" of army life. Ft. Kearney was specified as the depot of the Plains, but Atchison, Nebraska City, and Ft. Leavenworth were the points of departure on the Missouri River—the latter the most used. Although overland freighting to Utah posts did not cease with the war, the period of greatest activity passed in 1858. Thereafter the military aspect of the Utah traffic was of much less consequence than that to other points on the army frontier.

The discovery of gold in the Pike's Peak region in 1858 gave the greatest impetus to the overland traffic and freighting. Population began to trickle there in the fall of 1858, but in the following two years a veritable flood (estimated at 60,000 in 1859) poured across the Plains to the many mining hamlets in the valleys of the Rockies. When it became certain in 1859 that the settlement would not only be permanent but a growing one based upon mining and agriculture, a systematic trade began. Most of the emigrants in 1858, and several in 1859, took food supplies with them. In the latter year merchants of the principal Missouri River towns from Omaha to Independence, but principally from Leavenworth and Atchison, established branch stores. By 1860 the Pike's Peak trade engaged over fifty traders, was slightly greater than the commerce of the Southwest, and was more widely diffused among the river towns than any overland commerce in western history. Although New Mexico and Utah freighted some flour to the new mines, the trade with the States grew as the sixties wore on. These settlers were Americans willing to do without comforts only so long as such were not available. Hence, everything from mining machinery and brick to oysters and apples filled the wagons *en route* to the land which produced nothing but vegetables and precious metals. By 1866 nearly 80,000,000 pounds of goods, exclusive of those sent by the government, were shipped there annually at an average cost of ten cents per pound. This called for forms of transportation other than that by oxen and mules.

The growth of overland freighting from its inception in the second decade of the century to the coming of the railroad in the sixties is one of the most phenomenal aspects of western history, as yet not

fully understood. The greatest part of it was that of private freighters and merchants, with government contractors occupying a minor role. Until the Pike's Peak commerce came into existence Kansas City with its Santa Fé business was the greatest depot in the West, but the Colorado discoveries and the circumstances of the Civil War shattered that prestige which was never regained. However, the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific brought an end to the whole business about 1867, at a time when the total commerce was probably greater by thirty or forty times that of two decades before. When it died, a gigantic business ended: nearly 10,000 wagons had to be dismantled, some 100,000 oxen and 10,000 mules sold, and 20,000 men were shifted to the new freight lines extending north and south from the railroads or to a type of work to which they could adapt themselves. River towns no longer resounded to the curses of men and the bawling of oxen. The nearby prairies were never again to be dotted with the corrals of the canvas-covered schooner. The famous Platte River and Santa Fé trails were soon enclosed by wire fences in the farmer invasion. Instead of long lines of wagons resembling ships in full sail, the dull-colored train belching forth black smoke screamed its way across the plains so often trod by the tired bullwhacker.

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Questions concerning the function of the Missouri River towns in the westward movement of goods and people and the effect of that upon them has been partially answered from the use of travel literature, newspaper files, city directories, reminiscences, and interviews. The chief sources of information are the public prints, the most valuable of which were: Atchison *Squatter Sovereign* (1856-1857), *Freedom's Champion* (1858-1863), and *Free Press* (1865-1866); Brownville *Nebraska Palladium* (1854-1855) and *Nebraska Advertiser* (1854-1855); Council Bluffs *Bugle* (1854-1870) and *Nonpareil* (1859-1867); Columbia *Missouri Statesman* (1849-1864); Kanesville *Frontier Guardian* (1849-1852) and *Frontier Guardian and Iowa Sentinel* (1852); Kansas City *Journal of Commerce* (1857-1866); Leavenworth *Herald* (1854-1858), *Journal* (1856-1858), *Times* (1858-1864), and *Conservative* (1861-1864); Nebraska City *News* (1857-1867) and *Press* (1859-1865); Omaha *Arrow* (1854), *Times* (1857-1858), *Republican* (1859-1860), and *Nebraskian* (1860); St. Joseph *Gazette* (1845-1848), *Adventure* (1848-1853), *Weekly Commercial Cycle* (1853-1854), *Weekly West* (1859-1860), *Morning Herald* (1862-1864), and *Morn-*



*ing Herald and Daily Tribune* (1864-1866); St. Louis *Missouri Republican* (1849-1850). Without doubt the *Journal of Commerce* was the best paper of the whole border. Files for Independence, Westport, and Weston apparently have not been preserved.

Journals of the emigrants, many of which have appeared in volume form and in the publications of the state historical societies, give detailed evidence on outfitting. In the writer's possession are copies of several original California journals—one of which (John A. Benson, *Diary of a Trip from Louisa County Iowa, to California, via St. Joseph and the Platte River Route*) is a classic. Only one great freighter, Alexander Majors, has left a general account of his business activities. The comments of English travelers and of eastern Americans are illuminating as well as amusing. The following business directories are an excellent measure of the effects of the westward movement upon the economic life of the river towns: Charles Collins, *Omaha Directory* (Omaha, 1866); N. S. Harding and Company, *Nebraska City Directory for 1870* (Nebraska City, 1870); H. Fotheringham and Company, *St. Joseph Directory for 1859-60* (St. Joseph, 1860); Frank Swick, *Resident and Business Directory of St. Joseph* (St. Joseph, 1867); C. C. Spaulding, *Annals of the City of Kansas* (Kansas City, 1858); Sutherland and McEvoy, *Kansas City Directory, and Business Mirror for 1859-60* (St. Louis, date not given); James Sutherland, *Kansas City Directory, and Business Mirror for 1860-61* (Indianapolis, date not given); Millet and Sloan, *Kansas City Business Directory, and Mirror, for 1865-66* (Kansas City, date not given); and Excelsior Book and Job Office, *Kansas City Directory and Reference Book, with a Business Directory, for 1867-8* (Quincy, date not given).

Interviews with sons and daughters of the pioneers yielded little or nothing. Reminiscences appearing in the publications of the Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri, and Iowa state historical societies have shed some light and much color. The small volumes and pamphlets, such as A. P. De Milt's *Story of an Old Town*, have been of some aid. Histories of the states and counties served in some instances. But above all, the newspapers are the best sources.





## THE WEST IN THE CIVIL WAR DECADE

CHARLES H. NORBY

The American West, though frequently described as the unsettled part of American territory, may also properly be looked upon as the settling part of American society. In this section of the Republic people were continuously and freely though irregularly advancing into a diminishing area of free land, collecting to form new communities and new villages, filling in the uncrowded countryside and accumulating in villages, towns, and cities behind the frontier. Because of this continuous addition to the population, it was also conspicuously the scene of material progress. Although there were always dull islands and sometimes periods of inactivity, production and trade grew rapidly and at times spectacularly, as farms, stores, mines, factories, and other enterprises were founded, enlarged, and improved. The East and the South, when they became distinct in the pattern of national life, were neither fully formed nor static. But in point of geographic breadth, democratic participation, and range in the economic scale, the growth of the West was outstanding in the unprecedented nineteenth century economic development of the United States.

The structure of Western society was continuously transformed as it moved westward in uneven, saltatory surges, and moved within itself upward, we may say, in the scale of civilization. The relations of man to nature, the relations of man to society, and the relations of man to instruments and institutions were continuously modified. At one period Louisville was the metropolis of a population spread over a forested region, engaged mainly in agricultural pursuits, bound to a struggling new Republic by a system of trail and river transportation. At a later period the metropolis was Chicago, center of a rail and lake traffic traversing forest, prairie, plains, and mountains, heaping the products of farm, ranch, and mine into the lap of an emerging industrial power. If circumstance counts at all in the explanation of human affairs there was, strictly speaking, no West. There were only Wests.

A great deal has already been written about the earlier epochs in Western history. The works of Turner and Roosevelt, excellent state histories and monographs, illuminate the period before the Civil War.

State histories and monographs have also covered, in many cases quite intensively, portions of the later history. In them the significant changes which fall roughly within the Civil War decade have been pointed out and discussed. Historians are already familiar with the removal of Southern checks upon expansion, pioneering on the Great Plains, the dispersion of mining settlements over the Far Western interior, the conquest of the Prairie, the emergence of a railway system, the extension of lines beyond the frontier, the Sioux outbreak, the Homestead Act, the rise of the cattle industry on the Plains, the adoption of the reaper, the revolution in agriculture and trade, the transition to large scale mining of precious metals, the ascendance of Chicago and San Francisco, and the campaign for settlers. In his book *The Last American Frontier*, Professor F. L. Paxson has pointed to the influence of these developments upon the last great waves of the westward movement. But so far no one has attempted to piece these new developments into the old pattern and draw them together into a composite analysis of Western life. This investigation into the nature of economic life in the West during the Civil War decade is an attempt to turn a few furrows in a fresh, fertile, and extensive field.

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In 1860 Western society incorporated Middle Western agricultural settlements extending north of the Ohio River to the shores of Lake Erie and into southern Michigan and Wisconsin, and westward from the Ohio, beyond the Mississippi, into central Minnesota, southeastern Dakota, western Iowa, eastern Nebraska, and eastern Kansas. Ample spaces of unoccupied, unimproved lands lay within the social framework as well as beyond the frontier, inviting utilization, and influencing the course of the historic westward movement in the succeeding decade. It also contained isolated mining, agricultural, and pastoral settlements in the rugged Far West—in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, California, Washington, and Oregon. These varied in compactness, but all lay within a vast, unpeopled region widely though not universally hospitable to economic development.

Despite a lack of geographic solidarity, Western society was unified, and connected with the East and the world at large by an integrated, organized, and planned system of transportation. Steamboats plied the Mississippi, Ohio, and Missouri rivers, ascending the latter waterway as far as Fort Benton in the shadow of the Rocky Mountains. Steamboats and sailing vessels coursed the waters of the Great Lakes, and



larger vessels of the same type, operating upon the high seas, connected San Francisco and Portland with the East via the Isthmus of Panama and Cape Horn. Steamboats upon the Columbia, Sacramento, and San Joaquin rivers brought settlements deep in the Far Western interior within the orbit of trans-marine commerce. Additional carrying facilities were provided by overland transportation companies and by railways. A regularized stage and freighting service was conducted in the region beyond the Midwest frontier, reaching into remote portions of the Far West with the rise of the new mining communities in Montana and Idaho. In the Old Northwest the railway network was by 1860 "substantially complete," and in the ten years following new lines were extended westward, making deep inroads upon steamboat and wagon traffic. Before the decade closed three trunk lines connected Chicago and Omaha, and the Union Pacific linked Omaha and San Francisco. The railway system had passed out of the period of fractional beginnings. Facilities now existed for continuous long distance transportation. Bridges, ferries, and ice sledges spanned intervening waterways. Lines running westward out of Chicago had uniform standard gauges, and three arterial lines extended from Chicago to the Atlantic seaboard. Western communities, though separated, were not out of touch with one another or with the world beyond.

Telegraph lines, freight companies, and other commercial agencies grew as transportation facilities were improved, and in the agricultural or Middle West economic development became even more impressive than it was in those days when a sparse population along the rivers had clamored for a free outlet to the sea at New Orleans. Farmers on fertile acres, considerable portions of which were unimproved, were given more direct access to the comforts and conveniences of more mature societies, and at the same time the potentialities of their lands were enhanced by enlargement of the accessible market. The laborers necessary for expanded tillage were scarce and wages were high; the Civil War, moreover, intensified the labor problem. But farm machinery was available, and it was introduced at a pace which offers some challenge to Lord Morley's reflection that the past has moved with laggard paces. Unimproved lands were plowed and sown. Grain production increased. Cattle raising flourished on contracted pastures supplemented by feed bins. Rural activity and well-being grew vigorously though not always hardily on the once virgin prairie. One witness of the changes who, in looking backward, did not forget that the

early settler looked forward, wrote that "there was breathed into the farmer a new spirit, and he became another being."

Improved transportation services into the interior and the allurements of commercial agriculture contributed also to the launching of new farming ventures on the remaining untilled acres of the region. By this time government surveyors were working in the van of settlement, converting nameless tracts into identified, readily transferable blocks. In the frontier zone and for a considerable distance beyond, the federal government offered its lands free under the provisions of the Homestead Act, and at \$1.25 and \$2.50 per acre under legal provisions governing direct purchase. Behind the frontier zone practically all of the good land had passed into the possession of railway companies, state government, private realtors, and farmers. Anticipation of profitable disposal to settlers had motivated withdrawal of these tracts from the federal domain. But the price remained at a comparatively low figure, mounting greatly, as a rule, only in those regions where commercial advantages were enhanced. The presence of free and cheap government land westward and the plentifulness of the remaining portion tended to keep the general price at a low level. The practice of holding lands until the available price greatly increased was not common enough to be seriously obstructive. Immediate profits were attractive. Profits from town site sales and from other business undertakings which settlers would patronize were attractive also. Holdings were, in fact, aggressively advertised. Colonists were sought and liberal credit terms were offered—with marked success. In this manner the land policies of the states and the private landholding agencies, as well as the federal government, assisted and encouraged an increase in the number of farms and farmers.

On the frontier, the line of new settlement, development was fresh and lively, moving briskly from primitive to modern conditions. Here on the fringe of society the pioneer did face difficulty and danger and did bear heavy responsibilities. Life and property were frequently endangered by Indian depredations, severe weather, and other afflictions unknown or modified in older communities. But peculiar frontier hardships were only a passing hindrance to the march of civilization. After outbreaks in Minnesota and to the south tribes were subdued or expelled into the Far West. The elimination of the Indian problem brought greater security to life and farming. Its persistence elsewhere, moreover, swelled the profits arising out of traffic with trail stations, Indian posts, and military posts beyond the frontier. When the exten-



sion of railways stimulated the growth of the cattle industry on the Plains, farmers in Kansas and Nebraska were relieved of menace from trampling herds and given opportunity to purchase cattle, lean after long journeys, to fatten and to sell them profitably. The broad frontal extension of railways, furthermore, promoted the infiltration of settlers to whom land and produce were sold. It brought a growing society within the enlivening sphere of influence of the Agricultural Revolution, and by stimulating social organization awakened new motives and desires for enrichment. Primitive homesteads became rich estates and thousands of pioneers became well-to-do, influential, progressive "old settlers."

With the growth of the agricultural industry, Middle Western commerce and manufacturing were reinvigorated and stirred into livelier activity. Retail and wholesale establishments increased in size and number. The building trades and their ministering factories expanded. More business men and more workmen were drawn into the varied service of expansion, and they no less than the frontiersmen lived in the glow of impending success which, if it did not inexorably descend upon each of them, enveloped all in a warm atmosphere of anticipation. They lived on another frontier which was broad enough to accommodate shifting from employment to employment, from vocation to vocation, and from place to place. Chicago, with its grain elevators, its huge stockyard, its packing industry, stood out strikingly in this noisy transition. "Compared with the bustle of Chicago," one English visitor exclaimed, "the bustle of New York seems stagnation." But towns and cities grew and flourished at many points in the Middle West. Even adolescent villages, anticipating a swift passage from Lilliput to Brobdignag, were laid out on a pretentious scale, each the "fragment of a city" with soaring aspirations. Their citizens joined with other prospective beneficiaries of expansion in vigorous attempts to attract and direct settlement and investment. Extravagant though it was, the literature of persuasion which they broadcast was expressive of the temper of the times.

It is true that improvement was neither continuous nor universal. Although no widespread crop failures are recorded for the sixties, excessive rains, drouth, and grasshopper raids halted progress and even brought distress to numerous farmsteads. The Civil War also brought ill fortune. Many Midwestern banks, with notes based largely upon Southern state bank securities, crashed as hostilities opened, striking a heavy blow at trade and agriculture. Men were drawn from economic

pursuits for service in the army. Immigration was retarded. Farms and towns were damaged in Kansas and Missouri. Direct river trade with the South was interrupted, and as railways appropriated the traffic which steamboat lines were obliged to relinquish, a decline ensued in numerous river towns which was not in all cases arrested by the return of peace. The railway, creeping westward and creating new arteries of commerce, also inaugurated a decline in many overland freighting depots. Increased reliance and dependence upon railway transportation subjected farmers to the abuses so vigorously denounced in the Granger outbursts.

But these and other evils, if they did make it somewhat irregular and fitful, did not block the general economic advance in the Middle West. The War even assisted the development of agriculture. Inflation contributed to a rise in commodity prices. War emergency, and economic prostration in the South, expanded the market for Western foodstuffs. Other supports of Middle Western development were the growth of consuming urban centers in this country and abroad and the penetration of the European market in the early years of the decade. Population increase and the enlargement of human wants and needs in the world at large contributed immensely to the spread and rapid growth which were hall marks of Western society.

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For centuries prior to the celebrated days of forty-nine, gold and silver had been symbols and standards of wealth. Discovery of gold deposits in California just after the Mexican War had led to a feverish immigration and the swift though fluctuating development of a new mining industry in distant, mountain-hemmed American outposts. In the sixties that development continued, less spectacularly perhaps, but in a vaster and better equipped theatre. On the eve of the decade and at intervals in its course, casual and methodical prospectors discovered rich deposits of gold and silver in Nevada, Colorado, Montana, and Idaho. Eager throngs gathered in valleys and on isolated mountain sides where, building on California experience, they staked out numerous small holdings and used picks and pans, rockers, sluices, and hand mortars in removing great quantities of precious metals from Nature's hoard.

Capital and machinery were introduced in these as in older communities with the extension of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific and the improvement of other means of transportation. Hillsides were



swept away. Deep shafts were sunk. Owing to litigation over titles, isolation in a rugged country, Indian depredations, the cheapness of money, the attraction of laborers by new discoveries or the promising search for new discoveries, expenses were great. But, despite high costs, large scale operations were highly remunerative to owners, financiers, promoters, managers, miners, and numerous small stockholders and bondholders in the Far West. They profited, in many cases, merely from commerce in stocks and bonds. In many cases, controlling groups and their agents profited at the expense of their fellows and of Eastern and European investors through dishonest practices. In Montana alone one competent observer could have pointed out several managers who had "closed their mills and mean there shall be no profits realized until the flattened-out stock can be gathered into the hands of a few who govern the inner circle of the direction." Wealth accumulated rapidly in the mining country and the extravagant living and ostentatious giving which arose out of sudden affluence in a booming, "scantly institutionalized" society strengthened desire for continued accumulation.

But, as already indicated, success was scarcely more conspicuous than failure in the history of individual or corporate mining and mine investment during this period. Rich deposits deteriorated or became played out. Rich ores defied methods of extraction. Machinery and other equipment broke down or became useless as new needs arose. The wild buying and selling of stocks, the dishonesty and craftiness, quickened by the natural "uncertainties of mining, its sudden highs [sic], its equally surprising depths, and the eager haste to be rich," struck away financial support necessary for productive enterprise. At many points the industry languished during all or part of the decade. Timidity displaced temerity in the Eastern and European stock and bond markets. Each collapse made recuperation more difficult.

But new "strikes" frequently opened the way to a resumption of operations. New discoveries repeatedly provided new opportunities for those who could and would seek a new field of investment and exploitation. The failure of over-capitalized corporations opened the way to new, often saner, refinancing. Crafty and courageous promoters and investors continued to launch new enterprises. Stockholders made contributions. Old machinery was repaired. New shafts were sunk. New machinery and other new equipment were devised and adopted. Though it must be acknowledged that such activity did not arrest a general decline in the later years of the decade, it is quite evident that

the outlook for the future was very promising. It was reasonable to expect that somewhere in the vast mountain area hidden rich deposits awaited the prospector's pick. It was reasonable to expect that the completed Union Pacific Railway and other lines in course of construction would diminish the cost of supplies, increase the immigration of laborers, and establish closer contact with investors abroad. It was reasonable to expect that new inventions would shortly make possible the profitable working of refractory ores. Few Far Westerners could feel with certainty that boom days were gone forever.

Trade and agriculture in the interior rose and fell with the growth and decrease of the local mining population. In one year merchants sold their stocks rapidly at very high prices. In another year their stocks remained unsold unless offered at low rates or moved at great expense to some more favorable site. Farmers, despite grasshopper raids and other misfortunes, reaped large profits from tillage of irrigated fields until the local market sagged or collapsed. Recovery awaited a renewal of local mining activity or the opening of broader markets elsewhere. In Montana at the end of the decade, a lingering populace sought the construction of railway lines such as those which, through Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and California, brought to farmers and merchants of those regions bright prospect of relief from erratic movements of the business cycle. On the coast agriculture and trade grew more steadily. Ministering to larger and broader markets, San Francisco and Portland and the settlements in the coastal valleys pushed without prolonged interruption toward coveted greatness. Only on the Rio Grande and in other Latin American settlements could one see any striking modification of the economic change, the wakefulness and striving for great gain which were so markedly characteristic of the Far West. The residents of Mormon Utah, though controlled by a theocratic government, were participants collectively in agricultural and commercial development through the functioning of a shrewd, self-fortifying leadership. They, too, in company with other Westerners, were essentially busy dwellers in a "world of preparation, living not on the memories of its past but on the visions of its great future." In this decade, at least, the West plainly exhibited traits of the material development so evident in the full span of its history.

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In any thorough investigation of the forces dominating the politics and politicians of the West, its literature, and all its cultural tenden-



cies, it would be necessary to stress the importance of frontier experience. Life amid primitive surroundings left its stamp on the frontiersman and his family. Repeated migrations preserved that impress. Among those who remained to be enveloped by civilization it was conserved and only gradually effaced. The frontiersmen were only a small and comparatively inarticulate minority in the West of the sixties, however, and few were perennially birds of passage. In the more populous regions over which the frontier had passed, the people with a frontier background can hardly be called preponderant in numbers or influence. They may have been; but, even granting that, it is reasonable to doubt that past experience played a greater part in shaping their thought and feeling than the current experience just described. Within the limits of the present view, it is apparent that all shared in common though unequally the effects of a unique social expansion and development. They lived within or briefly in the pathway of a moving, building world wherein they might build for themselves. They were quite generally absorbed in or witnesses of economic careers which would lead biographers through an examination of varied opportunities, investment, occasional movements to new vocations and new locations, risk, profit, accumulation of property, reinvestment, loss, reborn hope. All this was part of the fluidity of Western society and all this entered into the environment and experience of the pioneer and other Westerners. The venturesomeness, self-reliance, and independence long ascribed to Western character were nurtured in this soil behind as well as on the frontier. The agrarian discontent which arose here was not the voice of grinding poverty such as Europe had long known. It was the voice of loss and frustration in a land of promise. The slow progress of the arts was a concomitant of preoccupation with other kinds of creative work. Anyone investigating the politics and culture of the period will find it profitable to consult the whole range and course of economic life and to reflect upon the remark of a Westerner concerning the westward creeping Union Pacific, "Yes, sir, I calculate this is going to be the biggest thing in God's creation."

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The *Reports of the Commissioner of Agriculture*, 1862-1870, contain in addition to general data, numerous articles on special phases of Western agriculture. The *Reports of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1860-1870, including the reports of the secretary and the *Reports of the Commissioner of the General Land Office* which, in turn, contain

the reports of surveyors general, include information on land laws, land utilization, and general economic conditions in the West. The census reports for 1860 and 1870 and other miscellaneous government documents are similarly rich. The first ten volumes of *The American Annual Cyclopædia*, covering the period 1861-1870, are principally concerned with political events but contain a great deal of generally accurate data on economic aspects of the decade. They are particularly useful as compact accounts with wide reference to American life which enable observation of the West in its national setting. Other valuable contemporaneous works—periodicals, travel accounts, guide-books, commercial directories, railway manuals, and books and pamphlets on a variety of subjects—are plentifully extant in the libraries of the State University of Iowa, the State Historical Society of Iowa, and the Minnesota Historical Society where they have been consulted, together with aforementioned materials and supplementary state histories, historical monographs, and historical journals, in the pursuit of this inquiry.



## THE MILITARY-INDIAN FRONTIER IN MONTANA, 1860-1890

MERRILL G. BURLINGAME

The rapid expansion of the cutting edge of the frontier into the vast areas of the West was one of the most important movements in the United States during the first century of its existence. The term "free land," which was applied to this great region, left out of account the roving bands of native redmen who had a claim to the land through the white man's own criterion of prior occupation. This first century of expansion was marked by a continuous process of breaking down the claims of the Indians to the lands of the West.

Not many studies have been made which attempt to trace the influence of the smaller areas of the frontier upon the formation and change of the Indian policy of the nation. The local situation was often the determining factor in the formation and application of the Indian-military policy. The Indian service and the army were invested with the duty of promoting the welfare of both the Indian and the white man. The white invaders moved so rapidly into the western territories, and the conflict with the Indians was so severe, that both the army and Indian service were used very largely to protect the white man.

Military and Indian affairs were closely interrelated and of first importance in the development of the Montana region. Lewis and Clark carried on their explorations through the facilities of the army. In 1812, the upper Missouri River area again attracted the attention of the military authorities. There was every likelihood that the Canadian influence upon the Indians south of the vaguely traced international boundary line would be distinctly harmful to the fur traders. Manuel Lisa, the Spanish veteran of the fur trade, was able to retain the loyalty of the Indians and peace was maintained in the region. General Henry Atkinson led an expedition up the Missouri in 1825, found a peaceful condition still prevailing, and advised against the erection of permanent military fortifications.

The Montana area until about 1850 was a fur-trading frontier and was, therefore, relatively unmodified by the intrusion of the white man. François Antoine Larocque had come into the Yellowstone River region

in 1805, in the interests of a Canadian fur company, and Manuel Lisa built the first post for a company from the United States in 1807, on the same river. This early effort was followed by the activities of the Missouri Fur Company, the Rocky Mountain Fur Company, the American Fur Company in the area east of the mountains, and of the North West and Hudson's Bay companies in the western part of Montana. All of these companies in the interests of their trade were deeply anxious to keep the frontier as nearly primitive as possible.

The colorful fur-trading period in Montana brought within its scope some of the most powerful personalities in the business. Such men as Manuel Lisa, William H. Ashley, Andrew Henry, Jim Bridger, Alexander Culbertson, Kenneth McKenzie, Charles Larpenteur, Auguste and Pierre Chouteau were intimately connected with the exploitation of the upper Missouri. Fort Union and Fort Benton will always rank among the more important fur-gathering centers on the continent.

The one civilizing force of note which had come on to the Montana scene before 1850 was that of the Catholic missions among the Flathead Indians. This stabilizing influence was more than offset by the restless activity of many capable traders and the erection of dozens of fur posts. So lightly, however, had the imprint of civilization been set upon the region, that the withdrawal of the white man would have allowed the conditions of 1800 to be restored within five or ten years.

The Indians of the region were grouped in the various geographic divisions. The Flathead nation, composed of the Flathead, Pend d'Oreille, and the Kutenai tribes inhabited the area west of the main range of the Rocky Mountains. The Crow nation, divided loosely in the early period into the Mountain Crows and River Crows, lived in the valley of the Yellowstone River, the River Crows often wandering into the Missouri watershed. The nation of the Blackfeet contained the Blackfoot, the Blood, and the Piegan tribes. These ranged the plains north of the Missouri, west of the mouth of the Milk River. In the northeastern section lived the Gros Ventre tribe, distantly related to the Algonquian nation, and the Assiniboin, a tribe of Sioux.

The factor which brought the most disturbing element into the frontier of the fur trade was the discovery of mineral wealth. A small amount of gold was discovered in Montana in 1850 by one François Finlay, a trapper for the Hudson's Bay Company. Finlay had no interest in mining, and the Company, anxious that its fur area should not be invaded by a mining population, suppressed the information. The first mining was undertaken by James and Granville Stuart in



the summer of 1858 on Gold Creek in the Deer Lodge Valley. This activity led to prospecting in the general region, which resulted in the discoveries of the fabulously rich mines at Bannack in 1862, at Alder Gulch in 1863, and at Last Chance Gulch in 1864. In a ten year period from the first rough diggings of the Stuarts, mineral wealth to the value of \$81,874,000.00 was taken from Montana.

Wide publicity given to the rich mining camps brought a rapid influx of immigration. From a population of less than 600 during the winter of 1862-1863, estimates of from 30,000 to 40,000 were made in 1867. This fell to the rather disappointing figure of 20,580 in the census of 1870.

The concentration of the mining fields in rather limited areas prevented many people from securing paying claims and left them without a means of livelihood. This group turned to agriculture, and a remarkable development took place in the fertile valleys of the Gallatin, Deer Lodge, Prickly Pear, Bitter Root, and Beaverhead. By this development, the population of the area was made comparatively self-sufficient in the basic commodities of cereals, vegetables, and meat.

The army appeared first in the Far West in the role of a civil servant. Its work of exploration, of survey, and road building was an invaluable aid to the movement of population. In Montana this work was begun by General Isaac I. Stevens and his party in 1853-1855. In this survey for a northern railroad route to the Pacific, the area was widely explored and carefully described and mapped. The treaties which Stevens made with the Indians also aided in preventing trouble when a large mining population rushed into the region soon after. The building of a wagon road from the headwaters of the Missouri at Fort Benton to Fort Walla Walla in Washington by Captain John Mullan was an incidental result of the Stevens expedition. This Mullan Wagon Road became the great artery of travel in western Montana.

To collaborate with Mullan's road project and also in an attempt to solve the problem of transporting Indian annuities, the government sponsored the navigation of the Missouri to Fort Benton in 1859. In 1860, the river was again successfully used when 300 soldiers were sent to Fort Benton and thence by the Mullan Road to Oregon. The economy and general success of the venture recommended the overland journey rather than that by water around Cape Horn, or by way of the Isthmus of Panama.

The agricultural progress of the Oregon region and the mining development in the Idaho area led the army to seek additional routes

of travel from the central states to the Northwest. Captain W. F. Raynolds and his aide, Lieutenant Henry E. Maynadier of the army engineers, were in charge of an expedition in 1859-1860. They were able to make a general survey of eastern and southern Montana and the feasible avenues of approach to it from the central states. They made recommendations concerning the best routes of travel by land, and investigated the navigability of the Yellowstone River.

The unrest resulting from the Civil War and its aftermath brought the army into action upon the northern plains in several ways. The leading members of the fur companies operating in Montana were accused of Confederate leanings and licenses were revoked. An army detachment was sent to Fort Union for a time to see that the interests of the North were guarded. The rebellious attitude of the plains Indians following the Minnesota uprising of 1862 merited considerable attention. General Alfred Sully led troops up the Missouri River, co-operating with forces in Dakota in an effort to quiet the Sioux. He was to erect a permanent military post on the Yellowstone River if he felt this to be necessary. He decided, however, that fortifications were unwarranted. The discovery of the rich gold fields in Idaho and Montana in the early years of the Civil War created a wave of migration. This forced the army, against its will, to provide military protection along the wagon route on the northern plains from Minnesota to Montana, and to direct improvement of roads connecting the Oregon Trail with the gold fields. The expansion of the white man into the central plains caused the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians to crowd into the Montana border region. The movement produced great alarm among the Montana natives, already irritated by having their lands cut through by the white migration. The white population was also very restless. Everyone wished to secure the most advantageous position possible in at least one of the fields of profitable development: mining, diversified agriculture, or grazing.

At the close of the Civil War the army attempted to increase the number of pre-war units, and decrease the size of the individual units. The object was to station soldiers in small detachments at enough frontier posts, strategically located, to preserve the peace. Public misunderstanding and opposition prevented the full completion of the plan. In 1866, however, reorganization of significance to Montana was carried out. A division of the Northwest had been formed in 1862 to give greater attention to the northern plains. In 1866, the District of the Northwest was created in the Department of Dakota. In the fall



of 1866, a small military force was sent to establish a temporary post, Camp Cooke, on the Missouri at the mouth of the Judith River. This post had as its duty the guarding of the Missouri River boat traffic. In the summer of 1866, another route of transportation to Montana was given a suitable guard. Forts Reno, Phil Kearney, and C. F. Smith were erected to guard the popular highway from the Oregon Trail in central Wyoming, east of the Big Horn Mountains into the Yellowstone region.

The threat of Indian outbreaks created widespread alarm in Montana in the spring of 1867. When the intrepid trailmaker, John M. Bozeman, was killed by the Indians in April, the militant Secretary and Acting-Governor of the Territory, Thomas F. Meagher, organized a militia force of several hundred men and carried on a futile and expensive summer campaign. The evidence points to the conclusion that real fear was soon overshadowed by the desire of certain men to obtain public attention and of the frontiersmen to secure large profits from sales to the army.

The military authorities opposed the militia campaign. They were, in fact, making arrangements for strengthening the military forces in the Territory when it occurred. In the summer of 1867, Fort Shaw was established as an infantry post on the Sun River, and in the fall Fort Ellis was built in the Gallatin Valley and garrisoned with cavalry and infantry.

The work of the army in Montana to 1866 had consisted almost entirely of the peaceful work of exploration and survey. With the establishment of permanent posts and a resident military force, it began to take an important part in the formation and development of an Indian policy in the region. Montana inherited the Indian problem when the controversial phases of its control were in their worst stages. Until 1849, the War Department had controlled Indian Affairs. The feeling that the Indians needed civilization rather than coercion led to the transfer of supervision over them to the newly formed Department of the Interior in that year. The two departments continued to disagree over procedure throughout the remainder of the century.

The opening up of Montana was one phase of the movement which caused the failure of the earlier attempt of the government to set aside the great plains area for the Indians forever. By 1851, treaties were being made with the plains Indians whereby they agreed to give way to the expansion which was taking place along the Oregon Trail. These were the first treaties in which the Montana Indians participated

directly. General Stevens took the first step in his treaties with the Flatheads and Blackfeet in 1855, to secure the isolation of the Montana Indians upon reservations. The treaties provided that agents should be sent to superintend the civilizing work among the Indians.

Practically all of the good and bad features of the agency system were enhanced in Montana. The Indians were isolated and primitive in the early period, and capable agents were able to get a quick response from most of the tribes. Incompetent or dishonest agents, on the other hand, had a free field. Both types had to contend with the great distance to the source of general orders and supplies. The difficulties of transportation and communication were added to distance. An unstable policy on the part of the national administration and the inability to enforce treaties caused the situation to be doubly difficult for local agents. The changing policy of selecting agents from civilians, then from military men, and then from civilians recommended by church groups, together with an already unstable tenure of office caused such frequent shifts of personnel that it was impossible for the agent to formulate and carry out any steady policy. In the eight year period, from 1866-1874 for instance, the Blackfeet had ten agents, with numerous intervals during which no one was in official charge.

Charges of graft on the part of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Territory and the local agents were frequently made, and often substantiated. Collusion among political groups, economic interests, and Indian office employees worked for several years against the interests of the Indians to produce a number of cases of startling brazenness. Appointments were often political and made for a consideration. Portions of the annuity goods were frequently traded to the Indians or sold to white traders. Funds for improvements and salaries were habitually squandered by incompetent officials or deliberately misappropriated. Among the Flatheads, as one example, a group universally recognized as being especially susceptible to encouragement, James A. Garfield found "but little to show" for the expenditure of over \$300,000.00 during a period of twenty years.

A change of policy occurred in 1871, and thereafter the Indian tribes were treated as wards of the government rather than as independent people. This allowed the change of a number of agency locations in Montana, and the gradual contraction of the reservation boundaries.

This shifting of the Indians produced a need for a larger armed force. The small garrison from Camp Cooke was moved to Fort Benton in 1869, where its largest policing task in the vicinity was that of



attempting to curb the liquor traffic. Fort Shaw continued as regimental headquarters, superintending the protection of the whole region. Fort Ellis troops were kept busy guarding the nervous inhabitants of the Gallatin Valley. Camp Baker was established in 1869 to guard the scattered mining population along the Belt Mountains, and to watch the passes into the Prickly Pear Valley. This post took the name of Fort Logan in 1877.

This army had many tasks to engage its attention. The mining population, except around Fort Logan, was well grouped in the western valleys and needed little protection. A most disturbing element of the frontier, however, consisted of the little bands of prospectors which pushed out into the Indian country, and often upon Indian reservations, in search of new mines. The army was forced to guard these groups even though the expeditions were undertaken in opposition to explicit orders. The army was often called upon to protect the Indian in his rights and prevent whites from infringing upon the reservations. The agricultural settlements were sparsely populated and widely scattered. There was a need for constant vigilance to protect the isolated farmsteads or settlements from Indian attack. Unreasonable fear rather than real need was a large cause, however, for demands upon the military. Political pressure by newspapers and individuals of local or state prominence often secured, for pecuniary reasons, the support of the military for one locality at the expense of another where greater need existed. There was a constant demand upon the armed forces as escorts for private and government wagon trains transporting goods. The army took a leading part in surveying and improving the road system of the region. Beginning in 1870, railroad surveys and the maintenance of telegraph lines took more and more of the time of the army. Occasionally adventures in pure exploration took small detachments from the forts. The Yellowstone and Glacier National Park areas were first adequately explored under the guidance of the military. There was always a need for a certain number of the men at the post to be engaged upon building or repair projects within the fort. So great was the demand for men for special duty in the early days of the military in Montana that there were seldom enough men to make it possible to carry on the purely military activities of drill and tactics.

Long predicted encounters with the Indians occurred in the 1870's. In January of 1870, Major E. M. Baker of Fort Ellis led an attack against the Piegan Indians, killing a large number and securing peace on the northern plains for several years. Another encounter occurred

in 1872, when Major Baker's escort for the Northern Pacific was attacked and the survey party was turned back.

Two of the most dramatic encounters in the history of the military-Indian frontier in America occurred in Montana. In 1876, Major-General G. A. Custer led his entire command to destruction at the hands of the Sioux. While this incident took place in Montana, the Indians engaged were not residents of the locality, and the Montana military force played a comparatively passive role. The battle itself, therefore, need not be considered, but the results were important.

The second important incident was that of the Nez Percé retreat in 1877 from Idaho through the Bitter Root Valley, Yellowstone National Park, and eastern Montana. Colonel Nelson A. Miles led in the capture of Chief Joseph's band near the northern boundary line. In this encounter, the Indians again were not native to Montana, but the full force of the military in Montana was thrown into the effort to capture the enemy.

From the unrest of the 1870's and the discussion incident to the major battles, there came a crystallization of the conflicting points of view on the Indian question. The antagonism among the various groups made the settling of the Indian problem very difficult. A major group in the East, removed from all danger, took a highly humanitarian outlook toward the Indian, and insisted upon a peaceful policy of education and civilization. The frontiersmen, faced with the practical aspects of the question, took an opposing view, insisting that the unprogressive Indian was manifestly destined to make way for the more advanced race. Many army officers of high rank joined with the frontier group in suggesting that the true solution of the Indian problem was to exterminate the Indian as quickly, economically, and painlessly as possible.

The attitude of the Indians also formed a part of the problem. There were fundamental differences in the two civilizations which made it seemingly impossible to reach common ground. The white man demanded that the Indian change his social patterns more quickly than this had ever been accomplished by any race. The failure of the Indian to do the impossible resulted in his downfall. This came about in spite of the fact that the Government of the United States tried consistently to treat the Indians with fairness and justice. It was never strong enough to force its citizens to respect the standards of equity which it set up.

Following the spectacular Indian wars in Montana in 1876 and



1877, the frontier was in such a state of shock that the government immediately built additional fortifications. Fort Keogh and Fort Custer were erected in 1877 to guard the Yellowstone Valley. Fort Missoula was built in the same year to guard the Bitter Root Valley and the Flathead Reservation. The flight of Sitting Bull and his band of Sioux to Canada constituted a threat to the peace along the border which caused Fort Assiniboine to be built in the vicinity of the headwaters of the Milk River in 1879. In 1880, Fort Logan was abandoned and Fort Maginnis was built in the eastern part of the Judith Basin, a fertile agricultural area.

This formidable military force served to guarantee the peace. Migration into Montana increased after the Indian wars. Good land was made available by treaties which materially reduced the reservation areas. Agencies were moved to make the Indian activities center in fertile areas as far from the white population as possible. Larger funds and longer experience in agricultural and educational methods led to marked improvement in these phases in the decade 1880-1890.

During the 1880's rapid progress was also made in the evolution of Indian policy. Through the collective effort of Indian administrators the policy of allotting land to the individual Indian and his family was evolved. Safeguards were thrown about his economic advancement as an individual, and some of the responsibilities of citizenship were also placed upon him. The influence of the tribe receded and the Indian emerged as an individual. This policy was made effective by the Dawes Act of 1887. Although this plan was not extensively applied in Montana until it had been modified by the Burke Act in the next century, certain of its features were used to advantage.

The coming of the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1880, and the improvement of the telegraph and highways, made it unnecessary for the army to be isolated in small, rough posts in thinly populated areas, engaging in daily scout and guard duty. When these improvements and the increasing population made it possible to house the troops in large and comfortable forts where the niceties of life and military procedure could be observed, the military frontier had come to an end. By 1890 these conditions prevailed in Montana. Within a decade the old frontier posts of Fort Shaw, Fort Ellis, Fort Logan, Fort Benton, and Fort Maginnis had been abandoned and the area was controlled from the newer, larger forts: Keogh, Custer, Missoula, and Assiniboine. The military frontier had ceased to exist.

The Indians were eventually settled on small reservations and took

up farming and educational activities. When this had been accomplished and when they began to take pride in the possession of individual farms and in the excellence of their workmanship, they ceased to be merely members of a tribe and became individuals. The disappearance of the tribe resulted directly in the disappearance of the Indian frontier.

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Important material for this study was obtained from the archives of the War and Interior departments in Washington. The files of the Adjutant-General of the Army contain a sufficiently complete set of post returns for all of the forts which were erected in Montana, except Fort Missoula. The records of Fort Missoula still remain in the offices of the fort. These post returns consist of the letters sent, letters received, military orders, reports, and special correspondence relating to the activities of the military fort. They furnish an exceptionally complete and authoritative source of information. The archives of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs contain the important correspondence relating to the conduct of Indian matters. These records consist of the reports and requisitions of agents, complaints of and against civilian and military groups, instructions, treaty negotiations, and countless details of the unfolding development of Indian policy.

Much illustrative material furnishing an understanding of details of military and Indian policy was obtained from the private papers of Captain G. C. Doane, furnished by Mrs. Mary L. Doane of Bozeman, Montana. The Government files of papers for Captain G. C. Doane, Major E. M. Baker, and Captain James L. Fisk in the archives of the War Department were also of value.

Public documents were invaluable. The reports of the Secretary of War, containing the reports of the General of the Army and Division and lesser officers formed a continuous and necessary source of information. Equally necessary were the reports of the Secretary of the Interior containing information furnished by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and his agents.

The works of Hiram M. Chittenden, *The American Fur Trade in the Far West* (New York, 1902), and *The History of Early Steamboat Navigation on the Missouri River* (New York, 1903), numerous journals edited by Reuben Gold Thwaites, notably certain volumes of his *Early Western Travels* (Cleveland, 1904), and the journals edited by Elliot Coues, such as *The Personal Narrative of Charles Larpenteur, 1833-1872* (New York, 1898) and *The Manuscript Journals of Alex-*



ander Henry and David Thompson (New York, 1898), yielded a great deal of information on the phases of the fur trade, navigation, and exploration which they treat.

Certain fundamental studies in allied fields furnished a guide through the intricate phases of the national policy. Such studies include, Alban W. Hoopes, *Indian Affairs and Their Administration* (Philadelphia, 1932); Lawrence F. Schmeckebier, *The Office of Indian Affairs* (Baltimore, 1927); James C. Malin, *Indian Policy and Westward Expansion* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1921), and Edgar B. Wesley, *Guarding the Frontier, 1815-1825* (Minneapolis, 1935).

The resources of the Library of the State Historical Society of Montana at Helena furnished considerable manuscript material, and newspaper material of great value. The State Historical Society Library of Minnesota at St. Paul was also used for diaries and newspapers of the period.





## WILLIAM SALTER AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE ANDOVER BAND IN IOWA, 1843-1910

PHILIP D. JORDAN

New England piety, rooted in the tough soil of colonial Puritanism, drank eagerly from the cup of life proffered by the Second Great Awakening. Long parched by heretical winds—deism, infidelity, and apathy—eighteenth-century faith bloomed anew. Indifference which had blighted American religion during chaotic post-Revolutionary decades was replaced by sincerity, faith, and zeal. Optimism displaced rationalism, and men turned their eyes from the corruption of earth to the glories of heaven. Decadence gave way to hope.

This revival of holiness filled the small, white churches of New Hampshire with worshippers and descended upon silent Boston meetinghouses. The Land of Steady Habits received it joyfully, and its presence brought comfort to Green Mountain boys. At Yale, students whom Lyman Beecher in 1795 had described as intemperate, profane, licentious gamblers, sceptics, and rowdies, became docile. "The divine influence," wrote a young son of Eli, "seemed to descend like the silent dew of heaven," impressing scoffers with the importance of regeneration.

Gathering momentum, the spirit of repentance swept southward along the Atlantic coastal plain, finding its way from Carolina estuaries almost to the pine barrens of the deep South. Tracts and testaments, tucked in pockets or saddle-bags, were distributed in the Appalachian back-country. Converts and circuit-riders, traveling on the busy Ohio, held revivals in the frontier settlements of Wheeling, Cincinnati, and Louisville. Thus, in brief, did the Second Great Awakening reach the West.

The Valley of Democracy was the cynosure of many an eastern ecclesiastic's eyes who saw there opportunity for fruitful proselyting. Methodists, Baptists, Catholics, and Episcopalians, all were competing for the spiritual conquest of the frontier. "The strength of the nation lies beyond the Alleghenies," said the sententious Charles Hodge in 1829. "The centre of dominion is fast moving in that direction. The ruler of this country is growing up in the great Valley. Leave him

without the Gospel and he will be a ruffian giant who will regard neither the decencies of civilization nor the charities of religion."

Presbyterians and Congregationalists, operating harmoniously under the Plan of Union of 1801, had set up the American Home Missionary Society in 1826. Other denominations followed quickly. The object of all was the same: to subdue the West to religious particularism. Within a few years the American Home Missionary Society, under the competent direction of Milton Badger, had placed 719 agents in the field. By 1855, over a thousand militant missionaries, imbued with Calvinistic thought and stimulated by the words of St. Mark, "Go . . . preach the Gospel," were located on a front nearly 1,800 miles long, over which the wave of population was constantly breaking. "The western states," declared a clergyman on recruiting duty, "must be made to become what New England now is, a land of churches, and schools, and charities, of pious homes, and great religious enterprise." Young men, completing their theological education, were urged to settle in western parishes where, although they would receive little cash, they might lay up great treasures in heaven. A typical example was a group of youthful graduates from Andover Theological Seminary who migrated to Iowa in 1843, and for sixty-seven years were Congregational standard-bearers in the West.

This investigation develops the history of the Andover Band in Iowa with particular emphasis upon the private, public, and pastoral activities of the Reverend William Salter. In addition, it evaluates the contributions made by a small group of Congregational missionaries from New England to the fringe of settlement. Lastly, it is a study, within a limited area, of the home missionary movement in the United States.

The Andover associates were preceded by eleven clergymen from Yale who pledged themselves to hold Illinois against the invasion of competitive theologies. Among this group were Theron Baldwin and Asa Turner. "My field of labor," said the latter, "is as boundless as the eye can see—a territory greater than that promised to Abraham, more abundant in its productions, and, I fear, almost as destitute of the knowledge of the true God." The Illinois gesture, although admirable, was ineffectual, for Suckers were already preferring Jacksonian emotionalism, dispensed by Baptist and Methodist circuit-riders, to the credo of classical, formalistic Congregationalism.

During the late thirties Turner moved to the Territory of Iowa where Satan's forces were legion, and the army of the Lord was weak. Soon



his cries for reinforcements reached Dr. Badger who hurried to Andover Theological Seminary, stronghold of orthodoxy, for recruits. Here he found another eleven, boys who even then, walking over Andover hills when no seminary bell called them to recitations, talked of Iowa.

Badger's plea, together with information from others, decided them. By the spring of 1843 letters, written on thin paper, were being exchanged between the eleven and Turner. "Don't come here expecting a paradise," warned Turner from his desolate Iowa parish. In August, when it was plain that the Andover lads would actually start for Iowa in October, Turner sent blunt words of advice. "Come prepared to expect small things, rough things. Lay aside all your dandy whims boys learn in college. . . . Get clothes, firm, durable, something that will go through the hazel brush without tearing. Don't be afraid of a good hard hand, or a tanned face." He told them to "marry wives of the old Puritan stamp, who could weave and spin and pail a cow, and churn butter, and be proud of a jean dress or a checked apron." Two lads followed his advice literally.

The contingent of missionaries—Benjamin Spaulding, Ephraim Adams, E. B. Turner, Daniel Lane, Erastus Ripley, Harvey Adams, Alden Robbins, Horace Hutchinson, and William Salter—moved to Turner's aid in October, 1843. Of these Salter was marked by fate as the most prominent.

Born in old Brooklyn, within sight of the sea, on November 17, 1821, Salter was the son of William Frost Salter, owner of the ship *Mary and Harriet*, upon which William frequently played as a youth, and of Mary Ewen Salter, who had come to New York with her husband from Portsmouth, New Hampshire. His father was descended from John Salter, a mariner who came from Devonshire, England, in the latter quarter of the seventeenth century, and settled at Portsmouth. His mother was a daughter of Alexander Ewen, who emigrated from Aberdeen, Scotland, to America prior to the Revolutionary War.

The lad's early days were little different from those of other children, but his education was unusual. At the age of ten he was put to the study of Latin, at the age of twelve to the learning of Greek, and six years later to both Hebrew and Arabic. His early schooling was received in S. Johnston's Classical and English School, of New York City. His religious inspiration was derived, in part, from listening to the sermons of the Reverend Samuel H. Cox, pastor of the Laight Street Presbyterian Church, of Dr. William H. Channing, and of the evangelists, Jeddiah Burchard and Charles G. Finney. Salter at one

time thought of embracing the law, and listened attentively to the great lawyers of his time—David B. Ogden, Josiah Hoffman, Daniel Low, and Prescott Hall.

New York, during Salter's early manhood, offered a variety of interests for his wide-awake curiosity. At the age of sixteen, Salter heard Daniel Webster deliver a stirring slavery address in Niblo's Garden. In 1837 the young man saw the arrival of the first ocean steamer to enter the port of New York, and he looked with "wondering eyes" upon the famous Indian chiefs, Black Hawk and Keokuk, as they passed through New York.

The young New Yorker was graduated from the University of the City of New York in 1840, and for the succeeding six months taught in the Academy at South Norwalk, Connecticut. By this time he had decided to enter the ministry, and therefore attended the Union Theological Seminary for two years. He then, "thinking a change from the din and scenes of a great city to a quiet place would be good," entered Andover Theological Seminary for a year of satisfaction and delight. His studies were largely historical, a fact which had a profound significance and influence upon his later life. With the other members of the Band, he was graduated in theology, amid a salvo of religious oratory, on September 5, 1843.

Within a month the lads left Albany by rail for Buffalo, then the terminus of western railway travel in upper New York. There the steamboat *Missouri* waited. We have seldom seen, said the editor of the *Buffalo Gazette*, such sterling young men of good sense and quiet characters. For six days, facing head winds and a rough sea, the *Missouri* labored through the Great Lakes, finally shuddering to dock at Milwaukee. Chicago, "sitting on the shore of the lake in wretched dishabille" and busy with the labor of growth, paid the missionaries scant attention. They finally persuaded a farmer, come to the great market of the middle border with a load of wheat, to carry them to the Mississippi, opposite Burlington. Canvas wagon coverings, blankets, coffee, bread, and bacon,—these items the preachers purchased for use on the 250-mile prairie trip. At Galesburg, local residents thought them either land speculators or Mormons. As the boys came upon the "smooth, broad bosom of the great river, with the last silvery rays of the setting sun playing upon it," they gave three cheers for the Mississippi! Their fourteen-day trip from Buffalo to Burlington was ended. Turner welcomed them tearfully.

After ordination at Denmark, Iowa, the brethren scattered, some to



establish inland parishes, one to locate in the Sac and Fox Agency, others to find churches in flourishing river towns, and Salter to enter upon two arduous years of circuit-riding in Jackson County. Each received a little over \$400.00 annually from the Society. Their instructions were plain and their commissions explicit. They were to preach the Gospel, to visit the sick, to stimulate the growth of common schools, to establish Sabbath and Bible classes, to fight the demon rum, and to show themselves patterns of good works.

The task was not easy. The wicked, the worldly, and the backsliders, inspired by frontier whiskey, ignorance, and the devil in general, made their mission difficult. "The only evidence that I have preached the truth among them," wrote Salter querulously, "is that they hate me." The equalitarian West resisted strenuously New England's attempt to stamp it with the ethical parochialism of Boston. Its appetite was not for domestication and culture, but for cheap land, water willing to be harnessed, and the wealth which even then lay "just around the corner."

What was this theological system which proved less popular on the frontier than many other faiths? Its rock was the Cambridge Platform of Church Discipline first formulated by Massachusetts ministers in 1648. All essential principles for church government lay in the New Testament, either in the form of express statutes, or inferred from the lives of the Apostles. "It is not left in the power of men, officers, Churches, or any state in the world, to add, diminish, or alter anything in the least measure therein." The essential qualification for church membership was individual piety, determined by examination. All ecclesiastical power was vested in the local church, and it was required that members peacefully and cheerfully submit to its discipline. Such, in essence, was the gospel, aged 200 years in Puritanism, which the Band carried afoot, on horseback, and in canoes over a western country more interested in religious individualism than ecclesiastical regimentation.

Not only did the Band fight that most insidious of foes—indifference; it also took the offensive against other religions. To many, rigid in uncompromising youth, Catholicism ranked with Mormonism; Universalists with Swedenborgians; Perfectionists with infidels; and Baptists with Unitarians. A particularly irritating thorn in Congregational flesh was Abner Kneeland, once a Boston preacher, but now a free thinker and devotee of Paine and Voltaire. Shocked missionaries heard that Kneeland had publicly celebrated the birthday of Thomas Paine,

and shuddered when they read the toasts. "The daughters of Iowa," proposed a Mrs. Adams, lifting her glass, "may they learn less of priestcraft, and lay aside their Bibles for the distaff and loom."

Frontier Congregationalism also assumed a patronizing air toward the many flaxen-haired, thrifty families from the Rhine and the land of dykes who swelled Iowa's population during the fifties. Substantial Germans were said to import an "incalculable amount of infidelity, superstition, and error," and to enjoy only in a very limited degree the divinely appointed means of grace. The Teutonic pipe, stein, and song were all anathema to Andover piety. It is little wonder then, that these foreigners, if they forsook their native Lutheranism, turned to the generous Methodist and Baptist doctrines which welcomed all.

Slavery, obviously, was another controversy to be faced by the Band. In general, they merely echoed on the frontier the precepts learned in abolitionist New England. Rarely did compromise or charity temper their moral repugnance. They bluntly declared slavery a "heinous sin and a gross violation of the laws and Gospel of Christ." Although the American Home Missionary Society had generously continued to offer financial aid to churches regardless of their slavery views, the General Congregational Association of Iowa in 1856 petitioned the Society no longer to grant aid to any church which allowed slaveholding by its members. Salter operated a station on the underground railroad, as did many another clergyman, and justified this violation of the Fugitive Slave Law on the basis of "northern" humanitarianism. In 1864 he volunteered for forty-days duty with the United States Christian Commission, the only member of the Band in this service.

Clergymen frequently found the rigid exactions of their college education a fatal embarrassment. Intellectuality seemed less palatable to settlers than emotionalism. These were days of sweat rather than of logic. In addition, settlers disregarded the Sabbath—traveling, drinking, playing cards, and plowing upon the seventh day. Personal antagonisms flourished, many frontiersmen feeling that Eastern missionaries "come West to civilize the heathen." Truly, the chariot of salvation was delayed by suspicion, ignorance, and intemperance. Although during the saddle period of Salter's ministry there were evidences of grace and even regeneration, Iowa remained singularly unleavened by the salt of Congregationalism.

Five years after the Band's arrival forty churches had been established. Many of these were only log cabins with sod roofs, but some were pretentious structures of finished lumber. A few boasted bell



towers, and others imported furnishings from Boston. Thirty-two ministers shepherded a flock of some 1,100 souls. Academies, education's first line of defense in the middle period, had been sponsored at Denmark, Maquoketa, and elsewhere. Iowa College, later to become Grinnell, had been opened at Davenport in 1848.

In 1846 the death of Hutchinson broke the Andover circle of comradeship for the first time, and Salter moved from Maquoketa to Burlington to carry on his work. Not long after, Alden, homesick and discouraged, returned to New England. Others, as the years advanced, deserted Iowa for fields elsewhere. Some, however, remained at their posts until relieved by death. Of these, Salter was one.

The pathetically slow growth of his church illustrates the difficulty Congregationalism faced in Iowa even after the frontier had moved westward and finally disappeared in the mists of romance. Salter averaged an increase in church membership of only three persons annually for a period of about half a century. Four years previous to his death on August 15, 1910, there were only from ten to twenty-five Congregationalists per 1,000 of population in Iowa. Catholics, Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Disciples, and Baptists, in the order named, all had a larger state membership. Among the more prominent faiths, only the Episcopal Church was less successful on the frontier than was Congregationalism.

Salter's ministry, however, as that of the Andover Band, must not be evaluated entirely by the standard of numbers. Not only did Salter make himself the idol of his city and become known as the preacher who helped Iowa grow up, but he also engaged in historical writing. Among his works of marked ability is a biography, *The Life of James W. Grimes*, Governor of Iowa and United States Senator; a history, *Iowa: The First Free State in the Louisiana Purchase*; and a collection of essays, *Sixty Years*. No other member of the Band left such a distinguished literary heritage.

The Band itself, as Paxson says and Sweet intimates, made the "frontier democracy of Iowa less completely Jacksonian than most of the Mississippi Valley was at this moment." Their pious crusade to reclaim what one missionary called a frontier Sodom and Gomorrah, has cast them in the role of Congregational heroes. Trained in the classics, schooled in Aristotelian logic, disciplined by Puritan morality, and conditioned by a Federalist aristocracy, their conception of the good life differed radically from the easy-going, fervent, Jacksonian ideology of Peter Cartwright's emotional brethren. The latter, like

true frontiersmen, fastened their eyes upon reality, not ideals. But so long had the Band gazed upon the Great Stone Face of Puritanism that they, like Ernest, assumed its likeness. Only a sceptic might point out that the copy, like the prototype, was carved from unpromising, even unsympathetic, granite.

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This study is based largely upon the unpublished correspondence, papers, account books, diaries, lectures, sermons, and notes of William Salter. In addition, the correspondence of Salter's parents, sisters, and brothers has proved illuminating. Not the least valuable were the letters of Mrs. Salter to her husband. Then, too, the correspondence of Salter's children yielded significant information. Another manuscript collection of importance was the letters of Salter's father-in-law, Eliab P. Mackintire of Boston. This long run of letters is housed in The New York Public Library. The other collections are in private hands.

An invaluable source of information was the collection of reports and letters sent by Congregational and Presbyterian ministers, including each member of Iowa Band, to the American Home Missionary Society. The originals are preserved in the Hammond Library of the Chicago Theological Seminary. *The Home Missionary*, official publication of the Society, contained many revealing letters and reports.

The diaries, correspondence, and addresses of the Reverend Julius A. Reed, kept at Grinnell College, proved useful, as did a set of thirteen typewritten volumes pertaining to the Iowa Band and written by the Reverend Truman O. Douglass.


*The Minutes of the General Association of Congregational Churches and Ministers of the State of Iowa* from 1840 to 1910 were invaluable for their information concerning the growth, business, and point-of-view of Congregationalism in Iowa. The Record Book of the First Congregational Church of Burlington, Iowa, contained accounts of all official business of Salter's church. Files of two newspapers, the *Burlington Hawk-Eye* and the *Burlington Gazette*, proved most useful.

Six books written by clergymen closely connected with the Iowa Band, offered valuable, if not always accurate, information. These were Ephraim Adams, *The Iowa Band* (1870), Truman O. Douglass *The Pilgrims of Iowa* (1911), Mrs. Reuben Gaylord, *Life and Labors*



of Rev. Reuben Gaylord (1899), George F. Magoun, *Asa Turner and His Times* (1899), and Julius A. Reed, *Reminiscences of Early Congregationalism in Iowa* (1885).

Among the general histories of Congregationalism consulted were: George N. Boardman, *Congregationalism* (n.d.), Henry M. Dexter, *Congregationalism of the Last Three Hundred Years as Seen in its Literature* (1880), Albert E. Dunning, *Congregationalism in America* (1894), and Williston Walker, *A History of the Congregational Church in the United States* (1894).





## THE NORSE IN IOWA TO 1870

H. FRED SWANSEN

Norse immigration to the United States in the nineteenth century began in 1825, but attained little significance numerically until 1836. From then on, while constantly fluctuating, the number of immigrant arrivals steadily increased. Great influxes, for example, occurred in the late forties and middle sixties.

The destination of these first Norwegians was Orleans County, New York. Here they remained until 1834 when they moved to the fertile prairies of Illinois. The mounting number of immigrants from Norway, a small part of the vast westward-moving throng of home-seekers, soon encountered difficulty in acquiring choice land in Illinois. By 1838 many of these Norsemen were turning to Wisconsin and by the close of the forties large numbers were making Iowa their goal.

The history of the life and work of the Norse in Iowa has never been fully developed or appreciated, although several excellent monographic interpretations have appeared. The purpose of this study is to record the significant factual data pertinent to the Norwegians in Iowa and to interpret their economic, political, and cultural contributions to that state. This dissertation, however, covers only a part of the projected plan and is confined in general to the period prior to 1870. It deals with the location of the settlements in the state, the economic and social phases of pioneer life over a space of about twenty years, the planting of the church, and the problem of adjustment to the American environment.

To understand the life and work of the Norwegian immigrant in America, one must possess some knowledge of conditions in Norway during the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries. The Norseman left a country where agriculture was the chief vocation, where scarcely more than 3 per cent of the soil was tillable, and where the population was increasing steadily during the nineteenth century. Nature, too, was hard and grudging. While the environment imposed hardships, it also reared men of strong character. Qualities such as industry, persistence, endurance, and thrift were essential to the Norwegian farmer in his difficult task of earning a living. Lack of

economic opportunity and a pressing need for frugality tended to make him conservative. These experiences and qualities, however, served him well in his pioneering venture in the American West. Schooled in the tradition of land scarcity, the Norse immigrant appreciated the ease with which large tracts of fertile land could be secured in the United States.

Not only was the immigrant conditioned by the scarcity of land, but he was also influenced by the spirit of controversy and unrest then common in Norwegian political, religious, and educational life. With his love for freedom and independence, he did not stand aloof from these controversial issues. The adoption of the constitution of 1814 and the passage of outstanding laws like those of 1837 and 1842, which provided for local self-government and complete freedom in religious affairs respectively, gave him valuable lessons in the essentials of democracy. These experiences with great political issues were to prove useful in America in later years.

Such was the background of the ten Norwegian immigrants found in Iowa in 1840. By 1850 the total had risen to 361, by 1860 to 5,688, and by 1870 to 17,556. If these figures are considered in the light of the total population of the state, they are not particularly impressive. If, however, they are regarded as representing concentrated areas of settlement they are of great consequence. They show clearly the appeal which Iowa made to the native Norwegian.

The principal factors attracting the Norseman to Iowa were five. The first of these, of course, was the lure of large, fertile tracts of land available on easy terms. The "America" letters, that is letters from Iowa immigrants to relatives and friends in Norway, was another. Similarly letters from Iowa settlers to relatives and friends in other parts of the United States was an incentive. Enticing news items in regard to Iowa, appearing frequently in the columns of the Norwegian-American press, was the fourth. Finally the contagious enthusiasm of Iowans, traveling through Illinois or Wisconsin settlements, influenced some. As the influx of immigrants into the state increased, these factors assumed greater importance.

For the purpose of this study the settlements of the Norse in Iowa are divided into four main areas. The first of these was in the Sugar Creek district of Lee County, probably as early as 1839. Since many of the early records pertaining to this adventure have been lost or destroyed, there exists some controversy regarding the exact date of its founding and the identity of the first settlers. J. R. Reiersen in



*Veiviser for Norske Emigranter (Guide for Norwegian Emigrants)*, published in the capital of Norway in 1844, contends that Hans Barlien and William Tesman fathered this settlement. Copies of letters written by Barlien in the spring of 1839 corroborate this view and, at the same time, lead one to conclude that he (Barlien) came during that year. Iowa manuscript census materials for 1856 support Reiersen's statement in regard to Tesman and indicate that the latter came to Lee County in 1839.

Thus it appears that Tesman and Barlien together founded the settlement in 1839. Tesman and several others came from Shelby County, Missouri, where they had gone from LaSalle County, Illinois, in an attempt to establish a colony. Others came to Sugar Creek direct from La Salle County at about the same time. While a considerable number of Norwegians came to Lee County in the early forties, the area never became an important settlement center. This county, the most southeastern in the state, was far removed from the main current of the Norse immigrant stream.

The second area of Norwegian settlement was in northeastern Iowa, mainly in Clayton, Fayette, Allamakee, and Winneshiek Counties. The first entry into this region was in 1846 when Ole Valle secured a tract of land in Read Township of Clayton County, about three miles southeast of the present town of St. Olaf. At the turn of the fifties Norwegians had entered the four counties mentioned above. Large and numerous Norse communities soon dotted the whole section, particularly Winneshiek County. Here Luther College and *Decorah Posten*, prominent institutions in the cultural development of the group, were established. The first settlers, who came from Rock and Dane Counties, Wisconsin, usually entered Iowa at McGregor's Landing, a town directly opposite the mouth of the Wisconsin River. From this point they proceeded as far as possible in a general northwesterly direction over the so-called Military Trail, which terminated at Fort Atkinson in Winneshiek County.

The first colony in the third area was established at St. Ansgar, Mitchell County. The immigrants, about seventy-five in number, came from Rock County, Wisconsin early in the summer of 1853. They entered Iowa at McGregor's Landing, followed the Military Road to Whiskey Grove, now called Calmar, in Winneshiek County, and from there traveled west over the prairies. It is noteworthy that the pioneer clergyman and pathfinder, C. L. Clausen, was the sponsor and director of this enterprise. From St. Ansgar the settlements spread

to the west as far as Emmet County and also to the north and south into adjoining regions. Worth and Winnebago Counties of this area became the destination of hundreds of immigrants.

The fourth area developed from a settlement project which was made in Story County in 1855. These immigrants, coming from Kendall County, Illinois, organized as a Lutheran congregation before leaving for Iowa. They crossed the Mississippi River at Davenport and moved west over the route running through the towns of Iowa City and Grinnell. They chose sites in the southwestern part of Story County, about a mile east of the present town of Huxley. From this modest beginning, Norse communities sprang into existence on all sides of the first colony, especially in Hamilton and Humboldt Counties. In this section of the state Story City became the center of Norse cultural activity.

These four areas, while not embracing all the Norwegian settlements in the state, did include the great majority. The disposition of the Norsemen to settle in definitely segregated communities led to a group-consciousness that exerted a deep and lasting influence on their life and cultural expression.

The adventure of the Norse in Iowa was a well-planned and well-executed movement. This had not always been the case in earlier efforts. In the Beaver Creek, Illinois, and Muskego, Wisconsin, settlements, for example, disappointment, disease, and death resulted from the purchase of low and swampy lands. Such experiences impressed upon the newcomer the need of caution in venturing into new country. Many of the early Iowa Norsemen had previously lived and worked in Illinois or Wisconsin where they learned important and practical lessons in the rudiments of pioneering. So adequate was their preparation in many instances that it explains, in no small degree, the economic success of the enterprises.

The immigrant, however, grappled with many hardships and disappointments in his pioneer home. He was usually far removed from town. Poor transportation facilities tended to emphasize that remoteness. Irregular and slow postal service contributed to his comparative isolation. The settler, too, had always to reckon with nature's angry moods. Scourges, prairie fires, extreme cold, and violent storms gave rise to fear and anxiety. Carelessness, indifference, or absence from home at such times occasionally involved serious consequences. Moreover, hard work, whether it pertained to fencing the field or harvesting the crop, was the daily lot of the pioneer. In addition to these con-



siderations the immigrant ordinarily had little money and encountered difficulties, therefore, in ordering his financial affairs.

To anticipate or to master these various situations was indeed a challenge. Under the primitive conditions obtaining, the settler relied upon his ingenuity for the immediate needs of the household and farm. He practiced the same resourcefulness in his efforts to avoid loss and disaster from capricious nature. A large number of tools, utensils, and implements, many of them illustrative of this resourcefulness, are exhibited in the museum of the Norwegian-American Historical Association at Decorah. Careful and thoughtful day-to-day planning and continual exercise of thrift were essential to success.

While these difficulties were in no way unusual, they, nevertheless, were real to a foreign-language group unaccustomed to the new and severe conditions of pioneer life in the United States. The effort to meet them led to occasional co-operative efforts between the new-comer and the native born settler. These contacts, it is worth noting, were advantageous to the immigrant in counteracting the strong tendency to clannishness.

The Norseman, appreciating the economic opportunities within his grasp, was industrious and persevering. In due time he saw with satisfaction the fruits of his labors. The wild prairies had been measurably transformed into fruitful fields of grain and the immigrant, in addition to improving his own condition, had contributed directly to the material development of the state. Incidentally he had also provided for the economic security of himself and his family. Thus he grew increasingly fond of his new home and took an active interest in the affairs of his adopted country.

With the coming of the seventies, economic and social conditions in the first settlements had changed greatly. The nation's industrial expansion of the post-Civil War period reached deeply into the life of the pioneer communities of the West. Labor-saving devices and modern machinery were enthusiastically accepted by the immigrants. The extension of credit contributed to the widespread distribution of these contrivances. Railroad construction brought Iowa into direct communication with the eastern seaboard in 1855. The demand for improved transportation facilities in all parts of the state resulted in the operation of 2,683 miles of railroad by 1870. At this time all of the Norse settlements had been drawn into the network.

These improvements wrought great changes in the pattern of the daily life. Farm machinery not only eased the burden of farm labor

but also made possible the raising of larger crops. The railroad was promoting a shift from self-sufficient farming with diversified crops, to specialization with emphasis on the cultivation of wheat and corn. Iowa profited from this change. Better railroad service improved marketing, facilitated the purchase of goods from hitherto inaccessible points, and increased the value of farm lands. Advances such as these combined to better the lot of the immigrant economically.

Practically all the first Norwegian immigrants in Iowa were farmers. By 1870, however, economic variations had appeared. The settlers still showed a decided preference for agriculture, yet approximately 18 per cent engaged in business and the trades. About 1 per cent, it is worth noting, were in the professions of theology, teaching, medicine, and pharmacy. Thus the simple economic pattern of 1850 was growing more complex. This trend was stimulated to some extent by alluring news items in the Norwegian-American press which recorded opportunities of all kinds in the various Iowa settlements.

In the social sphere, too, there were indications of change. Farms and dwellings took on the appearance of permanence and progress. Household equipment and furnishings continually improved and included, in a few instances, musical instruments and sewing machines. Temporary church structures gave way to more enduring and better arranged buildings. A striking evidence of cultural advance was the erection of the main building of Luther College at Decorah at a cost of \$75,000.00. These changes in the home and community provided a more congenial environment and also better opportunities for the enjoyment of a richer life.

Owing to these changes of the early seventies there was more participation in activities and institutions not associated with the mere struggle for existence. Public problems and politics arrested the attention of the immigrants. Office holding in county and township government was not infrequent. Periodical publications like the *Ved Arnen* (*By the Fireside*) and *For Hjemmet* (*For the Home*) appeared in Winneshiek County in 1868 and 1870 respectively. Libraries or reading circles were established in several of the Norse communities of the state. Musical, debating, and literary activities also won support in the larger settlements. The work of these organizations was deeply influenced by the cultural heritage from Norway.

One of the earliest forms of cultural expression among the Norse immigrants was religion. This resulted from the fact that the Lutheran state church of Norway, controlled and directed by a department of



the government, assumed a role of more than usual prominence in the daily life of the inhabitants. Since the Norsemen from childhood were reared in that church, they were strongly partial to its teachings and practices after coming to the United States.

In providing for his spiritual needs the immigrant received no aid worth mentioning from the state church of the fatherland. Lutheran lay-preachers and missionaries of other denominations found eager listeners among the first Norwegian settlers of Illinois and Wisconsin. This led to confusion. In 1843 and in the years immediately following, well-trained Norwegian Lutheran clergymen made an appearance. The lay-preachers by this time had large followings and were loath to surrender to the theologians from Norway. As a result two brands of Lutheranism developed. The lay-preacher and his adherents formed the low-church; the well-trained clergyman and his supporters, the high. By 1853 both groups had effected synodical organization. They were agreed on the aim of perpetuating the faith of the fathers among their countrymen, but not on the means of accomplishing it. The high-church group subscribed to the teachings and customs of the state church of Norway, favored a well-educated clergy, and were averse to lay-preaching. The low-church adherents, hostile from their experience in the home land to anything high-church, opposed the formal ritual of the service, emphasized the inner call rather than formal education for candidates for the ministry, and supported the practice of lay-preaching.

Since the first immigrants in Iowa relied on the missionary activity of the small Norwegian Lutheran groups, which in the early fifties had taken the first steps toward synodical organization, there was no serious threat from efforts of other denominations. The Lutheran Church, moreover, with its familiar language, teaching, music, and customs, made a strong appeal to the Norseman. In spite of this situation the Lutheran clergyman bent every effort to curtail or counteract any advance that threatened the establishment and extension of his own faith. The first missionary ventures of Norwegian Lutherans took place in the summer of 1851. These sporadic exertions were supplanted by regular ministerial administration in 1853. During that year two high-church clergymen accepted calls in north Iowa. In 1855 a low-church pastor took charge of the religious work in the central Iowa settlements. These preachers were often ably assisted by laymen who previously had had experience in congregational work in Illinois or Wisconsin. The first Norwegian Lutheran congregation in the state

was established at East Paint Creek, Allamakee County, in January, 1851.

From this modest beginning church work in Iowa prospered greatly. By 1870 the sixty-three Norwegian Lutheran congregations were served by twenty-seven pastors. The high-church group was the largest, counting forty congregations and fourteen preachers. The low-church was the smallest, numbering five parishes and three ministers. The remaining congregations belonged to the broad-church wing. This group, prominent after 1860, was a middle-of-the-road party, not as conservative as the high-church element, nor as liberal as the low. While subscribing to the fundamentals of Lutheran doctrine, it advocated a well educated ministry, a formal ritual for the church service, and a system of lay-preaching subject to synodical control.

The strong preference for the high-church may be explained by the tendency of the immigrant to seek the branch of Lutheranism most closely resembling that of the state church of Norway. There was also the fact that this element was piloted by well-educated and able leaders who had come from Norway in response to calls from their countrymen in America. The Reverends C. L. Clausen, U. V. Koren, and P. L. Larsen were men of this type. To this group belongs the credit of erecting the main building of Luther College at Decorah during the difficult times of the early sixties.

The prominence of the Lutheran church in immigrant life may be gauged from some types of its activity. Probably the most important enterprise was the parochial school. According to the 1870 report of the high-church synod, thirty-four teachers, all residents of Iowa, imparted religious instruction to 1,739 pupils. All pastors affiliating, however, did not furnish returns. Records for other synods are not available, but these figures, while too low, give some idea of the scope of that work. Luther College, it is worth noting, was established in northeast Iowa in order to insure capable ministerial leadership in the high-church at large. The church also exerted an influence through the publication of periodical matter and through the establishment of congregational libraries.

Religious organization and activity among the Norse was not confined entirely to the Lutheran denomination. Immigrants in the early years of settlement joined the Quaker and Methodist churches, but not in large numbers. The disposition to worship in the Quaker communion was largely, if not wholly, the result of earlier missionary work of this group in Norway. Several of the early Norse settlers of Lee



County were of this denomination. The first and only congregation, however, was established in Marshall County in 1864. This organization was singular in that it was the only Norwegian-speaking Quaker meeting in the United States. Methodism was introduced among the Norse by a staunch upholder of that faith, the Reverend O. P. Peterson, who was sent into northeast Iowa by the Iowa Conference of the Methodist Church in 1851. The results of this and other efforts were meager, for in the early seventies there were only three congregations in the state, two in Winneshiek County and one in Winnebago.

Indeed, with the coming of the seventies, the church, particularly the Lutheran, was an important factor in the immigrant community. In pioneer life it served a twofold purpose: it satisfied the spiritual craving of the immigrant and thereby prevented him from migrating elsewhere at a time when industry and perseverance were essential for the development of the state. It did not restrict its activity to religion, but reached into the educational and literary spheres as well.

Immediately upon his arrival in Iowa, the Norseman faced the problem of adapting himself to a new and strange environment. Certain factors tended to aid that process, others to retard it. The assimilative forces, in general, were the contacts with English-speaking neighbors and the public school. The main factors retarding the Americanization process were the Norwegian-American press and the immigrant church.

While the immigrant lived in isolation, he nevertheless made contacts with English-speaking inhabitants. On shopping trips to town, at meetings and celebrations, at the post office, and at the ballot box they met. Occasionally the Norse settler secured work that led to associations with the native element. The sons and daughters of the newcomers often worked on the farms or in the homes of Americans. These contacts did much to impart knowledge in regard to American life and speech. The English language, moreover, was a stepping stone to recognition and economic progress, hence the immigrant felt the need of acquiring a speaking knowledge of it.

The most important of the assimilative forces, however, was the public school. The interest of the Norseman in this institution reached back to his earlier experiences in Norway. In his frontier home he often assisted in promoting the work of public instruction. Occasionally adults took advantage of the facilities of the public school during the winter season. Parents often received aid from the children enrolled, particularly in the use of English. The school house, too, was

the center of social activity in the community; debates on questions and issues of civic importance, spelling bees, and literary and musical programs were held there. It also served as a lecture hall, especially before elections. These many activities centering in and around the school went far in communicating information in regard to American problems, customs, and institutions.

The Lutheran church with its large immigrant following was one of the important agencies retarding the process of assimilation. In this institution the Norwegian language was used exclusively, in fact the clergy looked upon that language as an important means through which to preserve the faith of the fathers. In the parochial school, one of the bulwarks of the church, the instruction was carried on in Norse. The periodical literature of the synods was also published in that language. According to the catalog of the East Paint Creek congregation library, probably the only record of its kind available, the collection consisted of books in the immigrant's language. Even the Quaker and Methodist congregations, which had associations with English-speaking synods, discovered with the passing of time that the use of Norwegian was essential to success.

The second of the retarding tendencies was the Norwegian-American press. Although no newspaper of that type was published in Iowa prior to 1874, *Emigranten* (*The Emigrant*), a Wisconsin publication, and *Skandinaven*, a Chicago paper, circulated widely among the immigrants. These weekly sheets, both through the use of Norwegian, and the publication of news from Norway, sustained the interest in Old World affairs. Religious periodicals in the Norwegian language also circulated in the settlements. The newspaper, however, contained a large number of items in regard to the political situation in the United States. Articles pertaining to non-political matters also appeared. Thus the Norwegian-American press was an aid in acquainting the immigrant with the problems and institutions of the state and nation.

The ardor of the Norseman for the culture of his native land was stimulated by the comparative isolation of the pioneer home and likewise by the "laissez-faire" attitude of the state. The government, federal as well as state, allowed full freedom of choice in matters relating to religious affairs, and imposed no restriction with reference to the use of foreign speech. Under these circumstances the immigrant in adjusting himself to the democratic environment of his adopted country, naturally moved along the lines of least resistance.

The attachment of the Norseman to his native language encouraged



the continuance of other foreign customs and traditions. In the Lutheran congregation, for example, the custom of employing a sexton, of having the preacher wear the gown and ruff, of retaining the chanting as a part of the ritual, of using Norwegian hymns in the service, and of providing formal religious training for the youth persisted whenever conditions permitted. This tendency while serving as a check to the process of assimilation, permitted, nevertheless, a slow, natural, and intelligent infiltration of immigrant culture into the American mould. Of necessity, it affected all forms of cultural expression. In spite of this tendency, foreign manners and institutions were gradually adapting themselves to the New World atmosphere.

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The materials used in this study are widely scattered and very largely in the Norwegian language. The diaries of Gilbert Gilbertson and Elizabeth Koren of Mitchell and Winneshiek Counties respectively, also the reminiscences of Anders N. Teslow of Winneshiek County, give good accounts of social conditions in the early Norse settlements of Iowa. The diary of Mrs. Koren, now in published form, is especially valuable on account of its detail. The Gilbertson diary is in the possession of its writer's daughter, Nellie Gilbertson, of St. Ansgar, Iowa. The Teslow account is in the keeping of Mrs. H. F. Swansen, Blair, Nebraska. The Assor Grøth letter collection was very useful in the study, particularly for the social phase of pioneer life. This collection was placed at the disposal of the writer by Mrs. H. S. Houg of St. Ansgar, Iowa, a daughter of Mr. Grøth. Smaller letter collections, some in manuscript, others in typewritten or printed form, also constituted a valuable source on all phases of immigrant life. Many of these appeared in books and pamphlets. The church records of the East Paint Creek congregation, including the catalog of the library, contained information on various phases of church work in the pioneer period. The United States Census Reports, and the Iowa manuscript census material, on file in the Division of Archives of the Historical, Memorial, and Art Department at Des Moines, proved an invaluable aid in determining the economic pattern of the immigrant pioneers in 1850 and 1870.

In order to secure information on the social, economic, religious, and educational phases of pioneer life, the writer prepared a questionnaire which was sent to about fifty Norse pioneers or their direct descendants. About thirty-five responded, a few with detailed accounts.

Other material on these phases of life was gleaned from personal interviews with several of the surviving pioneers and many of the children of Norwegian immigrants in the various settlements.

Newspapers and periodicals, especially those in the Norwegian language, were indispensable sources. *Emigranten* (*The Emigrant*) and *Skandinaven* contained a wealth of material in the form of news-letters from the settlements. The *Skandinaven* file for this period, and much of *Emigranten*, are in the newspaper collection of Koren Library at Luther College, Decorah. Other parts of the *Emigranten* file are at Luther Theological Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota. Of the various English-language newspapers used, the *North Iowa Times* (Clayton County) and *Le Grand Reporter* (Marshall County) deserve mention. The former, available at the Historical, Memorial, and Art Department at Des Moines, was useful because of the completeness of the file for the late fifties. The latter, deposited at Le Grand, was valuable on account of the large amount of material in its columns on the Norwegian Quakers.

*Kirkelig Maanedstidende* (*Monthly Church Times*), the paper of the high-church Lutherans, was serviceable in the study of church activities. *Symra*, a Norwegian-language quarterly published at Decorah for the decade following 1905, contained many valuable contributions by Iowa Norsemen on all phases of pioneer life. *Studies and Records*, published annually at Northfield, Minnesota, by the Norwegian-American Historical Association, also contained many helpful articles.


Pamphlet literature, much of it in the Norwegian language, was likewise used profitably. This material was usually in the form of congregation, community, or organization history. *Lidt af Gamle Ostre Paint Creek Menigheds Historie* (*A Little of the History of the East Paint Creek Congregation*), written by L. A. Grangaard and A. P. Lea in 1926 for the seventy-fifth anniversary of the congregation, is one. *Seventy-fifth Anniversary*, an anonymous pamphlet, published in 1928 to commemorate the founding of the Clausen colony in Mitchell County, is another. The St. Petri Congregation of north Story County celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1907. For this occasion the Reverend Ivar Havneros wrote a pamphlet entitled, *St. Petri Menighed's Historie* (*History of St. Petri Congregation*). These are merely samples of this type of literature.

The large and varied collection of articles on all phases of immigrant life in the pioneer room of the Norwegian-American Historical Museum



at Decorah was also a rare source. The Egge and Haugen cabins, which date back to Iowa pioneer life of the early fifties, are a part of the outdoor exhibit.

The secondary works consulted were numerous. These deal with all phases of Norse immigrant life and activity in the many settlements of the United States. For background material on the emigration movement from Norway, T. C. Blegen's *Norwegian Migration to America*, K. Gjerset's *History of the Norwegian People*, and G. T. Flom's *A History of Norwegian Immigration to the United States* are valuable. A large and varied collection of secondary works is available in the Koren Library of Luther College, Decorah, Iowa.





THE HISTORY OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA:  
THE COLLEGIATE DEPARTMENT FROM THE  
BEGINNING TO 1878

VERNON CARSTENSEN

In this study the writer has attempted to present a detailed account of the early history of the State University of Iowa. Although particular attention has been given to the development of the Collegiate Department, other phases of the history of the institution have been discussed. The first section of this paper deals with the relationship between the University and the State; the second, with the method and philosophy of the academic function; the third, with the administration of the University. This study has carried the history of the University to 1878. The year 1878 was selected to mark the limits of the present study because it marks the end of the first period of the development of the institution.

Since the University of Iowa was, in many important respects, typical of the land grant universities, this study should reveal not only the forces which served to mould it, but such a study should also focus attention on some of the neglected phases of the history of higher education in the United States.

The state universities owe their origin to two factors in particular: the land grant from the public domain, and the popular acceptance of the idea of state control of higher education. Although both ideas had been expressed before the American Revolution, the state university, as an institution, belongs particularly to the West. Several important factors favored the establishment of the state university in the West: (1) the land grant from the central government, (2) the division of church and state and the subsequent multiplication of religious sects along the frontier, (3) the materialism and democracy of the frontier, (4) the rapidity of settlement in the West, and (5) the idea of a unified system of education with the university at the head of the system. These factors served to give the state university an advantage over private and sectarian colleges which it did not enjoy in the older states.

The foundations of the University of Iowa were being laid at a time when the population of the State was increasing at a swift rate. When

the University was established in 1847, there were less than two hundred thousand people in Iowa; by 1880 the population had increased to over a million and a half. Most of the people who came into the State during this period were from the northern states, notably Ohio, although before the Civil War a large number had come from Virginia and Kentucky. Noteworthy among a relatively small foreign-born population were the Germans, Irish, English, and Norwegians. The settlement of the State was accomplished mostly by the "common man." Predominantly protestant in religion, moderately liberal in social and political attitudes, most of those who came were characterized by youth, hope, and poverty. It was while the social, economic, and political life of these people was taking form that the University developed. Hence, although the idea of a university was borrowed from an older and less fluid society, the institution which evolved in Iowa was modified by the conditions out of which it grew.

#### THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY

In 1838 the first Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Iowa, following a practice already established, petitioned the central government for money and land with which to establish a "Territorial University." This petition was ignored by Congress, but a second petition in 1839, asking for two townships of land, was successful. Congress adopted an act reserving two townships of land from the public domain for the permanent endowment of the University. According to the terms of this act, the land was to be selected immediately by an agent appointed by the Secretary of the Interior and reserved from sale. It was to be relinquished by the central government when the Territory became a State. Because of carelessness or negligence on the part of the Secretary of the Interior and the Territorial officers, only two or three sections of land had been selected before Iowa became a State in 1846. In 1847 the First General Assembly adopted an act establishing the University of Iowa and creating a Board of Trustees to govern the institution. Among other powers, the Board was given authority over the lands. It became the first duty of the Board to secure a responsible agent to select the remaining lands. Such a man was found in the person of John W. Whitaker who selected the remaining sections between 1847 and 1850. In 1851 the completed list of University lands had been approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

Not until all the land had been selected did the Board turn its attention to the problem of selling it. The law provided that these lands



should be disposed of under the same general regulations which obtained for the disposition of the other school lands. It is indeed significant to observe at this point that the law regulating the sale of school lands was designed to facilitate in every possible way the early sale of these lands. In June, 1851, the Board of Trustees agreed to appraise the University lands "at a minimum of five dollars an acre," and to offer them for sale. Accordingly, the Superintendent of Public Instruction offered 35,679 acres of the University land to the highest bidder on November 1, 1851. Only two bidders appeared, and together they purchased 482.74 acres at a fraction more than five dollars an acre. In February, 1852, the Board voted to raise the price of the University lands to ten dollars an acre. Heroic as this policy was, it could not long endure in the face of the conditions which prevailed in Iowa in the 1850's. Preëmtors and land-hungry settlers were to destroy it.

The University lands had hardly been selected before the Board was besieged by individuals who claimed to have preëmpted certain of the lands before they had been given to the University, and who, in accordance with frontier usage and Iowa law, demanded the right to purchase the land. In the beginning the Board attempted to secure five or ten dollars an acre from the preëmtors as well as other purchasers, but as the number of preëmtors increased, the policy of the Board collapsed. In 1854 it was decided to allow preëmtors, upon proving their claims, the right to the land at \$2.50 an acre.

In 1854-1855 the first large migration into Iowa occurred. It was estimated that during this time over two hundred thousand people came into the State, most of them seeking cheap land. Against this pressure the Board could not maintain the policy of reserving the land for ten dollars an acre. Accordingly, in 1854 the Board determined to have the remaining lands appraised at their "actual value," which was subsequently fixed at \$3.64 per acre. But even this price was too high.

In January and February, 1855, the General Assembly adopted an Act and a Resolution, each of which was to have immediate effect upon the policy of the Board. The Act, passed in the interest of land seekers and speculators, provided that all school, University, and saline lands should be thrown into the market within three months. The Resolution requested that the Board of Trustees report to the General Assembly on their plans for opening the University. The law left no alternative for the Board; the remaining University lands must be offered for sale. The Resolution served to bring home to the Trustees the possibil-

ity of the legislature's removing the University from Iowa City unless it was opened. It was in accordance with the law of 1855 that the Board of Trustees offered all the remaining University lands at public auction in Iowa City from June 15 to June 18, 1855. Thus, on the one hand, land-hungry settlers were demanding the right to purchase lands at a nominal price; on the other hand, the Board, with no money with which to run a university save the interest derived for the receipts from the sale of lands, was being pressed to open the University.

Nearly 18,500 acres of land were sold at this public auction, 11,036.20 acres of which were purchased by several members of the Board. This circumstance, when it became public, inspired charges that there had been "fraudulent conspiracy" on the part of some of the members to secure the lands. In January, 1856, the Board of Trustees, taking cognizance of these charges, adopted a resolution appointing a committee of three of their members, none of whom had been interested in the sales, to examine all the evidence bearing on the land sales, and to report whether there had been fraudulent conspiracy on the part of the members who secured land. This committee reported in June, 1856, that certain of the Trustees had purchased land, but that they had paid more than the appraised price for such lands. The committee concluded that from "all sources of information at their command, they have been able to discover no combination on the part of the Trustees or any of them, nor on the part of any other persons, to prevent the lands of the University from bringing at the sales . . . their maximum value, or otherwise diminishing the funds thereof." The report was unanimously adopted by the Board, but the General Assembly, in 1857, adopted a joint resolution declaring the sale of University lands to the Trustees as "utterly null and void," and censuring the members implicated in the sale for a "violation of a trust reposed in such trustees by the authority of the State." Despite this condemnation by the General Assembly, a careful examination of all available evidence fails to show that the Trustees implicated in the sales were guilty of anything worse than bad judgment. No convincing evidence of fraudulent conspiracy can be found.

The average price of all lands sold up to 1860 was \$3.52. In 1906 the total amount received from the land grant was a little more than \$235,000.00. Several individuals who have written on the history of the University or the administration of the land grant have criticized the Board of Trustees for carelessness, inefficiency, and dishonesty in handling the lands. Such criticism, when examined in the light of the condi-



tions which surrounded the Board in the 1850's, is unfair. The Board did all that it could to preserve the fund. Indeed, the remarkable thing is that the University lands brought in as much money as they did. It must be conceded with Thomas H. Benton, Jr. that "of all the grants made to the State for various objects, none has been so well managed, and yielded so large an income in proportion to the number of acres, as the one made for the support of the University." The chief importance of the land grant was that it gave the State means of establishing a University early in its political history; at a later day it opened the way for financial support from the State.

Between 1838 and 1846, no suggestion was made as to where the State University was to be located. The Constitution of 1846 gave the General Assembly authority to establish a University "with such branches as the public convenience may hereafter demand for the promotion of literature, the arts and sciences." Accordingly the first General Assembly adopted an act to establish a University. Since it was determined at the same session that the capital of Iowa should be moved to some point nearer the center of the State, the University was located in Iowa City and was to be given the State building there after the capital had been moved. It was in the nature of a political bargain that Iowa City was given the University in compensation for the loss of the capital.

The first session of the legislature saw several unsuccessful attempts to divide the University fund between the parent University, branches of the University, and normal schools. In 1849, however, provision was made for the establishment of two branches of the University; one to be at Fairfield, the other at Dubuque; and three normal schools, at Andrew, Mount Pleasant, and Oskaloosa; all were to be supported from the University fund. Fortunately the law which established a branch of the University at Dubuque contained a provision which saved the University fund from immediate dissipation: "No monies shall be appropriated to support any branch of the University until the revenues of the parent institution shall exceed three thousand dollars per annum from the grant made by Congress." Uncounted attempts to establish additional normal schools and branches of the University—all to be supported by the University funds—were made during the next eight years.

The branch of the University at Fairfield was organized, a site chosen, a building plan selected, and a faculty appointed. The normal school at Andrew began operation in 1849 and continued for several

years; the one at Oskaloosa opened in the fall of 1852. The branch of the University located at Dubuque and the normal school at Mount Pleasant were never organized. Each of these branches attempted to secure money from the University fund, but none of them succeeded. Their connection with the University was finally dissolved by the Constitution of 1857.

That these years should have witnessed so many attempts to establish normal schools and branches of the University, supported from the University fund, can be understood if one appreciates the motives of the legislators. First, there was a genuine desire on the part of the people of the State for a number of institutions of higher learning, especially normal schools. Few people could visualize the day when one large centralized institution would serve the State. Accordingly, each community sought to establish its own college. Secondly, some legislators sought to secure a portion of the University fund for their community for political purposes. Lastly, the establishment of a branch of the University in a community was supported by the land speculators who were almost certain that the increment of their land holdings would be greater if a school were located in the vicinity. These factors combined to bring about so many attempts to divide the University fund.

There are several reasons why the University fund was not dissipated before it was made secure in 1857. The relatively late sale of the lands, together with the legal provisions withholding the funds from the branches until the annual income should have reached three thousand dollars, combined to protect the fund until 1855. In 1855 the General Assembly adopted an Act instructing the Board of Trustees of the University to give a portion of the University fund to the normal schools. But the Board, at the suggestion of Governor James W. Grimes, refused to comply until so ordered by the court. The officers of the normal schools failed to secure such an order, so the funds remained undivided.

In 1857 a constitutional convention met in Iowa City to draw up a new constitution for the State. Several of the delegates successfully urged that a constitutional provision be adopted to locate the University at one place and without branches. A few days before the convention adjourned, a movement was begun by delegates from the western part of the State to provide for the permanent location of the capital by a constitutional provision. To secure the support of the delegates of the eastern counties, it was also proposed to locate the University perma-



nently in Iowa City by the same means. After considerable parliamentary maneuvering, the proposition was accepted by the Convention, written into the Constitution, and adopted by the State. Thus, after ten years, the University was at last settled permanently in Iowa City, and all branches were abolished.

There was only a suggestion of State responsibility for higher education in the Constitution of 1848, which provided that the General Assembly should "encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement." It was not intended then that the University should receive financial support from the State. Indeed, in 1850 the idea was not yet generally accepted that the State should support elementary education—to say nothing of secondary and higher education. Accordingly, at the beginning of the period under study, the relationship of the University to the State was that of an institution which was to be under the guardianship of the State but not financially dependent upon it. In 1878 the State tacitly assumed financial responsibility for the University by providing for an additional endowment for the University from State funds. The development of State support can be traced through three steps. First the State provided funds for additional buildings and repairs, then for running expenses, and lastly, annual endowment.

At the time the University of Iowa opened, it possessed only one small rented building. The Faculty, the Board, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Governor of the State all urged the General Assembly to provide a "boarding hall" for the University, on the grounds that the sons and daughters of Iowa farmers, mechanics, and merchants could not afford to pay the high prices demanded in Iowa City for board and room. Unless the General Assembly made some such provision, it was argued, only the residents of Iowa City and Johnson County could attend the University. In other words if the State intended to derive a widespread benefit from the University fund, it would first have to contribute funds for the erection of a "boarding hall." In 1858 the University secured its first appropriation from the General Assembly. As adopted, the bill provided ten thousand dollars for the erection of a "boarding hall," and three thousand dollars to repair the old capitol building which had been given to the University when the capitol was removed to Des Moines late in 1857. The money appropriated for the "boarding hall" was not sufficient for the building designed by the Board, so in 1860 the University came once more to the General Assembly for an appropriation. Al-

though the General Assembly did not appropriate money directly from the State Treasury, it did vote to give to the University all the remaining saline lands, together with the unappropriated funds, notes, and mortgages which had accrued from the sale of these lands. Part of the appropriation was to be used for finishing the "boarding hall"; the remainder was to be added to the permanent endowment of the University.

In 1862 the University again came to the legislature for aid, but no appropriation was made. Indeed, only the veto of Governor Kirkwood saved the University from being injured by a hostile General Assembly, which had passed an act designed to limit the number of professors in the University and drastically reduce their salaries. In 1864, another petition for aid from the University caused the General Assembly to appoint a Visiting Committee empowered to examine the institution, determine its needs, and make recommendations to the General Assembly. Upon a favorable report from this committee the General Assembly voted twenty thousand dollars for the erection of a new building "suitable for an astronomical observatory, a chapel, and chemical laboratory." Two years later the University returned to the legislature with the request for funds with which to complete the building. This appropriation was obtained. In 1868, just ten years after receiving the first appropriation, the University secured its first appropriation for maintenance. Thenceforth the General Assembly never failed to make an appropriation for the maintenance of the University.

In 1868 the Legislative Visiting Committee suggested that the University should be given an annual endowment by the State. Although a bill for this purpose was then introduced, nothing came of it immediately. However, agitation for an endowment continued. In 1874 John P. Irish, an Iowa City newspaper editor, presented the argument that the State had assumed responsibility for the University by accepting the University lands. The lands, he asserted, had been sold for a fraction of their real value. Hence the State was morally bound to recompense the University for such loss as was incurred by the careless handling of the lands. This argument was used with telling effect during the next few years in urging that a permanent endowment be made by the State for the University. In 1878 the Faculty, the Board of Regents, the Alumni Association, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Governor of the State, and the Visiting Committee from the General Assembly successfully urged that the General Assembly provide an additional permanent endowment for the University. In 1878



the long struggle for State recognition was won; there remained only the problem of securing support adequate for the healthy growth and development of the institution.

There is little evidence to show that religious interests ever actively opposed legislative appropriations to the University. After the professional departments of law and medicine were established in 1868 and 1870, special interest groups, representing private professional schools, often attempted to block State appropriations. Although never successful in their attempts to have the University deprived of State support, these groups were frequently responsible for reducing the amount of the appropriation.

The recognition of the University as head of the public school system of the State represents another important phase of the relationship between the University and the State. The process of making the University the head of the system involved four factors: (1) the acceptance of the idea of a unified system of education, (2) the acceptance of the University as the head of that system, (3) the development of high schools in the public system, and such standardization of these high schools that they could articulate with the University, and (4) the abolition of the preparatory department of the University at the time when it was decided that the high schools had so far developed as to be able to prepare students for the University.

The idea of a uniform organization of the public schools was borrowed from Europe, but was somewhat modified by American theory. American idealists looked to the schools as the means of preparing children for democracy and business pursuits; and there were some who thought of education as a universal solvent for social ills. Implicit in the educational theory of American idealists was the belief that intelligence was the natural possession of all men; education was the instrument which could release it.

The first suggestion that the schools of Iowa should have a uniform organization was made by the first Territorial Governor, Robert Lucas. Although subsequent governors, legislators, educators, and public men urged the adoption of a unified system of education, most of the provisions for education were the result of special legislation for particular districts. In 1856, at the suggestion of Governor Grimes, the General Assembly made provision for the creation of a commission, composed of three men, to plan for the entire educational system of the State. This commission, made up of Horace Mann, Amos Dean, and Frederick Kissell, prepared a school law which provided for a unified system of

education extending from the elementary schools to the University. Although the law was not adopted by the legislature at the time, it represents the first expression of a desire for a unified system of education.

The desire for a unified system of education was again expressed, this time effectively, by the Constitutional Convention of 1857. The Convention, without serious opposition, adopted an article which provided for the creation of a Board of Education. The Board was given authority to legislate for the educational system from the elementary schools to the University. When the legislature assembled for the first time under the new constitution, the Board of Education had not yet met. Ignoring the constitutional provision which granted legislative control of the public schools to the Board of Education, the General Assembly drew up and adopted a law providing for the organization of the schools of the State and recognizing the University as head of the system. Based largely upon the recommendations of the Horace Mann Commission, this law was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in December, 1858, a few days before the Board of Education met. The Board readopted most of the law, but it did not recognize the University as head of the public school system. It was not until 1870, after the Board of Education had passed out of existence, that the General Assembly adopted a measure which gave this recognition to the University.

When the University first opened there were no high schools in the State worthy of the name, nor was there adequate provision in the school law for the organization of such schools. Accordingly, the University organized a preparatory department to prepare the graduates of the elementary schools for University classes. It must be observed that this department was forced upon the University by circumstances. Unwillingly it provided for a preparatory department, and unwillingly retained it.

In 1865 there were only eighteen high schools in the state; they were neither able nor, apparently, willing to devote themselves to preparing students for the University. By 1870 there were forty-one high schools; twenty-three of these had well-defined courses of study. In 1875 the President of the University, George Thacher, reported that there were still only forty-one high schools in the State; only fifteen of these offered the necessary courses to prepare students for the freshman class of the University. Accordingly, the greatest need which must be satisfied was that of increasing the number of high schools and



of inducing them to offer courses designed to prepare students for the University. Until the high schools could be articulated with the University, the preparatory department would have to be maintained.

In the 1870's the Iowa State Teachers' Association began agitating for the extension and improvement of secondary education. In 1872 the Board of Regents of the University sought to provide a working basis for articulation between University and high schools by providing that: "The academical faculty (of the University) may admit to the various classes without examination students from such schools or academies as in their judgment offer sufficient facilities for preparation, but this privilege shall be withdrawn from any school found deficient in this respect." But to establish public high schools in Iowa was both difficult and slow; to bring such schools to standardize their offerings seemed impossible. Yet this had to be done before the University could serve effectively as the head of the system, before the high schools could be accepted as preparatory departments of the University. No single individual or group can be credited with having achieved this end. In the 1870's the faculty of the University, the Board of Regents, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Iowa State Teachers' Association, the editors of the State educational journals, and numerous newspaper editors joined to urge the extension and improvement of secondary education. This movement to establish high schools and make them serve as preparatory departments of the University forced compromise upon both the high schools and the University. Thus the University was faced with the vexing problem of having to set standards low enough for the high schools and yet keep them high enough to maintain the dignity of the institution. The need for the Preparatory Department cannot be said to have passed in 1878 when the General Assembly adopted a law abolishing it. This law, in effect, was a declaration by the General Assembly that thenceforth the high schools of the State were to be completely responsible for preparing students for the University; the University was to assume its place as head of the public school system.

#### THE METHOD AND PHILOSOPHY OF ACADEMIC FUNCTION

Although over twenty state universities were established before the University of Iowa, it cannot be said that a definite idea existed in 1847 as to what the State University was to be and to do. What the University became was the result of two forces: the historic idea of the University, and the demands and wants of the society in which it

developed. Of all institutions established in the West, few have felt the impact of the frontier conditions more strongly than the state universities.

The suggestion that Iowa was to have a state university was made by the First Territorial Assembly but neither this body nor subsequent Territorial Assemblies got further than to discuss the land grant. In 1847 the First General Assembly, in providing for the organization of the University, asserted that the principal duty of the institution should be to prepare teachers. The people of the State, so far as they expressed themselves, agreed with the legislature. Thomas H. Benton Jr., as Superintendent of Public Instruction, recommended that the University be used to train doctors and lawyers. In 1854 Governor James W. Grimes, President of the Board of Trustees, declared that it should be the duty of the University, when opened, to educate engineers, mechanics, architects, chemists, metallurgists, and geologists. When the Board of Trustees prepared to open the University, very careful attention was given to the selection of professors of chemistry, geology, and mathematics. These utterances and acts, all of which antedate the opening of the University, suggest that, while there may have been no agreement as to what subjects should be taught, the primary object of the University was to teach students how to earn a living. It is apparent that little thought was given to "mental discipline."

The first plan of organization and course of study, prepared by Chancellor Amos Dean, was in complete harmony with such action as the Board had taken before electing Dean to office. According to this plan, the University was divided into nine departments: Ancient Languages, Modern Languages, Intellectual Philosophy, Moral Philosophy (including International Law and Politics), History, Natural History, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Chemistry. The first five constituted the literary departments; the last four, the scientific. The Bachelor of Philosophy degree was granted upon completion of the studies in three of the literary departments; the Bachelor of Science upon completion of the studies in three of the scientific departments; the Bachelor of Arts upon completion of the studies in three departments of each group; the Doctor of Philosophy upon completion of the studies of all nine departments. Both sexes were admitted; boys at the age of fifteen, girls at the age of fourteen.

Although the "elective system" was little talked about in the United States in 1855, it was here provided in substance if not in name. A



student was allowed to come when he pleased, study in such departments as he selected—provided he studied in three—and, after he had mastered the studies of one department, receive a certificate of proficiency toward graduation. Such was the organization of the University that he could secure a Bachelor of Arts degree without having studied either mathematics or the ancient languages.

Thus from the beginning the University sought to harmonize “practical” and “liberal” education: to provide for Greek and surveying, moral philosophy and chemistry in the same course of study. If this is a source of confusion in American universities today, it is a condition which has been present since the middle of the last century. Significant, indeed, is this organization of the University in terms of the educational theory which it implies. To allow a student to select the studies which he considered would prepare him for earning a living was to espouse the principle that higher education had for its object the preparation of young people for the tasks of life. Cultivation of the mind was only subsidiary. In the words of the *Second Circular* this purpose is suggested:

“But while framed to furnish the loftiest style of culture, it [the University] can adapt itself to the lowest. By its rejection of college classes, and its adoption of independent departments, it is enabled to furnish to the student just what instruction he requires, without, at the same time, compelling him to receive much that he does not want.”

While the opening of the University under this plan did arouse the interest of Iowa newspapers, no objection to it was raised. But a complete faculty was never secured, the Chancellor never took office, and few students appeared who were prepared to take advantage of the University. The financial crisis of 1857, the adoption of a new school law, and the advent of a new Board of Trustees brought this first experiment to an end in 1858.

Meeting for the first time in April of 1858, with Amos Dean present for the first time since his election as Chancellor, the new Board of Trustees, without a great show of unanimity, abolished the Preparatory Department, eliminated the departments of ancient and modern language and “theoretical” mathematics from the course of study, excluded women from the University, and decided to close the University for two years. The object, as explained by the Secretary of the Board, was to establish a new policy: to create an institution primarily designed to offer instruction in Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, History, Natural Philosophy, Natural History, Applied Mathematics, and

Chemistry. "It is proposed," reported the Secretary, "to teach these different sciences, so important to fit young men for the different business pursuits of life, not only in their elements, but also in their applications." Unfortunately for the success of the "new policy" the announcement was made at an inauspicious time, for the legislature had just made an appropriation to the Board for a new building. A vigorous newspaper discussion followed the announcement of the "new policy" with the result that the eliminated subjects were restored to the course of study. The Board of Education, in December, 1858, adopted a law which prohibited the Board of Trustees ever again from excluding women from the University. Had circumstances been more favorable, the new policy might have resulted in the creation of a technological school.

From 1858 to 1860 only the Normal Department of the University remained in operation. In 1860 the Collegiate Department was reopened. Amos Dean had resigned in the meantime and another Board had been created. Silas Totten had been selected as President and had been asked to prepare a plan for reorganizing the University. In an address before the General Assembly and in a long paper submitted to the Board, Totten stated what he considered to be the proper function of a state university. The keynote of Totten's theory was that a "public institution should be so organized as to make the most of the materials upon which it operates." He recommended the departmental plan of college organization as the plan best suited to the peculiar needs of a new country. The University was to be divided into six departments: Intellectual and Moral Philosophy and Rhetoric; History, Political Science, Constitutional and International Law; Mathematics and Astronomy; Ancient and Modern Languages; Natural History, including Geology, Mineralogy, Botany, Agricultural Chemistry, and Zoology; Natural Philosophy and Chemistry. Each department was independent of the others. It had its own standards of admission, promotion, and graduation. Students might enter the highest class in one department, the lowest in another. The advantages urged for this organization were several: the amount of work could be graduated to meet the needs of the individual student; a student could pursue any subject to any length he desired; excellence in one department could be made to compensate for mediocrity in another; the knowledge that attainment, not time, was to serve as a criterion for graduation would stimulate a student to study. The plan, as proposed by Totten, was



adopted by the Board and served as a basis for the organization of the University until 1865.

During the next five years the course of study was somewhat extended by the addition of music, penmanship, and elocution. For a while, too, students were given gymnastic exercise and military drill.

Yet this plan of organization did not meet with unqualified approbation. The faculty found it difficult to administer. In 1863 an examining committee raised the question whether the program was so devised as to "lay the foundation broad and strong in a general and thorough course of collegiate study." The next year the faculty began to consider a revision of the course of study and a reorganization of the University. In 1865, the University was reorganized. Nothing can be clearer, however, than that in the beginning the University sought primarily to offer to students the means of securing a practical education. That it should do so, must be ascribed to the conditions out of which the University developed. The growing society in Iowa needed men and women who could solve the material problems everywhere apparent, and the State University was thought to be the institution which should give such training.

In 1865 the Board of Trustees, on the recommendation of the President and Faculty of the University, adopted a new plan of organization and course of study. The former provided for the organization of regular classes. Students, upon entering the University, were allowed to select one of three fixed courses: one leading to the Bachelor of Arts degree, one to the Bachelor of Philosophy, one to the Bachelor of Science. Only a minimum of elective subjects was allowed within each course. In 1870 the plan of organization was again changed. The college course was lengthened to five years, and all students were required to take essentially the same course during the first three years; during the last two years a student might elect most of his studies. In 1873 this organization was abandoned on the recommendation of President Thacher.

The new course of study adopted in 1865 made few changes in the offerings of the University, but during the next few years the course was enriched by a chair of English Language and Literature, a chair of Civil Engineering—for a time in the Collegiate Department—and more adequate provision was made for the social studies. Indeed, in 1869-1870, a professor was appointed to the chair of History and Political Economy, but at the end of the year he was discharged, apparently for political reasons. During this period the Board of Trustees un-

successfully attempted to provide studies suited to the "particular needs of the young women" in the University. The most significant expansion of the course of study, however, was to be found in the development of the department of physical science.

It was perhaps natural that the physical sciences should have been favored in an institution which, during its first ten years, had constantly sought to provide practical education. The student body of the University just after the Civil War was given more maturity by the presence in the University of a number of ex-soldiers who had taken advantage of tuition exemptions offered to war veterans. Many of the students sought to prepare themselves to earn a living. Moreover, by 1865 the United States was witnessing a tremendous technological development. Science was accepted as the only means of assuring material improvement. Lastly, the department of physical sciences was under the direction of an enthusiastic and well-trained scientist, Gustavus Hinrichs.

In 1865 the Board of Trustees voted to provide a laboratory in the new building (North Hall) instead of the contemplated astronomical observatory. In order to secure the most modern plans, Hinrichs was sent, in the summer of 1865, to examine the laboratories at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Michigan, and then to submit plans for the laboratory based on this examination and his own experience. After 1866 the laboratory received special mention in the University Catalogue: "When completed," reported the Board, "this laboratory will be second to none in the United States." Furthermore, Hinrichs secured large appropriations for his department, two assistants, and had the physical science offerings in the course of study greatly increased. By 1870 two years' study of physical science was required of every student in the Collegiate Department.

Before 1870 Hinrichs had adopted the laboratory method of teaching physical sciences, and all students were required to practice in the laboratory. He was indeed a pioneer in the field of scientific education in the United States. Students, newspaper editors, and educators watched his activities with interest, and while it cannot be said that his work escaped adverse criticism, it did win the approval of a host of observers. Several graduates, on returning to the University, lauded his work; some even insisted that his contributions to scientific knowledge and teaching methods alone gave the institution a respectable rank in this country. In 1871 the English scientific journal *Nature* (London) remarked:



"We trust that these important reforms in science teaching will prove contagious, and spread rapidly from the plateau of Iowa City to a region even greater than the American continent."

The same year an American scientist, Edward C. Pickering, asserted that the laboratory at the University of Iowa was one of the four best in the country. However, diverging theories of education, inter-departmental strife, and the advent of a new president brought the rapid development of the department of physical science to an end.

Even before George Thacher had come to the University as President in 1871 there was opposition to Hinrichs among members of the faculty. Some disagreed with him on the theory of education; others suspected him because he professed atheism; some were envious of his reputation and the strength of his department. All these factors were present when Thacher came to the University. Thacher, the oldest man in this period to serve as President, graduated from the Yale Theological Seminary in 1843, entered the ministry immediately, and remained there until called to the University. Possessed of the belief that education had for its purpose the cultivation of the mind, opposed to "electives," practical education, and the exclusion of the ancient languages from the University curriculum, prone to be dictatorial and emphatic in his religious beliefs, Thacher was not a man capable of administering the University without friction. Between him and Hinrichs there was no agreement as to the object of education. From the very nature of the two men there could be no compromise. During Thacher's first year he and Hinrichs quarreled, and it was rumored that the President asked for the dismissal of Hinrichs in 1872. The Board refused, but censured Hinrichs for his conduct. News of this reached the public, and the newspapers of the State generally supported Hinrichs. However, in Thacher the various opposition to Hinrichs found focus, and in the course of study in 1873 this opposition found expression.

This course of study was prepared by Thacher and two members of the Board; it was approved by the faculty with Professor Hinrichs not voting, and Professor Eggert voting in the negative. For the first time in the history of the University ancient languages were required for the Bachelor of Arts degree (this requirement was in effect only until 1884). The number of "elective" subjects was substantially reduced. The most significant change, however, was made with reference to the physical sciences. Under the old plan two years' study of physical science was required; under the new plan, two quarters. The

amount of physical science required for the science degree was likewise reduced, while the amount of required mathematics and natural science was increased. No other explanation of this course of study can possibly serve than that it was devised for the purpose of establishing a different educational theory as basic in the University, and of crippling the department of physical science.

Hinrichs during the next few years was deprived of both his assistants and most of his students. Only paltry appropriations were made for his chair. He complained to the Faculty and to the Board, but received little consideration. In 1876, however, a group of Iowa City business and professional men petitioned the Board of Regents for permission to establish a fund, amounting to a hundred dollars a year, for the encouragement of research in physical science. "We ask," said the petitioners, "the endorsement by you of this offer for the reason that we regard the practical results of physical science and chemistry as of more immediate financial benefit to the state than anything else taught in the University."

In 1878, upon the suggestion of President Christian W. Slagle, provision was made to divide the Collegiate Faculty into two sub-faculties: a Faculty of Science and a Faculty of Letters. Each faculty was to determine the course of study, entrance requirements, and graduation prerequisites for students in the School of Science and the School of Letters. Thus the Board attempted, in 1878, to resolve the problem which had been present since the beginning of the institution: the problem of offering both practical and liberal education in the Collegiate Department.

#### THE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY

During the period under study the government of the University was vested in five successive Boards. The fifth, the Board of Regents, remained in existence until superseded by the Board of Education in 1908. Four of these Boards, the first, second, fourth, and fifth, were created by and responsible to the General Assembly. The third was created by the Board of Education and was responsible to that body. The Board of Education was responsible to the legislature.

These several Boards, although differing somewhat as to size and organization, were very much the same in point of powers, duties, and responsibilities. The first three Boards disposed of most of the lands; the last were concerned primarily with formulating the general policies of the University and in securing and appropriating funds. Once the



University was organized, the details of administration were largely handled by the officers and the executive committee of the Board, and the faculty of the University. Occasionally, however, in the early years, the Board would interest itself in trivial matters such as student conduct, expenses for minor repairs in the University, and the like. As the administration of the University became more complicated, the Board delegated more and more administrative work to the faculty, and to its secretary and treasurer. Taken all together, the several Boards, made up for the most part of sincere, honest, and conscientious men, served the University well.

The executive committee came into existence at the time the University opened. In general it was composed of the resident Trustee, one or more members of the Faculty—generally the President of the University—the Secretary of the Board, and a responsible citizen of Iowa City. Its business was largely administrative, and its importance in the development of the University was only nominal.

From the opening of the University, the faculty held a position of considerable importance in the administration of the University. It determined, within general limits, the standards by which students were admitted, classified, promoted, and graduated. Under authority of the Board it adopted the regulations which were designed not only to govern the relations of the student with the University but also to take care of his religious training, his morals, and his conduct generally. The faculty sought conscientiously to enforce these rules of conduct.

A compact little group, made up for the most part of men who had once served in the ministry, the early faculties were not noted for harmony. Gustavus Hinrichs was the most outstanding of the early professors, although an abundant literature testifies to the popularity of Professors Wells, Parvin, Leonard, Parker, Currier, and Fellows. Of the early presidents to serve, Silas Totten, James Black, and Christian W. Slagle, were distinguished; Slagle was perhaps the most capable President during the period under study.

Most of the students in the University during the early period were the sons and daughters of Iowa farmers, mechanics, and small merchants; rich men's sons went to Eastern institutions or were sent to denominational colleges. Students came to Iowa City by train, stage coaches, lumber wagons, buggies, on horseback, or afoot. Once in Iowa City, a student, often with carpetbag still in hand, would go to see the president, then make arrangements for his room. After being

examined, he would be classified. Purchase of a ticket admitting him to classes completed his registration.

If a student were poor, as was often the case, he might do his studying, sleeping, cooking, and eating in a single room. Some students formed clubs in order to reduce expenses. The most popular of these student boarding clubs was the Syntropazone Club which at times boasted a membership of forty. Expenses for a year at the University ranged from one hundred to three hundred dollars—depending on how much a student worked for his support. Those who worked did innumerable tasks. They sawed, split, and carried wood for the University; did janitor work; tutored; served in the library; acted as handymen around many Iowa City houses. In 1878 about 30 per cent of the students in the University were working for all or part of their expenses.

Outside the classroom students developed a few social, athletic, and religious interests. The most popular, the most powerful, and the most characteristic of all college organizations in the early days was the literary society. This was distinctly a product of the period. It supplied students with means of satisfying their desire for companionship; it offered them practice in leadership and training in democracy; it served in the adult education movement. The literary society, once accepted as the most important part of college education, has passed into history because the University course of study has absorbed many of its forensic features and because the milieu which made it possible in the beginning has passed. There were four prominent societies on the campus: the Zetagathians, the Irving Institute, the Hesperians, and the Erodelpians. The last two were women's societies. Besides these four permanent societies, there were innumerable other societies which existed for a short time and then dissolved.

Living mostly with the townspeople, the students participated to some extent in the social, religious, and political life of the community. The students attended and sometimes joined Iowa City churches. They were prominent in the organization of the Iowa City Young Men's Christian Association. As members of this organization they helped launch the Iowa City lyceum program during 1868-1869 which brought such notable figures as Mark Twain, Horace Greeley, Frederick Douglass, P. T. Barnum, Anna Dickinson, and many another to Iowa City. Likewise some interested themselves in local and State politics, and despite the opposition of local politicians, insisted upon the right to vote. In 1880 the Supreme Court, in a test case, decreed that students



in the University who did not intend to establish a residence in Iowa City should not have the right to vote. For the most part, however, harmony prevailed between Town and Gown.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The source materials for the early history of the University are abundant. The most important of these have already been deposited in the University Archives; others are located about the campus of the University and in the historical library at Des Moines. Manuscript materials include the bound volumes of the records and the miscellaneous papers of the Board of Trustees, the minutes of the Faculty, the letter books of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the records of the several literary societies. All of these, except the letter books, are the property of the University.

Among the printed sources the most significant are the circulars and catalogues of the University, the University Reporter (student publication), the Iowa official documents, newspapers, and educational journals. The state documents include the journals of both houses of the legislature, the session laws, the debates of the constitutional convention of 1857, and the journal and laws of the Board of Education. The Iowa City newspapers are particularly useful for the file is almost complete after 1846, and the items on the University are numerous and informative. The educational journals of the State (*The Voice of Iowa*, *Common School*, *The Iowa School Journal*) are valuable for the background in educational thought which they provide.





## THE CONGRESS OF PARIS OF 1856

HAROLD T. HAGG

After the fall of Sebastopol in September, 1855, the great powers allied against Russia were sharply divided on the question of bringing the Crimean War to a close. In France, the people were overwhelmingly in favor of making peace, and Emperor Napoleon III realized that the continuation of the war offered little promise of further advantages for his country. In England, on the other hand, the opinion prevailed that another military and naval campaign was necessary if satisfactory peace terms were to be obtained. When Austria, however, sought to formulate peace proposals together with the western powers and announced her willingness to undertake armed mediation, England was obliged to defer to the views of her ally. Late in 1855, Austria sent an ultimatum to Russia embodying five points as a basis of peace: (1) the abolition of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and the cession of a portion of Bessarabia by Russia, (2) free navigation of the Danube River, (3) neutralization of the Black Sea, (4) immunities and privileges for the Christians in Turkey, (5) the right of the allies to develop further conditions in accord with European interests. Although Austria and France considered the first four points sufficient, England had demanded additional terms. After some controversy, the vague fifth point had been included. The threat of a rupture with Austria and the grave internal situation in Russia forced the Tsar to accept the ultimatum. England then insisted that her supplementary conditions be sent to Russia and accepted by her, before preliminaries of peace were signed. But Austria and France, anxious for peace and fearful that such a step would endanger the negotiations, refused to agree to it. England had to be content with the promise of Napoleon III that he would make the disarmament of the Åland Islands a *sine qua non* condition of peace.

It was apparent that the exigencies of domestic affairs were inclining the French Emperor to adopt a policy more moderate than that of England. Furthermore, his attitude would be pivotal, since it would not be feasible for England to renew the war without France. This was the basic factor in the selection of Paris as the seat of the peace con-

ference. England preferred the French capital in order that her plenipotentiaries might have the power of direct appeal to Napoleon III, whose support was essential if English war aims were to be achieved. For Russia, Paris offered the most favorable vantage point for exploiting the peace sentiment in France and seeking the good will of the French ruler. Under the circumstances, therefore, Napoleon III himself played the leading role at the Congress of Paris. His chief concern was to preserve the peace among the peacemakers. He kept in close touch with the negotiations throughout, and in numerous private interviews with the envoys sought consistently to smooth away difficulties and reconcile conflicting viewpoints. That he chose to exert his great influence on behalf of compromise and conciliation was not surprising. Peace was for him an economic and political necessity. Though determined to maintain his alliance with England, he feared that to support all her supplementary conditions might result in a rupture of the negotiations. To jeopardize the successful conclusion of the labors of the Congress by insisting upon additional terms which appeared to be of far more benefit to English interests than to those of France was a course the Emperor very naturally refused to follow. He was, in addition, not unmindful of the advantages of a *rapprochement* with Russia. His conciliatory overtures to that power during the Congress foreshadowed the diplomatic collaboration with her that was to be an important aspect of French continental foreign policy until 1863.

In the French eagerness for peace, Russia saw her opportunity to temper the demands of England and arrange a moderate peace settlement. Accordingly, the Russian government welcomed and reciprocated the friendly advances of Napoleon III, and, short of encouraging any ambitious projects he might suggest, instructed her plenipotentiaries to bend every effort to gain his favor and good will. England likewise realized the implications of the French attitude. Palmerston believed, therefore, that a resolute and vigorous policy was necessary. Active war preparations were to be continued until the signature of the peace treaty. At English insistence, the armistice was brief and was not applied to the blockades. These measures implied a threat to renew the war if Russia would not agree to adequate terms, for the English government was determined that if it could not have war it would have an effective and stable peace. On most issues England received the support of Austria because of the latter's unfriendly relations with Russia. Prussia had not participated in the war or the negotiations looking toward peace, and was therefore not admitted to the Congress until



the leading questions were settled. Then her envoys were permitted to share in the revision of the Straits Convention of 1841, to which she had been a signatory.

Each power sent two plenipotentiaries to Paris. In capacity and strength, the delegations contrasted sharply. Clarendon and Cowley, both men of outstanding ability, represented England. Russian interests were ably defended by Orloff and Brunnow. Austria was less fortunate in her spokesmen, Buol and Hübner. The first French plenipotentiary, Walewski, presided at the sessions. He proved an incompetent president, however, for he lacked the necessary skill and force to direct the discussions in a capable manner. So far as the great powers were concerned, Clarendon was the only one of the plenipotentiaries carrying out anything like an independent policy, and for this reason, he was the dominant figure among them. Neither the Turkish nor the Piedmontese envoys had much influence in framing the treaties, but Cavour labored indefatigably outside the formal meetings to gain every possible advantage for Italy.

The Congress of Paris emphasized in striking fashion the restoration of French prestige and authority, and Napoleon III spared no pains to make the occasion a brilliant one. There was a constant succession of great balls, receptions, and banquets where the distinguished visitors were received with a lavish display of hospitality. Its labors seemingly not appreciably hindered by this social gaiety, the Congress held its plenary sessions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at intervals of from one to four days. These meetings were supplemented by informal conferences in which many of the agreements were reached. Yet by no means all the important work was done behind the scenes. On some of the most serious questions, the final decisions were the outcome of hard struggles in the formal sessions. The Congress completed its tasks with celerity. The first session was held on February 25 and in less than five weeks the treaties were ready for signature. This was largely owing to the short duration of the armistice, a provision designed to forestall evasive and dilatory tactics on the part of Russia. The improved means of communication, especially the telegraph, were an important contributing factor.

The delimitation of the new frontier in Bessarabia proved the most serious difficulty in negotiating the treaty of peace. Although definite provision was made in the preliminaries for the cession of part of Bessarabia, Russia was extremely reluctant to fulfill her agreement. After the terms of the Austrian ultimatum had been drawn up, the

Russian forces had captured Kars, a Turkish fortress in Asia Minor. Seeking to reap an advantage from this event, Russia at first refused to restore the fortress without an equivalent concession in Bessarabia. Strong English opposition to this demand obliged Russia to admit the principle of surrendering Kars without compensation. But the attitude of Napoleon III made a compromise on the boundary inevitable and consequently Russia succeeded in retaining approximately two-thirds of the area originally to have been ceded. Nevertheless, the commercial and strategic aims prompting the demand for this cession of territory were achieved. The new frontier excluded Russia from the entire course and outlets of the Danube. She was deprived also of access to the lakes feeding the Danube and to the portion of the river Pruth navigable for gunboats. As a result, she would be unable to station naval flotillas at the junction of the Pruth and the Danube, or to construct them on the lakes for possible action in the Danube or the Black Sea.

Among the English supplementary conditions was a project for recognizing the independence of the mountain tribes of Circassia, Mingrelia, Imeritia, and other areas within the Russian frontier in Asia. The purpose was to create a chain of buffer states between Turkey and Russia that would serve to weaken the latter's power of aggression against the former. Because of the French Emperor's refusal to support the proposal, however, it ended in complete failure.

In accordance with the peace preliminaries the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities was terminated. It proved impossible, however, to provide a definitive organization for Moldavia and Wallachia, for no agreement could be reached on the question of uniting the provinces. Napoleon III, to whom the principle of nationality had a strong appeal, warmly supported union, and England and Russia also favored it. But Austria and Turkey were opposed, and because of their uncompromising attitude, the Congress was unable to effect a final settlement of the question. In order to avoid delay in concluding peace, it was agreed that a commission should investigate conditions in the Principalities and ascertain the wishes of the people concerning union. This commission was then to transmit a report to Paris, and the final arrangements were to be embodied in a convention to be concluded between the contracting powers and placed under their guarantee. In the Roumanian settlement, therefore, the wishes of the people were proclaimed as the decisive factor. This was notable as



marking the first recognition by an international congress of what came later to be called the right of national self-determination.

Like the territorial settlement, the limitation of Russian naval strength in the Black Sea gave Turkey important strategic advantages. The aim was to secure Turkey against Russian attack from the sea and thereby check the extension of Russian influence over the Near East. Neutralization was the device adopted to carry out these objects. Russia and Turkey were permitted an equal number of light warships for the service of their coasts, and each of the contracting powers was given the right to station two light war vessels at the Danube outlets in order to assure the execution of the regulations for the navigation of that river. With these exceptions, warships were forbidden on the Black Sea. Naval arsenals were also banned. Clarendon strove to extend these provisions to the Sea of Azov and the rivers flowing into the Black Sea, for if Russia remained free to construct warships in these waters, the neutralization of the Black Sea would not have been effective against her. But there was no specific provision in the preliminaries for this demand and Russia refused to agree to it. A compromise suggested by Orloff, however, proved acceptable to all parties. He announced that Russia would not construct in the tributaries of the Black Sea or the waters dependent on it any warships other than those to which she was entitled for the service of her coasts. This declaration was then embodied in the fifth protocol. Russia, therefore, evaded a treaty engagement but conceded the principle. On the other hand, there was no restriction placed on the Turkish naval force in the Bosphorus or the Sea of Marmora. The neutralization of the Black Sea, though it applied nominally to both Russia and Turkey, was really effective against the former only. And, with their country reduced to impotence on the Black Sea, the Russian plenipotentiaries were forced to agree to a proposal designed to weaken Russian naval power on the Baltic. In a separate convention signed by Russia, France, and England, provision was made for the disarmament of the Åland Islands. The aim of the allies was to afford a measure of security for Sweden and Norway against their powerful neighbor and erect a barrier against the spread of Russian influence over the Baltic area.

The new status of the Black Sea made it necessary for the Congress to revise the Straits Convention of 1841. A provision excepting the vessels to be stationed at the Danube outlets from the rule of closure was the only modification introduced. The retention of the principle of the closure of the Straits while Turkey was at peace afforded her

further security against Russian encroachment. Since this rule obtained only so long as the Porte remained at peace, it would be possible for the western maritime powers to come to her aid in the event of another Russo-Turkish war, for the Sultan could then open the Straits to their warships to attack Russia in the Black Sea. The allies' vessels at the mouths of the Danube could also be utilized against Russia. The Congress of Paris indeed placed a formidable barrier in the path of Russia's historic mission—control of the Straits. But the neutralization of the Black Sea with its humiliating limitations on the free exercise of sovereignty by a great power gave little promise of permanence. There could be little doubt that Russia would take the first favorable opportunity to free herself from these restrictions, which even denied her a fleet for the protection of her Black Sea coasts in time of war. Russia's repudiation of the Black Sea clauses in 1870 was foreshadowed in 1856. In all likelihood, Palmerston himself looked upon neutralization as a temporary arrangement that would afford Turkey a period during which she could institute reforms and reorganize her defensive system without fear of Russian naval aggression.

In 1856 Turkey was committed to such a program. A few days before the Congress opened, the Sultan had issued a firman providing for the introduction of civil and religious equality and other reforms. The Congress decided that this decree should be mentioned in the treaty without, however, creating any right of foreign interference in Turkey. A serious dispute arose as to the terms in which this reference should be made. Russia played her historic role as champion of the Greek Christians in Turkey and demanded treaty stipulations designed to insure the execution of the firman. The other powers, however, had induced the Sultan to issue it as a means of removing the pretext for interference on behalf of the Christians and were determined that Russia should not be permitted to utilize her community of religion with several millions of the Sultan's subjects to exert political influence in his Empire. Russia was compelled to acquiesce in an article which left the enforcement of the decree to the Turkish government and disclaimed any right of supervision by the powers. Under other provisions of the treaty, Turkey was formally admitted into the European Concert and her territorial integrity placed under the guarantee of the powers.

In most of the work of the Congress of Paris, the guiding purpose was the preservation of the independence and integrity of Turkey. To that end, effective barriers were raised to protect her against future



aggression. The collective action of the European Concert was to replace separate action by Russia. Within the security of these safeguards, Turkey could carry out her reform program and become a well-organized modern state, exercising full sovereignty and dealing justly with all classes of subjects. The action of the powers was clearly based on the assumption that Turkey was capable of becoming such a state. Protection against external attack would not suffice to maintain the Empire if internal stability were lacking. Ultimately the fate of the Empire would depend on its regeneration. By giving his Christian subjects the benefits of a just and enlightened rule, the Sultan could command their loyalty and support and remove the menace of foreign intervention in their behalf. Thus a powerful, regenerated Turkey would serve as a bulwark against Russian hegemony in the Near East. However, the attempt of the Congress of Paris to solve the complex Eastern Question did not succeed, because the premise—that Turkey was capable of reform—proved false.

In establishing an international administrative régime for Danube River navigation, the Congress filled a need long felt. Although the Congress of Vienna had declared that freedom of navigation should be the rule for all international rivers on the continent, this principle had never been applied to the Danube because Turkey was not a member of the European state system. Since 1829, Russia had been mistress of the outlets of the river, and because her own interests were directly opposed to the development of navigation on it, the manner in which she exercised her control had resulted in much inconvenience and expense to Danube shipping. Protests by Austria and England, the powers whose commercial interests suffered most, were fruitless. Under these circumstances, it was natural that a free Danube became an important war aim of the powers aligned against Russia.

To eliminate the disadvantages of separate regulation by the riparian states, the Congress established two international commissions for the Danube. A European Commission, composed of one representative each of the contracting powers, was charged with supervising the engineering works necessary to improve navigation at the river mouths. After the completion of its task, this body was to be dissolved and the administration of the river vested in a riparian commission. The new boundary in Bessarabia, by depriving Russia of her status as a riparian power and as local sovereign at the delta, insured the freedom of the international organs from possible Russian interference. Although the Austrian plenipotentiaries bent every effort to restrict the international

régime to the lower Danube, the principle of free navigation was applied to the entire river. The other powers refused to permit the country which would benefit the most from international control of the lower Danube to retain exclusive authority over the Austrian portion of the river. Although the original arrangements have been modified by later treaties, the Danube has remained under international control ever since 1856. The Congress of Paris, therefore, has an important place in the history of international administration.

The treaties were signed on March 30. Russia's success in exploiting the divergence in the interests of the allies enabled her to make peace on relatively moderate terms. Yet England was satisfied with the settlement, even though she had not obtained all the supplementary conditions. The French attitude made concessions to Russia necessary, but it was seldom that the English sacrificed the principles on which their policy was founded. Those principles were security for Turkish integrity and independence, and the limitation of Russia's power of aggression. The success of English policy may be attributed in part to the desire of Napoleon III to maintain his alliance with England and in part to the energy, resolution, and skillful diplomacy of Clarendon. The diplomatic alignment which emerged from the Congress had important consequences during the era of national state-making which followed. The conservative union of the three eastern powers was broken up. The resentment Russia harbored against Austria worked to the advantage of the plans of Napoleon III and furthered the unification programs in both Italy and Germany.

After the conclusion of peace, the Congress continued its meetings, since arrangements for the evacuation of territories, the raising of the blockades, and the resumption of commercial relations remained to be made. Following the completion of these tasks, several questions of current international politics were discussed. The most important was that of Italy. That Italian grievances were brought before the Congress was the result of Cavour's diplomacy and his success in gaining the sympathy of France and England. Both Walewski and Clarendon condemned the despotism and repression in Naples, while the English envoy also arraigned the misgovernment in the Papal States. Cavour himself contributed a statement all the more effective because of its wise restraint. The discussion had no immediate practical results. Nevertheless, Austrian policy in the peninsula had been indicted at the council table of Europe, while Piedmont acquired added prestige as the champion of Italian liberty and nationality.



On April 15, England, France, and Austria signed a treaty designed to afford further security for the peace settlement. The contracting powers guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire and agreed to consider any infraction of the general treaty of peace as a *casus belli*. The eventual conclusion of such a treaty had been provided for in a previous agreement between the three powers. Because of the friendly attitude of Napoleon III towards Russia, however, it was soon apparent that the convention had little real force.

The last act of the Congress was the adoption of the Declaration of Paris, a new code of rules for maritime warfare. Privateering was abolished; enemy goods on neutral ships, with the exception of contraband, were not to be liable to capture, nor, with the same exception, were neutral goods on enemy ships. Henceforth, blockades to be binding must be effective. Privateering had fallen into discredit since 1815 and the other provisions of the Declaration had been admitted by nearly all the powers. During the war, the allies had put all these principles in practice, though England had not previously accepted the rule that free ships make free goods. England now formally conceded this principle and obtained in return the abolition of privateering. The English therefore secured an important advantage in exchange for relinquishing their former rule, which they believed could no longer be maintained.

To a marked degree, the work of the Congress of Paris bore the impress of the new forces in European life and politics. Particularly significant was the recognition of the principle of nationality implied in the Roumanian settlement. Notable also was the establishment of an international régime for Danube navigation, illustrating the increasing interdependence of the countries of Europe. The Congress had also to its credit an endorsement, if made in qualified terms, of mediation as a process of adjusting international disputes. The Declaration of Paris harmonized international maritime law with the more enlightened conceptions of belligerent rights at sea which had developed since the Napoleonic wars. Moreover, the peace settlement which readjusted the balance of power did not aggrandize national interests so much as it promoted the general interests of Europe.

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The protocols are the most important source for the plenary sessions. These official reports furnish, on the whole, an accurate and full account of the formal proceedings. They are printed in *British and Foreign*

*State Papers*, vol. XLVI (London, 1865) and *Nouveau Recueil Général des Traités*, tome XV (Göttingen, 1857), edited by G. F. Martens. These documentary collections contain also the texts of the treaties, conventions, and other acts of the Congress. *Recueil de Documents relatifs à la liberté de Navigation du Danube* (Berlin, 1904), edited by Sturdza, is a convenient collection of documents on that subject.

For further material on the plenary sessions, and for the informal discussions and private conferences, memoirs and official and private correspondence were utilized. Important for the English side of the negotiations are *The Letters of Queen Victoria, 1837-1861*, vol. III (London, 1907); Martin, *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. III (London, 1878); Lane-Poole, *Life of Stratford Canning*, 2 vols. (London, 1888); and Maxwell, *Life and Letters of the Earl of Clarendon*, 2 vols. (London, 1913). These volumes contain liberal selections from the correspondence of Clarendon, the first English plenipotentiary. Further light is thrown on the English attitude by the debates on the peace treaty in *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd Series, vols. 141 and 142 (London, 1856).


The part played by Russia is disclosed in *Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances Étrangères*, tome XV, edited by F. Martens (St. Petersburg, 1909). This work includes the instructions of the Russian envoys and dispatches sent and received by them. A valuable, if biased, interpretation of Russian policy is *Diplomatic History of the Crimean War: Russian Official Publication*, 2 vols. (London, 1882), an anonymous work inspired by Gortschakoff. Nesselrode, *Lettres et Papiers du Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode*, tome XI (Paris, 1912), gives some additional insight into the aims and purposes of the Tsar and his advisers.

Two important works afford virtually a day-by-day account of the proceedings. The journal of Hübner, *Neuf ans de souvenirs d'un Ambassadeur d'Autriche*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1904), is of particular value for the Austrian point of view on the issues confronting the envoys. Cavour's letters to d'Azeglio in *La Politique du Comte de Cavour* (Turin, 1863), reveal his own adroit diplomacy and give a record of the work of the Congress by its keenest mind. Both of these sources are illuminating for the role of Napoleon III in the negotiations. Also of value for French policy is Thouvenel, *Pages de l'Histoire du Second Empire 1854-1856* (Paris, 1903), which contains extracts from the correspondence of Benedetti, the secretary of the Congress. The Con-



gress as it appeared to a famous English diarist while visiting in Paris is described in Greville, *A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria*, vol. VIII (London, 1888). An almost contemporaneous volume on the Congress is Gourdon, *Histoire du Congrès de Paris* (Paris, 1857). It has some useful details on the functioning of the Congress, but makes no attempt to trace and analyze the negotiations.

Contemporary articles in French and English periodicals have much valuable material bearing on the Congress. These include *Le Correspondant*, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, *Edinburgh Review*, *Saturday Review*, *North British Review*, *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, *Illustrated London News*, *Fraser's Magazine*, and *British Quarterly Review*. Important phases of the negotiations are treated in two penetrating secondary studies: Riker, *The Making of Roumania* (London, 1931) and Puryear, *England, Russia, and the Straits Question 1844-1856* (Berkeley, Cal., 1931).





## FORCED LABOR IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1850-1914

RICHARD DROST

About the middle of the XIXth Century the colony of Queensland in Australia and such islands of the South Pacific as were being exploited by European enterprise, began to suffer from an acute shortage of labor. This labor problem was solved in part by the introduction of forced labor obtained from the island world of the Pacific. English, French, and German, as well as American enterprises, were alike eager to press these islanders into service.

These "Kanakas," as they were called, were held to be better able to withstand the rigors of these tropical regions than were the whites. Then, too, it was considered far better to use black, island labor than to seek to secure resumption of convict labor or the introduction of Hindu or Chinese coolies against which there were violent protests throughout Australasia.

Abuses were inseparable from this labor traffic even when all reasonable official vigilance was exercised. Few natives voluntarily entered the service of white men. Because of the great need of labor unscrupulous recruiting methods were therefore introduced. Natives were inveigled into schooners under all manner of pretenses and were then secured and carried away. There were among the recruiters those who ran down canoes laden with natives who had paddled out to the recruiting vessel for sightseeing or trading purposes, thus rendering them helpless in the water so that they could be easily seized. Other recruiters took advantage of the confidence which the natives generally placed in the missionaries. They caused someone on board to pose as a missionary in order to entice the unsuspecting natives aboard their vessels, only to be carried away. Some even went so far as to camouflage their schooners to make them appear like the well-known missionary ships which cruised regularly about the islands. Numerous cases of violations of laws of humanity were a matter of record. A few cases only can be mentioned.

Perhaps the worst instances of malpractice were the raids of Peruvian slavers during the years of the American Civil War. Thousands of

unhappy islanders were carried into slavery upon the then flourishing cotton plantations of Chili and Peru. A notorious case was that of the brig "Carl." The "Carl" had been fitted out with the specific intention of going among the islands to recruit labor. The owners, Mount and Morris, seemingly had no intention of going about the task in a reasonable manner, but resorted to kidnapping practices at once. A large number of natives were secured and imprisoned in the hold, where, because of fear and resentment, a disturbance broke out among them. Mount and Morris directed the crew in shooting down in cold blood, through holes bored in the deck, about one hundred of the helpless natives.

Other sordid tales of kidnapping and murder were those of the "Hopeful," which left wherever she went, her toll of death, bloodshed, and arson; the "Siren" whose crew did not hesitate to tear husbands from their wives and fathers from their children; the "Young Australia" which mercilessly shot down resisting natives and collected a full complement of unwilling recruits. Numerous other instances of this kind could be introduced. These frequent manifestations of evil intentions caused the natives to become exceedingly distrustful of white men. Further evils of the traffic were: the extended voyages, often requiring months, in uncomfortable and overcrowded quarters; the contact with brutal and characterless seamen whose only interest in the recruits was the money they would bring; and the subjection to the hardships of a new environment in which they were required to labor to the full extent of their ability.

When Kanakas were brought to the various labor markets for disposal they were either turned over to interested parties who paid the stipulated price, or they were auctioned off to the highest bidder. In the early years of recruiting many were disposed of by middlemen who realized a handsome profit from a second transaction.

Usually some sort of contract was made with the laborer which bound him to give a number of years of service to the person who bought his labor. Whether or not the nature of this contract could be understood by the Kanaka was not a cause of deep concern to his master. Usually the contracts were neither specific nor detailed and did well to refer to such matters as length of service, food, clothing, and conduct. Length of service was at first for a period of five years, but because of the increasing difficulty of getting the native to leave home for so long a time, and because of the regulations governing the



use of contract labor which began to be applied, the time of indenture was materially lessened. For plantation laborers the time was reduced to three years. Other industries such as fishing, mining, and sandalwood cutting, by their very nature, permitted of much shorter contracts.

Judging by records prior to 1870 which indicate that employers of island labor were even then willing to pay five pounds per head for each recruit, those engaged in the work of recruiting found it a most profitable venture. These prices prevailed at the time in Fiji, New Zealand, Samoa, and Queensland. Thus a single vessel of average size, after a few weeks cruise, might carry a complement of recruits to some labor market for which a profit of £1200 or some \$6,000.00 was the reward. With the movement of Europeans into the Pacific to exploit its varied resources, the demand for labor was increased, and in consequence the value of labor was increased so that as much as \$110.00 per head was being paid by 1883. The enhanced prices were due to increasingly drastic regulations applying especially to British vessels, to the greater profits in raising sugar cane rather than cotton or coconuts, and to the fact that among the British the labor traffic was largely a private venture in which usually owners of single vessels were interested.

Competition among the several labor markets of the South Pacific also increased the price. Then, too, the islanders themselves became more and more unwilling to leave their homes because of the uncertainty of their return. This uncertainty was due to the fraud and deceit practiced upon them and to the frightful mortality among them when engaged as laborers elsewhere.

It is to be understood that the hardships inflicted upon the Kanaka lay not wholly in the method of recruiting but also in the treatment which he received while in service. Much discontent and ill will was created among the natives by unfulfilled promises and violated rights. Such conduct on the part of the whites caused frequent outrages perpetrated by natives. The cutting of sandalwood, for example, which was an exceedingly remunerative article of trade, was a challenge to greed and cruelty on the part of the native workers. This was also true of pearl fishing which drew many independent ship-owners because of the extraordinary profits offered. The swimming and diving required by this industry were performed by natives who were in many cases as much at home in the water as on land. Both the pearls and the shells were of great commercial value and the industry expanded enormously. In the Tuamota Islands a trader collected at one point \$100,000.00

worth of shell at a cost to him of \$24.00 in calico. Both Queen Victoria and the Empress Eugénie wore pearls obtained from these islands. Not only in pearl fishing but in its allied industry, *bêche-de-mer* or trepang fishing, was native labor in great demand. Trepang was much in demand in China and other parts of Eastern Asia where it was used in gelatinous soups. Trepang brought the traders from \$300.00 to \$500.00 per ton, according to species, and a very large margin of profit remained after the natives were paid. Some use was also made of Kanaka labor in removing guano from certain isolated islands, and in the mining industry, especially in New Guinea.

The great majority of Kanakas, however, were put to work on the numerous plantations of the South Pacific Islands and the mainland of Australia, particularly Queensland. On the larger plantations they were in charge of white overseers. These men were not rarely inclined toward brutality and indifference. Many planters showed a lack of interest in the proper comfort of their charges and failed to provide proper shelter and appropriate food so that disease was an everyday occurrence and death common. The great mortality among them made the Kanakas expensive laborers. The removal from the rather care-free existence of their own villages and the subjection to continuous and arduous labor no doubt helped greatly in causing a high rate of mortality.

It must be conceded that it took infinite patience on the part of the planters to train Kanakas to the duties of plantation life when they had in their own environment been so unused to sustained effort. The earliest plantation tasks assigned to the Kanakas were those connected with cotton culture, when, during the American Civil War, cotton plantations flourished in Queensland, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, and the French possessions. In Queensland and Fiji after 1870, sugar cane began rapidly to replace cotton. While cotton and sugar together with coffee and cocoa continued to be cultivated wherever possible, planters on the smaller islands turned to growing coconut palms because of the ease of their growth and the value of their product—copra, the dried kernel of the nut. The native laborers tended the trees, kept down all harmful growth, and cracked, shelled, and dried the kernel. Copra was shipped to Europe where the oil was extracted to be used in the manufacture of soaps and butter substitutes.

On the plantations the laborers were generally quite easily managed. Occasionally a desertion took place, but this was usually for very good reasons such as unbearable treatment and thoughtlessness as to their



care and comfort. Usually a far greater number of men than women were recruited, but some plantation owners desired the presence of a certain proportion in order to insure greater contentment. When employed on the plantations or in the fishing industries, the women carried on the same duties as the men. Many, too, were recruited for immoral purposes.

It is perhaps true that certain benefits accrued to the Kanaka laborers as a result of their work among white people. In some islands because of overpopulation the food was scarce, and by going to work in foreign parts a more regular supply was assured. Furthermore, service with the whites increased their knowledge and experience far above that of the members of their tribe who remained at home.

On the other hand it was claimed that the rigorous life which the native laborers were made to undergo made physical wrecks of them by the time their years of indenture were completed. Missionaries complained that such as had the Christian faith instilled into them in their native islands were rarely able to retain this during their period of indenture. It was also claimed that the repatriated natives were more reckless, cruel, and savage than when carried away.

The introduction of this native labor was a matter of concern among representatives of civilized nations generally. This is evident from the rather considerable space given to it in parliamentary debates, government documents, the press, missionary reports, and reports of travelers, traders, ship-captains, government inspectors, consuls, and other officials of the various interested nations. So much first-hand information telling of the atrocities of the traffic in natives was continually forthcoming that it became necessary for colonial and metropolitan governments to deal with the problem. It was deemed imperative that strict watchfulness should be maintained to prevent the rise of slavery under various innocent sounding names. During the course of Kanaka exploitation there was every reason to believe that the exploitation of the Pacific Island world was bringing about the enslavement of its dark-skinned inhabitants. Beginning in 1813 and continuing into the last half of the century proclamations by those in authority were frequently issued dealing with the treatment of South Sea Islanders. In spite of these official orders the natives continued to be the victims of violence and inhumanity.

Soon after the first Kanakas were brought to the cotton plantations of Queensland in 1863, it became apparent that legislation in their behalf was necessary. Many felt that a great wrong was inflicted by the

importation of these island natives; yet in the face of so large a group which thought that tropical agriculture could not be carried on without such labor, it seemed that the institution must go on. The Queensland Government of the time consisted largely of the planter class and not until 1868 did it focus its attention upon this important problem and then only after having been called upon by the British Colonial Office. The result was an "Act to Regulate and Control the Introduction and Treatment of Polynesian Laborers" which sought to legalize the traffic in Kanakas. Henceforth nobody was allowed to go about the Pacific islands to secure laborers to be introduced into Queensland unless supplied with a license from the government of that colony. Furthermore, masters of vessels were required to give security for the return within three years of such laborers as desired to be sent back, to give a bond against kidnapping, and to bring a certificate from the consul, missionary, or other known person stating that the laborers had engaged themselves of their own free will and that they understood the nature of their engagement. It was also required that inspectors be appointed to examine the colored immigrants, that shipmasters furnish bond to carry out properly the provisions of the act with respect to providing proper food and clothing and to refrain from distributing intoxicants. In fact it was now a licensed traffic and could be looked upon as respectable. The benefits of this legislation were very largely with the planters, for its provisions assured them of a labor supply under very moderate restrictions and at low cost.

The evils of recruiting were scarcely mitigated by this Act for it was extremely easy to evade the letter of the law. Because of the numerous offenses which were not properly dealt with, the colonial as well as the English press began to give considerable publicity to the matter, and pressure was brought to bear on colonial as well as imperial parliaments to stop the traffic altogether, or to remove its demoralizing and objectionable features by strict regulation. Some felt that it was a problem only for the colonies concerned, but a large group felt that it was indeed a matter in which the Imperial Government should interfere since the colonies could exercise no authority on the high seas. The Imperial Government should check the evils which had to do with the deportation from their homes and their transit to their new destination. Colonial governments might be considered equal to the task of proper control by law.

Throughout Australasia dissatisfaction over the growth of the Kanaka importation project grew with the movement itself. Many voices



were raised in denunciation of the traffic. This led the British government itself to take steps to control the system. As early as January, 1871, the British consul in Fiji was instructed to superintend the introduction and treatment of Polynesian laborers. During the same year the Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley, dispatched a circular letter to the governors of the different Australian colonies and of New Zealand in which they were reminded of the numerous unpunished crimes which were taking place in the labor traffic because of the difficulty of apprehending the perpetrators and of securing evidence against them. This reminder did not, for various reasons, soon bring noticeable results. There was a strong group in the Australian colonies which looked upon imperial legislation as meddling in their affairs. The matter of expense also acted as a deterrent. Then, too, some wished to leave the problem entirely to the British navy. Still others refused to be concerned about a few savages in a far-away corner of the world. Finally, there were those who felt that the co-operation of all governments having interests in the South Pacific, especially France, Germany, and the United States, must be secured in order to insure successful regulation.

Although warnings of travellers and missionaries were many, and the pressure of the Aborigines Protection Society in England was great, opposition was so strong that only some tragic event could bring reform. On September 20, 1871, Bishop Patteson, the missionary hero, died a martyr to the cause of the abolition of the labor traffic. His murder was much lamented in England as well as in the colonies. The result was the passage of the so-called "Kidnapping Act" of 1872 which had for its object the prevention of natives being forcibly taken or decoyed from their homes under false pretenses and under contracts which they could not understand. This Act declared it a felony to take natives without their consent and employ them as laborers. Violations were punishable in any Supreme Court in any of the Australian colonies. The carrying of natives without license made the master of the vessel liable to a fine, not to exceed five hundred pounds. The kidnapping of natives with its attendant crimes made the perpetrators liable to "the highest punishment other than capital punishment or to any less punishment awarded for any felony by the law of the colony in which such offender shall be tried."

Because this Act was unsatisfactory, the Imperial Government in 1875 supplemented the Act of 1872 by "The Pacific Islanders Amendment Act." This instrument contained a code dealing with the punish-

ment of misdeeds. A High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Gordon, found that inability to deal with non-British subjects, except in British possessions, made it difficult to punish offenders. Since no British subject, whatever his crime, could be reached except by means of a regular legal process, the hopes which had been placed upon the law enforcement of the High Commissioner's office were to a large extent vain, for but few infractions of the regulations were exposed and convictions and punishments were still fewer. This fact caused numerous criticisms. At the Sydney Intercolonial Conference of 1881, charges were brought against the High Commissioner, the most important of which were (1) "that he had shown undue leniency toward the misdeeds of natives," and (2) "that he had shown equally undue harshness in the punishment of British subjects when charged before him with offenses against the natives." Charges of culpable indifference to the lives of Englishmen were also brought against Gordon's associates, Chief Justice Gorrie of Fiji, and Commodore Wilson, Commander of the Australian squadron.

A Royal Commission, of which Sir Arthur Gordon was himself a member, now made an impartial study of the whole situation and offered recommendations on October 16, 1883. It was held that the trade could be so regulated that its abuses would be reduced to a minimum by more efficient precautions and increased vigilance. This could be done by placing the High Commissioner in full charge, with efficient deputy commissioners stationed at strategic points. Masters of labor vessels must be required to hold licenses, and the appointment and payment of labor agents must be made by either the High Commissioner or one of his deputies. These suggestions showed clearly the difficulties under which the various officials were compelled to work.

As Great Britain extended her authority over many of the island groups in which recruiting was carried on, the various regulations could be better enforced, the evils checked, and the more glaring abuses corrected. However, local acts also began to keep the traffic within proper confines in various colonies. These were based to some extent upon the results of local observation, but also upon suggestions offered by the Colonial Office and the report of the Royal Commission. These local regulations were able to accomplish more toward effective suppression of brutalities and inhuman practices than the general regulations.

Queensland, perhaps the best illustration of this growing emphasis upon regulations of a local nature, influenced both by political and by



humanitarian motives, passed a regulation prohibiting the traffic in liquor and firearms. But because of the resentment caused by this measure among recruiters who saw in it a transfer of this lucrative trade to other nations, the regulation was not enforced until some years later. Since the liquor trade was held to be an adjunct of the labor traffic and since the feeling grew that it should be suppressed in order to cope with the traffic in Kanakas, in 1884 all the British trading vessels in the Western Pacific were prohibited from offering liquor and firearms in trade to natives.

The most important factor in causing the growth of Kanaka labor in Queensland was the expansion of sugar culture in the 70's and 80's. The profitable nature of this intensive crop and the abundance of uncultivated land on which sugar could be grown in northern Queensland, together with the abundance of available capital, brought a sharp acceleration in the demand for island laborers. Among employers of Kanakas and among political leaders many apologists for the system existed, but there was also a strong and ever more critical opposing sentiment. In Queensland there developed a partisanship a little like that which existed between North and South in the United States before the Civil War. Whereas the early government of Queensland was dominated by the planter class for whose benefit Kanakas were being imported, a strong democratic feeling, fostered particularly in labor circles, came to the front in the political life of the colony in 1872. In Queensland the labor movement affiliated itself with the Liberal Party whose leader, S. W. Griffith, was willing to lead them to a realization of their desire to rid the colony of black labor. Henceforth the Kanaka labor question assumed a prominent place in the political life of Queensland, and it became the source of more party and personal differences than any other question in the political history of Queensland. For this reason Queensland's legislative history is full of changing policies with respect to labor regulation.

The Act of 1880 dealt with almost every conceivable angle of the traffic. In order to safeguard white labor Kanaka labor was henceforth to be restricted to agriculture. Directions for the comfort of the Kanaka were more specifically given, and suit might be brought for him in any court of justice. Several changes were made in the Act during the next few years most of which aimed at the improvement of the lot of the black laborer. The feeling that, so far as Queensland was concerned, the trade was carried out under such stringent regulations that it was impossible for abuses, especially kidnapping, to take place, receiv-

of a severe shock when it was revealed that Queensland recruits had found new recruiting grounds which were unexploited and had been carrying on all the practices of former years. Humanitarian sentiment was now responsible for swinging political action. Public sentiment could not sanction a traffic in which this new revelation of horrors seemed to be a necessary part. In 1885 a new Act was passed excluding the Kanakas from Queensland after the 31st day of December, 1897.

Provision made to substitute white labor for black was carried out with some degree of success by means of immigration projects. But by the close of the year 1897, the very man who had been the leader in the anti-Kanaka movement introduced legislation to reintroduce black labor. In defense Griffith stated that he could not quietly look on to see thousands of his countrymen ruined for lack of labor through the "senseless policy" of the labor party. A period of serious economic stress helped to draw the attention away from the Kanaka question making it possible for this formerly staunch advocate of a "White Australia" to have his measure passed. New regulations were adopted in an earnest endeavor to make the stay of the black laborers among their white masters as comfortable as possible. Colored labor continued for some years to be a question of great political interest, and throughout Australasia there was much sentiment unfavorable to the return of the Kanaka.

In the new movement for Australian Federation the labor vote which had taken on huge proportions during the 90's made Queensland a member state of the commonwealth of Australia thereby sounding the death knell to Kanaka labor. Thus the final solution in Queensland was not swung so much by the humanitarian motive which had been in the balance against the political, but by another political move which overbalanced and outweighed that of Kanaka labor, namely, that of federation of the Australian colonies.

Although the Queensland Kanaka labor market was practically closed in 1901, New Guinea, the New Hebrides, Fiji, the Solomons, and the French and German possessions all continued to require black labor for their development. The problem of securing a regular labor supply was ever the foremost problem in the development of island industries.

With the spread of trade and commerce, with the increase of missionary influence, and with the islands becoming subject to European governments under responsible officials the condition of the island laborers gradually improved. Nevertheless, it remained an institution



which was constantly attacked as inhuman in practice and unwise in political economy, and which met with little sympathy in the minds of those not actually engaged in or profiting by the traffic itself.

The results of the labor traffic were far-reaching. They had their bearing upon international diplomacy, upon questions of annexation, federation, depopulation, and missionary effort. All of these matters were of absorbing interest not only in the British colonies but in European countries as well. Such varied interests called for co-operation, understanding, and skillful diplomacy on the part of nations whose traders were engaged in or whose possessions were touched by the labor traffic.

Illustrations of diplomatic exchanges resulting from the traffic are many. France and England by bringing pressure to bear upon Chili and Peru were able to secure the return of such Kanakas, still living, as had been taken into slavery during the American Civil War. England in 1867 was reminded by France of the wrong practices of Queensland labor vessels. France was informed by other nations of gross evils connected with the labor traffic in New Caledonia.

England, the first to feel the danger of the traffic to international relations, for many years sought an understanding with France, Germany, and the United States to abolish the traffic together with its dependent trade in liquor and firearms. Attempts at co-operation failed; each country was afraid of losing the profitable gun and liquor trade. The proposition that an international commission should act as a court to try cases of violation was not approved because of the fear that such a commission, if permanently continued, might give rise to serious quarrels.

Not infrequently diplomatic failure resulted in annexation of islands and in strained relations between the home governments. Could the Powers have secured and maintained reasonable co-operation in the labor traffic there would have been no such race in annexation; at least, the reason most frequently urged would have been lacking. How to secure the labor and how to free the traffic from prevailing evils were the problems whose solution by way of annexation caused disputes between powers, differences between colonies, unsatisfactory treaties, threats, discord, and jealousies. The basis of a large part of the annexation movement lay in the need of securing and maintaining an unfailing labor supply. The humanitarian desire so to regulate the traffic as to curb the evils practiced by one nation usually served as an excuse for annexation on the part of some other power.

In the wrangle between Great Britain and France concerning the New Hebrides we find an opportunity to study the various results of the labor traffic. After the preliminary interest of the 60's the more serious events took place during the 80's when a general land-grabbing orgy was in progress among the Great Powers. The French interest in the islands drew protests from the Australasian colonies, all of which used the argument of the French attitude toward forced labor as a reason why France should not acquire the New Hebrides. Neither country would give up its rights in the islands although conventions of 1887, 1904, and 1906 attempted to settle the labor questions which occupied the greater part of the agreements in the most satisfactory manner possible. This settlement was bitterly opposed in the colonies largely because it was held to operate in practice along all lines to the advantage of the French, and because the colonies themselves had not been considered to the extent that the gravity of the situation warranted. They also felt that the labor traffic, which was being more and more discouraged throughout British Australasia, would receive added impetus from the French.

These young self-governing colonies of Australasia present the hitherto unusual phenomenon of continually demanding to be heard in matters which pertained to their environment and protection from other imperialistically inclined powers. The Australian colonists kept Mother England informed as to their every wish and desire. Were it not for this persistent demand on their part many of the Pacific Islands, now British possessions, might have passed into the hands of other Powers.

Just as the necessity for Kanaka labor had influenced annexation policies, so the abolition of Kanaka labor became one chief motive for the later trend toward federation among the Australian colonies. A certain amount of opposition to federation in the earlier years of the movement was due to its origin in Queensland and the feeling was expressed that, because of her large interest in black labor, she should not be the leader in the federation movement. On the other hand one of the impelling reasons advanced by leading Australian statesmen was the power which a united Australia could bring to bear in forcing the extinction of the labor traffic. Labor asserted itself with all its force in the fight for the protection of white labor against the unrestricted competition of a colored population, and the specter of a grave social problem which would result from the continued immigration of colored labor helped to influence the electorate to cast a decisive vote



to bring the Commonwealth into being. Upon federation, of course, followed the abolition of Kanaka labor. Late in 1901 a bill was passed in the Commonwealth Parliament abolishing black labor from Australia. Few regrets were expressed. As was predicted, very little hardship resulted from the removal of the Kanaka, and in Queensland there was genuine satisfaction expressed that she could no longer be characterized as a slave state.

No consideration of the system of the labor traffic as it was conducted in the South Pacific would be complete without some reference to the missionaries. Of those who were interested in the welfare and protection of the natives they must receive first mention. Because of their intimate acquaintance with the savages, they were aware of the evil influences constantly working to the detriment of their protégés, and their love for humanity revolted against such practices as the labor traffic exhibited. The missionaries exposed to the authorities, whenever possible, the infamous deeds of the traders. Their general interest in the suppression of the labor traffic led missionaries to urge annexation of various island groups as offering the best means of regulation and suppression. Then, too, missionaries began to realize more and more that the conversion of the native into a worker was closely associated with the development of island industry, and that with wise provision and control the best interests of the natives could be conserved with advantage rather than injury to economic progress. For that reason they became more lenient toward British traders, encouraging especially those who had established themselves among them. English missionaries were especially helpful in establishing and promoting British rule in newly annexed territories.

An important effect upon native life attributed to the labor traffic was the rapid depopulation of the islands. Colonial governors, High Commissioners, and other officials did not hesitate to place the responsibility for much of the existing condition upon the labor trade which carried the natives, while in the prime of life, away from their homes for long periods of time. To be sure, the labor trade was not entirely responsible for this condition. Various diseases, formerly unknown among natives, seriously depleted their numbers. Social diseases had been introduced; the use of alcohol brought about debauchery and degradation.

The importance of Kanaka labor in the South Pacific can scarcely be overestimated. It made possible the sugar industry in Queensland, Fiji, New Caledonia, and New Guinea; pearl and trepang fishing

throughout the islands; sandalwood cutting here and there; some mining; and the development of coffee, tobacco, cocoa, and coconut plantations wherever the soil permitted. The far-reaching results of the traffic were experienced especially in annexation and federation, for in these movements lay the promise that the traffic would finally react upon itself and be eliminated from the territories where it had become an institution.

The problem of forced labor and native policy generally throughout the Pacific cannot, however, be understood in isolation. These problems are linked up not only with Australasian questions but with those of the world in general. The issues they raised were not simply administrative in character; the more international economic and political rivalries drew the entire Pacific into world politics, the more did world events vitally and constantly affect local events. An understanding reached in the Pacific meant that the way was smoothed for some new and significant event on the chessboard of international politics. Again, understandings reached concerning other parts of the world frequently had their reverberations in the Pacific.

When historians of the future write the story of the last eighty years and tell us the causes of annexations, of alliances, of jealousies that have resulted in war, and of motives that have determined the nature of treaties of peace, we shall find the tale inextricably interwoven with the history of forced labor.

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Documentary material has been very extensively used in the preparation of this dissertation. *The New Zealand Journals and Parliamentary Debates*, the *Victoria and New South Wales Parliamentary Debates*, the *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, and the *Journals and Printed Papers of the Federal Council of Australia* have all had a distinct value. Queensland documents were not available in the library of the State University of Iowa, but two important works published at Brisbane by government authority helped satisfactorily to close the gap which the lack of these documents might otherwise cause. These publications are: *Queensland Imperial and Colonial Acts Relating to the Recruiting, etc., of Pacific Island Labourers*, published in 1892, and the work of Charles Arrowsmith Bernays, *Queensland Politics During Sixty (1859-1919) Years*, published in 1919.


The apparent disfavor with which New Zealand looked upon the forced labor traffic in her sister colony, together with the close scrutiny



maintained by the British government and the consequent amount of space given to the question in these documents further assist in overcoming the lack of the Queensland records. Then, too, it must be borne in mind that beside Queensland there were other centers of the labor traffic.

The British *Parliamentary Debates* furnished information as well as English reaction and empire perspective. The *Stenographische Berichte des Deutschen Reichstages*, especially the *Anlagen*, have been of considerable assistance because of the descriptions of rivalries between German and English planters and merchants in various parts of the Pacific. The *American State Papers* and *Die Grosse Politik* have been given some attention.

Documentary material was supplemented by original accounts gleaned from *Petermann's Mittheilungen*, *Deutsche Rundschau*, *Die Neue Zeit*, and other periodicals. Further illustrative material and atmosphere was obtained from numerous missionary accounts, accounts of travelers, traders, and naval officers, all containing information of a varied nature. Among these the account of the recruiter, W. T. Wawn, was especially helpful.





## FOUR ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF GREAT BRITAIN AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

ARTHUR GEORGE UMSCHIED

Four major economic problems confronted the British people in the late nineteenth century—the position of Great Britain in the world of commerce and industry, the question of commercial policy, the plight of British agriculture, and the movement towards economic consolidation of the Empire.

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The traditional view has long maintained that the late nineteenth century witnessed the decline of Great Britain in the world of commerce and industry. It is quite true that the passing of Britain's manufacturing monopoly cost England the economic hegemony she had so long enjoyed, but from this very obvious fact one has no right to infer an actual decline. Many a gloomy picture has been painted of Britain's recession and many a lamentation has mourned her faded glory. From her industrialists and exporters arose cries of despair as foreign tariffs barred once lucrative markets and foreign traders disputed with the Englishman for supremacy in the neutral markets of the world.

In sharp contrast to this well-known story appear the words of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in presenting the budget for 1900. The budget, he said, "... bears remarkable testimony to the extraordinary industrial activity and commercial prosperity of the year 1899. It is one of a period—I hope of a long period—of prosperous years; but it has been by far the most prosperous of all."

The traditional view is one that will bear some modification. It is hardly correct to speak of the decline of Great Britain unless by that term one means a relative decline. Some industries, notably agriculture, sugar, and silk, had gone down through their inability to produce at the level of world prices which the free trade system allowed to prevail in the United Kingdom. But at the turn of the century Britain's industrial production and foreign trade reached heights never before attained.

After the industrial revolution had obtained a firm foothold in the

principal foreign countries, Britain was no longer able to match the furious pace set by Germany and the United States, both of whom were endowed with superior resources. But the primary concern of both these Powers was the domestic market from which they were anxious to exclude British goods; to them the export trade was at first an important, but nevertheless secondary, consideration. The success of the challenge from abroad cannot be measured in terms of foreign trade alone, as many have attempted to do. Foreign competition in neutral markets made serious inroads on British commerce, but a more severe blow was dealt when the rich domestic markets of the United States and the Continent were partially closed to British wares. The foreign challenge first expressed itself in protective duties.

The position of Great Britain at the turn of the century is often painted in colors unnecessarily dark by those who fail to take into account the great fall in price levels over the long period between 1873 and 1896. In England, according to Professor Clapham, commodity prices fell between 36 and 40 per cent. This interesting phenomenon, which still awaits the investigation of some competent scholar, was by contemporaries ascribed to the results of the currency problem left in the wake of the demonetization of silver by Germany and the Latin Monetary Union. Competition increased among the gold standard nations for the world's supply of that metal and low prices were explained in terms of the appreciation of gold. The cause need be of no great concern at the moment, for only the effects have a direct bearing on the present study. The Board of Trade estimated the fall in price levels to be from an index number of 152.7 in 1873 to 88.2 in 1896. This means that almost twice the volume of goods would be required in 1896 to approximate the values of 1873. All comparison, therefore, of prices and annual values is a somewhat risky procedure, even though it is much more convenient to use the monetary statistics.

Attention should also be called to the unreliable manner in which percentages are employed in comparative analyses of British and foreign trade. By indulging in the fallacy of percentages it is a simple matter to show that Britain was being hopelessly outdistanced by certain of her rivals. But it was not difficult for foreign nations with industries in the formative stage to double production in a year's time; to expect Britain so to increase the enormous production of her major industries was expecting the impossible. Such comparisons prove little beyond the relative rate of growth.

The major industries, excepting agriculture, show no evidence of



recession. Iron and steel production in the nineties fell considerably below the figures for the previous decade, but new heights were attained in the five years following 1900. Despite these gains, Britain could no longer match the pace of her rivals. In pig iron production, for example, the United Kingdom increased her total from 8.1 million tons in 1880-1884 to 9.8 million in 1905-1908; in the same period American production increased from 4.2 million tons to 22.5 million. In the export trade, however, Great Britain sent out in 1905-1908 iron, steel, and steel manufactures almost equal in value to those of Germany, the United States, and France combined. No figures could give a more eloquent testimony to the value of the domestic market where the greater American and German output was absorbed.

Coal production increased from 156.4 million tons in 1880-1884 to 254.1 million in 1905-1908, but whereas in the former period Britain produced an amount equal to that of Germany, the United States, and France together, in the latter the United States alone produced 380.2 million tons compared with Britain's 254.1 million.

The number of spindles employed in the British cotton industry increased from 36 million in 1870-1874 to 52 million in 1905-1908 and the consumption of raw cotton increased from a value of 1228.6 million pounds sterling in 1871-1875, reckoned at inflated prices, to 1575.4 million pounds in 1891-1895, when prices were near their lowest. The consumption of raw wool was slightly less in 1900-1904 than in 1890-1894, but it reached new heights in 1905-1908.

In 1900 the shipping tonnage of the United Kingdom was 9,304,108; with the added tonnage of the British Empire the figure reached 10,751,392. On the other hand the total registered tonnage of Russia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the German Empire, Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, United States, and Japan was, in round numbers, about 10,000,000, but of this number some 4,500,000 was enrolled and licensed in the United States for use on inland waterways, fisheries, and the coasting trade.

In productive capacity Great Britain was outdistanced by the turn of the century. In the value of her foreign trade she still led the field with no close competitor, as foreign trade played a role vastly more significant in her unbalanced economy than was true of her principal rivals. It is impossible to understand the altered position of British commerce and industry at the dawn of the twentieth century unless one takes into account the tremendous increase in the world's capacity to produce and consume resulting from the expansion of the industrial

revolution. In 1900 British trade and industry, although surpassing all previous bounds, appeared far less formidable than had been the case a generation before when it was actually much smaller both in value and volume.

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In throwing open her markets to the trade of the world, England embarked upon uncharted seas. There were many who were frankly skeptical of the entire experiment. Some looked upon it as an expedient move; others favored it only under pressure of stern necessity; still others were won to the cause by the humanitarian psychology so prevalent at the time. Under the influence of the tremendous expansion which followed so closely upon the heels of the experiment of 1846, free trade strengthened its hold upon the British mind. It was no longer necessary to rely upon an impregnable body of theory; the trade returns spoke in a voice far more resounding and far more eloquent. With Disraeli men believed that protection was not only dead—but it was also damned. By 1880, however, the grave so carefully dug some thirty-five years before was empty! In foreign states Cobdenism was on the decline. In England free traders could be found who admitted that the battle for their doctrines might have to be fought over again.

Controversies over the question of commercial policy have tended to reflect the state of a nation's trade. Bad trade will inevitably lead to agitation for modification of the existing system whether it is liberal or restrictive. In the United States high protection came with the Civil War. On the Continent, where free trade doctrines were never deeply rooted in the popular mind, the commercial depression of the seventies was blamed upon the low tariffs. With the German tariff of 1879 the protectionist reaction had begun. Frederick List and *Nationalökonomie* had supplanted Adam Smith and the international division of labor. British free trade, originally designed for the world of free trade anticipated so confidently by Richard Cobden, was called upon to face the mounting tariff walls of the United States and the European continent. The dawn of the twentieth century found Britain a solitary outpost of insular free trade.

In England itself the protectionist reaction made considerable progress. After 1880 the attention of Parliament was repeatedly called to the impossibility of Britain's position. Hostile tariffs could not be resisted by "one sided Free Trade" or "the insane system of free importations." Resolutions were introduced calling for inquiries into



the subject of commercial policy, but against the large free trade majority they were at best only idle gestures. The minority in Parliament opposed to free trade could do little but make themselves obnoxious.

The epithet of "protectionist" was one which no one in British political circles coveted. Hence the early movement against free trade masked itself under the designation of "Fair Trade." The Fair Trade League was organized in May, 1881, and presented a program calling for the adoption of moderate duties on foreign manufactures to be used in bargaining and to check foreign "dumping." Import duties were to be levied upon foodstuffs produced in foreign countries while similar produce from the Empire was to be admitted free. This was a tactical blunder and gave the free traders the opportunity to unleash the fury of their attack upon a minority who would tax the food of the people.

The Fair Trade League was a premature movement. It had been able to capitalize upon the undue concern in England caused by the tariffs of the eighties which were not prohibitive in any sense. Strangely enough, in the nineties, with highly protective tariffs in the United States and on the Continent, one finds less alarm in Great Britain than was true in the previous decade.

It was not until the publication of the Board of Trade memoranda of 1903, 1905, and 1909, that the burning issue of free trade and protection could be satisfactorily divorced from the theoretical grounds upon which it was usually argued. The statistics included in these memoranda prove conclusively that, despite the contentions of the orthodox free traders, the foreign tariffs had seriously crippled British trade, not by reducing the actual value of British exports to protected markets, but rather by retarding the tempo of Britain's commercial and industrial expansion. In the protected markets the mounting volume of British goods had been checked and its proportion to the total value of all British foreign trade was falling steadily. In 1880-1884, 42.5 per cent of Britain's total foreign trade went to the protected markets of the world; in 1905-1908 the proportion had fallen to 36.2 per cent. If manufactured articles only be considered, the decline was more pronounced, as might be expected, for such goods bore the brunt of hostile tariffs. In 1850, 57 per cent of all British manufactures went to those countries later designated by the Board of Trade as protected; in 1902 these same markets absorbed only 38 per cent of Britain's manufactured exports. The shift in percentages does not neces-

sarily imply a decline in actual value or volume; such was not the case. It does, however, denote a significant and meaningful change in the direction of British foreign trade. The attention of England was diverted from markets which she could no longer control to neutral markets and to the British Empire where the battle for commercial supremacy would be waged by the great industrial powers.

England was not the victim of her commercial policy or of its failure—she was the victim of a revolutionized economic world. The free trade which Cobden and Bright preached in their crusade against the Corn Laws was a free trade which never existed beyond the realm of the ideal. The nearest approach to that ideal was the network of low tariff treaties which covered continental Europe and were patterned after the Anglo-French agreement of 1860. Free trade remains as yet unproved because free trade has never been put into practice. In fashioning her unbalanced economy England gambled upon the permanence of a world economic order which did not long remain static.

With the adoption of protection abroad, it was only natural that a movement for retaliation should arise in England. The British people must have been more than human if they had not resented the exclusion of their goods from the markets of foreign countries who were allowed free access to the rich market of Britain herself. But England could not retaliate—it would have been folly to place duties upon food and raw materials which made up the bulk of her imports. Exporters who complained of the foreign tariffs were seeking outlets for their products. Such markets were not to be had by encircling the United Kingdom with tariff walls. It was the opinion of the majority of the British people that, whatever might be the case in foreign countries, free trade was best for Great Britain. Indeed, England really had but little choice.

In launching his tariff reform movement in 1903, Joseph Chamberlain probably selected the least propitious moment in a quarter of a century. Trade was prosperous and the British people were suspicious of change. The free traders fell back upon their standard argument and painted in vivid colors the horrors which must result from duties on foodstuffs. The most subtle and appealing protectionist arguments were carried like chaff before the wind when the specter of taxing food was brought forward. This was the obstinate hurdle which no protectionist could clear.

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Few spectacles in modern economic history are more striking than



the decay of British agriculture in the late nineteenth century. In a world of competitive and militaristic nationalisms Great Britain viewed with complacency the passing of the basic industry in human economy. It was the supreme gesture of confidence in *laissez-faire*.

Of the generation that witnessed the triumph of free trade, there was a strong minority who cried out against the danger of leaving agriculture unprotected against the rigors of international competition. But a quarter of a century passed only to discredit these prophecies as British agriculture prospered behind the shelter of natural barriers. By 1875 this protection had been withdrawn. The course of westward expansion in the New World, aided by technological advance, broke down the sheltering barriers and the British farmer was rudely thrust beyond the borders of the island kingdom into a world market in which he could no longer compete.

Had British agriculture anticipated this transition, internal readjustments might have softened the blow. The agricultural system was, however, poorly designed to meet the challenge of changing times. A sturdy middle class landowner might have withstood the shock, but a system composed chiefly of interdependent great landowners and small tenant farmers found both helpless during the long years of distress.

The prosperous years before 1873 led to high rents and land valuation. Tenants, anxious to secure farms, were encouraged to bid for leases and the highest bidder was successful. The leases themselves were unavoidable products of the system. There was no real freedom of contract and landowners could dictate terms restricting the freedom of the tenant beyond all reasonable bounds. They stipulated the crops he might raise, the rotation he must follow, the number of animals he might pasture, and the compensation, if any, he was to receive for unexhausted improvements. They usually reserved all mineral and timber to the landlord, while at the same time forbidding the tenant to destroy any game, even though it ravaged his crops. These leases were long, nineteen and twenty-one years being most common; when entered into during prosperous times they became heavy burdens in the years of depression.

Rents were high, averaging 20s. to 25s. per acre in the early eighties. To this cost was added an equal amount for fertilizers required on the exhausted English soil. Rates, special taxes, and the obnoxious tithe were all paid by the tenant with the sole exception of the property tax which fell to the lot of the landlord. The high cost of inefficient agricultural labor constituted an important item in the farmer's operating

expenses. The valuable assistance of technical education was denied the British farmer, as there were in 1887 but four colleges in the whole of England and Wales devoted to scientific and technical education in agriculture and they depended upon tuition paid by the sons of tenant farmers.

Agricultural distress began with the abnormal meteorological conditions of the seventies. The farmer must always gamble on the season, but seldom is he called upon to contend with seven bad years in a single decade. Heavy rainfall resulted in a diminished yield in 1873, 1875, 1876, 1877, and the "black year" 1879, when cereal production was less than half of normal. Not only the corn farmer was affected by this unprecedented weather as livestock diseases followed in the wake of bad seasons. Pleuro-pneumonia and the foot and mouth disease were prevalent, while liver flukes destroyed whole flocks of sheep. Few small farmers, possessed of limited capital, as most of them were, could withstand the losses from the inclement seasons. Sir James Caird, Sir Robert Giffen, and other statisticians estimated the capital loss thus caused between 1875 and 1880 at £138,828,000. If to this amount could be added the loss of farm income and purchasing power, the result would be staggering.

In England the fall in price levels between 1873 and 1896 was estimated at from 36 to 40 per cent, but on the principal agricultural commodities it was even greater. Wheat declined from 58s. 8d. per quarter in 1873 to 22s. 10d. in 1894, a figure about one-half the estimated cost of production. Other cereals fell to a lesser extent as did meats, the drop in beef prices being quite sharp both in fresh and salted meat. Wool prices fell about 50 per cent and root crops, dairy produce, and fruit prices declined. The long period of falling prices worked a severe hardship on the British farmer. In a desperate effort to save himself by taking advantage of the somewhat higher prices of meats and dairy products, the British farmer allowed 2,351,150 acres of cereal growing land to go out of cultivation between 1869 and 1899 while in the same period grass land increased by 3,894,850 acres. Few farms consisting mostly of arable land were able to realize any profit; some were abandoned and allowed to go to ruin as no tenant would take them; rents had fallen generally all the way from 20 to 66 per cent according to testimony given the Royal Commission on Agricultural Depression of 1894-1897. Agricultural laborers were drifting to the cities and the prediction might be heard that cereal farming could no longer be carried on in the United Kingdom.



In the disastrous year 1879, with half a normal crop, the price of wheat fell instead of rising. This peculiar anomaly attracted the attention of the Duke of Richmond's Commission on Agricultural Depression in their final report of 1882, but for some reason, known only to themselves, they made no effort to solve the perplexing problem. The reduced yield of the bad seasons compelled Britain to import from abroad and with the mounting flood of imports came lowered prices. The exhausted soil of the United Kingdom was brought into competition with the cheap, virgin soil of the New World. Railroads and steamships, often the products of British industry and capital, enabled the agricultural products of the Western hemisphere to be delivered quickly and cheaply in English ports. Although the corn farmer bore the brunt of the attack in the early years, the advent of artificial refrigeration in 1880 removed the protection of distance from the meat producer also.

Attempts on the part of the agricultural interests to secure governmental intervention met with little success. The intensive farming of Great Britain could not possibly supply her own needs, and food had to be imported. Free trade reigned supreme in the halls of Parliament and no concession was to be expected if even the most trivial tax upon food was involved. Government after government expressed its sympathy; domestic legislation was passed; two Royal Commissions conducted exhaustive inquiries, one in 1879-1882 and the other in 1894-1897, but no modification of the policy of unrestricted imports could be obtained.

At the turn of the century the pattern of British agriculture was greatly changed. In 1841-1845 the domestic production of wheat was sufficient to meet the requirements of 90 per cent of a population of 24,000,000. In 1901-1905 wheat production in the United Kingdom fed only some 4,500,000 people, or 10.6 per cent of the population. Parliament was warned that out of every six loaves consumed in Great Britain, five came from abroad, and four of those five were exported from potentially hostile countries. In the mid-seventies 85 per cent of the meat consumed was produced at home; in 1901-1905 domestic production accounted for only fifty-five per cent of the meat used by the British people. Twenty-six per cent of the corn producing area of the United Kingdom had gone out of cultivation. The number of agricultural laborers had decreased from 983,919 in 1881 to 689,292 in 1901.

Great Britain entered the twentieth century with a national economy

more unbalanced than that of any major power. In a world of protection, free trade became more than ever essential to her economic life, even as her great navy protected her political existence. It was not so difficult for foreign nations to encourage industry at the expense of agriculture for intensive farming and the new technology guarded them against unlimited imports of food. But Britain's problem would have been to sacrifice industry to encourage agriculture. Even had this impossible task been undertaken she could not have produced enough food.

In surveying the revolutionary change which had transformed the agricultural industry of some thirty years before, the Tariff Commission stated: "The position of the United Kingdom is absolutely exceptional. No other country shows so marked a decline of agriculture; no other country depends to so large an extent upon importations from abroad for its food supply; in no other country has the balance between agriculture and manufacturing industries been so completely disturbed to the disadvantage of agriculture."

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Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century the instability of British colonial policy reflects the instability of the British imperial mind. Government after government threaded its way uncertainly between two opposite extremes of policy—renewed efforts at centralization on the one hand and granting prematurely an apparently inevitable independence on the other. During the halcyon days of mid-Victorian prosperity it is difficult to distinguish any perceptible British imperial policy. Indeed this very lack of policy expressed itself in terms of the indifference of the British people generally to their possessions and dependencies. Free trade had reduced the colonies to a common economic level with the foreigner and had, in a sense, compelled them to shift for themselves. The practical-minded Englishman asked with Richard Cobden: "Where is the value of our possessions, if they are not able to supply us with articles as cheap and as good as come from other countries?" Many a disgruntled taxpayer saw no value whatever in the Empire—he regarded it as a liability. But economic adversity brought with it a new conception of empire. In the late nineteenth century the British imperial mind was awakened. Men began to envisage an imperial economic unity which should take the place of the markets lost through tariffs and foreign competition.

When Gladstone took office in 1880, he was hopelessly enmeshed in



the imperial web spun by his predecessor, Disraeli, in the ministry of 1874-1880. The new imperialism had already gone beyond the possibility of control by Gladstone's restraining hand. The days of the "little Englanders" were numbered and a new British Empire, still in the making, was gradually assuming definite proportions in the mind of the English people. The long-expected adoption of free trade by the principal foreign countries appeared more remote than ever as tariff walls cast lengthening shadows over the prospects of British trade. It was in this darkening sky that the colonies appeared in a new light and men raised the clarion call of "Eclipse or Empire." The new conception was all the more appealing because it was so logical. The great expanse of the Empire, its rich and varied resources, its productive potentiality, all gave promise of completely supplying Britain's needs. And this vast Empire was mainly agricultural, providentially designed to accommodate itself to British industrialism. So attractive was this rationalization that men failed to see the pitfalls along the way. They forgot that more than a century before the embryonic nationalism of the thirteen colonies would not allow itself to be coerced for the profits of the British trader. They forgot that in 1846 England had adopted free trade. They forgot that the right of a self-governing dominion to choose protection could not be interfered with unless the unwritten constitution of the British Empire was to be thrown into discard. In theory the new imperial concept aimed at greater unity; in practice it contained the seeds of disruption. British free trade must compromise with colonial protection and British imperialism must harmonize with colonial nationalism.

From its very beginning the imperial movement clashed with the free trade ideal. The Fair Trade agitation of the early eighties had as one of its objectives the levy of duties of 10 per cent *ad valorem* upon food imported from foreign countries while admitting that from the Empire free. This was a sorry tactical blunder. Upon the heads of those who supported the Fair Trade doctrines fell the wrath of the free traders, whose anger knew no bounds whenever the suggestion of taxing food was put forward. If the Empire had contributed a larger share of Britain's imports, the plea of the imperialists might have carried greater weight, but four-fifths of the total food imported came from foreign nations.

Under pressure of economic distress during the years of intense depression between 1883-1886, the enthusiasm of the imperialist minority transcended all previous bounds. Some dreamed of the self-suffic-

ing British Empire completely independent of all connections with foreign powers. Others would be content with an imperial customs union. In an effort to lure the free traders from their traditional moorings, they were promised an empire of free trade which would broaden immensely the area of the earth's surface over which the Manchester doctrines reigned. Even the harrassed farmers were talking of federation and Zollverein as a solution for the problems of agriculture, though such a policy would, if successful, merely substitute food from the Empire for that from foreign nations. To the industrialist, barred from many of his former markets and struggling to retain those in neutral countries, the imperial idea was seized upon as a panacea for bad trade.

The imperialists' program was never a specific one. Few men had a definite idea of just what the new Empire involved, or how it was to be constituted. From Joseph Chamberlain on down, they lacked an adequate understanding of the nature of the British Empire. To them it was an Empire of commerce, a purely business proposition, and the autonomy of self-governing dominions was brushed lightly aside. The entire question of commercial union with the colonies was not the result of clear and reasoned thinking, nor was it an expression of natural imperial development.

It was in the series of colonial conferences, beginning with that of 1887, that the issue assumed added significance. At the first conference veiled hints were dropped by the Salisbury Government that a closer political and economic union might be desirable, but the colonial representatives showed no inclination to take up the matter and Salisbury in his opening speech conceded the impossibility of any such economic union unless British fiscal policy was altered. At the Ottawa Conference of 1894 the colonies themselves took the initiative and went on record in favor of a customs union of the Empire designed to place imperial trade on a more favorable basis than that carried on with foreign states. The resolution was passed only by a five to three vote, however, and said nothing as to how the proposed union was to be created. The colonies further requested that any treaties preventing preferential treatment of British goods in the Empire be repudiated. At the Ottawa Conference the delegates were free from the restraining hand of the free traders, as Great Britain was represented only by the Earl of Jersey, whose powers were very limited. No positive results followed the Ottawa Conference, however, as the free traders were unwilling to denounce the treaties of 1862 with Belgium and that of 1865 with the German Zollverein which prevented the British colonies



from giving preferential treatment to products of the Mother Country. Following the Conference of 1897 at London, with the Salisbury Government again in power, and upon the repeated request of the colonial representatives, the treaties were denounced. The way was paved for colonial preference on British goods.

The colonial preferential tariffs mark the closest possible approximation to an imperial customs union while Great Britain still clung to the free trade system. All hope of reciprocal treatment by Britain for colonial products came to an untimely end after the historic debate at the Conference of 1907, when the Liberals, fresh from their overwhelming victory at the polls only a few months before, interpreted the election as a mandate to retain the free trade system intact. The issue rested thus until Britain's departure from free trade in 1931.

The failure to consolidate the Empire over a period of half a century was chiefly due to the incompatibility of British free trade and colonial protection on the one hand and British imperialism and colonial nationalism on the other. The more immediate explanation was to be found in the nature of British trade. During the late nineteenth century, only one-fourth to one-third of Britain's total trade was with the Empire. Free traders were probably more practical than they were given credit for as they argued that 75 per cent of Britain's trade should not be crippled by duties in the illusory hope of stimulating the remainder. The idea of the British commonwealth of nations was destined to grow despite the lack of economic encouragement, but as the twentieth century dawned British imperialists realized that whatever might be the future status of the Empire, at least it did not hold the solution to Britain's more immediate problems.

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In assembling a bibliography for these essays, the writer's task has been one of elimination. A tremendous amount of official and unofficial material is available, of which only the more significant has been used. The *Parliamentary Papers* have been the source most frequently utilized. The more important include: the series of Memoranda on British and Foreign Trade and Industry prepared by the Board of Trade, which contain an immense amount of valuable information, much of which is arranged in a comparative manner; the *Statistical Abstracts* for the United Kingdom, the Colonies, the principal foreign countries, and, after 1905, the British Empire; the reports of Special Commissioners sent by the Board of Trade to inquire into the conditions and

prospects of British trade in given localities; there are countless papers dealing with the subjects of special trades and industries and others containing correspondence on commercial treaties and tariffs; the annual and special consular reports, while ordinarily confined to very local scope, permit some interesting generalizations; the replies to the dispatch of Joseph Chamberlain concerning foreign competition in the British Empire (1897) stand in a class alone; the papers and proceedings of the Colonial Conferences of 1887, 1894, 1897, 1902, and 1907 contain the nucleus of much of the fourth essay; a veritable mine of information is to be found in the voluminous reports of the Royal Commissions on the Precious Metals (1887-1888), on the Depression of Trade and Industry (1885-1886), and the two Commissions on the Depression of Agriculture, the first presided over by the Duke of Richmond, which began its sittings in 1879 and submitted its final report in 1882 and the second Commission which started its work in 1894 and presented its final report to Parliament in 1897; special reports on earnings and wages of agricultural laborers and on the decline of agricultural population proved very helpful.

*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* covering the years 1880-1900 have been used throughout the study.

The *Report of the Tariff Commission*, volumes of which were published intermittently between 1904 and 1907 covering all the principal British industries, has an enormous amount of factual information, but unfortunately its value is greatly diminished by its very obvious attempt to justify the Chamberlain program of tariff reform.

The wealth of material to be found in contemporary periodicals covers almost every conceivable aspect of the inquiry and gives a valuable index to public opinion throughout the period. The principal magazines utilized were *Fraser's*, *Macmillan's*, *Contemporary Review*, *Fortnightly Review*, *Nineteenth Century*, *Empire Review*, *Economic Review*, and *Economic Journal*.



## THE INFLUENCE OF SIR WILFRID LAURIER ON THE FORMATION OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

NEIL HIMROD BAXTER

In 1896, when Wilfrid Laurier became Prime Minister of Canada, the British Empire was composed of the British Isles, the Dominion of Canada, the self-governing colonies, India, the Crown Colonies, and Protectorates. It was scattered over the American continents, Asia, Africa, and Oceania, and was inhabited by peoples of different races, cultures, and in different stages of advancement.

Growth and development as well as geographical conditions had brought about a wide commercial diversity within the Empire, and as a result each self-governing colony had established its own fiscal policy. The variety of tariff regulations made for confusion and revealed the need for a closer commercial union, not only among the geographically co-terminous colonies, but also between all the self-governing colonies and the Mother Country. Among the first suggestions to be made was the establishment of a system of preferential tariffs within the Empire. This proposal was made at the first Imperial Conference in 1887 in connection with a general defense plan but nothing was accomplished.

The first practical step was taken by the Laurier government in 1897 when a preference in the form of  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent reduction from the general tariff was granted on British manufactured goods. This preference was freely given and no concessions were asked from the British government. In 1898 the preference was increased to 25 per cent and later raised to  $33\frac{1}{3}$  per cent. Under the stimulus of these reductions British-Canadian trade not only arrested the decline of recent years but made a remarkable gain. The granting of this preference had several definite results: firstly, it pointed the way to a new method of co-operation in an area where uniformity was undesirable and impossible, since the Canadian government could not abandon protection and Great Britain would not give up free trade; secondly, it forced the British government to abrogate unfavorable treaties with Germany and Belgium, which had prevented the granting of preferential treatment of

British goods by her colonies; thirdly, it marked Laurier as an imperial statesman.

In the imperial conferences of 1897 and 1902 Chamberlain presented the idea of setting up an Imperial Customs Union similar to the German Zollverein. Such a customs union did not meet the approval of Laurier because it endangered the principles of responsible government and was too highly centralized to be compatible with local autonomy. In spite of the enthusiasm engendered by the Boer War, which was expected to make the task of unifying the Empire easier, Laurier refused to agree to any plan that led to centralization. The question of preferential tariffs took on added significance in 1902 when it was adopted by the other self-governing colonies and in the Imperial Conference of 1907 preference was championed by Alfred Deakin, Prime Minister of Australia and by Dr. L. S. Jameson of South Africa.

The Liberal Government in 1907 had been pledged in the recent campaign to "free trade" and against protective tariffs. Because of these commitments it was impossible to make any progress toward an empire-wide preferential system. Preferential tariffs continued to be a method by which the self-governing colonies could aid British trade. But the Mother Country could do nothing to aid colonial trade. This position was not so unreasonable when it is remembered that the total colonial trade was but a small part of the total imperial trade, and to endanger the greater part of the trade to encourage the smaller was not good business from the British point of view.

Laurier urged co-operation between the component parts of the Empire but warned against any attempt at compulsion of any sort. Each group, he contended, must decide what was best for itself and any plan must be entered into voluntarily and with due respect to local autonomy.

The question of the defense of the Empire was of primary importance and the part that the self-governing colonies should take in providing defense was discussed in both the conferences of 1887 and 1897. Nothing definite was accomplished until the Conference of 1902. The Boer War had revealed the fact that the British army was unprepared. This fact, with the serious naval rivalry that was beginning to develop with Germany in particular, the uniting of the European powers into secret alliances, the emergence of Japan and the United States as world powers, all combined to make it necessary that more definite defense plans for the Empire be made.

A recommendation was made by New Zealand to the Conference that



each section of the Empire raise, train, and equip a force to serve in any place within the Empire at the call of the Mother Country. Canada and Australia objected to this and both insisted that local forces should be controlled by local authorities. Laurier could not consent to any such program of centralization. He did agree to reorganize the Canadian Militia so as to bring it more in harmony with the imperial forces. Laurier could not agree to make direct contribution to the British Admiralty for naval purposes. The Admiralty demanded full control of all naval forces of the Empire. To this Laurier was opposed. His largest group of supporters was composed of the French-Canadians, provincial people who were jealous of their local privileges and suspicious of anything that might threaten them. Laurier, of necessity, was forced to shape his program so as to appeal to this group as well as the English Liberal group who were generally more imperialistic than the French-Canadians.

The Rt. Hon. R. B. Haldane, Secretary of State for War, introduced the discussion on defense at the Imperial Conference of 1907. He suggested that each self-governing colony establish its own General Staff to work with the Imperial General Staff that had recently been organized. These local General Staffs were to be responsible to the local authorities but to work in close co-operation with the Imperial General Staff. Because there was no attempt to centralize authority Laurier could agree to these suggestions. It was recognized that each British community was responsible for providing for its own security and that each should help in making provision for the defense of the Empire. This involved the problem of the naval defenses of the Empire. It was essential that the Empire maintain naval supremacy. Once the control of the sea was lost the Empire was lost. The Admiralty, however, had no new suggestions to make beyond the making of direct contributions and the building of large dry docks.

In March of 1909 the whole defense question was brought sharply to the attention of the Empire by a debate that accompanied the presentation of the Naval estimates in the British House of Commons. The Government asked for markedly increased grants for naval construction, citing as the reason for this increase the rapidly growing naval power of Germany. It was not so much the strength of the German fleet nor even the size of the German fleet provided for in the German naval law that worried the British statesmen, as it was the fact they did not know how fast Germany could build and why it was that she insisted on building a great fleet. The British had watched the growth of

this fleet with concern and there had been several incidents in recent years that added to their apprehension. The German Emperor had made some famous speeches that seemed to indicate that he wished for a fleet as strong as or stronger than that of the British. The attempts of Joseph Chamberlain to secure an understanding with Germany had been failures and had left the British statesmen and people with a feeling of uncertainty as to their future relations with Germany. The German naval program seemed to confirm their fears, and they believed that Germany was preparing to challenge British naval supremacy. The British reasoning in the face of this threat can best be illustrated by a statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, McKenna, in debate, March 16, 1909, in the British House of Commons:

"The safety of the Empire stands above all other considerations. No matter what the cost, the safety of the country must be assured. . . It will be regarded as axiomatic that our island position, the extent and dispersion of our Empire, and the magnitude of our trade oblige us, so long as we are equal to the task to maintain a Navy adequate in strength to ensure our shores from hostile attempts, and our trade from destruction in war. It follows from this that we cannot determine in advance any definite limits to our Navy. These limits for us must be fixed by the progress of foreign Powers."

The Dominions responded to the appeal of the Mother Country with offers to provide for battleships, contributions, or definite promises for immediate action to construct local naval units. The Canadian Parliament after a long debate decided to proceed at once on the construction of a Canadian naval unit. Laurier was not a militarist and did not think that there was a German threat. He moved in the direction of greater military and naval expenses with reluctance and believed more in the "arts of peace," as he put it, than in the "arts of war."

He was compelled by public opinion to do something definite in providing for Canada's naval defense, but he was not to be stampeded into any hasty action, and after due debate and deliberation it was decided to send the two Canadian ministers responsible for defense to England to consult with the War Office and the Admiralty. The British government had decided by this time to call a general conference on defense in order that the best possible use could be made of the contributions of the Dominions. In the reports that the Admiralty made to the 1909 Conference they accepted the principle for which Laurier had been contending for twelve years: they recognized dominion nationalism and the principle of dominion control as a necessary part of self-government.



This was a most important victory for Laurier. It was now possible to proceed with a naval program since local control had been assured. The Admiralty had, at last, decided that co-operation was possible on this basis and that uniformity of contribution was no guarantee of real unity, and accordingly they gave up any further attempts to secure centralized control. The Canadian government proceeded at once with plans for the construction of a Canadian naval unit.

The attitude of the British government changed rapidly in this matter of defense, and by 1911 the Dominion Prime Ministers were taken into the confidence of the Imperial Government in matters of defense. It was the understanding that each Dominion would shape its program in the light of the imperial need, but do so voluntarily and with full control of its own forces in time of peace, and in times of war, at their own discretion, place them at the disposal of the imperial authorities. This was a complete acceptance of Laurier's contentions.

Dominion participation in imperial foreign policy was of slow development. The evolution of the Canadian Provinces from colonies with representative governments to responsible government and then to Dominion status in a Commonwealth of equal nations was an unprecedented development, and the question of the relation of the Canadian government, of whatever period, to the imperial authorities accompanied this evolution and was constantly present in one form or another. The tendency has been continuously in the direction of greater freedom on the part of the colony as it grew in strength.

The granting of fiscal independence was the first step and came as a result of an exchange of dispatches between the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who protested against certain revenue measures passed by the Canadian Provincial legislatures, and Alexander T. Galt, Minister of Finance in Canada, in 1859. Galt's reply to Newcastle, known as the Galt Memorandum, claimed for the Government of Canada the right to decide for itself "both as to the mode and the extent to which taxation shall be imposed." Galt insisted that the Provincial Ministry was responsible solely to the Provincial Parliament and that if the Imperial Government assumed the right to disallow a revenue measure they should be prepared to assume the responsibility of the government of the provinces. The British government was not prepared to go to any such extremes and the fiscal independence of self-governing colonies was established. Fiscal independence was necessary because of the commercial diversity that existed within the Empire. The self-governing colonies were dependent on

customs duties and public lands for revenue and this policy ran directly counter to the free trade policy of Great Britain. It was difficult for the people of Great Britain to understand that the wide difference in commercial development between the Mother Country and the self-governing colonies required different fiscal policies to meet colonial requirements. Fiscal independence was the only practical answer to the problems presented by commercial diversity.

It was soon discovered that the fiscal independence of the self-governing colonies was insufficient, if they did not at the same time have a voice in the making of the commercial treaties that controlled their trade with foreign countries. This right was gained by the Canadian government gradually, first by the appointment of Canadians as members of the commission to make a treaty, then by the appointment of Canadians as plenipotentiaries to negotiate a treaty with the British Ambassador, and finally in 1907, with the negotiation of the Franco-Canadian treaty, the Canadian ministers acted alone as plenipotentiaries of the Crown with no reference to British diplomatic agents.

Laurier had been insistent on the right of Canada to negotiate her own commercial treaties and when the right was recognized he did not desire to make any further demands. He held that commercial relations were primarily of local concern and could be best handled by those familiar with the local needs but as to the problems of foreign policy other than local requirements were involved and these could best be handled by the imperial authorities.

Laurier stated repeatedly that to give advice on foreign policy meant assuming the responsibility for the policy advised. The British government, in 1911, granted to the Dominions the right to decide whether they would or would not adhere to a treaty that had been negotiated by the imperial authorities and provided also that a Dominion should have the right to withdraw from the treaty after having given notice of its adherence. This seemed to Laurier to be all that the Dominions could desire, and he expressed himself as being satisfied with the status that this gave a Dominion in the international community.

In harmony with this position Laurier insisted that the Dominions be relieved of the obligations in treaties granting "most-favoured-nation treatment." Many of these treaties had been negotiated before the Dominions had reached a high state of development. Such treaties would no longer be negotiated to apply to a Dominion without its consent. Therefore, he argued, the Imperial Government ought to find a



way to relieve the Dominion from the obligation of such of these treaties as the Dominion felt was detrimental to its trade.

It was the contention of Laurier that, in matters of commerce and trade, the Dominions should be free but that conditions did not yet demand any further participation by the Dominions in imperial foreign policy. His influence was strong enough to block any move to force the Imperial Government to grant such rights. He was satisfied with the existing relations between the Dominions and the Mother Country and saw no reason for changing them until a crisis demanded that action be taken. Then, the circumstances would determine the changes necessary, as is usual in British political development.

The question of Imperial Federation began to assume great importance during the late 1870's and the 1880's. The period had passed during which Englishmen talked of the colonies as burdens to the Mother Country and that it would be better for all concerned if the colonies were independent. This revival of interest in the Empire led to the organization of the Imperial Federation League. This League suggested to Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, that the occasion of the celebration of Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee would provide an excellent time for an imperial conference. At this first conference the questions of communication and of defense were fully discussed, but the question of political union of the Empire had been excluded since no opinions on the question had been expressed by the colonies. Pleased by the results of this meeting and pressed by circumstances and events, the Colonial Office, in 1897, under Joseph Chamberlain, called another conference of the Colonial Prime Ministers to consider the same problems. At this conference definite proposals for federation were made.

Chamberlain suggested, as the first step to be taken, that an Imperial Customs Union, similar to the German Zollverein, should be established. Then, that there should be established an Imperial Council for the Empire. He advocated, also, a more highly centralized system of defense in order to assure greater efficiency and to share more equitably the expense. Laurier was a member of this conference and was responsible for the defeat of the Chamberlain proposals for an Imperial Council and a centralized system of defense. The recently established preferential tariffs by the Canadian government in favor of British goods was a very practical answer to the proposed customs union.

The Boer War, 1899-1902, combined with the continental military and diplomatic situation, accentuated the need for imperial defense. In

1902 another conference was called to discuss and to shape, if possible, a more definite organization. The continued efforts of Chamberlain to form an Imperial Council with elastically defined powers, and to shape a defense program under the control of the British government, and not responsible to the various local parliaments were again defeated by Laurier, who insisted that local autonomy and control were necessary under responsible government. The conference, however, was definitely recognized as a part of the imperial organization, and provision was made for regular subsequent meetings.

In 1905 the British government proposed that an Imperial Council be established. Laurier objected to the term "Council" as indicating a more formal assemblage than a conference and suggesting that it possessed an advisory and deliberative character. The term council used in conjunction with the word imperial, he feared, could suggest a permanent institution which might eventually encroach upon and interfere with "the full measure of autonomous legislative and administrative power now enjoyed by all the self-governing colonies." He preferred the term conference as a less formal body possessing "no faculty or power of binding action." These objections were sufficient to defeat, for the time, suggestions for centralization.

In 1907 the next Imperial Conference met and Laurier defined it as being a "Conference between Government and Governments." The Conference was reorganized under the British Prime Minister as President, rather than under the Colonial Office. It was no longer a conference between a department of the Imperial Government and the colonial Prime Ministers but was a conference between the Prime Minister of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Prime Ministers of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the seas. This gave the Conference an entirely new status, and avoided the dangers that Laurier pointed out in connection with the proposed council. In defeating the movement for a centralized council, Laurier made possible this greater Conference and set the course of Imperial Federation in the direction of co-operation among equals. Laurier's influence was acknowledged in this conference and his opinions were deferred to, particularly in this reorganization.

In the Conference of 1911, Sir Joseph Ward, Prime Minister of New Zealand, presented a grandiose proposal for an "Imperial Parliament of Defence." This Parliament was to be given legislative power over questions of defense. It was not to have the power of levying taxes though it was to plan the defense program. Laurier said that it was



"hopelessly impracticable" and that a body that was given the right to spend but not create revenue was unthinkable. Laurier held that the majority must respect the views of the minority and no matter how small, a minority group should not be overridden.

In all of this discussion of Imperial Federation, two theories were present, the one based upon centralization with an Imperial Parliament or Council, having legislative and executive power for the Empire. The other involved a confederated Empire with no supergovernmental organization. The latter view, championed by Laurier, held that any commercial union should be based upon local fiscal independence, that political union should respect autonomy, and that any plan of imperial defense should recognize the rights of the local parliaments to control their military and naval forces. The Empire rested on loyalty to a common Sovereign, common institutions, common purposes, and full recognition of colonial autonomy and control.

The British government came slowly to the Laurier position, and conferences among the several British governments became the accepted rule. In 1907, Canada was given the right to negotiate her trade treaties. In 1909, the imperial defense plans were shared with the colonies, and in 1911, the imperial foreign policy was fully revealed to the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, but they were not admitted to responsibility for framing that policy. Laurier, the spokesman for the oldest dominion, had guided the evolution of the constitutional development which led ultimately to the formation of a Commonwealth based upon the unique principle of "spontaneous co-operation."

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This study has been based almost entirely on published government documents. The *House of Commons Debates*, Canada, 1896-1914, furnished most of the material. The speeches in Parliament of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, as Prime Minister, were the statements of a responsible minister of the Crown and leader of the Liberal Party. These pronouncements were the official statement of the Government on whatever subject was being discussed. If the addresses of other Cabinet ministers are cited, the same thing can be said of their speeches because they have not only individual but collective responsibility within the Cabinet and the statements of any minister can be taken as official.

The *Sessional Papers* of the Parliament of Canada, 1896-1912, provided much material for the study, containing as they do, the reports of the Imperial Conferences, the printed correspondence of the Govern-

ment, the departmental reports and the reports of governmental commissions. The full reports of the Imperial Conferences of 1907 and 1911 are given and furnished very valuable material, showing Laurier's influence on imperial questions. The reports of the conferences of 1902 and 1909 contain only the opening speeches and reports that were given to the conference. No debates on any subject are included, but the official attitude of the governments can be obtained, in part at least, from the reports. The *Sessional Papers* do not include a report of the 1897 conference. Other printed sources were used for information on this conference, about which very little has been published to date.

The *British Parliamentary Debates* were used only in relation to the question of the British-German naval rivalry and the debates on the naval estimates of 1909. *Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1763-1917*, in two volumes, edited by A. B. Keith, furnished some documents not available elsewhere.

In the periodical material only the *London Times* and the *Canadian Annual Review*, 1903-1912, were used to any extent. The *Times* was consulted for reports of public addresses by Laurier while in attendance at the imperial conferences of which he was a member. These addresses were of great importance in revealing Laurier's attitude on imperial relations. The *Canadian Annual Review* was not particularly useful except to indicate the trends of public opinion and to give a running account of the events of each year.

Books of a secondary nature were not extensively used. The most valuable of these were: O. D. Skelton, *The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier*, in two volumes, New York, 1922; Sir John Willison, *Sir Wilfrid Laurier*, Toronto, 1926; Richard Jebb, *The Imperial Conference, A History and Study*, in two volumes, London, 1911; A. G. Dewey, *The Dominions and Diplomacy; The Canadian Contribution*, in two volumes, New York, 1929. Other books that proved useful were Sir Charles Tupper, *Recollections of Sixty Years*, London, 1914; Hugh Keenleyside, *Canada and the United States*, New York, 1929; H. Duncan Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations*, London, 1920; and A. B. Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, in two volumes, Oxford, 1928.



## THE BIRTH OF A NEW SOCIETY IN NEW SPAIN

CECIL E. MARSHALL

No phase of the history of Spanish colonization in the New World has been given more varied and yet more inadequate treatment than that of the initial contact and subsequent relations between the Spanish colonists and the native tribes. Some historians have described the process by which Spanish dominion was extended over a vast continent and an alien race as one of the most brilliant conquests of all time. Most writers, however, have taken as their point of view that of Las Casas, and have told a tale of sordid exploitation and ruthless extermination of aboriginal inhabitants by colonizing whites. They have, to be sure, lauded the benevolent intent of the legislation passed by the Spanish Crown to Christianize the natives and to protect them from the depredations of gold-hungry colonists. But invariably they have emphasized the discrepancy between intention and execution and have reached the conclusion that Spain's achievement overseas was meager. There are, indeed, those who doubt the sincerity of Spain's humanitarian purpose and see in desire for revenue the chief *raison d'être* of the Spanish colonies. And contrasting the economic success and political development of the English colonies in North America with the economic backwardness and absence of local self-government in the Spanish they have charged Spain with failure in the colonial field.

Few historians have questioned the validity of these conclusions or have pointed out the fallacy of approaching the colonial history of Spain from the same point of view as that of England. Protestant commercial England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries built up a largely self-sufficing economic Empire. Catholic mediaeval Spain created an Empire inhabited by people of many colors. In the English colonies of North America the Indians were brushed aside by land-hungry settlers who quickly took away their land and shot down their wild game. In the Spanish colonies, the fate of the natives was far different. For the Spanish Conquest of America, somewhat like the Norman Conquest of England, had as its unique result the essential fusion of conqueror and conquered in the creation of a new society.

At the close of three centuries of Spanish rule the population of New

Spain was estimated as follows: 41 per cent or 2,500,000 were Indians of pure blood; 19.5 per cent or 1,200,000 were white; and 39 per cent or 2,400,000 were of mixed blood. The process of racial fusion initiated during colonial days grew apace in the era of national independence. In 1930 the Indians of the Republic of Mexico had increased to 4,620,000 but formed only 28 per cent of the whole; whites totaled 2,444,466 or 14.8 per cent; and the number of those of mixed blood had risen to 9,040,590 to constitute 55 per cent of the entire population.

Obviously such a society did not spring into existence full-grown like Athena from the head of Zeus. It certainly is not to be explained in terms of unrestrained economic exploitation and ruthless extermination. It was owing rather to complex religious, social, economic, political, and geographical factors which in Spanish America brought the Spaniards and negroes into intimate contact with the Indians, mitigated the asperities of that contact and made the readjustments necessary to a new environment a relatively easy and natural process. To explain this process is to witness the birth of a new society. It is also to cast much light on the history of modern Hispanic America. For many of the major problems of Hispanic-American nations, like the problems of modern South Africa, arose directly or indirectly out of the racial contacts between European and native.

Foremost among the factors producing a new society in Hispanic America was a spirit of humanitarianism whose be-all and end-all was the welfare of the aboriginal inhabitants and which was conspicuously absent in the colonizing activities of the English and the Dutch in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Catholicism, differing from Calvinism and Puritanism of a later date, adhered firmly to the doctrine of the sanctity of life and the brotherhood of man. Its dogma taught that men were morally equal; that each possessed a soul that might be saved through good works; that salvation of those souls and not the acquisition of wealth was the primary purpose of life; and that races should be separated according to religion rather than color of skin. This religious creed was given renewed activity in the sixteenth century. Essentially the Church, in so far as it followed Spain, entered upon a new period of missionary zeal. It must carry the Gospel to all lands and labor to save souls for the Kingdom of God. In the papal bulls which gave Spain formal title to the New World, it was emphatically asserted that the primary aim of Spanish dominion in the Indies, as



well as its justification, was the conversion of the natives to Christianity and their reduction to an orderly civil life.

There is still another aspect of Spanish solicitude for the well-being of the natives, which, heretofore little appreciated, greatly influenced Spain's native policy. Francisco de Victoria, Dominic de Soto, Las Casas, and other leading jurists and theologians rejected their view that the New World was *territorium nullius* and denied the Pope's authority to dispose so summarily of the sovereignty of these regions. There was, in their opinion, a natural society of nations founded upon a divine moral law which granted to Indians and Spaniards equal civil rights. Whatever political power the Spanish monarchs might have in the New World was a "trust" to be exercised for the benefit of the natives and its permanence rested solely upon the willingness of the Indians to accept Christianity and to acknowledge the Spanish King as their *Señor Universal*.

The importance of such views cannot be overestimated. Those who held them were high in the Councils of the Home Government. Nothing is more evident than that the idea of a civilizing mission together with the principles of the civil as well as moral equality of races moulded the spirit and dictated to a great extent the nature of Spain's native administration during the years under review. True there was a great discrepancy between the fact and the ideal in Spanish native policy. But to stress Spain's failure and minimize her success is to fail to appreciate the complexity of her colonial problems. And it was precisely these problems which greatly complicated if not precluded a solution of the native question on its own merits.

Even more decisive in moulding Spanish-Indian relations were the social and economic factors which determined the nature of the relationship between native and colonist. It is well known that the great majority of Spaniards did not emigrate to the New World to better their economic condition by manual labor. What is not, however, so well known is the extent to which this fact affected the status of the Indians. The early Spanish settlers looked to the natives to supply the labor to produce foodstuffs and to mine gold. But the colonists soon discovered that a people who could satisfy their few wants with two roots from the forest and a bit of wild honey made unwilling workers. Hence the need for some system of enforced labor. Curiously enough, this economic need received a religious sanction when many colonial missionaries became convinced that their proselytizing efforts would prove futile unless the Indians were weaned from their primitive vices by

profitable occupations and the influence of continuous contact with Spanish society. Such was not possible unless Spaniards made permanent settlements. And Spaniards would not settle in the Indies unless they were assured of an adequate labor supply to work the mines and to till the soil. It was this alliance of local interests and religious aims that, from the colonial point of view, made the assimilation of the natives to Spanish society an economic necessity as well as a humanitarian desire.

Largely in response to these colonial needs there grew up in the Indies a unique system of indirect native administration, the *encomienda*. To the colonist (the *encomendero*) who held such a grant was given the right to use the labor of a certain number of Indians and to collect their tribute. In return, he was required to render military service to the government and to aid in the conversion of the Indians. The *encomienda*, therefore, contemplated the incorporation of the natives into Spanish colonial life but on a definitely subordinate plane. The natives were to be the hewers of wood and the drawers of water for the Spanish settlers. The social theories by which the colonists sought to justify this attitude toward the native population were largely those upon which rested the feudal society of contemporary Spain.

Such a system of social organization inevitably aroused the opposition of the humanitarians who considered the Indians "by natural law and reason" free and, therefore, "obligated to render only those personal services that were rendered by other free persons of these realms." From their point of view, no native policy was morally justified or juridically defensible which failed to recognize the Indians as free subjects of the King. The Crown was admonished to surrender no control over its new vassals, but with the aid of the Church and its religious orders to govern them by a system of direct administration (the *corregimiento*). Thus there ensued a severe conflict between these two attitudes toward the natives which was, at root, a struggle between two conceptions of society—a feudal hierarchy of privilege and duty, and a society which contained the germ at least of a more modern social order.

In the subsequent clash between these two points of view, the Crown played an interesting albeit an exceedingly difficult role. The rapid expansion of European trade and commerce during the period of the Renaissance; the increasing urbanization of European life with its ever-growing ostentation and luxury; the beginning of an era of international wars fought by professional armies selling their services to the highest



bidder; and a rising price level greatly accelerated by the influx of American gold and silver was rapidly breaking down the mediaeval economy of dealing in kind, and was ushering in an era of the nation-state whose very existence depended upon a readier source of money. The circumstances which explain the role played by the Fuggers as bankers of Charles V were not without far-reaching consequences in Spanish colonial history. To a government saddled with the financial burdens of Hapsburg *Machtpolitik* and the championship of the Counter-Reformation the necessity of founding self-supporting and revenue-yielding colonies in the New World was too obvious to admit of argument. Then, too, the entire expense of colonial administration—military and civil—had to be defrayed by the revenue obtained in the colonies. Even the contributions the Crown made to the building of churches, monasteries, hospitals, and orphanages and to the maintenance of indigent colonists, the widows, and children of deceased conquerors, had to be met out of the colonial revenues. And the drain upon the treasury was in no way diminished by the lack of a well-trained and experienced civil service to insure the efficient collection and honest handling of royal revenues. The extent, therefore, to which Spain could carry out her humanitarian program was necessarily determined by the degree to which a benevolent but impecunious government could reconcile her own needs and those of her colonists with the spiritual welfare of the natives.

Unquestionably, it was the determination of the Crown to resolve this difficulty, coupled with an undoubted willingness to experiment, that explains much of the changeable nature of Spanish-Indian policy during the formative period of Hispanic-American society. Spain could not, like England or the United States, grant her colonists land alone. Owing to their incapacity as agriculturists and their scorn of manual labor, the colonists desired not land, of which there was plenty, but land made productive by native labor. Perpetual *encomiendas*, they insisted, would induce Spaniards to settle in New Spain and would assimilate the Indians to Spanish civilization. The defenders of native interests, on the other hand, maintained that the *encomienda* was an instrument of tyranny; a serious obstacle to conversion; and, moreover, diverted a large amount of royal revenue into the pockets of the colonists. The Crown was on the horns of a dilemma. When in the spirit of Don Quixote it sallied forth to fight the windmills of oppression, the colonists in the more realistic spirit of Sancho Panza set up the cry of empty saddle bags. When it met the demands of the colonists

it was denounced by the humanitarians, like Las Casas, for having forfeited its title to the New World. Whenever the issue was squarely joined, however, it was the viewpoint of the colonists rather than the views of Las Casas that prevailed. For the Spanish Crown could not go too far in carrying out measures opposed by the colonists who had established Spain's political dominion in the New World and whose economic activities were its major source of colonial revenue. Thus, for example, it was the necessity of meeting the colonial demand for labor that forced the Crown in 1503 to approve the *encomienda* on the islands. It was the necessity of rewarding the conquerors and pioneer settlers of Mexico and providing them with a means of livelihood that defeated royal efforts to prevent the introduction of enforced labor on the mainland and induced the Crown in 1528 to consent to a general and permanent *repartimiento* of land and natives. It was the impending depopulation of New Spain, the economic demoralization of the colony together with the great depreciation of royal revenue and the loss of Spanish sovereignty which would inevitably follow, that forced the Home Government to forego its attempt to abolish the *encomienda* in 1530 and once again to declare in favor of this institution. It was the same pressure of economic forces that explains the revocation of the New Laws in 1545 designed to secure the more gradual abolition of the *encomienda* and the third decree granting the desires of the colonists. In like manner, the need of a mobile supply of cheap labor in the colonies to work the mines, to till the fields, to build monasteries, churches, and hospitals; to drain swamps; and to transport foodstuffs and merchandise, which owing to the lack of navigable rivers and an adequate system of good roads had to be carried from place to place on the backs of Indians, explains the repeal or suspension in 1533 and 1545 of royal ordinances prohibiting the personal services exacted of the natives.

The failure of the Crown to adapt its legislation more adequately to meet local economic and geographical conditions led it to pursue a policy which often defeated the very purpose it was designed to achieve—the well treatment of the Indians. By attempting to hold with the hare and run with the hound, the government not only encouraged the colonists to resist reform but created an atmosphere of uncertainty which caused them to exploit their Indians while circumstances permitted. Yet the ultimate outcome of Spanish-Indian relations was to a far greater extent than has usually been admitted a compromise between those two oppugnant principles of Spanish colonial policy—



economic need and humanitarian desire. The apparent ease, indeed, with which the colonists at times succeeded in winning the Crown over to their point of view was, doubtless, owing to the fact that colonial missionaries and churchmen as well as colonial officials joined with them in declaring the *encomienda* was as necessary to convert as to exploit the natives. Then, too, the policy of converting the natives in new areas by peaceful means—a policy to which the government had committed itself in the New Laws—had not proved to be an overwhelming success. And when the Crown in 1563 again embarked upon a policy of aggressive proselytizing in the New World it encouraged colonization by a system of enforced labor not unlike that which had developed in New Spain.

Yet the Home Government remained under the influence of the views of the humanitarian party. The *encomienda* itself was regarded at best as an expedient to meet the temporary economic needs of the Spaniards and a means by which the natives might be Christianized and converted to Spanish ways of living. Thus the Crown refused to carry out its project to make a general and perpetual partition of all land and natives. It persistently strove to emphasize the civilizing aspect of the *encomiendas* which had been granted by curtailing the powers of the *encomenderos* to exploit the natives. Thus the Queen decreed in 1532 that the *encomendero* had no direct dominion over the Indians he held in *encomienda*. And when, in 1571, Philip II gave formal definition to this institution the jurisdiction of the *encomendero* was limited legally to the mere right of collecting the tributes otherwise paid to the royal treasury.

Thus those writers who regard the revocation of the New Laws as the breakdown or abandonment of Spain's policy of advancing the welfare of the natives must necessarily modify their views when it is realized that the triumph of the colonists was far from being complete. The *encomienda*, in theory at least, was a compromise. Its efficacy as an economic institution is unquestioned. Only after the need for it had to a great extent disappeared did the Home Government finally succeed in legislating it out of existence. As a civilizing agency its strength or weakness lay in the character of the individual *encomendero* and the ability of the Crown to supervise his activities. Notwithstanding the Crown's efforts to make grants only to those of good character and the numerous laws enacted to safeguard the natives, enlightened self-interest was often the only restraint upon the inclination of the *encomendero* to oppress his Indians. As in the case of the English col-

onies of North America, so in the Spanish, a government could not legislate away 2,000 leagues of ocean which weakened the effectiveness of imperial control. Spain attempted to overcome this obstacle by a highly centralized colonial system. Thus the absolutist character of Spanish colonial administration, like that of the British Colonial Office in the early part of the nineteenth century, found its justification in no small degree in the determination of the Home Government to protect the natives in its colonies. Spain, however, was seriously handicapped by the fact that political and social conditions at home did not give rise to a body of experienced political administrators capable of governing a vast colonial Empire. Fortunate though Spain was in having men like Bishop Fuenleal and Antonio de Mendoza, local administration was largely in the hands of those whose interests lay in exploiting rather than in civilizing the Indians. The desire of the Home Government to compensate the conquerors and their descendants for their services without giving them *encomiendas* led to the practice of preferring them in making appointments to the important judicial and administrative offices, *corregidor*, *alcalde mayor*, and *alguacil*. Moreover, owing to the long residence of the *oidores* in the colony and their marriage into prominent colonial families, there existed in New Spain a "family compact" which like that in Upper Canada or the coteries of families in the colonies of Maryland or New York dominated local government and resented what they deemed outside interference in their domestic affairs. Only too often the Viceroy alone represented imperial interests and violent quarrels between the Viceroy and the local Audiencia were no less effective than the struggles between royal governor and Assembly in the English colonies in weakening imperial authority and preventing the enforcement of royal will. At times even the Viceroy succumbed to colonial influences and identified himself with the interests of the colonists.

It is an unsound view, however, that seeks to dismiss Spains efforts in behalf of the natives as a piece of solemn futility, because she was unable to execute her laws in their entirety. The numerous complaints of the colonists against the Viceroys, *visitadores*, religious orders, and the Church bear eloquent witness to the fact that the Indians were not without active champions in the colony. And the work of the *visitadores* in reducing the tributes and personal services of the Indians to the extent that the Crown and the *encomenderos* were deprived of from one-fifth to one-fourth their annual income and Mexico City was faced in 1546 and 1553 with a dire shortage of food is evidence enough that



the desire of the Home Government to protect the natives was far from being a pious wish or its authority a shadow.

But whatever its merits or demerits, the *encomienda* system by establishing economic contacts between Europeans and natives became an important factor in the creation of a new society. The Indians in New Spain were not swept away by the rapid advance of an agricultural or fur-trading frontier as in English North America, but like the Hot-tentots in South Africa were incorporated into colonial society as a working class.

These economic contacts were made still more intimate and more or less constant by a commercial policy which hamstrung colonial commerce and industry in the interests of a few Sevillian merchants. The Spanish System of annual fleets under convoy; the limitation of trade and commerce to a few ports in the colonies and to Cadiz and Seville in Spain; the prohibition or strict supervision of intercolonial and Oriental trade paralyzed colonial trade and industry and made the colony dependent upon European manufactured goods. Spain's inability to control the seas coupled with a rapidly rising price level accelerated by the flood of precious metals from America, curtailed the amount and raised the prices of these commodities. The continual export of gold and silver bullion by the Crown and Spanish merchants; the unfavorable balance of trade with the Philippines as well as with Spain; the numerous exploring expeditions fitted out in the colony, the difference in the value of money coined in New Spain and Spain which caused the former to be rapidly withdrawn from circulation; and the inability of the colony to offset this lack of specie by the more modern business devices of paper money or credit deprived New Spain of capital sorely needed for the development of its own resources. These factors together with the Spanish Monopoly prevented the diversification of colonial economic life which would have provided the colony with better opportunities for supporting its Spanish population.

The effects of such a situation were heightened by geographical conditions peculiar to New Spain. The yellow-fever breeding swamps about Vera Cruz and the silting of its port made the loading and unloading of cargoes a difficult undertaking and exceedingly dangerous to human life. Then, too, the lack of navigable rivers, and an adequate system of highways made the price of those goods which trickled through Mexico City to the internal provinces higher still. The economic instability created by the Crown's native policy and the insecurity of land tenures which existed long after the government had abandoned

its attempt to abolish the *encomienda* contributed its share to retarding the economic growth of New Spain. The prohibition of exploring expeditions in 1545 to protect the natives in new areas from oppression by the colonists eliminated an economic activity that gave profitable employment to many and dammed up an outlet for a surplus population which was increasing far more rapidly than it could be absorbed into the economic life of the colony. The activities of the royal officials in reducing tributes in kind or commuting them into money payments reduced the food supply of the colonists and added to the burdens created by the rapid rise in the level of commodity prices which was taking place in New Spain as well as the Mother Country. The influence of these economic conditions upon Spanish-Indian relations can scarcely be exaggerated. The screw which rising prices and a shortage of foodstuffs turned on the natives explains much that, heretofore, has been attributed simply to the deliberate exploitation and willful cruelty of the Spanish colonists. The persistent efforts of the colonists to obtain perpetual grants of land and natives; their continual petitions for larger and more remunerative grants; the increasing amount of the tributes which they exacted from the natives; their exacting demand that the natives deliver their tributes in kind at the house of the *encomendero* or the local market; their plea that tributes in kind be not commuted into money payments; the insistence of the Church upon the collection of tithes from the natives; the raids by friars as well as laymen upon the *cajas de comunidades* of the Indian villages; the participation of royal officials, friars, and churchmen in economic enterprises—all these are placed in a somewhat different light by a knowledge of the factors which moulded the daily relationship between Spaniard and Indian.

Although such a situation increased the economic pressure of the Spanish colonists upon the natives, yet, from another point of view, it made possible an easier solution of the problems of racial contacts. In English North America, the Old Commercial System based upon the principle of a self-sufficing economic Empire permitted and encouraged the relatively rapid and extensive development of colonial resources which gave the Indians little opportunity to readjust themselves to new conditions. In tropical and subtropical Africa, the intensive economic exploitation of modern capitalistic enterprise has detribalized the natives far too rapidly and has created problems of serious consequences. But the mediaeval spirit and organization of Spanish economic life was not conducive to such rapid economic transformation. During the



early years of Spanish colonization, nevertheless, the growth of colonial industries—notably the textile—threatened to subject the natives in New Spain to industrial exploitation. That danger, however, was quickly dispelled by the commercial restrictions imposed by the Seville Monopoly. In Spanish America, therefore, no extensive exploitation or rapid detribalization of natives took place. The economic dependence of the Spaniards upon the Indians and the social stagnation produced by Spain's commercial policy did much to make the transition from the old to the new social order a rather gradual and natural process.

In like manner, immigration played a great part in determining the social structure in New Spain. Spain was convinced that the safety of the nation and the souls of its subjects lay in unity of religious belief. Partly for this reason and partly because Spain, like England, desired to secure to herself the economic benefits of her colonies, she undertook to exclude all foreigners and certain classes of Spaniards from the Indies. As there existed no impelling causes such as desire for religious and political freedom to send Spaniards with their families across the seas, the number of Europeans who came to the Indies in comparison to the number of natives was very small. The natives, therefore, were not swept away by a flood of white immigration as the Indians in North America or greatly outnumbered as the Maoris in New Zealand. The thin stream of European immigrants came into contact, for the most part, with sedentary agricultural tribes who supplemented the social and economic organization of Spanish colonial society. Their social organization, moreover, was feudal. Thus, to a great extent, the Spanish colonists merely replaced the Aztec overlords and continued a social order long familiar to the Indian peasants.

Then, too, the Spanish Crown played an important part in creating a new society in New Spain by actively promoting the racial fusion of Spaniards and their families to settle in the Indies, relatively few did so. As the Spanish Government, unlike the English Crown a century later, prohibited the emigration of unmarried women, the colonists were predominantly of the male sex. Miscegenation was, therefore, to a great extent inevitable. To prevent illicit relationships between Spaniards and Indian women, the government freely encouraged the legal intermarriages of white and red races. This policy was also pursued as an effective means of converting many natives to Christianity and introducing them to Spanish civilization.

Much more important than racial intermarriage in producing a popu-

lation of mixed blood were the extramarital relationships which existed between Indians, half-castes, and Spaniards of all classes. Particularly important in this respect were the mestizos, mulattoes, and Spaniards of the lower classes, who, in violation of the law, lived cheek by jowl with the Indians in their villages. Undoubtedly many such persons were so domiciled of their own volition. But many others, unable to make a living in the urban centers of the colony, were driven by economic necessity out into the rural districts where they might find employment as interpreters and overseers on *encomiendas* or merely batten upon the natives. The inevitable result of this widespread dispersal of Spaniards, mestizos, negroes, mulattoes, and *zambaigos* among the natives was a great increase in the half-caste population. Numerous and vigorous were the attempts of the Crown to dispel these "vagabonds" from the Indian villages but they failed of success. Vagabondage and the mestizo were inherited together by later generations, for the sixteenth century saw the beginning and not the end of these social problems.

By the second half of the sixteenth century, the lines of racial fusion were fairly well established and defined. The first census of New Spain which was taken about 1560 is little more than a rough estimate. Yet it reveals that the population of the colony was already composed of many races and many colors. The number of Spaniards according to this report was 20,211; negro slaves were not far behind with 16,147; mestizos totalled 2,445; and mulattoes 1,465.

It is quite apparent, for various reasons, that the number of persons of mixed blood accounted for in the census is far too small. But taking the figures it sets forth as a basis for calculation, the total population of the colony, excluding Indians, was 40,268. Whites composed about 50 per cent of this number; negroes 40 per cent; mestizos 6 per cent; and mulattoes  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. For better or worse colonial society had become a society of many colors—white, red, black, and the varying shades produced by the intermixture of these races. As a society of color it was unique. As a society of smells it was stranger still, for the castes of Indian and African descent retained the bodily odors peculiar to those two races. And Humboldt is authority for the statement that the sense of smell of the Indian muleteers was so sensitive that in the darkness of the night they could distinguish between a European, an Indian, and a negro. To the first they gave the name *pezuna*, the second they called *posco*, and the third *grajo*.

Thus a process of miscegenation, made possible by intimate racial



contacts, facilitated by the social and economic stagnation of colonial life, stimulated by a favorable moral atmosphere, sanctioned by the Church, advanced the creation of a new society in Hispanic America, which with time bids fair to solve all racial problems as they were solved in Southern Italy in the days of the Roman Empire—by the complete assimilation of cultures and amalgamation of bloods.

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This study is based for the most part on documentary sources and the writings of contemporaries of the period. Among the most valuable materials must be noted the numerous laws and ordinances passed by the central and local government for the administration of the American colonies to be found in such compilations as *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias*, 4 vols., Madrid, 1756; *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, 112 vols., Madrid, 1842-1895; *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de Ibero-América*, 3 vols., Madrid, 1927-1928; *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas*, 42 vols., Joaquín F. Pacheco, Francisco de Cardenas, Luis Torres de Mendoza, eds., Madrid, 1864-1889; *Colección de documentos para la historia de México*, 2 vols., J. García Icazbalceta, ed., México, 1858-1866; *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de ultramar*, segunda serie, 17 vols., Madrid, 1885-1925; Puga, Vasco de, *Provisiones, cédulas, instrucciones de su Majestad, ordenanzas de difuntos y audiencia para la buena expedición de los negocios y administración de justicia y gobernación de esta Nueva España y para el buen tratamiento de los Indios desde el año de 1525 hasta este de 1563*, 2 vols., México [1563], 1878; and *Relaciones Geográficas de Indias*, German Latorre, ed., Sevilla, 1919. In the last mentioned work is to be found probably the first census report made of the colony of New Spain. Also useful were Bartolomé de Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, 2 vols., José Vigil, ed., México, 1877, and Alejandro de Humboldt, *Ensayo político de la Nueva-España*, 4 vols., Paris, 1822. Of the many secondary works referred to in this study mention should be made of Lesley Byrd Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain*, Berkeley, 1929, and the scholarly articles in the *Hispanic-American Historical Review*.

